This revision petition has been filed against the order of the learned Revenue Appellate Authority, Jaipur, dated 5.8.65, whereby he rejected the appeal of the petitioners against the order of the S. D. M. Ajmer, dated 30.6.65 relating to the grant of temporary injunction in respect of the suit lands. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the non-petitioners filed a suit for perpetual injunction in the court of the S.D.O., Ajmer, on 9.6.65. During the course of the proceedings an application was made under sec. 212 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act seeking a temporary injunction against the defendants-petitioners. The trial court granted a temporary injunction and after hearing both the parties made it absolute on 30.6.65. Having felt aggrieved by this order, the petitioners filed an appeal before the learned Revenue Appellate Authority who also refused to interfere with the order of the trial court on the ground that the plaintiffs-non-petitioners (respondents in the court of the Revenue Appellate Authority) bad produced the Khatauni relating to the suit lands for the St. years 2017 to 2021 as well as the girdawari for the corresponding period and the mutation sheet supported by an affidavit which showed that the plaintiffs-non-petitioners had continuously been in the physical possession of the land since St. year 2017. The present revision petition has been filed against this order. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the courts below have not followed the rule laid down in Musa vs. Badri Prasad and others (1953 ILR Raj. 257), according to which it is a well established principle in the matter of temporary injunction that a person seeking temporary injunction should be able to satisfy (i) that he has a prima facie case, (ii) that the courts interference is necessary to protect him from that species of injury which the court calls irreparable before his legal right is established by the trial court and (iii) that the comparative mischief or inconvenience which is likely to issue from withholding the injunction will be greater than that which is likely to arise from granting it. It is his contention that as many as 15 affidavits were produced by the petitioner which have not been taken into consideration. It is his contention that as many as 15 affidavits were produced by the petitioner which have not been taken into consideration. In this connection, he has specifically drawn my attention to the very laconic order of the trial court and has urged that the first appellate court should have accepted his appeal and remanded the case to the trial court to write a proper judgment in accordance with law. So far as the order of the trial court is concerned, it must be stated at the outset that it is a very laconic order and does not conform with the requirements of the rule laid down in the aforesaid authority and is, therefore, bad in law. The same, however, does not apply to the order of the learned Revenue Appellate Authority now impugned before me. In arriving at the decision to reject the appeal, the learned Revenue Appellate Authority has duly considered the documentary evidence produced by the plaintiffs-non-petitioners which is overwhelmingly in their favour and establishes that they have a prima facie case. In refusing to interfere with the order of the trial court, the learned Revenue Appellate Authority has ensured the maintenance of the status quo over the property which according to the plaintiffs-non-petitioners was in danger of being invaded by the petitioners. The scope of revision under sec. 230 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act is very limited. The Board is not expected to enter into the merits of the evidence in the exercise of its revisional powers. It is only expected to see whether the requirements of the law have been duly and properly obeyed or not. The Board should be reluctant to interfere with the concurrent decision of the lower courts unless it is shown to its satisfaction that the lower courts have acted with material irregularity in the exercise of their jurisdiction and some material injustice has been caused to the applicant. Taking these criteria into consideration, I do not find that there is any justification for interfering with the impugned order of the learned Revenue Appellate Authority. In the result, therefore, I reject this revision petition.