JUDGMENT Rajeshwari Prasad, J. - This is a defendant's appeal. The plaintiff brought a suit giving rise to this second appeal, seeking a decree for the ejectment of the defendant as a tenant from the premises in suit as well as a decree for recovery of rent; pendente life and future mesne profits. 2. One of the grounds on which the claim of the plaintiff was resisted was that the defendant was protected by the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act of 1954. It was contended that there was no liability for ejectment of the defendant before expiry of two years period from the date of issue of sale certificate in favour of the plaintiff. 3. The lower appellate court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the decree passed by the trial court. 4. The only question in the second appeal before me is whether the suit was premature in view of the provision to Sec. 29 of the aforesaid Act. 5. The sale certificate was issued on the 20th October 1956. As held by the Supreme Court in Messrs Bombay Salt and Chemical Industries v. L. J. Johnson, A.I.R. 1958 SC 289 and also by this Court transfer of property would take place only on the issue of sale certificate. It is therefore clear that the plaintiff-respondent became owner of the property as from 20th October, 1956. As held by the Supreme Court in Messrs Bombay Salt and Chemical Industries v. L. J. Johnson, A.I.R. 1958 SC 289 and also by this Court transfer of property would take place only on the issue of sale certificate. It is therefore clear that the plaintiff-respondent became owner of the property as from 20th October, 1956. The proviso to Sec. 29(1) of the aforesaid Act lays down as follows: - "Provided that notwithstanding anything contained in any such terms and condition, no such person shall be liable to be ejected from the property during such period not exceeding two years as may be prescribed in respect of that class of property, except on any of the following ground: - (a) that he has neither paid nor tendered the whole amount of arrears of rent due after the date of the transfer within one month of the date on which the notice of demand has been served on him by the transferee in the manner provided in Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882; (b) that he has without obtaining the consent of the transferee in writing: - (i) sublet or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the property, or (ii) used the property for a purpose other than the purpose for which he was using it immediately before the transfer, (c) that he has committed any act which is destructive of, or permanently injurious to the property." 6. On an examination of the plaintiff's claim, it appears that the suit for ejectment has not been filed on any of the grounds given in Clauses (a) (b) and (c) of the proviso to Sec. 29 (1). Suit has been filed on the allegation that permission to file the suit has already been obtained from the District Magistrate. Therefore, the only question which arises is whether a suit for ejectment could be filed before the expiry of two years from the date of the issue of sale certificate which was on the 30th October 1956. 7. The lower appellate court has observed that a mere filing of the suit does not make a party liable to ejectment, and that it is only after a decree is passed, one is liable to ejectment in execution of that decree. Having said so, the lower appellate court came to the conclusion that the suit was not premature. 7. The lower appellate court has observed that a mere filing of the suit does not make a party liable to ejectment, and that it is only after a decree is passed, one is liable to ejectment in execution of that decree. Having said so, the lower appellate court came to the conclusion that the suit was not premature. 8. I am afraid I cannot agree with the view taken by the lower appellate court. The words used in the proviso are "no such person shall be liable to be ejected." These words indicate that the liability to ejectment itself is non-existent. If the words used had been "no person shall be ejected," the view taken by the lower appellate court would have been correct. In my opinion, if the liability to ejectment did not exist then a suit for enforcement of such non-existent liability could not be competent. The suit was filed for the enforcement of the liability for ejectment. If the liability had not arisen, there was no cause of action for the suit and consequently the suit would be a premature suit, I am of the view that the plaintiff's suit could not have been decreed for ejectment under the above circumstances. 9. The appeal is allowed. The decree passed by the court below for the ejectment of the defendant, from the premises in question is set aside. In other respects, namely, in respect of recovery of rent, the decree passed by the court below is confirmed. As the suit for ejectment fails, the decree for pendente lite and future mesne profit, is also set aside. No body appears for the respondent before me. I, therefore, make no order as to costs.