ALIHUSEIN ABBASBHAI v. COLLECTOR,panchmahals — 1966 DIGILAW 63 (GUJ)

P. N. BHAGWATI, J. ( 1 ) THIS Revision Application raises a short but interesting question of law namely whether a Reference under sec 18 of the Land Acquisition Act abates if the applicant dies and his heirs do not make an application for bringing themselves on record within a period of 90 days from the date of the death of the applicant. The dispute in this Revision Application concerns land bearing Survey No. 56b-1/1 admeasuring 1 acre 25. 12 gunthas situate in Dohad in the Panchmahals District. The land belonged to three brothers namely Abbasbhai Hatimbhai and Taherbhai each having 1/3 share in the land. In or about 1956 the land was acquired by the State Government under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act for the purpose of State Transport Corporation and after going through the procedure prescribed by law the Collector Panchmahals District made an award dated 23rd September 1957 offering compensation at the rate of Rs 2. 62 np. per square yard for the land. All the three brothers were dissatisfied with the offer contained in the award of the Collector and therefore two of them namely Hatimbhai and Taherbhai made a joint application and Abbasbhai the third brother made a separate application to the Collector for a reference under sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. Hatimbhai and Taherbhai claimed compensation at the rate of Rs. 12/per square yard while Abbasbhai claimed compensation at the rate of Rs. 14-62 np. per square yard. On the application of Abbasbhai a reference was made by the Collector to the District Court on 26th September 1957 and it was numbered Ref. LAR. 9/57 while the reference made on the application of Hatimbhai and Taherbhai was numbered Ref. LAR. 11/57. Both the references were sent by the District Court to the Court of the Civil Judge Senior Division for disposal. The notice of the date fixed for the hearing of Ref. LAR. 9/57 was thereafter issued by the learned Civil Judge for service on Abbasbhai but before it could be served on Abbasbhai died as a result of an accident on 10th October 1957 with the result that it was returned unserved by the Bailiff on 27th November 1957. The notice of the date fixed for the hearing of Ref. LAR. 9/57 was thereafter issued by the learned Civil Judge for service on Abbasbhai but before it could be served on Abbasbhai died as a result of an accident on 10th October 1957 with the result that it was returned unserved by the Bailiff on 27th November 1957. The petitioners who are the heirs and legal representatives of Abbasbhai thereupon addressed a letter dated 2 January 1957 to the Collector requesting the Collector to bring the names of the petitioners on record as heirs and legal representatives of Abbasbhai in Ref. LAR. 9/57. To this letter according to the petitioners there was no reply and the petitioners therefore did nothing further in the matter until 11th August 1960 when they came to know for the first time on reading the report in the daily newspaper Navbharat that Ref. LAR. 11/57 was disposed of by the learned Civil Judge and additional compensation of Rs. 9. 38 per square yard was awarded to each of Hatimbhai and Taherbhai. On learning about the disposal of Ref. LAR. 11/57 the petitioners made inquiries as to what had happened to Ref. LAR. 9/57 made at the instance of Abbasbhai and on making inquiries they learned that in Ref. LAR. 9/57 the Collector had made an application dated 12th January 1960 that the Reference had abated since no application to bring the heirs and legal representatives of Abbasbhai on record had been made within a period of 90 days from the date of death of Abbasbhai and on such application the learned Civil Judge had made an order dated 30th July 1960 dismissing the reference as having abated. The petitioners thereupon made an application to the Court for setting aside the abatement and there were two grounds on which the application was supported. The first ground was that the order dismissing the Reference as having abated was illegal and invalid since a reference under sec. The petitioners thereupon made an application to the Court for setting aside the abatement and there were two grounds on which the application was supported. The first ground was that the order dismissing the Reference as having abated was illegal and invalid since a reference under sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act could not abate on the death of the applicant even if no application to bring the heirs of the applicant on record was made within a period of 90 days from the date of death of the applicant and the second ground was that in any event the petitioners had sufficient cause for not making an application to bring themselves on record within the said period. Both the grounds were however negatived by the learned Civil Judge and the learned Civil Judge rejected the application. Hence the present Revision Application by the petitioners. ( 2 ) OF the two grounds urged before the learned Civil Judge Miss Daboo learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners urged only the first since the second was a ground which even if well-founded could not be raised in revision. Miss Daboo confined herself to the first ground and urged that the order passed by the learned Civil Judge on 30th July 1960 dismissing the Reference as having abated was illegal and invalid and the learned Civil Judge was therefore in error in rejecting the application for setting aside the abatement. Mr. A. D. Desai learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the Collector of course disputed the validity of this contention but he also urged in addition that in any event this contention was not open to the petitioners since the Revision Application was not directed against the order dismissing the reference as having abated. The Revision Application he argued was directed only against the order rejecting the application for setting aside the abatement and so far as that order was concerned it was patently correct for the application in effect sought to obtain a review of the order dismissing the reference as having abated though there was no valid ground for review available to the petitioners. Realising the force of this preliminary contention Miss Daboo applied for leave to amend the revision application by seeking relief against the order dismissing the reference as having abated. Realising the force of this preliminary contention Miss Daboo applied for leave to amend the revision application by seeking relief against the order dismissing the reference as having abated. The application was granted by me but that was not the end of the difficulties for Miss Daboo. The amended revision application in so far as it was directed against the order dismissing the reference as having abated was clearly time barred and Miss Daboo had therefore to make an application for condoning the delay. The application was resisted by Mr. A. D. Desai on behalf of the Collector but in view of the fact that even under the unamended Revision Application the relief substantially sought was against the order dismissing the reference as having abated and the defect was merely one of form in the sense that there was no specific prayer for setting aside the said order I condoned the delay and entertained the amended Revision Application. ( 3 ) THE main challenge of the petitioners on the amended Revision Application was directed against the order dismissing the reference as having abated and there were three grounds on which the challenge was founded. Miss Daboo first urged that the reference could not be said to have commenced before the Collector until the notice of the reference was served on the various persons specified in sec 20 and since Abbasbhai died before notice of the reference could be served on him there was no pending proceeding in the reference at the date of death of Abbasbhai and there was accordingly no question of applicability of Order 22 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure and there could be no abatement of the reference even if no application was made by the petitioners to bring themselves on record in place of Abbasbhai. It was the duty of the Collector argued Miss Daboo to apply to the Court for bringing the petitioners on record as heirs and legal representatives of Abbasbhai and it was only after they were brought on record and notice of the reference was served on them that the proceeding in the reference could be said to have commenced before the Court. Miss Daboo next contended and that was her second contention that in any event Order 22 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not apply to a reference under sec. Miss Daboo next contended and that was her second contention that in any event Order 22 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not apply to a reference under sec. 18 and the Reference did not therefore abate even though no application was made to bring the petitioners on record as heirs and legal representatives of Abbasbhai. The last contention of Miss Daboo was that even if the proceeding could be said to have commenced on the receipt of the reference by the Court and Order 22 Rule 3 applied to such reference there was no time limited by law for the making of an application to bring the heirs of a deceased applicant on record Article 171 of the Indian Limitation Act 1908 being inapplicable and there was accordingly no abatement of the reference even if the petitioners failed to make an application to bring themselves on record within a period of 90 days from the date of the death of Abbasbhai. These were the three contentions urged on behalf of the petitioners and in the strength of these contentions it was submitted that the order passed by the learned Civil Judge dismissing the reference as having abated was illegal and invalid and was required to be set aside. ( 4 ) IN order to determine the validity of these contentions it is necessary to refer to a few provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. After a notification under sec. 6 is issued acquiring land notice under sec. 9 is issued to persons interested inviting claims to compensation for all interests in the land. The Collector then proceeds to inquire into the objections to the measurement of the land which may have been lodged by any person interested into the value of the land at the date of the notification under sec. 4 (1) and into the respective interests of the persons claiming compensation and makes an award under sec. 11 determining the true area of the land the compensation which in his opinion should be allowed for the land and the apportionment of such compensation amongst all persons known or believed to be interested in the land. 4 (1) and into the respective interests of the persons claiming compensation and makes an award under sec. 11 determining the true area of the land the compensation which in his opinion should be allowed for the land and the apportionment of such compensation amongst all persons known or believed to be interested in the land. Sec. 12 declares that the award shall except as provided in the succeeding sections be final and conclusive evidence as between the Collector and the persons interested of the true area and value of the land and the apportionment of compensation amongst the persons interested. Now it is well settled that though called an award this is really nothing but an offer on the part of the Government which the person interested may or may not accept. If he accepts well and good; but if he does not accept a remedy is provided to him by sec. 18 which says in sub-sec. (1):18 (1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may by written application to the Collector require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the court whether his objection be to the measurement of the land the amount of compensation the persons to whom it is payable or the apportionment of compensation among the persons interested. The person interested who does not wish to accept the award can by a written application to the Collector raises an objection to the measurement of the land the amount of the compensation or the apportionment of such compensation among the persons interested and require the Collector to refer his objection to the Court for determination. Of course the proviso to the section prescribes a time-limit within which an application must be made but that is not material to the present controversy. On receipt of the application if the Collector finds that the application complies with the requirements of sec. 18 the Collector is bound to make a reference to the Court and sec. 19 sets out what facts shall be stated by the Collector for the information of the Court while making the reference When the reference is received by the Court sec. 18 the Collector is bound to make a reference to the Court and sec. 19 sets out what facts shall be stated by the Collector for the information of the Court while making the reference When the reference is received by the Court sec. 20 says:20 The Court shall thereupon cause a notice specifying the day on which the Court will proceed to determine the objection and directing their appearance before the Court on that day to be served on the following persons namely: (a) the applicant; (b)ball persons interested in the objection except such (if any) of them as have consented without protest to receive payment of the compensation awarded and (c) if the objection is in regard to the area of the land or to the amount of the compensation the Collector. The Court then proceeds to hear the reference on the day fixed for hearing or on any adjourned day or days and after hearing the parties makes an award determining the objection and specifying the amount of compensation for the land or the apportionment of such compensation. Sec. 26 (1) prescribes the form of the award and sec. 26 (2) assimilates the award to a decree by declaring:26 (2) Every such award shall be deemed to be a decree and the statement of the grounds of every such award a judgment within the meaning of sec. 2 clause (2) and sec. 2 clause (9) respectively of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908sec. 53 makes the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to the reference and it says:53 Save in so far as they may be inconsistent with anything contained in this Act the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply to all proceedings before the Court under this Act. It will be seen from these provisions that the scheme of the Act is that the applicant who does not accept an award has to make an application to the Collector within the prescribed period raising his objection to the award and requiring the Collector to refer his objection for the determination of the Court. If the conditions set out in sec. 18 are satisfied the Collector is bound to make a reference and when the reference reaches the Court it is taken on file and numbered and it becomes a proceeding before the Court. If the conditions set out in sec. 18 are satisfied the Collector is bound to make a reference and when the reference reaches the Court it is taken on file and numbered and it becomes a proceeding before the Court. Now obviously since the reference is made by the Collector and is not initiated directly before the Court by the applicant notice of the day fixed for the hearing of the reference must be given to the applicant so that he can take steps for the purpose of proceeding with the reference. Equally notice must be given to other persons if any interested in the objection so that a proper determination of the amount of compensation or apportionment of such compensation binding on all interests can be made by the Court. Notice must also necessarily go to the Collector for it is the Collector representing the Government who would be vitally concerned to repel the objection of the applicant to the amount of compensation. Sec. 20 therefore provides for service of notices on these various persons by the Court on receipt of the reference. But that does not mean that the reference does not become a proceeding before the Court until such notices are served by the Court. The reference becomes a proceeding before the Court as soon as it is received taken on file and numbered and it is because it is a proceeding already initiated before the Court that the Court can fix a day for its hearing and give notice of such date to the various persons mentioned in sec. 20. Moreover it is difficult to appreciate how notice of a reference can go to the Collector who is in the position of a defendant before the reference has commenced. 20. Moreover it is difficult to appreciate how notice of a reference can go to the Collector who is in the position of a defendant before the reference has commenced. Ordinarily notice of a proceeding would go to the opposite party after the proceeding has commenced before the Court: unless the proceeding is before the Court there would be no question of giving notice of the proceeding by the Court to the opposite party The contention of the petitioners that the proceeding in the reference had not commenced at the date of the death of Abbasbhai since no notice was served on him before his death is therefore clearly unsustainable and it must be concluded that the proceeding in the reference commenced before the Court as soon as the reference was received taken on file and numbered and it was pending when Abbasbhai died. ( 5 ) THE next question that arises is whether Order 22 Rule 3 applied to the Reference for it is only if that provision applied to the reference that the question of abatement could arise. Now sec. 53 which is reproduced above clearly declares that save in so far as they may be inconsistent with anything contained in the Act the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply to all proceedings before the Court under the Act and since a reference under sec. 18 is a proceeding before the Court under the Act Order 22 Rule 3 must apply to the reference unless that provision is inconsistent with anything contained in the Act. The question which therefore calls for consideration is whether there is anything in the Act which is inconsistent with Order 22 Rule 3. Order 22 Rule 3 enacts a provision in the following terms:22 3 (1) Where one of two or more plaintiffs dies and the right to sue does not survive to the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs alone or a sole plaintiff or sole surviving plaintiff dies and the right to sue survives the Court on an application made in that behalf shall cause the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit. (2) Where within the time limited by law no application is made under sub rule (1) the suit shall abate so far as the deceased plaintiff is concerned and on the application of the defendant the Court may award to him the costs which he may have incurred in defending the suit to be recovered from the estate of the deceased plaintiff. Now there is manifestly no specific provision in the Act which is directly inconsistent with Order 22 Rule 3 and the only inquiry can therefore be whether there is anything in the Act which is by necessary implication inconsistent with Order 22 Rule 3. The argument of Miss Daboo was that the nature of the proceeding itself is such that the applicability of Order 22 Rule 3 is incompatible with it and the said provision cannot therefore apply in case of death of the applicant in a pending reference and this argument she sought to support by relying on the decision of a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Abdul Karim v. State of Madhya Pradesh A. I. R. 1964 Madhya Pradesh 171. This decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court does undoubtedly support the argument of Miss Daboo but with the greatest respect to the learned Judges who decided this case I find myself unable to accept it as correct. The decision proceeds on the hypothesis that once a reference is made by the Collector it must of necessity terminate in an award of the Court and on this hypothesis it works out the conclusion that even if the applicant does not appear or produce evidence in support of the objection the reference cannot be dismissed but an award must be made even though such award be in the same terms as the award of the Collector and equally if the applicant dies and his heirs do not make an application to bring themselves on record the reference cannot abate but the Collector must supply the names of the heirs to the Court and the Court must give notice of the reference to the heirs and then proceed to make an award which in the absence of evidence in support of the objection may be in the same terms as the award of the Collector. This conclusion is clearly not justified by the scheme and language of the sections. This conclusion is clearly not justified by the scheme and language of the sections. What is referred to the Court for determination in a reference under sec. 18 is the objection of the applicant to the award of the Collector and it is that objection which is determined on the reference by the Court. The objection has to be determined by the Court on the evidence before it and if no evidence is led by the applicant in support of the objection and the Collector also does not lead any evidence in justification of the award the objection would be negatived by the Court and the reference would be dismissed. There would in such a case be no question of the Court making an award for there being no evidence before the Court as to the measurement or value of the land it would not be possible for the Court to make its own award. The award to be made by the Court would have to be based on the evidence before the Court and if there is no evidence before the Court the Court obviously cannot make an award determining the amount of compensation. If the Court were to make an award in the same terms as the award of the Collector it would mean that in the opinion of the Court the amount of compensation determined in the award of the Collector was the proper amount of compensation but the Court cannot possibly arrive at such opinion without evidence before it. The Court would therefore have no alternative but to reject the objection as unsupported by evidence and to dismiss the reference. Similarly if the applicant fails to appear at the hearing of the reference the reference would have to be dismissed for default of appearance under Order 9 Rule 8 as applied by sec. 53. It is difficult to see how the Court can in the absence of the applicant proceed to determine his objection on merits unless of course the Collector chooses to lead evidence for the purpose of satisfying the Court that the amount of compensation determined in the award of the Collector is the proper amount of compensation for the land. 53. It is difficult to see how the Court can in the absence of the applicant proceed to determine his objection on merits unless of course the Collector chooses to lead evidence for the purpose of satisfying the Court that the amount of compensation determined in the award of the Collector is the proper amount of compensation for the land. But there is no obligation on the Collector to lead evidence for the purpose of supporting the award and if the Collector does not lead evidence on what evidence would the Court proceed to make an award in the same terms as the award of the Collector ? It is therefore clear that the nature of a reference under sec. 18 is not such that it must necessarily result in the making of an award by the Court and when I use the word ;award I mean it in the sense of an award determining the amount of compensation for the land. The reference is no different from an ordinary civil proceeding in which the applicant who is in the position of a plaintiff objects to the amount of compensation offered in the award of the Collector and claims additional compensation. If the applicant fails to appear at the hearing of the reference the reference must by force of Order 9 Rule 8 which is made applicable by sec. 53 be dismissed for want of appearance like any other civil proceeding and in the same way if the applicant does not produce evidence in support of the objection the reference must be dismissed just as any other civil proceeding would be dismissed for want of evidence in support of the claim. When the reference is dismissed the award of the Collector stands and the applicant can always accept the offer contained in such award. Now if the reference can be dismissed for default of appearance of the applicant or for want of evidence before the Court there is no reason why Order 22 Rule 3 should not be applicable to the reference. If Order 22 Rule 3 does not apply to the reference what is to happen when the applicant dies during the pendency of the reference ? If Order 22 Rule 3 does not apply to the reference what is to happen when the applicant dies during the pendency of the reference ? The right to claim additional compensation which the applicant is agitating in the reference would certainly survive to his heirs and there is nothing in the nature of the reference which should preclude the heirs from making an application to the Court for bringing themselves on record in place of the applicant. It is difficult to see why instead of permitting the heirs to follow the ordinary and simple procedure of applying to the Court for bringing themselves on record in place of the applicant and proceeding with the reference the law should insist that the Collector who is the opposite party must supply the names of the heirs to the Court and the Court should issue notices to the heirs as persons interested in the objection and then proceed with the reference. There is clearly nothing in the nature of the reference which is inconsistent with Order 22 Rule 3 sub-rule (1) and the provision contained in Order 22 Rule 3 sub rule (1) can be applied to the reference without causing any anomaly or inconsistency. Order 22 Rule 3 sub-rule (2) provides for abatement of the proceeding if no application for bringing the heirs on record is made within the time limited by law and the question may therefore well arise whether there is any time limited by law for the making of an application to bring the heirs of a deceased applicant on record in a pending reference. If there is a time prescribed by law for making such application and such application is not made within the time so prescribed the reference would abate leaving the award of the Collector unaffected. But if no time for making such application is prescribed by law the application can obviously be made at any time and there would be no abatement of the reference and in that event as soon as application is made the Court would bring the heirs of the deceased applicant on record and proceed with the reference. Order 22 Rule 3 sub-rule (2) is also therefore not in any way inconsistent with the nature of the reference. Order 22 Rule 3 sub-rule (2) is also therefore not in any way inconsistent with the nature of the reference. The provision enacted in both the sub-rules of Order 22 Rule 3 can be made applicable without creating any inconsistency or disharmony and it must therefore be concluded that Order 22 Rule 3 applies to a reference under sec. 18. ( 6 ) THIS view which I am inclined to take is considerably fortified if reference is made to the earlier Land Acquisition Act 1 of 1870. In that Act there was no provision corresponding to present sec. 53 making all the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to proceedings before the Court under that Act but sec. 36 of that Act provided that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in regard to certain specified topics shall apply to a reference and one of the topics so specified was death of parties. Now if the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in regard to death of parties were made applicable to a reference under the earlier Act it is difficult to conceive of any reason why these provisions should be held inapplicable to a reference when the Legislature actually enlarged the scope of applicability of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and made all the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable unless there was anything inconsistent in the Act. Moreover if under the earlier Act the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in regard to death of parties were applicable to a reference it is not possible to say that the nature of the reference is such that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in regard to death of parties are inconsistent or incompatible with the reference. I am therefore unable to agree with the ratio of the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Abdul Karim v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) and I must hold that Order 22 Rule 3 applies to a reference under sec. 18. ( 7 ) IT is therefore clear that when the applicant died during the pendency of the reference the petitioners as the heirs and legal representatives of the applicant were entitled to make an application to the Court for bringing themselves on record under Order 22 Rule 3 sub-rule (1 ). 18. ( 7 ) IT is therefore clear that when the applicant died during the pendency of the reference the petitioners as the heirs and legal representatives of the applicant were entitled to make an application to the Court for bringing themselves on record under Order 22 Rule 3 sub-rule (1 ). But the question is whether they were bound to make such application within any particular period. It is only if a time for making such application was limited by law that the failure to make such application within the time so limited could invite the penalty of abatement under Order 22 Rule 3 sub-rule (2 ). The controversy between the parties therefore centered round the question as to whether any time was limited by law for the purpose of making an application by the heirs of a deceased applicant in a pending reference for bringing themselves on record. Mr. A. D. Desai on behalf of the Collector relied on Article 176 of the Indian Limitation Act 1908 and urged that this Article provided a period of ninety days from the date of death of the deceased applicant for making an application to have the heirs of the deceased applicant made parties in the reference. Article 176 of course talked of an application to have the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff made a party and provided a period of ninety days from the date of death of the deceased plaintiff; but the argument of Mr. A. D. Desai was that the reference was a suit and the applicant was a plaintiff in such suit and this Article had therefore application to a reference. And support for this contention was sought to be drawn from secs. 26 (2) and 53 of the Land Acquisition Act. The contention broadly divided itself into two parts. The first part of the contention sought to equate an applicant in a reference with a plaintiff in a suit and thereby to attract the applicability of Article 176 and the argument in support of this part of the contention was that the word plaintiff in this Article was sufficiently wide to include applicant in a reference. Now there can be no doubt that there can be a plaintiff only in relation to a suit and the question must therefore resolve itself into a narrow one namely what is the suit contemplated by the Limitation Act. Now there can be no doubt that there can be a plaintiff only in relation to a suit and the question must therefore resolve itself into a narrow one namely what is the suit contemplated by the Limitation Act. The word suit has received different judicial interpretations in different enactments: sometimes it has received a narrow construction and sometimes a wider construction depending upon the context of the enactment. The question as to what is the sense in which the word suit is used in the Limitation Act would therefore have required an examination of the context of the statutory provisions enacted in the Limitation Act but fortunately this question is no longer open to controversy for it is concluded by a decision of the Privy Council in Hansraj Gupta v. Official Liquidators 35 Bom. L. R. 319. The Privy Council in this case was concerned with the interpretation of the word suit occurring in sec. 3 of the Limitation Act and Lord Russell delivering the opinion of the Privy Council observed that the word suit in sec. 3 of the Limitation Act ordinarily means a civil proceeding instituted by the presentation of a plaint. This decision of the Privy Council clearly establishes that the suit contemplated by the Limitation Act is a civil proceeding commenced with the presentation of a plaint and the plaintiff in Article 176 must therefore mean a plaintiff in such a suit and cannot include an applicant in a reference. It is significant to note that though sec. 53 makes the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure applicable to a reference it does not make Article 176 of the Limitation Act applicable to such reference. Article 176 of the Limitation Act cannot therefore be held to be applicable to a reference on the argument that an applicant in a reference is a plaintiff in a suit within the meaning of that Article. That disposes of the first part of the contention. The second part of the contention is also in my view equally futile. The argument under the second part of the contention was that a reference is in the nature of a statutory suit and Article 176 of the Limitation Act must therefore be held applicable to it. That disposes of the first part of the contention. The second part of the contention is also in my view equally futile. The argument under the second part of the contention was that a reference is in the nature of a statutory suit and Article 176 of the Limitation Act must therefore be held applicable to it. Now in the first place it must be remembered that unless there is a statutory fiction deeming a reference to be a suit for the purpose of the Limitation Act Article 176 cannot have any application to a reference. There is no such statutory fiction either in the Land Acquisition Act or in the Limitation Act. There is no doubt a statutory fiction created in section 26 (2) and by that statutory fiction an award made on a reference is deemed to be a decree within the meaning of sec. 2 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. But that does not convert a reference into a suit; it does not fictionally make a reference into a suit. The statutory fiction is a limited one and it has merely the effect of converting an award which is not a decree into a decree for the purpose of sec. 2 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. As a matter of fact this statutory fiction clearly postulates that a reference is not a suit for if it were a suit the award would straightway have been a decree and there would have been no need to enact the statutory fiction. Moreover in that event it would not have been necessary to enact sec. 53 for the purpose of making the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to a reference. Those provisions would have applied proprio vigore by reason of the reference being a suit. It is therefore evident that a reference is neither a suit nor a deemed suit and Article 176 of the Limitation Act has therefore no application to it. If that Article does not apply there is no other Article which can possibly be invoked on behalf of the Collector and it must be held that no time is limited by law for making of an application by the heirs of a deceased applicant for bringing themselves on record in the reference. If that Article does not apply there is no other Article which can possibly be invoked on behalf of the Collector and it must be held that no time is limited by law for making of an application by the heirs of a deceased applicant for bringing themselves on record in the reference. Some reference was made to Article 181 which is a residuary Article providing a period of limitation for an application for which no period is provided elsewhere in the First Schedule but this Article provides a period of three years and even if it were applicable the application of the petitioners in the present case for bringing themselves on record as heirs of Abbasbhai would be within time. The learned Civil Judge was therefore in error in holding that the reference had abated by reason of the petitioners having failed to make an application for bringing themselves on record within a period of ninety days from the date of death of Abbasbhai and in dismissing the reference as having abated he refused to exercise jurisdiction to entertain the reference which was vested in him by law. ( 8 ) I therefore allow the Revision Application set aside the order passed by the learned Civil Judge dismissing the reference as having abated and remand the matter to the trial Court with a direction to grant the application of the petitioners to bring themselves on record as heirs and legal representatives of Abbasbhai and to proceed with the reference and to dispose it of in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs of the Revision Application. Application allowed. .