JUDGMENT-The two petitioners along with their father Ramrao at one time admittedly were members of a joint Hindu family, but the question whether on 15•2.1961 and thereafter they continued to be members of the joint Hindu family has been a matter of dispute. The respondent No.4 Mahadeo was the tenant of 8 acres out of survey No. 60/1 of mouza Pusda, taluq and district Amravati. He has been a, tenant since 1951 when the petitioners and their father formed a joint Hindu family. The land in suit has been purchased in the year 1951 and the petitioners have been shown in the sale deed to be purchasers of this land. Besides this land, the joint Hindu family consisting of the petitioners and their father held 13 acres of land and it is not disputed by the petitioners that the total land now amongst the three members of the family is 21 acres consisting of 13 acres and 8 acres. It is, however, contended by the respondent No. 4 that besides these 21 acres there was also a land measuring 10 acres and in any case, it is the contention of the respondent No.4 that there were five acres more which have been sold on 23.5.1961. The finding which has been given by the Additional Tahsildar on the quantum of the land is not very clear, but it is not disputed that the total land amongst the three members of the family is not less than 21 acres. I shall proceed on the basis that the total land is 21 acres as in the view I take, it does not make much difference whether the total land was 21 acres or more. 2. The two petitioners after giving a notice as required by sub-section (2) of section 39•A of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1958 (hereinafter called the Bombay Tenancy Act), filed an application for resumption of the land under section 39•A of the Bombay Tenancy Act con tending that the land held by them was not exceeding one third of a family holding and as such, subject to the other conditions required to be fulfilled under section 39•A they were entitled to resumption of the land for personal cultivation. The application was resisted by the respondent No.4 and one of the contentions raised, with which we are now concerned, was that the petitioners held more than one-third of the family holding and as such, their application under section 39-A was not maintainable. The Additional Tahsildar framed four points for his decision for purposes of considering whether the plaint or the application was tenable. It was contended by the petitioners that in the first place, the eight acres of land were separate property of the petitioners and was not an item of joint family property. In the second place, it was contended that even so far as the 13 acres of joint family land are concerned, there had been an oral partition in 1958 in which 10 acres out of the said land were allotted to the father and 3 acres were allotted to the petitioner No.1. It was hence contended that the petitioner No.1 held 7 acres of land consisting of 3 acres obtained in the partition of 1958 and half share in the 8 acres in question and the petitioner No.2 held 4 acres of land and as such, the land with each of the petitioners did not exceed one-third of the family holding. The family holding in this area is 26 acres. 3. The petitioners examined certain witnesses. The petitioner No. 1 Manohar admitted in his cross- examination that the field in suit was purchased in the name of the two brothers by their father and no partition between the father and them had taken place. The father Ramrao also deposed that they all live in a joint family. The case of oral partition was not accepted by the Additional Tahsildar and he held that the petitioners with their father formed a joint Hindu family. He further found that on 15-2-1961, which is the date mentioned in section 39-A, the joint family held 21 acres of land as the property of the joint family and the whole family is to be taken as a unit for purposes of section 39•A and since the family held 21 acres which was in excess of one-third family holding, it was held that the petition under section 39-A was not maintainable. On this view, the application filed by the petitioners was rejected by the Additional Tahsildar. On this view, the application filed by the petitioners was rejected by the Additional Tahsildar. This order was confirmed by the Special Deputy Collector, Tenancy Appeals, Amravati, in Revenue Appeal No. 75/59 (l0-F) /63-64. The Special Deputy Collector also held that the petitioners along with their father formed a joint Hindu family and the oral partition alleged by the petitioners had not been established. This appellate order was further confirmed by the Maharaahtra Revenue Tribunal in Revenue Revision Application No. 1257/Ten. 1964. The Revenue Tribunal has taken the view that the entire land has to be treated as one unit belonging to the joint Hindu family and the share of an individual member of the joint Hindu family cannot be taken into consideration for purposes of an application under section 39-A. These orders have now been challenged by the petitioners by this writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. We are here not concerned with the merits of the case since the application of the petitioners was dismissed on the preliminary ground that it was not tenable. 4. On the basis of the decision of this Court in Janardan Damodar Deshpande v. Shrawan Raibhan Thakre (1), decided by Abhyankar and Kanta-wala JJ., it is contended by Mr. Madkholkar, learned counsel for the petitioners, that in determining under section 39-A whether a landlord holds land in excess of one-third of the family holding, the land in possession of the tenant has not to be taken into consideration. The land in the personal cultivation of the landlord has alone to be taken into consideration. It is then said that excluding these 8 acres of land of which resumption was sought, the land of the family was only 13 acres in which each of the petitioners had about 4 acres and 13 gunthas and hence the land held by each of the petitioners being less than one-third of the family holding, they were entitled to resume the land which is in possession of the respondent No.4. The decision cited was one under section 39 of the Bombay Tenancy Act and not under section 39-A. The word "holds" in section 39 has been interpreted by the Division Bench as meaning "possess" and on the interpretation which has been given to that word by the Division Bench, it has been held that the landlord must not be possessing an area exceeding a family holding in order to entitle him to resume possession under section 39. The words used in section 39 are "holds an area" and it has been laid down by the Division Bench that the word "area" has been emphasised and what has, therefore, to be seen is whether the landlord holds an area, which means possesses an area not exceeding a family holding. This decision cannot be of any assistance in interpreting the provisions of section 39-A. There is a radical difference between the two sections which would be apparent from the mere reading of the two provisions. The words "holds an area" are not to be found in section 39-A. On the other hand, section 39-A requires that a landlord must not hold as tenure holder more than one-third of the family holding. The word "hold" has different shades of meaning. In Oxford English Dictionary the word "to hold" has been defined as, to have or keep as ones own absolutely or temporarily; to own, have as property; to be the owner, possessor, or tenant of, to be in possession or enjoyment of. Another meaning which has been given to this word is, to occupy, be in (a place); also in stronger sense, to remain in, retain possession or occupation of. The word "hold", therefore, takes a different colour in different context. In some cases it may mean "own". In others it may mean "possess". While interpreting the word "hold" in section 39 of the Bombay Tenancy Act, the Division Bench in the light of the context of the section has interpreted this word to mean "possess", but the same meaning cannot obviously be given to this word in section 39-A because of the words which follow. In others it may mean "possess". While interpreting the word "hold" in section 39 of the Bombay Tenancy Act, the Division Bench in the light of the context of the section has interpreted this word to mean "possess", but the same meaning cannot obviously be given to this word in section 39-A because of the words which follow. The relevant portion of section 39-A (1) reads as follows: "Notwithstanding anything contained in sections 9,19, 38 or 39 but subject to the provisions of this section, a landlord who before the 15th day of February 1961, held as tenure-holder not exceeding one-third of a family holding ... ( underlining is mine). Just as in section 39 of the Bombay Tenancy Act the emphasis was on the word "an area", an emphasis has to be laid on the word "tenure holder" in section 39-A. The word "tenure-holder" has not been defined in the Bombay Tenancy Act and the definition of the word "tenure-holder" as given in the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954, has, therefore, to be taken into consideration. In section 2 (20) of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954, the word "tenure-holder" has been defined thus: "tenure-holder" means a person holding land from the State Government as a Bhumiswami or a Bhumidhari." The land in suit along with other land of the joint Hindu family is a Bhumiswami land and a person who holds a Bhumiswami land from the State Government is a tenure-holder. The petitioners hold this land in suit which is the Bhumiswami land from the State Government and as such with respect to this land they are tenure-holders. Undoubtedly, the petitioners, whether in their separate capacity or as members of the joint Hindu family, are the landlords of the respondent No.4 with respect to the land in suit as is apparent from the definition of the words "tenant" and "landlord" given in section 2 (32) of the Bombay Tenancy Act. The respondent No.4 holds the land in suit on lease and as such, he is a tenant of the suit land and after giving the definition of the word "tenant" in section 2 (32), the word "landlord" has to be construed accordingly. It would mean that a person from whom the tenant holds land on lease is a landlord. The respondent No.4 holds the land in suit on lease and as such, he is a tenant of the suit land and after giving the definition of the word "tenant" in section 2 (32), the word "landlord" has to be construed accordingly. It would mean that a person from whom the tenant holds land on lease is a landlord. Therefore, the petitioners would become the landlords of the respondent No.4 with respect to the land in suit. Such a landlord must hold as tenure-holder land not exceeding one-third of the family holding in order to enable him to make an application under section 39A (1) of the Bombay Tenancy Act. Now the petitioners who are the landlords and who are also the tenure-holders with respect to not only 13 acres of land but the 8 acres of land in suit are holding the land as tenure-holders and, therefore, what has got to be taken into consideration in construing section 39A is whether these landlords are or are not tenure-holders of these 21 acres. As I have said earlier, the 8 acres in suit as well as the 13 acres are held by the petitioners as tenure-holders and hence the petitioners as landlords held on 15-2-1961 at least 21 acres as tenure- holders (excluding the five acres of land alleged to have been sold on 23-5-1961) which is certainly more than one-third of a family holding. In this view the petitioners jointly held more than one-third of the family holding and if it is held that the petition has got to be made jointly as one unit and all the land held jointly is to be taken into consideration, then undoubtedly the petitioners are not entitled to make the application under section 39A . . 5. It is, however, contended by Mr. Madkholkar that the land falling to the share of each of the petitioners alone has to be considered for purposes of section 39A. It has first been contended that even if it is held that the 8 acres of land in suit is a joint family property, the total land is 21 acres and each member of the family would have 7 acres of land in the whole property and as such, the land of each of the petitioners would be less than one-third of the family holding. This argument also cannot be accepted. This argument also cannot be accepted. It will be seen that if the property is held to be joint family property, then the respondent No.4 is a tenant of the field in suit which is of the ownership of the joint Hindu family and construing the word "landlord" accordingly, the family would be the landlord of the respondent No.4 with respect to this field. The tenure-holder would be the joint Hindu family as the family as such would be holding the land from the State Government and not individual member of the joint Hindu family. Hence it is the joint family which, as a landlord, would be holding this land as a tenure-holder and under section 39A of the Bombay Tenancy Act the joint Hindu family as a landlord holding as a tenure-holder will have to be taken into consideration for finding out as to whether it holds land in excess of one-third of a family holding. Giving this construction, there is no doubt that the family has to be taken as a unit and the share of each individual member of the joint family has not got to be taken into consideration while construing the provisions of section 39A, unless there is a partition between the members, of the joint Hindu family by metes and bounds. On this construction also the petitioners are not entitled to maintain an application under section 39A. 6. It is also contended by Mr. Kherdekar, learned counsel for the respondent No.4, that the notice given by the petitioners was also not valid and consequently, the application in pursuance of the said notice. It is contended that the petitioners formed a joint Hindu family along with their father, who is the manager, and the notice had to be given either by all the members of the family or by the manager. The notice in this case has been given by the petitioners only who are not the managers and hence the notice was invalid. This contention does not seem to have been taken before the lower Courts. But I am considering this because it will have some bearing on the application which has been made. The further contention of Mr. The notice in this case has been given by the petitioners only who are not the managers and hence the notice was invalid. This contention does not seem to have been taken before the lower Courts. But I am considering this because it will have some bearing on the application which has been made. The further contention of Mr. Kherdekar is that the application also ought to have been made either in the name of the three persons or in the name of the father who would be the manager and the application not having been so made is not tenable. On the view which I have taken that it is the joint family which has got to be taken as a unit, the contention of Mr. Kherdekar seems to be correct. The application ought to have been made by the father describing himself as manager or in any case all the members of the joint family ought to have been shown as applicants in the said application. On this ground also the application could not be held to be maintainable. 7. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.