Judgement N. U. BEG, J. : This is a plaintiffs' special appeal arising out of a suit for declaration The property in dispute consists of two houses, Nos. 1 and 2 in this .judgment. The common ancestor of the parties was one Ram Prasad. The following genealogical table will be helpful for understanding the facts of the case; 2. The plaintiffs' case was that Shyam Manohar, the father of plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2, and Shyam Binod had died during the life-time of Ram Prashad, their father Shyam Binod had died issueless. Ram Prasad died in 1920. After his death Shyam Behari, the husband of the defendant Smt. Chando Devi and the plaintiffs became the owners of the house in dispute as members of a joint Hindu family. After the death of Shyam Behari in 1938 the plaintiffs became the owners of the property in dispute to the extent of half and the defendant as the Hindu widow of Shyam Behari became entitled to a life estate in the remaining half. On the 24th March, 1916. Ram Prasad had executed a will bequeathing his entire property in favour of his son Shyam Behari with direction therein to the effect that the plaintiffs would have a right of residence in house No. 1 with the consent of Shyam Behari. The plaintiffs' case was that the properly in dispute being ancestral property. Ram Prasad had no right to execute the will in respect of it and the will executed by him cannot, therefore. affect their rights. In the alternative, the plaintiffs' case was that even if the will in question be considered to be a valid will they had a right of residence in house No. 1 under the said will. 3. The defendant contested the plaintiffs' case. So far as house No. 1 is concerned, the defendant's case was that Pandit Ram Prasad was the absolute owner of the property, and, after his death, the said house became the absolute property of his son Shyam Behari as the sole legatee of all his properties under the will dated the 24th March, 1916, and that the said house was given by Shyam Behari to the defendant by a gift deed dated the 10th March, 1980. So far as house No. 2 was concerned, it was built by Shyam Behari with his own money, and Shyam Behari had on the 29th August, 1938, executed a will bequeathing house No. 2 amongst other properties in favour of his wife Smt. Chando Devi, defendant. Shyam Behari died on the 3rd September, 1938. So far as the will of Shyam Behari dated the 29th August, 1938, is concerned, the plaintiff's case was that the said will was not genuine as the testator did not possess a sound disposing mind at the lime of its execution. 4. On behalf of the plaintiffs it was conceded before the trial Court that there was no evidence to show that the properties in dispute were ancestral properties in the hands of Ram Prasad. The plaintiff also admitted the due execution of the will by Ram Prasad. As to the will dated the 29th August, 1936 set up by the defendant. The trial Court found that it was not executed by the testator while in a sound disposing mind and the said will was, therefore, not a genuine will. The trial Court further found that the plaintiffs had no right to reside in house No. 1 The trial Court, accordingly, came to the conclusion that the only declaration to which the plaintiffs were entitled was that the defendant held house No. 2 as a Hindu widow. It, therefore, decreed the plaintiffs' suit to the extent that it granted a declaration that the defendant held house No. 2 for her life as a Hindu widow. For the rest it dismissed the plaintiffs' suit. 5. Dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the trial Court, the defendant filed an appeal against the decree in so far as it rejected her claim to absolute rights in house No. 1. The plaintiffs also filed cross-objections against the part of the decree rejecting their claim to a right of residence in house No. 1. 6. The appeal came up for decision before a learned single Judge of this Court. Before him it was argued on behalf of the defendant-appellant that during the pendency of the appeal, the Hindu Succession Act (Act No. XXX of 1956), hereinafter referred to as "the Act", had come into force. 6. The appeal came up for decision before a learned single Judge of this Court. Before him it was argued on behalf of the defendant-appellant that during the pendency of the appeal, the Hindu Succession Act (Act No. XXX of 1956), hereinafter referred to as "the Act", had come into force. Under Section 14 of the Act the life estate of the widow had been enlarged into an absolute estate, and therefore, the decree of the trial Court in so far as it declared that the defendant had only a widow's estate for life in house No. 2 should be set aside and she should be declared to be the absolute owner of the same. The learned single Judge accepted this contention and allowed the defendant's appeal holding that the defendant had, as a result of the coming into force of tile Act, become an absolute owner of house No. 2. The cross-objections filed by the plaintiffs in respect of house No. 1 were dismissed In the result, the defendant was declared to be the full owner of both the houses. Dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the learned single Judge, plaintiff Manna Lal filed the present special appeal. He, however, died during the pendency of the appeal and was substituted by his heirs and legal representatives who figure as appellants now Respondent No. 1 was the defendant Smt. Chando Bibi, Ram Bharosey Lal, plaintiff No. 2, has been impleaded as respondent No. 2. 7. So far as house No. 1 is concerned, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants before us was that under the terms of the will executed by Ram Prasad on the 24th March, 1916, the plaintiffs got a right of residence in the said house. On the other hand, on behalf of the respondent No. 1 it was contended that on a proper construction of the will the plaintiffs cannot claim to reside in the said house as a matter of right. The question depends on the interpretation of the terms of the will. Clause 2 of the will which is relevant in this connection states that the testator was bequeathing all his moveable and immoveable properties which belonged to the testator at the date of the execution of the will or become his property in future in favour of Shyam Behari his son, without excluding anything with all rights of transfer. Clause 2 of the will which is relevant in this connection states that the testator was bequeathing all his moveable and immoveable properties which belonged to the testator at the date of the execution of the will or become his property in future in favour of Shyam Behari his son, without excluding anything with all rights of transfer. It then goes on to state that the remaining heirs would only have a right of residence in the said house with the consent of the legatee. Subsequently, the clause lays down that in case any of the heirs commits any act of misconduct so as to bring bad name to the testator or to the legatee, then the said heir would be deprived of the right of residence altogether. It further states that the heirs would have the right of residence only on condition of their good character and with the consent of the legatee but that they would have no proprietary rights in any of the properties. Clause 2 closes with the following statement. I have full confidence that Shyam Behari, the said legatee, will observe all the said conditions and follow the instructions given to him. The elementary rule of construction of wills is that the intention of the testator should be gathered by giving a harmonious interpretation to the, various terms of the will as a whole. The terms of the above will clearly indicate that the testator did not intend to create any right in favour of heirs other than the legatee. The heirs are allowed a right of residence only on the condition that the legatee accords his consent to it. The direction regarding the residence of the heirs appears only to be a pious wish and not a mandatory injunction to the legatee so as to create a legal right in the heirs. Their right of residence is further subject to their maintaining good character so as not to commit any act which would reflect adversely on the fair reputation or honour of the testator and the legatee. The fact that the direction regarding residence is merely of a recommendatory nature is further borne out by the closing sentence of clause 2 which states that the testator had full confidence that the legatee would observe all the conditions laid down by him. The fact that the direction regarding residence is merely of a recommendatory nature is further borne out by the closing sentence of clause 2 which states that the testator had full confidence that the legatee would observe all the conditions laid down by him. For the above reasons we are of opinion that there is no force in this part of the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants. 8. The next argument of the learned counsel for the appellants related to house No. 2. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that in the present case the life estate of the widow would not be enlarged into an absolute estate under S. 14, Sub-Section (1) of the Act, because the present case falls within the exception contained in Sub-Section (2) of S. 14. Section 14 of the Act provides as follows :- "14 (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation.- In this sub-section, "Property" includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her an stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act. (2) Nothing contained in Sub-Section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil Court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property." It is rightly conceded by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Act being a retrospective one the effect of Sub-Section (1) of S. 14 standing by itself would be to enlarge the estate of the widow into an absolute estate. The learned counsel for the appellants, however argues that the exception provided in Sub-Section (2) would apply to the present case because in the present case the trial Court has passed a decree declaring the defendant's right to be that of a Hindu widow. We are unable to accept this contention. The decree contemplated under Sub-Section (2) of S. 14 of the Act appears to be a decree finally adjudicating the rights of the parties but where an appeal has been filed against a decree so that the final adjudication of the rights of the parties would depend upon the decree passed in the appellate Court, the decree passed by the trial Court cannot be said to be a decree contemplated by Sub-Section (2). The appeal is a continuation of the suit. The result of filing the appeal would be that the sanctity of the decree would be taken away and the decree passed by the appellate Court adjudicating the rights of the parties would supersede the decree of the trial Court. In the present case it cannot be said that any decree had been passed finally determining the rights of the parties. Sub-Section (2), accordingly cannot be invoked to cover the present case Reference in the connection might also be made to Pathummn Beebi v. Krishnan Asari, AIR 1961 Ker 247 following Vankamma v. Vankatareddi, AIR 1959 Andh Pra 158 and Annapurnamma v. Bhima Sankarasao, AIR 1960 Andh Pra 359; which would support the same view. 9. We are further of opinion that there is another reason why Sub-Section (2) of S. 14 would be inapplicable to the present case. Sub-Section (2) contemplates only a decree where the property is acquired by a Hindu widow by the said decree. In other words, the decree mentioned in Sub-Section (2) is a decree which forms the foundation of the title of the widow. Where the widow gets a life estate under the right of inheritance possessed by her and the decree merely declares her estate to be a widow's estate, the decree is not the foundation of her right or the basis of her title but merely a recognition of the same. A Hindu widow's right to hold the estate of her husband for her life time may be recognised by several decrees passed in a number of suits filed by different claimants. A Hindu widow's right to hold the estate of her husband for her life time may be recognised by several decrees passed in a number of suits filed by different claimants. Can it be said that her light to a widow's estate is acquired by all the decrees passed in various suits ? It is obvious that the decree passed in such suits do not create any right or title in her. They merely declare or recognise a right already created m her favour under the personal law to which she is subject. The view taken by us would be supported by a single Judge decision of this Court in Smt. Janak Dulari v. District Judge, Kanpur, AIR 1961 All 294 . 10. The learned counsel for the appellants argued that the view taken in the said case should be considered to be incorrect bearing in mind the subsequent decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Munnalal v. Rajkumar, AIR 1962 SC 1493 . In this case it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the share of a Jain widow, declared by a preliminary decree passed in a suit for partition of join family property is a share "possessed" by her within the meaning of S. 14 of the Act and if the widow died before actual division of the estate, the interest declared in her favour devolves upon her son to the exclusion of her grandson. It was further held that by S. 14(1) of the Act the interest of a Hindu female which under the shastric Hindu law would be regarded as a limited interest, is converted into an absolute interest. It was further held that the explanation to S. 14(1) gives to the expression "property" the widest connotation so as to include within the ambit of the said word the share declared by a preliminary decree for partition in favour of a Hindu widow even though there has been no actual division of the share by partition of the faint family estate. In this case there was a preliminary decree for partition declaring the share of a widow in joint family in lieu of her right to maintenance. In this case there was a preliminary decree for partition declaring the share of a widow in joint family in lieu of her right to maintenance. It was argued against her that the right of a Hindu widow to maintenance from the joint family property being of an incohate character continued to retain that character till actual division was made with the result that if she died before actual division, this incohate interest reverted to the estate out of which it was carved out. It cannot, therefore be considered to be property possessed by a Hindu widow within the meaning of S. 14(1) of the Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court repelled this contention holding that the word "property" was used in S. 14(1), as the explanation of the said subsection would indicate, in its widest conotation. This case appears to us to be clearly distinguishable from the present one. In this case the question that arose was whether the right in question can be considered to be "property possessed" by a Hindu female within the meaning of S. 14(1) of the Act. The question of interpretation of Sub-Section (2) of S. 14 never arose for consideration in this case. In the present case we are concerned not with the meaning of the expression "property possessed" in Sub-Section (2) of S. 14 but with the meaning of the words "property acquired" in Sub-Section (2) of S. 14. This case, therefore, cannot be pressed into service for the purpose of lending support to the contention advanced on behalf of the appellants. 11. Further, it may also be noted that in the case cited the widow did not possess the right of inheritance in the estate as a Hindu widow not any such question arose for consideration in the said case. The husband of the widow having died prior to the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act (XVIII of 1937) the widow had merely a right of maintenance. It could therefore, be said that her right to a share in the family property came into existence for the first time as a result of the partition decree. The partition decree did not declare her pre-existing right. It could therefore, be said that her right to a share in the family property came into existence for the first time as a result of the partition decree. The partition decree did not declare her pre-existing right. On the other hand, it carved out a new right namely a right to a share in the estate in lieu of her previous right, namely a right to maintenance out of the joint family property. 12. For the above reasons, we are of opinion that the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants in regard to house No. 8 also fails and has no substance. 13. We, accordingly, dismiss this appeal with costs. Appeal dismissed.