JUDGMENT H.R. Krishnan, J. This is an appeal by State from the judgment of acquittal in a case u/s 302, Indian Penal Code passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Rajgarh against respodent Gangabai-a young woman of about 19-20 years charged with the murder of her own sister-in-law a girl of about 9 years in course of a quarrel during Which the Respondent was insisting on running away from her husband's village to her parental home, and the young sister-in-law was trying to present her. In this case we have the problem of sufficiency or otherwise of circumstantial evidence which ultimately is one relating to facts. However, on a number of the usual questions the views of the learned Additional Sessions Judge have been reconsidered. They, are, for example, the effect of extra-judicial and judicial confessions in the circumstances to be set out, a plea in respect of facts with an avoidance of the effect, the nature of a discovery or pointing out to neighbours before the police arrest the accused, the admissibility of hearsay evidence as something introducing or explaining the conduct of witnesses before the Court, and the effect of admitting the serologist's report after the accused bad been examined; There is nothing new about these problems; but this case though a simple one has several of them posed at the same time. The common ground in this case is the following: The Respondent, as already noted a young woman of less than 20 years had been for a few years married to one Chunni in the village Mundli. Her own place was at some distance where lived her father and mother who having given this girl in natre to Chunni for a bride-price which has been mentioned as 1,000, were no; at all events exerting themselves to see that the girl went to her husband and lived with him. On more than one occasion she had gone back to her parents' place and the husband had not succeeded in taking her with him. However, about a fortnight before the happening on 10-10-1964 which is the subject-matter of the case the husband had ultimately succeeded in bringing her to live with him There is an indication that there was an element of force on this occasion. The attitude of this woman was not unknown to the villagers' who naturally sympathised with the husband. However, about a fortnight before the happening on 10-10-1964 which is the subject-matter of the case the husband had ultimately succeeded in bringing her to live with him There is an indication that there was an element of force on this occasion. The attitude of this woman was not unknown to the villagers' who naturally sympathised with the husband. Advised by him they were on a general look-out against the fleeing of this woman; the husband's own relations of course were especially careful. Shortly before mid day on 10-10 1964 Gangabai the Respondent went to bathe in a river or nalla a short distance from the village. She said so to her elder sister-in-law while the younger,-a girl of about 9 or 10 years called Gulab-went with her. They were seen together by a villager. It is not clear whether the girl went unsuspectingly or she was from the beginning on guard against any attempt by the Respondent to run away to her parents as she had done on previous occasions; certainly her sympathies were with her elder brother and she would, if any occasion arose, do her little best to prevent the flight of her sister in-law. The girl was never seen alive afterwards. Shortly after one boy named Prabhu informed several villagers that he had seen the Respondent walking away in the direction of village Mandor it being in fact the direction of the village of her own parents. Naturally the villagers got suspicious that she was again on flight and going up to her stopped her and asked her to come back and explain. In course of their talk the woman took them to a place where the corpse of the girl was lying with a number of stab injuries by some sharp pointed weapon which could have been a scythe. Her husband was informed and he went and gave the first information report. The police arrived and on the night itself put her under watch though the formal arrest was in course of the next day, the actual time on the Panchanama being 1-0 P. M. Soon after the arrest the woman gave information and taking the police officer and the Panchas to near where the corpse had been shown by her on the previous day took out a scythe from under the grass. This was only a few places away from where the corpse had been found but while the latter had been lying in the open this had been concealed. This scythe being sent for chemical and serological examination was found to have blood stains-stains turning out to be those of human origin. In addition the personal apparel of the woman had also been taken and when examined in a similar manner was found to have marks of human blood. About a week after her arrest most of which time she was in the judicial lock up, the woman expressed a desire to confess and made a confession which was recorded. That of course has been since retracted. 6 When the case came up to the Court of Session and the woman was called upon to plead she stated that she had hit Gulab with a 'dantla' (scythe) but had not really wanted to kill her. The Court treated it as a plea of not guilty and proceeded to try the case. In course of the trial, however, the woman denied having had anything to do with the killing of Gulab, retracted all her earlier statements and asserted that she had been implicated falsely. The Court examined every one of the pieces of evidence and for what might be called discrepancies and contradictions refused to believe the story and giving the Respondent benefit of doubt recorded an acquittal. The first stage of the happening was when as it is alleged this woman and the murdered girl were seen going together in the direction of the nalla. One witness (Ramprasad P. W. 2) claims to have seen them actually while another witness-the elder sister-in-law (P.W. 8) did not see her go but was informed by the Respondent that she and Gulab wore going to the nalla; a sister-in-law till then on good terms and living in a neighbouring house she was the very person to whom in due course the Respondent would have told of her going to the nalla. Ramprasad himself impresses us as speaking truth but he has been disbelieved, or at any rate held to be doubtful, after a long discussion of what we should call unimportant and almost trivial discrepancies. We would believe Ramprasad and as for Gopilal who was with him for some time not remarking the movements of the two women there is nothing unusual in it. We would believe Ramprasad and as for Gopilal who was with him for some time not remarking the movements of the two women there is nothing unusual in it. At that time there was no special reason why anybody must have remarked these movements. The only thing is that Ramprasad actually remembered it and Gopilal was not quite so sure. The next stage is very important. Soon after, a boy of the village naned Prabhu comes and tells several villagers like Ramprasad himself, Babulal, Gangaram and Rodji that the woman was walking away in the direction of Mandor. Now this child witness about 7 years of age was put into the witness box but was found too nervous to give any statement. Therefore, as direct evidence of the boy's seeing the woman run away this is of no value. But hearing this these villagers went in that direction and succeeded in overtaking and stopping the woman. That is not part of what Prabhu had stated; that at all events is admissible. The learned Additional Sessions Judge's logic seems to be that because Prabhu was not examined bis statement as such would be hearsay which is of course correct. Further, whatever the villagers did followed the statement which now turns out to be hearsay and accordingly is not admissible which view is certainly wrong. Hearsay evidence is admissible for certain purposes. For example, when it introduces or explains a piece of conduct or a course of action taken by the witness before the Court it can certainly be looked into not so as to examine its truth or otherwise but to establish a connection between it and the conduct of the witnesses. In this case, for example, we are not in a position to say whether or not Prabhu spoke the truth when he went and reported to the villagers that the Respondent was walking away in a particular direction; but we have certainly to see whether these villagers themselves went in that direction and overtaking the woman stopped her, and if they did. why exactly they took it into their heads to take that course of action. Looked at that way, the alleged report given by Prabhu is evidence for this limited purpose. why exactly they took it into their heads to take that course of action. Looked at that way, the alleged report given by Prabhu is evidence for this limited purpose. We do not at all agree that because it was not possible to examine Prabhu we should also reject evidence of the conduct of those who are actually before us in the Court and who did certain things on hearing Prabhu's report. Apart from the question of admissibility, the main problem for us is to decide whether when these villagers went in that direction they did find the Respondent herself alone going in the direction of village Mandor. On that we have several witnesses and in addition the fact that first information report was given based on what they reported to Chunni when the woman was stopped. All of them are certain that when they stopped the woman she was alone and she was anxious to leave and had to be stopped by show of force. Then they say she gave a statement explaining the absence of Gulab. That of course was of the nature of extra-judicial confession and while that is admissible it should be examined with all the prudence and caution prescribed for the scrutiny of such confessions. 10 An extra-judicial confession is most often a very weak piece of evidence. But the point is it is not just nothing and there may be circumstances in which it may be of more probative value than it usually is. The first disability is that whenever there is an extra-judicial confession by the time it comes to the Court we are not in a position to know in what actual words the accused had spoken. Some shade of emphasis this way or that, some gesture or some short words that might have escaped the notice or had been forgotten by the witness, might make all the difference. As far as the actual wording goes, the longer and the more complicated the story of the confession the greater such danger and naturally the less the value of the extra-judicial confession. But where the story is short and simple this disability is less serious. Here, for example, all the witnesses are certain of the following circumstances. As far as the actual wording goes, the longer and the more complicated the story of the confession the greater such danger and naturally the less the value of the extra-judicial confession. But where the story is short and simple this disability is less serious. Here, for example, all the witnesses are certain of the following circumstances. Seeing the Respondent alone one or more of the arrivals there asked her what had happened to Gulab which, confession or no confession, is the most natural question which every villager would ask. Then the story is that the woman said that Gulab had tried to stop her from going away to her village and there had been a struggle in which she had hit her with a 'dantla'. Naturally the villagers are curious about where Gulab or her body was and the woman takes them to a short distance to a patch of grass ('bir') and points to it. Thus while there are the usual disabilities of the extra-judicial confession in this case as well this is slightly more reliable than such confessions usually are, because there is independent corroboration by the fact of the woman's knowing where the corpse lay and that too immediately or shortly after the murder. Still this has been retracted and cannot be rated very high. A significant point in this connection is that the indicating of Gulab's corpse was not in any sense a discovery and none of course as envisaged in Section 27 of the Evidence Act. For one thing, it was an open place and for another, the woman had not been arrested. This takes us to the next stage in which the woman discovered the concealed weapon while she was in police custody. The course of events is clear though there are one or two points of vagueness in the estimate of time which, however, are not of much significance. Sometime at night the police arrived and the woman was taken in charge. She was kept under watch but formal arrest with the usual memorandum was made only in course of the next day. Anyway, at this stage she seems to have said that she could take the people by daylight to where she had concealed the weapon in the grass. Nothing more was done on that night and this information, whatever it was worth, was not pursued at that moment. Anyway, at this stage she seems to have said that she could take the people by daylight to where she had concealed the weapon in the grass. Nothing more was done on that night and this information, whatever it was worth, was not pursued at that moment. After the preliminaries were finished there was the formal arrest at about 1-0 P. M. after which the woman's information was recorded before the panchas, the relevant part of which runs- I have concealed a dantla (scythe) in the grass near that place (where Gulab's corpse had been found). i can give it to you if you come with me. Accordingly she went with the police officer and the panchas and took it out from under the grass not far away from the spot where the corpse had been found on the previous day It is difficult to see what irregularly had been committed in the making of the discovery or the admission of the statement that had led the lower Court to reject it. All that can be said was that the information was repeated once at night and again at day-time; but that was only one information and there was only one discovery. Again, the position in regard to the discovery of the dantla is different from that in regard to the pointing out of the corpse because the latter had not been "concealed" in any proper sense. What is significant is that the dantla on chemical and serological examination was found to have blood-blood of human origin. Apropos of the serologist's report, a somewhat unusual situation has been pointed out which calls for examination. The accused was examined in the Sessions Court on 14-12-1964. Already the chemical examiner's report was there regarding the blood marks on the dantla and also on the clothing which, however, we are not taking seriously for reasons that will be presently stated. Anyway in that examination there is no question regarding the human origin of the blood on the dantla, naturally so because the report of the serologist was exhibited by the public prosecutor on 16 12-1964 after the accused had been examined. Certainly it had been prepared at Calcutta and on the 30th November which is in fact the date of the forwarding letter and must have in due course reached the Sessions Court by the 7th or the 10th of December. Certainly it had been prepared at Calcutta and on the 30th November which is in fact the date of the forwarding letter and must have in due course reached the Sessions Court by the 7th or the 10th of December. Yet it came on record only after the examination of the accused as a result of which there was no pointed question put to her as to the human origin of the blood on the dantla which according to her information she had concealed in the grass. The judgment itself was delivered still later so that there was time for the Court if it had so desired to call the accused from jail and question her about the new material which was going into the record without any formality. The trouble was not much. In any event in every such case where a piece of evidence comes after the examination of the accused he has to be recalled and the new material put before him so that he could explain. As far as this case is concerned, there has been no doubt an irregularity though obviously a small one because there is nothing special in the serological report on which the accused could have given an explanation. Having failed to explain the existence of the blood marks themselves it was not likely that there would be an explanation of the origin. Still we offered learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent here a chance of getting her explanation on this point; but it was declined. Thus the theoretical prejudice by the eon-examination of the Respondent on this particular point has been remedied and there is nothing more to be said about it. We need dispose of briefly the blood-marks on the clothing of the Respondent. There is no doubt about these marks and of their human origin. What however worries us in this and in similar cases is the almost general omission of the investigating authorities to mention the location, shape and size of the blood patches. Often we have pointed out that a mere statement that the personal clothing of so and so had marks of human blood is not very helpful. Most often the accused persons belong to a class which do scratch or slightly wound themselves in course of their daily avocation. Often we have pointed out that a mere statement that the personal clothing of so and so had marks of human blood is not very helpful. Most often the accused persons belong to a class which do scratch or slightly wound themselves in course of their daily avocation. Many of them are also not particularly clean in their habits or accustomed to change clothing or even to wash them thoroughly. Thus the blood marks found on the clothing might be their own-received even without their knowledge and allowed to remain in part. What Courts should see is whether the blood marks are such that by their size, shape and location they indicate that they came from some other person and that too in course of an attack in which the blood of the latter was shed. By that standard we are unable to say anything about these blood marks. The next piece of evidence is the confession before the Magistrate which has been retracted. Actually we are not making any use of it as prosecution evidence and in fact there is nothing in that confession which is not found in the Sessions Judge's record of the plea to the charge. Still there are one or two points in the judgment of Sessions Court in this regard which call for discussion. The learned Additional Sessions Judge seems to think that the mere fact of a policeman bringing the accused to the Magistrate's Court is an indication that the witness was under police pressure. In another part of the judgment the fact that after the recording of the confession the Magistrate asked the police guard to take the Respondent back to the lock-up is dealt with as if he had sent back the confessing accused to police custody which is of course quite improper and which goes against the accepting of the confession itself. It is inevitable that the bringing of the accused from jail to the Court and back again is to be done by the police and in small places the police officers may turn out to be the members of the station police at times the very station which has been investigating the particular crime. But that by itself is not an indication either of police pressure or of the persons being placed back in police custody; actually police custody has nothing to do with it. But that by itself is not an indication either of police pressure or of the persons being placed back in police custody; actually police custody has nothing to do with it. All that we have to see is whether the Magistrate or other authority recording the confession has given sufficient time to let the accused think over the matter and understand the consequences of making a confession. In plain words, everything is done to dissuade any hasty or rash confession which may be the result of pressure or hope of reward or light punishment or even the restlessness which is felt by even innocent persons in jail. The proper course as in fact, it is the most common, is to get the accused produced on one occasion and having administered the usual cautions send him back to the judicial lock up with a direction that he might be brought on the next day. It is also advisable whenever possible to inform the jail staff about it and request them to see that as far as possible the particular under-trial is kept away from the noise and confusion of the jail and particularly away from those who might be influencing him. Then on the next day the accused might be sent for and asked whether he had really thought of the matter bearing in mind what the Magistrate had told him on the previous day. These steps are not the express requirements of law; but they are principles of prudence which go a long way to give us the assurance that the confession has not been the result of haste or pressure. In the instant case there does seem to have been some sort of instruction to the jail staff on the previous day that they might keep this undertrial apart from the others. But that was not done after the Magistrate's caution. On that day itself some time was certainly given to the accused to think of the matter in the light of the caution administered by the Magistrate; but it was only part of the day, may be, something like an hour or two. But that was not done after the Magistrate's caution. On that day itself some time was certainly given to the accused to think of the matter in the light of the caution administered by the Magistrate; but it was only part of the day, may be, something like an hour or two. Where it is not possible to follow completely the suggestions of prudence laid down above, part of the day might be considered sufficient to enable the confessing accused to think of the whole matter; but in the instant case there was no hurry and the confession could without any serious damage to the cause of justice have waited for the next day. All things considered therefore and for reasons different from those given by the trial Court we would not take this confession seriously. The next stage was the trial in the Sessions Court where of course the accused was produced to begin with, given an account of the case and the charge against her, whereupon she stated that she had in fact hit Gulab with a dantla but had not really wanted to kill her. Certainly it cannot be said that this was the result of any inducement or threat. The learned Sessions Judge very properly treated this as a plea of not guilty to the charge of murder and proceeded with the trial. Later on, however, the accused stated that she had pleaded like that under pressure; but this is far from convincing. The total result of the foregoing discussion is that on 10-10-1964 Gulab was murdered by being hit several times with a scythe, six wounds being near her neck. The death must have been immediate and whoever attacked her was guilty of murder. The total result of the foregoing discussion is that on 10-10-1964 Gulab was murdered by being hit several times with a scythe, six wounds being near her neck. The death must have been immediate and whoever attacked her was guilty of murder. This Respondent was seen going away with her for a bath shortly before the corpse was found ; soon after she was also going away alone in a direction farther away from the village, she made certain statements to the villagers who stopped her, and whether or not we take them into account she drew their attention to where Gulab was lying murdered; it was not a discovery but it showed that the woman knew or was the earliest, or at any rate one of the earliest, to know that the girl had been murdered; on the next day she gave a statement that led to the discovery of a scythe which could have been used for the killing of the girl and which was found to have marks of human blood. These circumstances are sufficient to show beyond reasonable doubt that the Respondent was the person who had hit the girl Gulab with a scythe. In addition and confirmatory of this conclusion are the extra-judicial confessions and also the statement given to the Sessions Judge in reply to the charge; but whether we take these into account or not, the result is the same. Coming to the section applicable, we have no doubt it was a case of murder. Certainly the woman may not have directly intended, that is to say, directly desired that the girl should die. All that she wanted was that the girl should not obstruct or create a commotion which would prevent her from going away to her parent's place. But the fact still remains that she hit with a scythe as many as eight times on different parts of the body. Actually the blows had fractured the spine in the region of the treachea. Therefore the woman had every reason to know whether or not she desired the death of the girl that it was the only possible result in due course of nature. Accordingly we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of acquittal and convict the Respondent Gangabai w/o Chunni u/s 302, Indian Penal Code. Therefore the woman had every reason to know whether or not she desired the death of the girl that it was the only possible result in due course of nature. Accordingly we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of acquittal and convict the Respondent Gangabai w/o Chunni u/s 302, Indian Penal Code. All told, it was a very unfortunate case of a young woman trying to flee away from her husband and the latter for his part adopting somewhat blunt methods in trying to win and keep her. From the view-point of the Respondent the girl was no more than a spy on her movements. All thing considered, this is a case in which the extreme penalty is not indicated. We accordingly award the sentence of imprisonment for life on the Respondent. Final Result : Allowed