JUDGMENT M.H. Beg, J. - This is an appeal against the acquittal of the respondents from charge under Sections 448/504/506, I.P.C. which has come up for hearing after obtaining special leave. The complainant-appellant seems to be the caretaker of the house No. D-35/163, Mohalla Agast Kunda, Police Station Dashaswamedh in the city of Varanasi. The house was said to be owned by Sushil Chandra Sen and others who resides at Calcutta. The complainant alleged that he entrusted the house in dispute to the respondent Sudhir Kumar Ghosh for executing some petty repairs and whitewashing and then left Varanasi for a couple of days to take part in some ceremony elsewhere. The complainant also alleged, in the complaint filed on November 16, 1962, that the respondent, S. K. Ghosh, "forcibly" entered the two rooms on the second floor of the house on February 7, 1962, along with his wife, Smt. Shanti Devi, respondent No. 2, and locked the rooms which were in the possession of the complainant, and, thereby, caused annoyance to the complainant. It was alleged in the complaint that the complainant objected to the unlawful occupation of the rooms by the respondents Nos. 1 and 2, but they became furious, and, with the aid of and in the company of Mahanand Pandey and Harihar Pandey, respondents Nos. 3 and 4, who are father and son, abused the complainant and tried to intimidate him on two occasions, the dates of which are given as June 10, 1962 and November 15, 1962. The respondent S.K. Ghosh denied having undertaken to repair or whitewash the house and alleged that he was in possession of the two rooms in question under the orders of the owner of the house. He added that the complainant lives on the ground floor of the house and that he does not want the respondents to occupy the two rooms on the upper portion of the house, and, therefore, the complainant has lodged a false complaint. 2. The trial court, which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses depose, considered the evidence of Behari Lal (P. W. 1) and of Pankaj Kumar (P.W. 3) and of the complainant Surendra Nath Sen (P.W. 2) with regard to the two occasions on which the respondents are alleged to have insulted and threatened and disbelieved the complainants version. 2. The trial court, which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses depose, considered the evidence of Behari Lal (P. W. 1) and of Pankaj Kumar (P.W. 3) and of the complainant Surendra Nath Sen (P.W. 2) with regard to the two occasions on which the respondents are alleged to have insulted and threatened and disbelieved the complainants version. As this part of the finding of the trial court has not been assailed, I need not go into this question further, 3. It has, however, been argued vehemently that the respondent No. 1 entered the two rooms with an intention which brought his action within the purview of Section 441, I.P.C. which runs as follows:- "Whoever enters into or upon property in the possession of another with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of such property, or having lawfully entered into or upon such property, unlawfully remains there with intent thereby to intimidate, insult, or annoy any such person, or with intent to commit an offence, is said to commit "criminal trespass". 4. It was also argued that the respondents, by remaining in the two rooms, after the complainant had objected and asked them to vacate it, necessarily committed offences within the purview of the second part of Section 441, I.P.C. inasmuch as they unlawfully remained there with the intent to intimidate, insult, or annoy the complainant who was in possession. The argument for the complainant was based upon the admissions of the respondent. It is pointed out that the respondents had no right whatsoever to remain on the premises and that the complainant having proved himself to be the caretaker in possession of the whole house was bound to feel annoyed at the continued possession over the two rooms by the respondent No. 1, his wife, and his two friends. The argument for the complainant was thus based on the presumption that unlawful occupation of property by a trespasser, without the proved permission of the person authorised to give that permission, is bound to cause annoyance. 5. Reliance was placed upon a number of authorities on behalf of the complainant-appellant, and, in particular of Jodha Ram v. State through Bishun Datt, A.I.R. 1954 , All. p. 66; Keshar Singh and others v. Rex through Prem Ballabh Joshi, AIR 1959 Allahabad p. 157 Kunju Moideen Methararu v. Kandan, A.I.R. 1959 Ker. 5. Reliance was placed upon a number of authorities on behalf of the complainant-appellant, and, in particular of Jodha Ram v. State through Bishun Datt, A.I.R. 1954 , All. p. 66; Keshar Singh and others v. Rex through Prem Ballabh Joshi, AIR 1959 Allahabad p. 157 Kunju Moideen Methararu v. Kandan, A.I.R. 1959 Ker. p. 146; Matadin Singh Bharun Singh v. State, A.I.R. 1964 Punj. 145; Veerathaiah and another v. Ramaswamy Iyengar, A.I.R. 1964 Mys. p. 11; M. L. Das v. Manmohan Sharma and others, Cr.L.J . 1950 p. 1496. 6. As Keshar Singhs case (supra) and Jodha Rams case (Supra), the two authorities of this court, were principally relied upon in the subsequent Kerala, Mysore, and Punjab cases, I will content myself by pointing out what was laid down in these two cases. In Keshar Singhs case (supra) Desai, J. (as he then was) held :- "Direct evidence of intention can hardly ever be produced and the intention has, in most cases, to be inferred from the circumstances. There is a well known presumption that every man intends the probable consequences of his act. The presumption is rebuttable, but if it is not rebutted it will stand." 7. That was a case of "forcible", ploughing of a field in spite of the protest of the person in possession. On the facts of that case, it was held that the required intention to annoy the person actually in possession of the field could be presumed. In Jodha Rams case (supra) it was held: "The annoyance which is spoken of in Section 441, I.P.C. is not intended to be instantaneous. It may happen subsequently. There is no warrant for thinking that annoyance mentioned in the section must be caused to the person in possession at the moment when another person enters into or upon the property." 8. In Jodha Rams case (supra) there had been a "forcible" entry by a landlord of a house in actual possession of the tenant whose lock was broken open. Both the cases turned upon a decision about the intention of the accused in making entry into premises shown to be in the possession of the complainant On behalf of the respondents, reliance is placed principally upon: Bishan Dayal v. Brij Behari, 34 Cr.L.J. (1933) p. 1014; and S. Valluppa v. S. Bheema Row, 1918 Cr.L.J. Mad. (F.B.) p. 162. Both the cases turned upon a decision about the intention of the accused in making entry into premises shown to be in the possession of the complainant On behalf of the respondents, reliance is placed principally upon: Bishan Dayal v. Brij Behari, 34 Cr.L.J. (1933) p. 1014; and S. Valluppa v. S. Bheema Row, 1918 Cr.L.J. Mad. (F.B.) p. 162. The last mentioned Madras Full Bench case was relied upon in Bishan Dayals case (supra) by the Oudh Chief Court. In the Madras case it was held :- "A mere knowledge that the trespass is likely to cause insult or annoyance to the owner of the property does not amount to an intent to insult or annoy within the meaning of Section 441, Indian Penal Code, but where the trespasser knows that his trespass is practically certain, in the natural course of events, to cause insult or annoyance to the owner of the property it is open to the Court to infer an intent to insult or annoy. It is a question of fact whether this presumption of intent is displaced by proof of any independent object of the trespass." 9. It was also held there: "A man who forces his way into anothers house against his will commits a civil trespass for which he may be made answerable in substantial damages." 10. It is evident, from a perusal of all the cases cited before me, that the prosecution must establish the intent with which the accused is alleged to have committed a trespass. It is the proof of the criminal intent which distinguishes a civil trespass from a criminal trespass. The cases cited by the two sides provide instances of the different circumstances in which the required criminal intent was or was not shown to have existed. Proof of intention of a person in committing an act is often a difficult matter, and, therefore, a resort has to he often had to circumstances from which the intent may be inferred. The cases cited by the two sides provide instances of the different circumstances in which the required criminal intent was or was not shown to have existed. Proof of intention of a person in committing an act is often a difficult matter, and, therefore, a resort has to he often had to circumstances from which the intent may be inferred. This difficulty in determining intent, is illustrated by the following quaint saying of Brian, C.J. which contains an extreme proposition: "for it is common knowledge that the intention of man will not be probed, for the Devil does not know mans intention." Courts, however, proceed to gather intent on the assumption that "the state of a mans mind is as much a matter of evidence as the state of his digestion." The circumstances of the case may raise a natural "presumptio facti", under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, about the particular intent which may be presumed from the nature of and the totality of the circumstances preceding, accompanying, and following the acts of an individual. 11. The circumstances from which the criminal intent may be inferred will vary from case to case. The conditions under which a presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, which is, after all, a "presumption of fact", may arise can be indicated but not rigidly laid down. It is true that if a man occupies premises without any shadow of right, knowing full well that he has no right, and, if he evinces hostility or violence in the act of occupation or in continuing in possession, after having been prohibited by the person authorised to exclude him from possession, the natural inference is that the required criminal intention is there. On the other hand, where the facts and circumstances of the case indicate that the accused was likely to have occupied a property with the knowledge or reasonable belief that he has some right and continues to occupy it for some period of time without any show of force or hostility on either side or any objection by the person entitled to exclude him from possession, the more natural inference will be that the required criminal intention was absent. In each case, as it has been emphasised in the above mentioned Madras Full Bench decision, the question is one of fact. 12. In each case, as it has been emphasised in the above mentioned Madras Full Bench decision, the question is one of fact. 12. In the present case, I find that the complainant himself has alleged that he entrusted the property to the accused S.K. Ghosh for a particular purpose which was that of white washing and executing some repairs. It is most unusual and extraordinary for a mere Thekedar, entrusted with white-washing and minor repairs to take possession of the house which he has to white wash and repair on payment of charges for doing so. The complainant, after alleging the contract under which the accused S. K. Ghosh was entitled to take charge of the premises, for the purpose of white washing and repairs, went on to allege, in paragraph 5 of the complaint, that the accused No. 1 "forcibly entered into two rooms on second floor of the aforesaid house on February 7, 1962 along with accused No. 2 and unlawfully occupied and locked the aforesaid rooms which were in possession of the complainant". The evidence of the complainant shows that he had left two days earlier and came back on February 7, 1962. If the accused wanted to take possession unlawfully, he could have done so when the complainant was away. There was no need whatsoever to take "forcible" possession on February 7, 1962 when the complainant had returned. Indeed, the complainant seems to have realised this difficulty at the time of giving evidence and gave up the case of a forcible entry into the two rooms on February 7, 1962. He contented himself by deposing that he found the accused in possession when he came back on February 7, 1962. The ether two occasions on which the objections of the complainant were alleged to have been met by anger and abuse and threats on the part of the accused have also not been proved and are not relied upon in support of the prosecution case in the arguments before me on behalf of the complainant. 13. The alleged authority of the complainant to exclude the accused from possession has also been subject matter of argument advanced by both sides. It has been contended on behalf of the respondents that the letter Ex. 13. The alleged authority of the complainant to exclude the accused from possession has also been subject matter of argument advanced by both sides. It has been contended on behalf of the respondents that the letter Ex. Ka 1, dated August 22, 1962, alleged to have been sent by the owner, Sri Sushil Chandra of Calcutta, was put forward in evidence at a very late stage on August 6, 1963. This letter was not even mentioned by the complainant when he gave his evidence in court on April 27, 1963. Therefore, its genuineness was challenged. It was produced suddenly after the statement of the accused on March 20, 1963 in which he claimed authority from the landlord himself to occupy the accommodation. As the letter was said to have been received long before, apparently in reply to a quarry sent by the complainant to the landlord, it ought to have been revealed by the complainant if it existed at the time when the complainant gave his evidence in Court. It was also I contended that the letter cannot be used against the accused inasmuch as it was not put to the accused under Section 342, Cr.P.C. 14. However, even if the letter was genuine and could be used, I find that there is nothing in the letter which indicates li that the complainant had actually felt annoyed at the occupation of the premises by the respondents. The more I important document would have been the letter sent by the complainant which I was being replied to. In any case, this letter in reply shows, even assuming that it was genuine, that the complainant was uncertain whether the accused S.K. Ghosh had or had not got the permission of the landlord. If that was the state of the complainants mind, it is difficult to believe that the complainant was really annoyed. The term annoyance cannot be equated with uncertainty. The letter contains no expression of any regret sympathy of the alleged owner at any incident which may have occurred between the complainant and the respondent. Presumably, the complainant never communicated any such incident or his annoyance over it to the owner. If the complainant was a bona fide caretaker and agent, who had been insulted and intimated for doing some service for the owner and his principal, it is natural to expect that he would inform his principal about this. Presumably, the complainant never communicated any such incident or his annoyance over it to the owner. If the complainant was a bona fide caretaker and agent, who had been insulted and intimated for doing some service for the owner and his principal, it is natural to expect that he would inform his principal about this. The letter, therefore, far from helping the complainant, only indicates that the complainant had some uncertainty in his mind and that probably no incident had taken place at all which could give rise to any annoyance to the complainant. It is rather difficult to understand why a mere caretaker should feel annoyed if he has been hood-winked by a person claiming to be authorised by the landlord. 15. I may observe that the existence or otherwise of annoyance on the part oi the complainant is only indirectly relevant. The real question to be decided in such cases is whether the accused had the criminal intention. The annoyance felt by the complainant can only indirectly perhaps corroborate the evidence of such intention as the accused may have had. In the present case, I do not find evidence of any real annoyance or reason for it at all on the part of the complainant, assuming that the alleged incidents of February 7, 1902 and June 10, 1962 and November 15, 1902 about which no report made by the complainant to the Police have been proved. The prosecution for criminal trespass cannot succeed without proving satisfactorily the criminal intent with which the accused must be shown to have either entered or continued in possession of property. 16. The respondents seem to have occupied the rooms in question as a result of some belief induced by the conduct of either the complainant or of somebody claiming to be the owner of the premises. The legal rights and obligations of parties can be more appropriately adjudicated upon by means of suitable proceedings elsewhere. A civil court can grant damages for trespass, but a criminal court cannot do so. Criminal proceedings are, however, not frequently resorted to in such cases, instead of the more appropriate civil proceedings only to avoid the greater expense, time, and trouble involved in civil proceedings. The learned Magistrate, who tried the case and acquitted the respondents, was quite right in not allowing a misuse of the criminal law of the land in this case. 17. The learned Magistrate, who tried the case and acquitted the respondents, was quite right in not allowing a misuse of the criminal law of the land in this case. 17. The appeal is hereby dismissed.