judgment- (1) This petition and numerous other petitions are filed in this Court for challenging the validity of the Government Resolution, dated March 18, 1966, as clarified by the two circular letters each dated April 16, 1966. The petitioners also challenge the notices of discharge, each dated April 5, 1966, terminating the services of each of the petitioners and allotting them to services of Zilla Parishads as of and from August 16, 1966. In other petitions also similar notices are challenged. The petitioners have prayed for quashing and setting aside of the notices of discharge and also for a mandamus restraining the Government from allotting the petitioners to the services of Zilla Parishad, Dhulia. (2) The questions arising in this petition being common to several petitions filed in this Court are of general importance in relation to all the Class 3 and Class 4 employees of the State Government (consisting of about 45/55 thousand in all) who as surplus staff, are proposed to be allotted and transferred to ""District Services"" of Zilla Parishads of several districts in the State of Maharashtra. (3) The broad facts leading to the passing of the above resolution and the issuing of the notices of discharge dated April 5, 1966, devoid of numerous details which will require to be noticed in connection with the contentions made by the parties, may be summarised as follows: The petitioners were initially recruited in the Revenue Department as Clerks on various dates between the years 1943 and 1944. They were confirmed as Clerks in the year 1948. They were promoted to officiate as Aval Karkuns in the years 1956 and 1957. Subsequently, in 1965, they were promoted to officiate as Mamlatdars. Long prior to April 1966, the petitioners were provisionally substantively confirmed as Aval Karkuns and were then officiating as Mamlatdars. The scale of pay available to the petitioners as Aval Karkuns was Rs. 145-8-185-10-215 plus admissible allowances. The petitioners had reached the maximum of Rs. 215, long prior to their promotion of officiate as Mamlatdars in 1965. As officiating Mamlatdars, the petitioners were entitled to the scale of pay of Rs. 300-12-420-E. B.-15-450-20-550. In April 1966, the petitioners were drawing the basic salary of Rs. 315 and admissible allowance amounting to about Rs. 45 per month. The petitioners had reached the maximum of Rs. 215, long prior to their promotion of officiate as Mamlatdars in 1965. As officiating Mamlatdars, the petitioners were entitled to the scale of pay of Rs. 300-12-420-E. B.-15-450-20-550. In April 1966, the petitioners were drawing the basic salary of Rs. 315 and admissible allowance amounting to about Rs. 45 per month. (4) The programme of Community Development and National Extension Service was initiated by the State Government in 1952 to provide for a multilateral intensive development of rural areas according to a phased programme. As soon as a particular area was selected to form a project or block for such development, the staff, finance and other requisites were provided according to a set pattern. The staffing pattern included certain normal categories of posts like those of Aval Karkuns, etc. Most of the posts created were treated as temporary additions to the normal cadres of the respective departments and the personnel was also drawn from those normal cadres to meet the requirements of the projects and blocks. The cadre of Aval Karkuns catered to the needs of development blocks and certain posts of Aval Karkuns were specially sanctioned for the work connected with development activities under the control of the District Collectors. All these posts were continued on a temporary basis year after year. On May 1, 1962, the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act 1961 (Act 5 of 1962) hereinafter referred to as the Act, came into force. The Act was passed inter alia to provide for the establishment in rural areas of Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis, to assign to them local Government functions and to entrust to them the execution of certain works and development schemes of the State Five-Year Plans. Section 101-B of the Act required the Government to transfer to the Zilla Parishads all completed works and development schemes relating to the activities which fell within their sphere under the Act. On May 1, 1962, the State Government transferred by an order many development activities to Zilla Parishads. Even subsequently, the Government transferred additional schemes and works to Zilla Parishads by passing orders in respect thereof. The posts that were created and continued from time to time since 1952 for the various development activities which came to be transferred to Zilla Parishads became surplus to the Govt. Requirements upon the transfer of the activities to Zilla Parishads. Even subsequently, the Government transferred additional schemes and works to Zilla Parishads by passing orders in respect thereof. The posts that were created and continued from time to time since 1952 for the various development activities which came to be transferred to Zilla Parishads became surplus to the Govt. Requirements upon the transfer of the activities to Zilla Parishads. The temporary posts that fell surplus and vacant were allowed to lapse at the end of their sanctioned period. The posts as were already permanent continued to exist and were not immediately abolished. Some of the permanent posts were, however, abolished. It was possible for the Government to abolish surplus posts and discharge their holders on payment of terminal benefits. Section 241 of the Act authorised the Government to dispute officers in Class I and Class II Services of the State for the work of Zilla Parishads, Section 242, inter alia, provided: ""* * * * * Such members of the services of the State Government as are allotted to the District Technical Service, Class III, and to the District Service, Class IV shall be taken over by the Zilla Parishads * * * *"" Section 244 provided that ""The initial appointment of officers and servants under Zilla Parishads or allotment to the District Service as aforesaid shall be made by the State Government * * * *"". By ""the appointed day"" , i.e. May 1, 1962, the Government found it impossible to constitute the District Services of Zilla Parishad in accordance with Section 239 (b) of the Act in connection with the working of Zilla Parishads. The Government accordingly issued (Removal of Difficulties) Order dated April 12, 1962 and Order dated may 1, 1962, provisionally sanctioning for the Zilla Parishads for a period of six months all posts existing prior to the appointed day and authorised the Collectors of each district to make allotment of officers and servants to those posts. In pursuance of those orders, such of the Government servants who were allotted to take charge of their posts started working for the Zilla Parishads as from May 1, 1962. In pursuance of those orders, such of the Government servants who were allotted to take charge of their posts started working for the Zilla Parishads as from May 1, 1962. By a circular letter dated December 3, 1962, the Government inter alia stated as regards the Government servants allotted the Zilla Parishads that the allotment had been made under section 242 of the Act adding- ""Their reversion to Government Department is not now possible, as they belong to District Service of Zilla Parishads concerned."" The Government clarified that they had an option to retire from service. In December 1963, a representative petition, being Special Civil Application No. 13 of 1963 was filed in the High Court on behalf of a group of Class III Government servants challenging the validity of the orders finally allotting them to Zilla Parishads. By a circular letter dated January 24/25, 1964, the Government clarified the position stated in the earlier letter dated December 3, 1962. By this letter, the Government stated that, apart from the cases of Government servants whose orders of allotment had already become final by reason of abolition of their posts, all other Government servants serving with the Zilla Parishads were considered as under provisional allotment and as continuing to hold a lien on the Government posts held by them permanently, until orders abolishing the posts held by the, were passed by the Government as being surplus as a result of the implementation of the Act. In the above petition in the High Court, consent terms were filed on February 24, 1964. The parties adopted the position that the petitioners had not been permanently allotted to Zilla Parishads and they continued to have lien on their permanent posts in the Government service. The Government accepted the position that the petitioners had not been allotted to Zilla Parishads under section 242 or section 244 of the Act. On those facts, by consent, no order was made on the petition except as regards costs. The Government found it difficult to proceed on the footing that the staff working with the Zilla Parishads had been permanently allotted to it. A large number of Government servants sent over to Zilla Parishads made representations for repatriation to their posts under the Government. The Government found it difficult to proceed on the footing that the staff working with the Zilla Parishads had been permanently allotted to it. A large number of Government servants sent over to Zilla Parishads made representations for repatriation to their posts under the Government. To prevent dislocation of work, the Government promulgated on August 27, 1964 Ordinance No. 4 of 1964, introducing with retrospective effect from may, 1, 1962, new section 253-A . The Ordinance has been replaced by Act 43 of 1964. This section was held to be not illegal on unconstitutional by the High Court in February 1966. The section authorised the Government for the period fixed under the section to make temporary allotment of members of Government service to provisionally sanctioned posts in Zilla Parishad. The Government thereafter issued two circular letters dated October 8, 1964. The purport of the first circular was that, though Government servants in Class III and Class IV services had been temporarily allotted and were on deputation to Zilla Parishads, the number of Government servants on deputation did not correspond to the strength of the cadre from which they were deemed to be on deputation. In order, therefore, to maintain correspondence between Government servants and the strength of the adre from which they were treated to be deputation, it was necessary to revive temporary posts which had either been discontinued or allowed to lapse. The Government issued instructions for reviving all temporary posts which had been discontinued and for continuing them for such time as Government servant deemed to be on deputation to Zilla Parishads were finally allotted to them. Under the second circular, the posts in continuous extence for five years or more as were required under permanent or long term basis were directed to be made permanent. Such posts were directed to be included in the proposals for conversion of temporary posts, into permanent posts. In connection with the posts revived, the Government issued circular letters dated January 2, 1965 and January 5, 1965. The Government first resolved to revive 50 per cent, of the temporary posts and to make them permanent. The Government ultimately decided to convert 80 per cent, of the temporary posts into permanent posts. In connection with the posts revived, the Government issued circular letters dated January 2, 1965 and January 5, 1965. The Government first resolved to revive 50 per cent, of the temporary posts and to make them permanent. The Government ultimately decided to convert 80 per cent, of the temporary posts into permanent posts. In accordance with that decision, in each of the districts in Maharashtra 80 per cent, of temporary posts held by Government servants on deputation to Zilla Parishads were revived in the Government services as permanent posts. In connection with the posts at Dhulia, the Government issued an order dated April 19, 1965 showing in the accompanying statement posts which were converted from temporary to permanent and directed the Collector of Dhulia to take action and order confirmations in those posts in accordance with the existing procedure. As is shown in the statement accompanying the above order 8 temporary posts were converted into permanent posts of Aval Karkuns at Dhulia. Prior to the above order dated April 19, 1965, in fact, in Dhulia, there were 38 permanent posts of Aval Karkuns. The result of the order dated April 19, 1965 was that, as from that day, there were 46 permanent posts of Aval Karkuns at Dhulia. (5) As already recited above, from 1965 the petitioners were promoted to officiate as Mamlatdars. The petitioners were provisionally substantively confirmed as Aval Karkuns respectively on August 31, September 1 and September 2, 1960. They were retrospectively substantively confirmed in the posts of Aval Karkuns respectively as of and from February 1 1965 and February 18 and 19, 1966. In April 1966, the three petitioners were the three junior most substantively confirmed Aval Karkuns at Dhulia. They were, however, then officiating as Mamlatdars and receiving a basic salary of Rs. 315 and an admissible allowance of about Rs. 45 every month. (6) The Impugned resolution dated March 18, 1966 was passed to provide a scheme for serving notice of discharge (retrenchment) on incumbents of posts rendered surplus (and to be abolished) by reason of transfer of the works of national extension schemes and development project to Zilla Parishads and to offer to the surplus staff an option to accept allotment to ""equivalent posts"" in the services of Zilla Parishads. The discharge and allotment were fixed as of and from August 16, 1966. The discharge and allotment were fixed as of and from August 16, 1966. Rule 291 read with R. 266 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules (hereinafter referred to as the Service Rules) envisages service of three months notice on an employee intended to be discharged from service on account of abolition of his post. We will have to notice the details of the scheme contained in this resolution whilst considering the contentions made in respect of the validity of the scheme and the resolution. The two circular letters dated April 16, 1966 clarifying the enforcement of the scheme in the resolution were issued subsequently. (7) The Collector of Dhulia determined 4 permanent posts of Aval Karkuns and 12 permanent and 50 temporary posts of Clerks on his establishment as surplus and due to be abolished. In the above resolution, the Government had determined that, with effect from August 16, 1966 all surplus posts should be abolished. In accordance with the scheme in the resolution, one Sali and the three petitioners as junior most permanent Aval Karkuns at Dhulia were liable to be retrenched in respect of 4 permanent posts rendered surplus and due to be abolished. They were entitled to three months notice, having regard to the contents of Rules 291 and 266 of the Service Rules. To all persons rendered surplus, including Sali and the three petitioners, notices of discharge dated April 15, 1966 in the prescribed form were issued. These notices were served on the three petitioners on April 14, 1966. The three petitioners were informed that they were rendered surplus in the posts to be abolished and their services would be terminated with effect from August 16, 1966. They were informed that they would be finally allotted under section 242 in the scale of pay of Rs. 135-5-145-6-175 -E. B. -8-215 to the District Service, Class III of Zilla Parishad, Dhulia. They were informed that they were given an option whether or not to become servants of Zilla Parishads with terminal benefits under Rules 4 and 5 of the Zilla Parishads (allocated servants) Premature Retirement Rules. They were given a further option, if they so chose to continue their officiating posts of Mamlatdars after forfeiting unconditionally their claim to permanent posts. They were informed that they were given an option whether or not to become servants of Zilla Parishads with terminal benefits under Rules 4 and 5 of the Zilla Parishads (allocated servants) Premature Retirement Rules. They were given a further option, if they so chose to continue their officiating posts of Mamlatdars after forfeiting unconditionally their claim to permanent posts. They were requested to give their intimation so as to reach the Commissioner, Bombay Division, not later than July 15, 1966 as respects the option selected by them. They were informed that, in default of any communication received from them before July 15, 1966, it will be presumed that they had accepted appointments with the Zilla Parishad, Dhulia. (8) The petitioners challenge the notices of discharge served on them in pursuance of the scheme contained in the impugned resolution dated March 18, 1966 read with the two clarificatory circular letters dated April 16, 1966. The petitioners also challenge the scheme in the resolution. The grounds on which the challenge is made are divisible into two heads as follows: (I) challenge to discharge from and/or termination of Government service and (ii) challenge to orders for allotment to the services of Zilla Parishads. We have hereinafter specifically stated each of the grounds on the basis whereof the challenge is made. It is, therefore, not necessary to recite here those grounds. The Government has denied each and all of the contentions and grounds. We will mention the case of the Government whilst dealing with each of the grounds. (9) The first ground is that the impugned notice of discharge dated April 5, 1966 is bad and illegal as being in contravention of the provisions in Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. The Submission is that the petitioners will stand discharged from Government service as from August 16, 1966 under the impugned notice. The petitioners will be deprived of their substantive posts and will have lost benefits under the service. This is per se punishment. The impugned notice, therefore, involves removal of the petitioners from service within the meaning of the Article. The petitioners are sought to be removed without affording then an opportunity of showing cause in accordance with the Article. The impugned notices of discharge contravene the Article and are liable to be quashed and set aside. This is per se punishment. The impugned notice, therefore, involves removal of the petitioners from service within the meaning of the Article. The petitioners are sought to be removed without affording then an opportunity of showing cause in accordance with the Article. The impugned notices of discharge contravene the Article and are liable to be quashed and set aside. (10) The Governments reply that, to the facts of the case, the provisions in the Article are not attracted. The proposed discharge of the petitioners is a consequence of the proposed abolition of posts which were found surplus to the Governments requirements. The emphatic submission is that, generally, and also having regard to the tenure of a Government servant being at pleasure under Article 310 of the Constitution, the Government has for administrative purposes an absolute right to decide the number of posts necessary for governmental purposes and to abolish posts rendered surplus. The incumbents of abolished posts are liable to be retrenched. Such retrenchment does not attract the provisions in the Article. Having regard to the above cotroversy, the sole important question which arises for decision is as to whether abolition of posts rendered surplus and discharge and /or retrenchment of Government servants from such abolished posts amounts to removal from posts within the meaning of Article 311 and whether, in respect of such removal, there is an obligation on the Government to give opportunity to the concerned holders of posts to show cause that the poss are not rendered surplus and/or need not be abolished. In the first instance, it may be stated that apprently Articles 309 and 310 of the constitution contain provisions relating to the authorities entitled to enact rules for terms and conditions of services of the Government employees in Central and State services and specifically provide that the tenure of service is ""pleasure of the President"". Article 311 restricts the pleasure as regards 3 major punishments of dismissal, removal and reduction in rank and provides protection that an opportunity to show cause against the action (of punishment) proposed to be taken must be afforded. This Articles is not in any other manner related to the matter of the tenure of service of the Government employees. It is not contended on behalf of the petitioners that the Government has not got an inherent right to create and abolish posts for administrative purposes and reasons. This Articles is not in any other manner related to the matter of the tenure of service of the Government employees. It is not contended on behalf of the petitioners that the Government has not got an inherent right to create and abolish posts for administrative purposes and reasons. The submission on behalf of the State, therefore, is that it is clear that Art. 311 postulates existence of posts and the vested right that is protected thereunder is inrespect of posts which must exist and are not abolished. (11) It further requires to be stated that there is not dispute about the fact that by the impugned notice dated April 5, 1966, the petitioners were informed that it was proposed to abolish their permanent posts and to discharge them owing to abolition as of and from August 16, 1966. The petitioners were offered several options which are not relevant in connection with this first contention. We have been requested to decide the question on the footing that the impugned notices are orders discharging the petitioners from Government service as of and from August 16, 1966. (12) On this question, strong reliance has been placed on behalf of the petitioners on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Moti Ram Deka v. General Manager North East Frontier Rly., AIR 1964 SC 600 . The submission is that the ratio of the decision is that every termination of service of a Government servant, except under rules of discharge upon superannuation and reasonable rules for conpulsory retirement, would be per se punishment and removal from service within the meaning of the Article. Every termination of service, except under the above two kinds of rules, necessitates affording of an opportunity to show cause against the proposed action in accordance with the porvisions in Article 311(2). The Supreme Court has, in the above decision, not accepted the concept of punishment being necessary for finding a termination of services as amounting to removal within the meanig of the Article. The Supreme Court has, in the above decision, not accepted the concept of punishment being necessary for finding a termination of services as amounting to removal within the meanig of the Article. In regard to the observations relating to abolition of posts in the previous decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, 1958 SCR 828 = ( AIR 1958 SC 36 ), the submission on behalf of the petitioners is that the same have been disapproved of in the case of Moti Ram Deka, AIR 1964 SC 600 , by a larger Bench of the Supreme Court. The judgment of Subba Rao, J. (Now Chief Justice), contains direct observations supporting the above submissions for the petitioners. These obervations are binding on this Court and must be followed. (13) The Advocate General for the State has controverted each and all of the above submissions. In his submission, the observatiions in the decision in Parshottam Lal Dhingras case, 1958 SCR 828 = ( AIR 1958 SC 36 ), regarding termination of service resulting from abolition of posts being not punishment and not removal within the meanig of the Article are not only not disapproved of but in fact approved of by the larger Bench in Moti Ram Dekas case, AIR 1964 SC 600 . In his submission, the judgment of Subba Rao. J. (Now Chief Justice), disapproves of the ratio in Parshottam Lal Dhingras case. 1958 SCR 828 = ( AIR 1958 SC 36 ), in this respect. But it is not a concurrent judgment but a dissenting onein that respect. He submitted that the phrases ""Dismissal"", ""Removal"" and ""Reduction in rank"" had a legislative hisotry which was directly relevant. The phrases called for an interpretation not according to the dictionary meaning but to a true meaning having regard to that legislative history. Such rlevant history had been noticed in the prior decisons and particularly in the case of Parshottam Lal Dhingra, 1958 SCR 828 = ( AIR 1958 SC 36 ). The majority judgment in the case of Moti Ram Deka had accepted the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Parshottam Lal Dhingra, 1958 SCR 828 = ( AIR 1958 SC 36 ),as regards the true meaning and interpretation of these phrases. The two phrases were consistently held to be not tautologous. The majority judgment in the case of Moti Ram Deka had accepted the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Parshottam Lal Dhingra, 1958 SCR 828 = ( AIR 1958 SC 36 ),as regards the true meaning and interpretation of these phrases. The two phrases were consistently held to be not tautologous. The two phrases had been held to be terms of art and not liable to be interpreted in accordance with the dictionary meaning. In his submission, the learned Judge has expressed a dissent from the previous decisons of the Supreme Court and the majority view in that connection in this case of Moti Ram Deka, AIR 1964 SC 600 , and has held that these phrases in the Article had their dictionary meaning. In his submission, the observations of the learned Judge indicate his dissent in th matter of (I) the true meaning of there phrases and (ii) the approval by the majority judgment of the observations in the case of Parshottam Lal Dhingra, 1958 SCR 828 = ( AIR 1958 SC 36 ), that termination of service consequent upon abolition of post is not ""removal"". In his submission, the observations made by the learned Judge being contrary to the previous decisions of the Supreme Court are not binding on this Court. Under all the circumstances mentioned above, our main task in this connection is to find out the relevant observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Parshottam Lal Dhingra 1958 SCR 828 = ( AIR 1958 SC 36 ), regarding the Governments right to terminate service upon abolition of post. We have further to find out whether these observations are approved of by the majority Judgment in the case of Moti Ram Deka. AIR 1964 SC 600 . (14) The case of Parshottam Lal Dhingra, 1958 SCR 828 = ( AIR 1958 SC 36 ) related to an order of revision of Parshottam Lal Dhingra from an officating higher post to his permanent post in lower cadre. Before the order was passed, adverse remarks were made against him in his confidential report by the General manager of the concerned railway with a note that ""he shold revert as a subordinate till he makes good the shortcoming noticed"". The General Manger had thereupon issued the impugned order reverting him to his permanent post. Before the order was passed, adverse remarks were made against him in his confidential report by the General manager of the concerned railway with a note that ""he shold revert as a subordinate till he makes good the shortcoming noticed"". The General Manger had thereupon issued the impugned order reverting him to his permanent post. His case was that the ordr amounted to reduction in rank without affording him an opportunity to show cause and was punishment and contravened the provisions in Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. In this connection, reference was made by the counsel for the parties and the Court to previous decisions of the Court relating to true effect of the phrases ""dismissal"" , ""removal"" and ""reduction in rank"" contained in the Article. Reference was made to the previous legislative history also. The matter of construction and interpretation of all the three phrases directly arose for consideration by the court. In that connection, reference was made by the parties to the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Satish Chandra Anand v. Union of India, 1953 SCR 655 = ( AIR 1953 SC 250 ), and Shyamlal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1955-a SCR 25 = ( AIR 1954 SC 369 ). Reference was also made to several other previous decisons. At p, 847, (of SCR) = (at p. 44 of AIR), in the majority judgment, it was stated: ""What then is the meaning of those expressions dismissed removed or reduced in rank? It has been said in Jayanti Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, ( AIR 1951 All 793 ), that these are technical words used in cases in which a persons services are terminated by wayof punishment. Those expressions it is urged, have been taken from the service rules, where they were used to denote the three major punishments and it s submitted that those expressions should be read and undestood in the same sense and treated as words of art. Those expressions it is urged, have been taken from the service rules, where they were used to denote the three major punishments and it s submitted that those expressions should be read and undestood in the same sense and treated as words of art. This leads us to embark upon an examination of the service rules relating to punishments to which the Government servants can be subjected."" (15) The Court thereupon examined the previous rules and the relevant provisions in the Government of India Acts, 1915 and 1935 and the contents of Article 311 and held: ""It follows from the above discussion that both at the date of the commencement of the 1935 Act and of our Constitution the words dismissed, removed and reduced in rank, as used in the service rules, were well understood as signifying or denoting the three major punishments which could be inglicted on Government servants."" In that connection, it was stated that these phrases had been explained by the Supreme Court in the case of S. A. Venkataraman v. Union of India, 1954 SCR 1150 = AIR 1954 SC 375 . In further discussion, the Court stated: ""The foregoing conclusion, however, does not solve the entire problem, for it has yet ""to be ascertained as to when an order for the termination of service is inflicted as and by way of punishment and when it is not."" Apart from other findings of the Court, the relevant finding at p. 861 ( of SCR) = (at p. 49 of AIR) of the report was as follows: ""And every termination of service is not a dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, theexercise of a contractual right is not per se d ismissal orremoval, as has been held by this Court in 1953 SCR 655 = ( AIR 1953 SC 250 ). Likewise the termination of service by compulsory retirement in terms of a specific rule regulating the conditions of service is not tantamount to the infliction of a punishment and does not attract Art. 311(2), as has also been held by this Court in 1955-1 SCR 26 = ( AIR 1954 SC 369 ). In either of the two abovementioned cases the termination of the service did not carry with it the penal consequences of loss of pay, of allowances under Rule 52 of the Fundamental Rules."" (16) In arriving at the above conlusion, at pp. In either of the two abovementioned cases the termination of the service did not carry with it the penal consequences of loss of pay, of allowances under Rule 52 of the Fundamental Rules."" (16) In arriving at the above conlusion, at pp. 857-858, 9of SCR) = (at pp. 47-48 of AIR), the Court observed; ""It has already been said that where a person is appointed substantively to a permanent post in Government service, he normally acquires a right to hold the post until under the rules he attains the age of superannuation or is compulsory retired and in the absence of a contract, express or implied or a service rule, he cannot be turned out of his post ""unless the post itself is abolished"" or unless he is guilty of misconduct, negligence inefficiency or other disqualifications and appropriate proceedings are taken under the service rules read with Art. 311 (2). Termination of service of such a servant so appointed must per se be a punishment, for it operates as a forfeiture of the servants rights and brings about a permature end of his employment"". (Underline italic-sic is ours) (Here in "" ""). The Advocate Gerneral has strongly relied on the above quoted passage in the judgment in the c ase of Parshottam Lal Dhingra, 1958 SCR 828 = ( AIR 1958 SC 36 ) as containing the ratio, andinany event binding observations of the Supreme Court. Justifiably he has submitted that termination of service consequent upon abolition of post has been pointed out by the Supreme Court in the above passage as not attracting the provisions of Article 311 (2). The submission on behalf of the petitioners is that the Supreme Court has disapproved of the above quoted passage in the case of Moti Ram Deka, AIR 1964 SC 600 . Before parting with the case of Parshottam Dal Dhingra, 1958 SCR 828 = ( AIR 1958 SC 36 ), the following passage from the judgment in that case is given by Bose, J., may be quoted- "" I also agree with my Lord that the words dismissal, removal and reduction in rank, used in Article 311 have special meaning. I would not have said this had it not been for ambiguities that arise otherwise. I would not have said this had it not been for ambiguities that arise otherwise. We were faced with that in 1953 SCR 655 = ( AIR 1953 SC 250 ), where we has to construe the words dismissal and removal and to determine whether they were merely tautologous or had been introduced to emphasise a difference in meaning. According tothe dictionary they mean the same thig or, at any rate have subtle shades of distinction that are meaningless in the context in which they are used. It was therefore necessary to look to the surrounding circumstances and determine whether they had acquired special technical significance at the date of the Constitution. For that purpose, itwas necesssary to examaine the history of the conditions of service under the Crown and look to the various statuts and rules then in force. * * * * * * * *"" Moti Ram Dekas case, AIR 1964 SC 600 deals with validity of the Rules 148 and 149 of the Railway Establishment Code. Rule 148 (3) related to non-pensioable railway service and, inter alia provided: ""The service of other (non-pensionable) railway servants shall be lable totermination on notice oneither side for the periods shown below. Such notice is not however required in the case of dismissal or removal as a disciplinary measure after compliance with the provisions of Clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution, reitrement on attaining the age ""of superannuation, and termination of service due to mental or physical incapacity"". As regards this Rule, the Court observed: ""It is thus clear that Rule 148 (3) empowers the appropriate authority to terminate the services of other non-pensionable railway servants after giving them notice for the specified period , or paying them their salary for the said period in lieu of notice under Rule 148 (4)."" After 1957, non-pensionable services were ended, and Rule 149 (3) provided: ""Other railway servants:- The services of other railway servants shall be liable to termination on notice on either side for the period shown below * * * * * * * *"". The Court observed: ""Just as under Rule 148 (3) the service of the railway employees to which it applied could be terminated after giving them notice for the period specified, so under Rule 149 (3) termination of services of the employees concerned can be brought about by serving them with a notice for the requisite period, or paying them their salary for the said period in lieu of notice under Rule 149(4)."" On the question that arose the Court said: ""That takes us to the question as to the true scope and effect of the provisions contained in Article 311 (2), and the decision * * * * * * * * * *"" The Court then gives the previous legislative hisotry as had been done in the case of Parshottam Lal Dhingra. 1958 SCR 828 = ( AIR 1958 SC 36 ). The ratio of the decision of the Court admittedly is contained in paragraph 26 at p. 610 of the judgment. As regards the permanent railway servants, the Court held: ""A person who substantively holds a permananet post has a right to continue in service, subject of course to the rule of superannuation and the rule as to compulsory reitrement. ""If for any other reason that right is invalid"" and he is asked to leave his service, the termination of his service must inevitably mean the defeat of his right to continue in service and as such, it is in the nature of a penalty and amounts to removal. In other words termination of the services of a permanent servant otherwise than on the ground of superannuation or compulsory reitrement, must per se amount to his removal."" (Italic is ours) (Here in "" ""). Having made the above findings, the Court held that Rules 148 (3) and 149 (3) contravened the provisions in Article 311 (2) and were, therfore, invalid. The submission on behalf of the petitioners is that we must take cognizance of the phrase ""if for any other reason that right is invaded"" as contained in the above passage. The submission is that the Supreme Court had carved out only two exceptions to the ordinary rule that the termination of service must inevitably mean the defeat of Government servants right to continue in service and as such would be in the nature of a penalty and amounted to removal. The submission is that the Supreme Court had carved out only two exceptions to the ordinary rule that the termination of service must inevitably mean the defeat of Government servants right to continue in service and as such would be in the nature of a penalty and amounted to removal. The two exceptions were the rule of superannuation and the rule as to compulsory retirement. The Advocate General has submitted that, in the above passage, the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of ParshottamLal Dhingra, 1958 SC R. 828 = ( AIR 1958 SC 36 ), relating to the Governments right to abolish posts and retrench Government servants have not ben considered. The Supre Court was not at that stage called upon to carve out all the exceptions to the rule that the termination of service must per se amount to penalty. He has further submitted that, in fact, in the latter part of its jjudgment, the Supreme Court has considered the relevant observations in the case of Parshottam Lal Dhingra, 1958 SCR 828 = ( AIR 1958 SC 36 ), and has approved of the same. (17) In the majority judgment in paragraph 40 at p. 614 the following is quoted from the majority judgment in Parshottam Lal Dhingras case, 1958 SCR 828 = ( AIR 1958 SC 36 ):- ""In the absence of any special contract, the substantive appointment to a permanent post gives the servant so appointed a right to hold the post until under the rules, he attain the age of suprannuation or is compulsorily retired after having put in the prescribed number of years service, ""or the post is abolished"" and his service cannot be terminated except by way of punishment for misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or any other disqualification found against him on proper enquiry after due notice to him."" (Italic is ours) (Here in "" ""). The Court then observed: ""Reading these two observations together, there can be no doubt that with the exception of appointments held under speical contract, the Court took the view that wherever a civil servant was appointed to a permanent post substantively, he had a right to hold that post until he reached the age of superannuation or was compulsorily retired ""or the post was abolished"" * * * * * * *"" (Italic is ours) (Here in "" ""). In paragraph 41 at p. 615, the Court quoted from Parshottam Lal Dhingra's case, 1958 SC R. 828 = ( AIR 1958 SC 36 ) the following: ""It has already been said that where a person is appointed substantively to a permanent post in Government service, he normally acquires a right to hold the post until under the rule he attains the age of superannuation or is compulsorily reitred and in the absence of a contract, express or implied, or a service rule, 'he cannot be turned out of his post unless the post itself is abolished, or unless he is guilty of misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualifications and appropriate proceedings are taken under the service rules read with Article 311 (2). Termination of service of such a servant so appointed must per se be a punishment, for it operates as a forfeiture of the servant's rights and brings about a premature end of his employment"". (Italic (here into ' ') is ours). Now, in disapproving of a part of the observations from the abovequoted passage in the case of Parshottam Lal Dhingra. 1958 SCR 828 = ( AIR 1958 SC 36 ), the Court observed as follows:- ""The learned Chief justice * * * * * * * * * has made 'two' significant additions * * * * * * * ""he refers to a contract or service rules which may permit the authority to terminate the services of a permanent servant without taking the case under Article 311 (2), though such termination may not amount to ordinary or compulsory retirement. ""The absence of contract, express or implied, or a service rule which has been introduced' in the present statement are not to be found in the earlier statements * * * * * and additions of these two clauses apparently is due to the fact that the learned Chief Justice considered Rule 49 and the explanations attached thereto and brought them into the discussion of a permanent servant, and that, we venture to think, is not strictly correct"". (Italic (here into ' ') is ours). (Italic (here into ' ') is ours). The Supreme Court quoted the following further passage from Parshottam Lal Dhingra's case, 1958 SCR 828 = ( AIR 1958 SC 36 ), in the next paragraph; ""As already stated, if the servant has got a right to continue in the post, then, unless the contract of employment or the rules provide to the contrary, his services cannot be terminated otherwise than for misconduct, negligence, inefficiently or other good and sufficient cause * * * * * * *"". and observed:- ""With respect, we wish to make the same comment about this statement which we have already made about the statement just cited."" We have in some detail referred to the above passages from the judgment in Moti Ram Deka's case, AIR 1964 SC 600 in order to find out if the observations in the case of Parshottam Lal Dhingra, 1958 SCR 828 = ( aIR 1958 SC 36 ) relating to the termination of service of a Government servant upon abolition of his post have been disapproved of by the Court in Moti Ram Deka's case, AIR 1964 SC 600 and/or whether these observations have ceased to be binding on us. We have given anxious consideration to the questionand have come to the conclusion that, in fact, in Moti Ram Deka's case,. AIR 1964 SC 600 , the majority judgment does not refer to the third exception specifically mentioned in Parshottam Lal Dhingra/s case, 1958 SCR 828 = ( AIR 1958 SC 36 ), viz. ""unless the post itself is abolished"" in the above passage where the ""two significant additions"" have been disapproved of. The above third exception, therefore, may justifiably be held to have been approved of. In any of event, it cannot be held to have been disapproved of and the law of the third exception as enunciated in Parshottam Dhingra's case, 1958 SCR 828 = ( AIR 1958 SC 36 ), must be held to be binding. (18) It is significant that whilst dealing with the Additional Solicitor General's contention that the Rules 148 and 149 of the Railway Code only provided for cases of termination of services simpliciter in cases where rule provided for retirement and/or posts were abolished, the Court had an opportunity to disapprove of this third exception, viz. termination of service arising on abolition of post but the Court did not do so. termination of service arising on abolition of post but the Court did not do so. (See paragraph 33 of the judgment). This supports our conclusions mentioned in the foregoing paragraph. (19) This conclusion derives support from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Champaklal v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 1854 . In paragraph 11 at page 1861 the Court observed: ""One reason for terminating the services of a temporary servant may be that the post he is holding comes toan end. In that case there is nothing further to be said and his services terminate whe the post comes the an end"". This decision reaffirms the previous view of the Supre Court that termination of service simpliciter consequent upon cessation and abolition of post does not attract provisions in Article 311 (2). (20) It is clear that Subba Rao, J. (Now Chief Justice ) in his judgment in Moti Ram Deka's case. Air 1964 SC 600 ascertained afresh the true meaning of the phrases 'dismissal"" and ""removal"" and arrived at a dissenting conclusion in respect of ""rules relating to compulsory retirement"" and observed in respect of retrenchment, abolition of post and compulsory retirement that ""if an opportunity is given * * * * * * * * *to show cause against the proposed action, he may plead and establish that either there was no genuine retrenchment or abolition of post or that others should go before him"". These findings are not adopted by the majority and are with respect, contrary to the other bidning decisions of the Supreme Court referred to by us. (21) Following the majority decision in Moti Ram Deka's case, Air 1964 SC 600 and the other binding decisions of the Supreme Court we hold that abolition of posts does not involve ""removal"" from service within the meaning of Article 311 and does not involve punishment at all. As the descharge from service indicated in the impugned notices is to result upon abolition of posts, the petitioners wre not entitled to any opportunity to show cause against the impugned notices (and orders) of discharge. The notices are therefore not invalid as contraventing Article 311 (2) and the first contention fails. As the descharge from service indicated in the impugned notices is to result upon abolition of posts, the petitioners wre not entitled to any opportunity to show cause against the impugned notices (and orders) of discharge. The notices are therefore not invalid as contraventing Article 311 (2) and the first contention fails. (22) The second ground is that the matter of permanent allotment of surplus staff in Class III and IV Government services subsequent to the appointment day (May 1, 1962) has been specifically provided for in section 242-A which came on the Statute Book on December 15, 1962. None of the other sections in the Act deals with or makes provision for such a subsequent allotment. It is rightly pointed out that this section enables and authorises the Government to allot the surplus staff to District Services, Class III and IV of Zilla Parishads within a period of three years from the appointed day, i.e. on or before December 1, 1965. The impugned notices are for allotment of the petitioners to Class III Service in Zilla Parishad as of and from August 16, 1966, and for that very purpose terminate employment with the Government. The submission is that the three years' period from the appointed day (May 1, 1962) having expired on May 1, 1965 the Government had ceased to have any power of allotting the surplus of Zilla Parishad as from and after May 1, 1965. The impugned notices (order) allotting the petitioners having been issued after May 1, 1965, are illegal and of no effect and not binding. The allegations and submissions made in that connection in paragraph 6 of the petition have been dealt with in paragraph 9 of the affidavit in reply by denying the same. The impugned notices (order) allotting the petitioners having been issued after May 1, 1965, are illegal and of no effect and not binding. The allegations and submissions made in that connection in paragraph 6 of the petition have been dealt with in paragraph 9 of the affidavit in reply by denying the same. (23) The relevant part of section 242-A provides: ""Where consequent on the transfer or entrustment of powers and functions by or under this Act to Zilla Parishad there is foud to be surplus staff in Government offices throuhgout the State, then, notwithstanding anything contained in this Chaper, the State Government may, within a period of three years from the appointed day * * * * * *allot any of the Government officers or servants from such staff to the District Technical Service * * * * * * of the Zilla Parishad * * * * * *"" The phrases ""notwithstanding anything contained in this Chpter"" and ""within a period of three years from the appointed day"" in the section are significant. It is clear that the section makes a specific provision in connection with the staff determined as surplus subsequent to the appointed day. It is clear that the power to allot such surplus staff to the services of Zilla Parishads is directed to be exercised within a period of three years from the appointed day. It is clear that any other provisiion int Act enabling the Government to allot the surplus staff to Zilla Parishad has been withdrawn and the power is restricted and limited to be exercised within a period of three years from the appointed day. This being a specific provision in respect of the staff determined and ascertained as surplus and to be allotted after the appointed day to Zilla Parishad, it applies in all particulars to the cases of the petitioners and all other members of the staff who have been ascertained as surplus staff subsequent to the appointed day. (24) It is well established that when specific provision in a statute is applicable to a particular set of facts, anyother general provisions in respect of the same matter in the same statute cannot be held to be applicable to those facts. The matter must be held to be governed by the specific provision. (24) It is well established that when specific provision in a statute is applicable to a particular set of facts, anyother general provisions in respect of the same matter in the same statute cannot be held to be applicable to those facts. The matter must be held to be governed by the specific provision. Having regard to the above finding and the fact that the petitioners were ascertained surplus staff to be allotted after the appointed day, we have no doubt that the only power enabling the Government to allot the petitioners to Zilla Parishads was contained in section 242-A of the Act. The Government was under that section entitled to allot the surplus staff to Zilla Parishads withi a period of three years from the appointed day i.e. on or before May 1, 1965. The purported exercise of the powers contained in this section for allotting the petitioners and other persons similarly situated to Zilla Parishads as on and from August 16, 1966, is not in consonance with the provisions in the section. The Government had therefore, no power to allot the petitioners and persons similarly situated to Zilla Parishad on and after May 1, 1965. (25) In this connection, the learned Advocate General relied upon the preamble and sections 103, 242, 244 and 253-A and the general scheme of the Act and contended that the scheme and the sections clearly envisaged that different works of National Extension Schemes and Block Development Projects were from time to time intended to be transferred to Zilla Parishads even subsequent to the appointed day (May 1, 1962). Section 253-A which by an Ordinance and amending Act has since August 27, 1964 come into force made all previous allotments of Government servants to Zilla Parishads temporary and provisional. He contended that in fact up to the date of the impugned notices Government Servants had not been permantly allotted to Zilla Parishads. According to him, for these reasons, the power of the Government under section 242 read with section 244 to make ""initial appointments"" and ""permanent allotments"" of Government servants had continued even subsequent to May 1, 1965, and had not become exhuasted or lapsed as contended on behalf of the petitioners. According to him, for these reasons, the power of the Government under section 242 read with section 244 to make ""initial appointments"" and ""permanent allotments"" of Government servants had continued even subsequent to May 1, 1965, and had not become exhuasted or lapsed as contended on behalf of the petitioners. He has submitted that in construing sections 242 and 242-A, grammatical and literal construction need not be adhered to, and the rule of construction enunciated in Hayden's case and approved of by the House of Lords and accepted by the Supreme Court in several cases should be followed. He has relied upon the decisions in the cases of Attorney General v. (Prince) hanover, 1957 A. C. 436-1-3; and R. M. D. Chamarbaugwalla v. The Union of India 1957 SCR 930 : ( AIR 1957 SC 628 ) and Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 221 (11th Edition). He relies upon the facts which led to enactment of section 253-A and the fact that permanent allotments to Zilla Parishads had not been made up-to-date. (26) The provisions in sections 242, 244, 246 and 242-A and 253-A require to be read together for ascertaining the correctness of the above submission. Section 242 provides that ""Subject to the provisions of this Chapter"", such members of the services of the State Government service as are allotted * * * * *shall be taken over by Zilla Parishad * * *"" and further provides for matters of tenure and terms and conditions ofservices of the allotted staff. The proviso one in the section provides: ""Provided the terms and conditions of servicee applicable immediately before 'the appointed day'* * * * * * * *shall not be varied to"" disadvantage of such staff except with the consent of the Government. Section 244 provides that ""The initial appointment of * * * * * or servant under a Zilla Parishad or allotment * * shall be made by"" the Government or nominated Government officer. Section 246 provides that ""Nothing in the foregoing provisions shall apply to ""any servant . . . . . . Section 244 provides that ""The initial appointment of * * * * * or servant under a Zilla Parishad or allotment * * shall be made by"" the Government or nominated Government officer. Section 246 provides that ""Nothing in the foregoing provisions shall apply to ""any servant . . . . . . allotted * * * * who by notice in writting given * * * * * * before 'the appointed day' or 'as the case may beon the date of his allotment under section 242-A' * * * * * ""intimates his option of not desiring to become' * * * * * * servant of Zilla Parishad * * * * * * * * and thereupon he shall be permitted to retire from Government service * * * and shall be entitled tosuch termial benefits * * * * * * * * * as may be prescribed * * * * *"". Subsequently enacted section 242-A provides for allotment within 3 years from the appointed day as already noticed. Section 253-A still subsequently enacted provides for provisionsal allotment for a limited period. (Italic (here in ' ') is ours). It is clear to us that power with Government to make ""initial allotment"" of the Government servants and the consequence thereof have to be gathered from the contents of the Ss. 242 and 244. It appears to us that the Legislature had intended that District Services for each of the Zilla Parishads should be constituted and the orders for initial appointments and allootments of the Government servants to Zilla Parishads should be made respectively under sections 229, 242 and 244 so as to come into effect as on and from the ""appointed day"" (May 1, 1962). The phrases ""the appointed day"" in the provisio one to section 242 and section 246 and ""initial"" in section 244 go to show that above is the true effect and construction of these sections in respect of the scheme of allotment contained therein. It is in this connection important to remember tht under Section 246 anabsolute right to claim retirement by giving one month's notice in writing is conferred on the allotted Government servant. The one month period commences with the ""appointed day"" in respect of initially allotted servants whilst in respect of servant subsequently allotted under section 242 -A, it starts with a subsequent date of allotment. The one month period commences with the ""appointed day"" in respect of initially allotted servants whilst in respect of servant subsequently allotted under section 242 -A, it starts with a subsequent date of allotment. Under section 242, Zilla Parishads are compelled to accept and take over allotted servants whilst under section 242-A would be illusory and negatived if it is held that section 242 empowered the Government to make allotments after the appointed day. The provisions in that section are in fact subject to the provisions in the rest of the Chapter XIV including the sections 242-A, 244 and 253-A. We are, therefore, unable to accept the submissions made as above on behalf of the Government. The fact that the Government had as on and from May 1962 transfered works to Zilla Parishads and treated all Government servants engaged in those works as initially allotted to Zilla Parishads cannot be disputed. The initial allotments were challenged in Special Civil Application No. 23 of 1964 and the Government then treated the initial allotments as invalid. In that very connection,section 253-A was enacted. These facts, however, cannot alter our conclusion that the provisions in sections 242 and 244 are not applicable to the allotment which could only be made under section 242-A. (27) In the result, we accept the contention that the purported allotment of the petitioers to the services of Zilla Parishads as of and from August 16, 1966, is in contravention of section 242-A and is therefore invalid and of no effect. (28) The third contention is that the impugned resolution dated March 18, 1966, as clarified by the two circular letters dated April 16, 1966, contain two standards to be followed for rtrenchment of incumbents of surplus posts differently for (1) permanent servants and (2) temporary servants. The submission is that there is not rational basis for classification of permanent servants and temporary servants differently, and there is no nexus between such classification and the object of retrenchment. The two standards allowed to be followed leave the matter of application of either standard to the discretion of the Collectors arbitrarily. One or the other of the above standards has been applied by different Collectors. The Collectors have been left with the discretion of picking and choosing from amongst the Government servants for their removal and retrenchment arbitrarily. The two standards allowed to be followed leave the matter of application of either standard to the discretion of the Collectors arbitrarily. One or the other of the above standards has been applied by different Collectors. The Collectors have been left with the discretion of picking and choosing from amongst the Government servants for their removal and retrenchment arbitrarily. The result has been that seniors are discharged and juniors are retained in several districts including Dhulia. The submissions is that the scheme contained in the impugned resolution as clarified by the above two circular letters permits unwarranted discrimination in the matter of retrenchment and is violative of the provisions of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution (29) Before referring to the relevant facts, it is convenient to notice the scheme of retrenchment contained in the above resolution and the two clarifactory circular letters. The relevant provisions in these documents are as follows. In paragraph 1 of the resolution, it is recited that, in the subsequent paragraph, directions are given for final allotment to the Zilla Parishads of Class III of Class IV Government servants borne on the cadrea of posts, the duties and functions of which have partly or wholly been permanently transferred to Zilla Parishads. The second paragraph directs that final allotment to Zilla Parishads should be made to the extent permanent and temporary posts are rendered surplus as a result of transfer of Government's activities to Zilla Parishads and are consequently abolished. Directions are then given regarding the method to be adipted toascertain the posts rendered surplus and consequently to be abolished. The third paragraph relates to the scheme of allotment of Class III and Class IV services to Zilla Parishads by the abolition of surplus posts. It also relates to the discharge of Class III and Class IV servants from Government service, and the sub-paragraph (2) provides as follows: ""On abolition of surplus permanent and/ or temporary posts from a concerned cadre of class service of a Government department, final allotment of a Goveenment servants to Zilla Parishads or duscharge from Government service be made in the order of their inter se juniority amongst substantuve holders of post in the case of abolitiomn of permanent posts in thecadre and inter se juniority in the whole cadre in the case of abolition of temeporary posts as the case may be. Sub-paragraph (8) contains direction for service of a notice of three months on the Government servant due to be finally alloted to Zilla Parishad and thus to accept discharge fron Government service. Sub-paragraph (4) contains the scheme for retrenchment in respect of abolished permanent and/or temporary posts of class III and IV services. The relevant part of the sub-paragraph (4) are as follows: ""Where a substantive holder of a permanent post in a cadre officiates for the time being for a temporary post in another cadre******* action should be taken as under: (a) If he is due to be finally alloted both with reference to his officiating temporary post and his substantive post, he should be finally alloted to Zilla Parishads********. (B) If he due to be finally alloted with reference to his officiating temporary post but not his substantive post, he should opt in writing for (1) being finally alloted to Zilla Parishad or (2) being retained in Government service after reversion. If necessary to a suitable post. (C) If he due to be finally alloted with reference to his substantive post but not his officiating temporary post, he should opt in writing (1) being finally alloted to Zilla Parishad of (2) being retained in Government services in the post he is officiating on a purely temporary basis and after forfeiting unconditionally all his claims to his substantive post."" Paragraph 4 provides that final allotment to Zilla Parishads or the action in lieu of such allotment should take effect not later than August 16 1966. The two clarificatory circular letters dated April 16, 1996 inter alia contain the following instructions. Paragraph 1 in the first letter points out that the scheme in paragraph 3 of the resolution dated March 18, 1966 was decided upon on the presumption that all permenent posts in the concerned cadre would be duly substantively filled in by the time notices were due to be issued. It is further stated that it had been ascertained that, in a few cadres, a large number of permanent post had been meant to be substantively filled in and that the failure to carry out confirmations in a large number of permanent posts in a few cadres was likely affect the purpose underlying the scheme to final allotment. The Government had, therefore, re-examined the position. The Government had, therefore, re-examined the position. The Government , therefore, clarified that an abolition of surplus permanent posts from a concerned cadre which had not been substantively filled in final allotment of Government servants to Zilla Parishads or discharge from Government service should be made in the order of inter se juniority in the whole cadre. In that connection, the Government directed that sub-paragraph (4) of paragraph 3 of the resolution dated March 18, 1966 would be applicable in cases where surplus permenant posts were not substantively filled in on the footing that the word ""temporary"" in sub-paragraph (4) was deleted. In the second circular letter, in view of the instructions in thefirst circular letter, instructions were given as regards Government servants who should be given notice to final allotment to Zilla Parishads in respect of surplus permanent posts not filled in and substantively vacant. The instructions contained in paragraph 2 are as follows: ""If the number of surplus substantive holders of permanent posts borne on a concerned cadre is less than the nuber of surplus permanent posts borne on the cadre,persons to whom notice are final allotment should be given against surplus permanent posts that are substantively cacant will be from among the junior-most permanent or temporary Goverment service officiating in the cadre and notices in the proper form should forthwith be issued to permanent persons who are junior-most as stated above among the officiating personnel in the cadre as stated above."" Notices are directed to be served not later than April 23, 1966. (30) It appears that the scheme for retrenchment as contained in the above resolution and the two clarificatory circular letters provides as follows. On abolition of permanent surplus post from a concerned cadre of class III and IV services, discharge from services must be made in the order of inter se juniority amongst the substantive holders of posts in the cadre. In the case of abolition of temporary posts, discharge from service must be in the order frm inter se juniority in the whole cadre. Government servants who are thus liable to be discharged should be finally alloted to Zilla Parishads with an option not to accept allotment and there retire the Government service. In the case of abolition of temporary posts, discharge from service must be in the order frm inter se juniority in the whole cadre. Government servants who are thus liable to be discharged should be finally alloted to Zilla Parishads with an option not to accept allotment and there retire the Government service. In this very connection in respect of Government servants officiating for the time being in another cadre but being substantive holders of permanent posts abolished, the question regarding permanent posts found surplus and to be abolished is to be dealt with in the manner mentioned in paragraph 4 of the resolution. For the purpose of retrenchment in respect of abolition of permanent surplus posts thestandard prescrubed under paragraph 3 (2) was inter se juniority amongst substantive holders of post in a cadre, whilst, in respect of abolition of temporary posts, the standard was inter se juniority in the whole cadre. (31) As regards the manner in which the scheme of retrenchment came to be applied in regard to permanent post of Aval Karkuns in District Dhulia, the relevant facts are as follows. Prior to April 29, 1966, he Collector of Dhulia found and held that there were 46 permanent posts of Aval Karkuns. He further found that, due to transfer of National Extension and Block Development Projects to Zilla Parishads, four of these permanent posts were rendered vacant. He further found that, in fact, 42 posts were held by permanent Aval Karkuns, Vacancies in 4 of the permanent posts had not been filled in. There were 4 permanent posts of Aval Karkuns that were surplus and to be abolished. The 4 vacancies not filled in had arisen because (1) S. D. Deshmukh, the holder of the post, lost lien on the post, (2) U. A. Choudhary, and (3) L. C. Choudhary were appointed to other substantive posts, and (4) B. R. PATIL had retired. The Collector further found that A. D. Sali and the 3 petitioners were the senior-most provisionally substantively confirmed Aval Karkuns entitled to become substantively confirmed Aval Karkuns in the above four vacancies. He, therefore passed directions substantively confirming A. D. Sali and 3 petitioners in the permanent post of Aval Karkuns respectively as from April 1, 1963, February 1, 1965 and February 18 and 19 , 1966. He, therefore passed directions substantively confirming A. D. Sali and 3 petitioners in the permanent post of Aval Karkuns respectively as from April 1, 1963, February 1, 1965 and February 18 and 19 , 1966. The result of these directions was that there were 46 substantive holders of 46 permanent posts of Aval Karkuns. Four of these posts were rendered surplus and to be abolished. To carry out retrenchment of four posts, he served notices of discharge on A. D. Sali and the 3 petitioners each dated April 5, 1966. The 3 petitioners received these notices on April 14, 1966. The scheme of retrenchment that was followed in the case of these four occupants of permanent posts was in accordance with the directions contained in paragraph 3 (2) of the resolution dated March 18, 1966. These four persons (including the petitioners) were selected for discharge, because they were junior-most among the substantive holders of posts in the cadre from which four posts were determined surplus and to be abolished as on and for August 16, 1965. (32) Difficulties subsequently and after the date of the above notices of discharge, arose as follows. By an order dated September 7, 1965, the Government had made new permanent posts of Class III services in respect of occupants of these posts in the office of the Commissioner , Bombay Division. The posts which were made permanent were: (1) Aval Karkun . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . 11 (2) Senior Clerks in Aval . . . . . . . . Karkun's grade . . . . . . . .. . . . . .3 (3) Clerk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The above 11 posts of Aval Karkuns working in the office of the Commissioner, Bombay Division, were liable to be distributed in the districts in the Bombay Division on the basis of ratio of non-gazetted permanent post of each category in each district to the total number of non-gazetted permanent posts of such category in all the districts in the Division. The Commissioner had not distributed these posts in the 7 districts in the Bombay Division on the above basis until April 29, 1966. The Commissioner had not distributed these posts in the 7 districts in the Bombay Division on the above basis until April 29, 1966. By the order dated April 29, 1966, he distributed 11 permanent posts of Aval Karkuns is the 7 districts. Two of the posts came to be distributed and allocated to Dhulia District. The result was that there were in all 48 permanent posts of Aval Karkuns at Dhulia. The Collector, had, however, found and taken action and given notices of discharge to Sali and the 3 petitioners previously on the basis that there were 46 permanent posts of Aval Karkuns and not 48 as fixed as a result of the order dated April 29, 1966. This situation was met with by withdrawing notices of discharge served on A. D. Sali and petitioner No. 1, P. V. Naik, who were to the other two petitioners as holders of permanent posts of Aval Karkuns. By this method two permanent posts of Aval Karkuns stood retrenched in respect of petitioners Nos. 2 and 3. The two last permanent posts of Aval Karkuns, being 47 and 48 had remained untilled. In respect of these unfilled posts, directions for co"