Das, J. ( 1 ) THIS is defendants appeal from the judgment and decree of a learned Subordinate Judge 1st Class, Delhi, granting to Ham am Singh plaintiff a decree for Rs. 10,000. 00 with costs and against the Union of India and the General Manager, Northern Railway, New Delhi, in a suit brought in forma pauperis. ( 2 ) ACCORDING to the allegations in the plaint, on 16-3-1952 at about 4 A. M. , railway engine No. 1175 belonging to the defendants attached to the refuse train coming without light from Badli railway station smashed against the plaintiff s truck No. D. L. B. 1946 at level crossing gate No. CI-2 in mile No. 2/15 on Delhi Kamal railway line. This accident occured as a result of gross negligence on the part of the defenants employees, namely, the driver of the engine and the gate-man at the level crossing gate. The gate-man on duty had not closed the gate of the level crossing to indicate the arrival of the train, nor was there any signal to indicate this fact. Indeed, the gate-man on duty was, according to the plaintiff s allegations, sleeping at the time. The railway engine was moving in the reverse direction without lights. Even whistling was not sounded by the engine and there was no warning given when the engine was to cross the gate. As a result of this accident, two persons actually died and several others received injuries. The truck in question was completely smashed and had become a total wreck which was not capable of being repaired. ( 3 ) IN the written statement, the defendants raised two preliminary objections, one of them being the usual objection of invalidity of notice under section 80, Code of Civil Procedure. According to the other objection, no suit lay against the General Manager and it was urged that the suit against him should be dismissed with costs. So far as the factum of accident is concerned, the averments in paragraphs Nos. 2 and 3 of the plaint were admitted to that extent. According to the plea in defence at the time of accident, green light was clearly visible from the signal indicating the arrival of the train and this could be seen from a distance of more than half a mile. 2 and 3 of the plaint were admitted to that extent. According to the plea in defence at the time of accident, green light was clearly visible from the signal indicating the arrival of the train and this could be seen from a distance of more than half a mile. The truck driver could have avoided the accident if he had been vigilant and taken precautions to see the signal. The driver, so proceeds the plea in defence, did not possess a licence for driving the motor track. The accident thus occurred on account of contributory negligence of the driver who tried to pass the gate even when he could see the approaching engine. Want of efficiency as a driver in driving the truck was to a great extent a contributory factor. It is principally on these pleas that the liability of the defendants was controverted. The invalidity of notice under section 80 Civil Procedure Code, was pleaded without giving details in support of the plea. ( 4 ) THE preliminary issue regarding maintainability of the suit against the General Manager was decided in favour of the plaintiff on 16-12-1954 and we have not been addressed with any arguments against that decision. On the merits, the following issues were framed :- 1. Whether the accident arose on account of the negligence of the employees of the defendants ? 2. Whether the driver had a motor driving licence ? If not, to what effect ? 3. Whether the driver was guilty of contributory negligence? If so, to what effect ? 4. Whether the plantiff is entitled to damages ? If so, to what extent ? 5. Whether a valid notice under section 80, Civil Procedure Code, was served upon the defendants ? 6 Relief. Issue No. 5 dealing with notice under section 80, Civil Procedure Code, was decided against the defendants because Exhibit P. 3, a copy of the notice, was produced on the record The defendant s counsel, according to the judgment of the Court below, did not care to advance any argument showing invalidity of the notice. 6 Relief. Issue No. 5 dealing with notice under section 80, Civil Procedure Code, was decided against the defendants because Exhibit P. 3, a copy of the notice, was produced on the record The defendant s counsel, according to the judgment of the Court below, did not care to advance any argument showing invalidity of the notice. At this stage, I cannot help observing what untenable pleas of this type, when urged on behalf of responsible departments of the State and on behalf of the Union of India, do not establish their sene of responsibility or enhance their prestige in the eyes of the Court It merely shows that these departments do not mind raising frivolous and untenable pleas which do not seem to be very creditable. Issues Nos. 1 and 3 which were discussed together by the Court below, were decided in favour of the plaintiff and it was unhesitatingly held that the accident in question had arisen on account of the negligence of the defendants employees. It was observed during the discussion in the in pugned Judgment that though the signal indicating the coming of the train was. according to the defendant s witnesses, down showing green light never the less, as the gates of the level crossing were open it could easily persuade a person into thinking that the railway line was safe lor crossing and even if the truck driver in she present case did not use his faculties so clearly as he might have done if the gates had not been open and did not care to have a look on the signal he cannot he considered guilty of contributory negligence. Relying on a decision of the Allahabad High Court, reported as Daya Shankar v. B B and C. I. Railway Co. , the Court took the view that the truck driver could not be said to have been guilty of contributory negligence. Issue No. 2 was also decided in favour of the plaintiff and it was found that Tirath Singh driver who was driving the truck at the time of the accident, had a licence to drive. In support of this finding, reference was made to Exhibit Public Witness. 6/1. Under issue No. 4. the Court came to the conclusion that the truck had been purchased for Rs. 10,750. 00 and a sum of Rs. 10,000. In support of this finding, reference was made to Exhibit Public Witness. 6/1. Under issue No. 4. the Court came to the conclusion that the truck had been purchased for Rs. 10,750. 00 and a sum of Rs. 10,000. 00 as damage was considered to be reasonable amount to be awarded. On this view, the impugned decree as noticed earlier, was passed in favour of the plaintiff. ( 5 ) ON appeal in this Court, R. B. Nanak Chand, learned counsel or the appellants, after taking us through the record in a very thorough manner, argued in the first instance that the truck driver being guilty of contributory negligence, there is no question of awarding to the paintiff any decree for the damage done to the truck as a result of the accident in question Contributory negligence has been sought to be established on the basis of the following submissions :- 1. That the raiway signal clearly showed that there was green light indicating the arrival of the train. If that was so, according to the learned counsel, it was the bounden duty of the truck driver to slow down the vehicle and to look round if any train was about to cross the level crossing, and if so, then to stop. The fact that the gates of the level crossing had not been closed, according to the learned counsel, was of little consequence because the truck driver could even in that contingency have avoided the accident by stopping the truck. 2. That the speed of the engine, according to the learned counse! was barely 10 miles an hour and, therefore, any inference of rash or negligent driving by the railway engine driver must be ruled out. 3 That the engine had whistled before it approached the level crossing, with the result that there was simp e warning to alj those who were desirous of crossing the railway line and they should have, stopped Not to heed the whistle, according to the learned counsti, quite clearly estab ishes contributory negligence. 4. That the driver had no licence for the period during which the accident occured which also shows that the truck driver was guilty of contributory negligence. 4. That the driver had no licence for the period during which the accident occured which also shows that the truck driver was guilty of contributory negligence. This argument is sought to be developed by explaining that violation of a provision of the Motor Vehicles Act must, as a matter of law be considered to be a negligent act and, therefore. having violated a statutory provision, the motor driver or for the matter of that, his master, the present plaintiff, cannot claim any damages on account of an accident which occurred while an unlicensed driver was driving the truck. ( 6 ) IN my opinion, none of these points have merit and no case of contribatory negligence has been made out by the appellants. The fact that the railway signal indicated green light to the railway engine driver, does not by any means impose any obligation on the truck driver in the case in hand not to cross the railway line when the gate is open. It is worth noting that according to the witnesses for the plaintiff, it was raining at the time of the accident which was at 4 0 clock in the morning and there was also strong wind blowing vide evidence of Mansa Ram P. W. 1 and Hazara Singh Public Witness. 3 Babu Khan D. W. 2, shunting porter has, of course, denied that it was raining at that time or drizzling, bat he too was constrained to admit that at the time of the accident, it was a dark night. It is interesting to point out that Baij Nath Firemen, D. W. 4 who was in the engine which collided with the truck, quite clrarly stated in cross examination that it was drizzling and it was cloudy. The fact, therefore, that the signal was down and there was green light is, in my opinion, of little consequence and certainly it is not possible to infer contributory negligence from this factor. ( 7 ) COMING to the question of the speed of the engine, it is noteworthy that the driver of the railway engine has not been produced by the defendants and no explanation is forthcoming for his non-production at least the learned counsel for the appellants has not drawn our attention to any such explanation. ( 7 ) COMING to the question of the speed of the engine, it is noteworthy that the driver of the railway engine has not been produced by the defendants and no explanation is forthcoming for his non-production at least the learned counsel for the appellants has not drawn our attention to any such explanation. The only evidence to which the appellant s learned counsel has relied for proving the speed of the train is the testimony of Baij Nath Fireman, D W. 4. He was, however, cons rained to admit that the engine stopped 20 yards away from the place where the accident took place. This witness also asserted that the train had started whistling from about half a mile from the gate and it continued to do so intermittently. I am far from impressed by this part of the testimony of this witness When one reads the evidence of Shri Shanti Narain, Stock Controller, D W. 1, who has deposed that the truck in question was thrown away about 20 yards out side the track. One finds it difficult to believe that the speed of the engine was about 10 miles per hour when the collision took place. Had it been so, the engine could without much difficulty have stopped belore the actual impact. It is not argued that the truck had no lights on. Of course, the driver of the truck is dead but what about the driver of the engine. No explana. tion is offered before us for his non-production. It is also difficult to believe that the engine had been whistling from a distance of about half a mile and had also lights on, as was deposed by Baij Nath D, W. 4 On the point that the engine was whistling, the only testimony to which our attention has been drawn is that of D. W. 4 and as just observed, I am wholly unimpressed by this testimony. ( 8 ) COMING to the fourth point, namely that the driver had no licence for the period during which the accident took place, it is worth noting that the trial court has relied on Exhibit P. W. 6/1 for the finding that the driver did possess a driving licence The appellants have not cosidered it proper to have exhibit P. W. 6/1 included in the printed paper book as required by rule 3, Chapter 2-A Vol. V. High Court Rules and Orders The appellants counsel has contended that this document was produced by the plaintiff and, therefore, it was not for appellants who are defendents, to have it printed. This appears to me to be an incorrect view of the rule to take The party on whon the duty falls under this rule is not the party which relies on the document in the sense that he produced it, but the party for whose case in appeal the document is necessary and essential, and it is asnecessary and essential to anppellant who impugns the correctness of a document or contends that it has not been correctly weighed and interpreted, that it should be printed as that the judgment, which has attacks, should be printed. It was so held as far back as a Bench decision of the Lahore High Court, in Bhaj Jawahar Singh and Sons v. Secretary of State. Of course, under Rule 5 of the above Chapter, the Court can permit at the hearing reference to a document not in eluded in the printed record, but ordinarily, it is incumbent on a party who wants to refer to a document at the hearing to have it printed as required by the rules. We tried to look at this document ourselves, but unfortunately, it is not traceable on the record and the learned counsel for the appellants has not been able to throw any light as to whether he had at any time seen the document, if and when he inspected the records of this case, as some counsel on behalf of the appellants may well be expected to have done. The result, therefore, is that it is not possible for us to hold that the Court below has erred in relying on this document in support of its conclusion. The result, therefore, is that it is not possible for us to hold that the Court below has erred in relying on this document in support of its conclusion. The appellants learned compel has, however referred us to the testimony of Malak Mohan Lal P W. 6 who has deposed that Tirath Singh had adriving licence No. 646 for the period 27-11-1947 to 26-1!-1948 and the copy of entry in the register which is Exhibit P. W. 6/1 whether this witness is mistaken in marking this statement or the Court is wrong in coming to its finding on the reading of Exhibit P. W. 6/1 is the question which calls for answer but may not be easy to answer on the present record In our view however, on the facts and circumstances of this case, whether the driving licence of the deceased was renewed for the period duiing which the accident occurred in hardly matererial because failure to renew it can on no logical or rational ground be he d to constitute contributory negligence in regard to the accident in question as contended by the appellants learned counsel The counsel has not been able to refer to any statutory provision: nor has he brought to our notice any principle or precedent in support of his argument which is based on his bald though bold assertion. Reference to section 3 of the Motor Vehicles Act which prescribes necessity for driving licence is in this connection fatile:so is reference to section 5 of this Act which merely lays down that no owner or person incharge of a motor vehicle sha!l cause or permit any person who does not satisfy the provisions of sections 3 and 4 to drive the vehicle. These sections do not by any stretch throw light on, or, touch the plea of contributory negligence on the part of the driver who was driving the truck at the relevant time. These sections do not by any stretch throw light on, or, touch the plea of contributory negligence on the part of the driver who was driving the truck at the relevant time. The decision in Bengal North Western Railway Co Ltd v Matukdhari Singh on which the Court below has relied, has been sought by the learned counsel for the appellant to be distinguished by reference to p 602 where a decision of an English Court in Mercer v. South Eastern and Chatham Railway Companies Managing Committee has been described as the well-known case in which the law on the subject was thoroughly explained by Lush, J I do not consider it necessary to go into the English decision because I do not think thii decision can throw much helpful light on the care required of the parson while crossing a railway level- crossing in India because factors which have to be taken into account in considering the negligence on the part of those crossing such level-crossings are far from parallel in the two countries It is however, worth noting that this very English decision was considered by a Bench of the Assam High Court in Swarnalata Barua v. Union of India etc and after referring to this decision and two other English decisions, from one of which certain passages were quoted, the Assam High Court proceeded to observe as follows :- "we are clearly of opinion that there is an obligation on the part of the railway company or administration to ensure that whenever the railway pauses over a thoroughfare adequate warning should be given to the public of the passing of the trains at the time they piss so that accidents may beavoided. This duty need not necessarily be a statutory duty. It is implied and inherent in the functions to be discharged by the Railway Administration in the matter of running their railways. "in my view, there is no mystique in the law of negligence and consideration of this question calls for application of common morality and commonsense to the activities of common man. One expects reasonable care to be taken to avoid reasonably foreseeable injuries acts or omissions. "in my view, there is no mystique in the law of negligence and consideration of this question calls for application of common morality and commonsense to the activities of common man. One expects reasonable care to be taken to avoid reasonably foreseeable injuries acts or omissions. In the case in hand, keeping in view the time the weather the fact that the gate of the level-crossing was open that there was no light fixed to the rear of the railway engine when it was going in the reverse direction, failure to whistle by the engine from a reasonable distance from the crossing, and the absence from the railway-crossing of the gate-man, any contributory negligence on the part of the deceased driver of the truck must be completely ruled out. The fact that the truck was thrown away from the track by about 20 yards, as deposed by D W. I, is no less significant, when it is not shown that the truck was going at an abnormal high speed. In these circumstances, I am wholly unable to hold that the deceased driver was expected as a reasonable prudent man to stop the truck before crossing the railway-crossing and to see if it was safe for him to do so. If it was not incumbent on him to adopt this course, I fail to see how he can reasonably be held guilty of contributory negligence. The absence of the gate-man from the crossing at the relevant time appears to me in this case to be most serious breach of duty and I find no cogent reason to take a light view of this deviation from the path of public duty on his part. It is a misconduct for which the defendant-appellants cannot disown their responsibility to the citizens who suffer therefrom. And then, it is not understood how the plae of contributory negligence can constitute a complete defence to the plaintiff s claim absolving the defendant-appellants of all liability. As we are disinclined to uphold contributory negligence and as the legal effect of tie successful plea of contributory negligence his not been fully canvassed at the bar, it is unnecessary tosay anything more on this point. ( 9 ) NOW remains the question of quantum of damages assessed by the Court below. As we are disinclined to uphold contributory negligence and as the legal effect of tie successful plea of contributory negligence his not been fully canvassed at the bar, it is unnecessary tosay anything more on this point. ( 9 ) NOW remains the question of quantum of damages assessed by the Court below. According to the learned counsel for the appellants, the plaintiff should have led positive and conclusive evidence showing the precise value of the truck at the time of the accident. He has also added that whatever was left of the truck should have been valued and deducted from its price. I am unable to accede to this submission. Damages In such cases are not fixed in a dogmatic way and one cannot adopt a doctrinaire approach in this respect. According to the Court below, the truck was purchased in April, 1950 for Rs. 10, 750. 00 This indeed is not disputed. The evidence on the record has convincingly established that the truck was completely smashed. The fact that some parts of the smashed truck could be sold as scrap does not substantially invalidate the conclusion of the Court below or render it erroneous so as to justify intererence by this Court. It is noteworthy that the defendant-appellants did not care to adduce any evidence to show that the truck was not completely smashed and no at tempt has been made on their behalf to produce evidence on the value of the truck, new or old, and indeed, they did not even care to apply to the Court to have the remants of the smashed truck inspected and evaluated by an axpert. Having led no evidence themselves, it is futile on the part of the defendant-appellants at this late stage to talk of the abstract doctrine of onus of proof because it was also obligatory for them to adduce evidence in support of their case. The nature of the impact at the time of the accident would quite clearly and reasonably suggest that the truck must have been rendered completely useless and there is no cogent and reliable material on the record to counter this suggestion. The learned counsel for the defendant, appellants has not been able to persuade us to hold that the value of the truck, as determined by the Court below, is by any means excessive. The learned counsel for the defendant, appellants has not been able to persuade us to hold that the value of the truck, as determined by the Court below, is by any means excessive. ( 10 ) BEFORE finally closing the judgment, I consider it my duty to remind the Courts below that it is their solemn obligation to see that the judicial records are properly preserved and all precautions are taken to see that the documents do not get misplaced or lost. Carelessness or laxity in this respect is bound to detract from the requisite quality of justice in this Republic. Fall in the standard of administration of justice must impair the confidence of the people in the efficaciousness of our democratic set-up. Such a result is indisputably fraught with grave danger. Without saying anything more, we hope that the Courts below would take all reasonable steps required by law and, the instructions given by this Court, on the subject of maintenance and preservation of judicial records. ( 11 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. ( 12 ) I agree.