Order.- The tenant is the petitioner herein. The owner let him into possession of the property as tenant. Subsequently, one Raju Servai took a usufructuary mortgage of the property and the tenant Baluswami Servai attorned to Raju Servai. Raju Servai filed a petition for eviction of the tenant on the ground, inter alia, that he wanted the house for his own occupation. He did not have a house of his own nor his son. His requirement was found to be bona fide and eviction was ordered by the Rent Controller and the order was confirmed on appeal by the learned Subordinate Judge and in revision by the learned Additional District Judge. The point taken by Sri K.V. Sankaran, learned Counsel for the petitioner, before me is that though Raju Servai might satisfy the definition of ‘landlord’ in section 21 (6) of Madras Act XVIII of 1960, none but the owner will be entitled to recover possession from the tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement of the premises for personal occupation. The relevant provision of the Act is section 10(3)(a)(i) which says that a landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building, in case it is a residential building, if the landlord requires it for his own occupation or for the occupation of his son and he or his son is not occupying a residential building of his own in the city, town or village concerned. The definition of a ‘landlord’ in section 2(6) is: “Landlord includes the person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building, whether on his own account or on behalf of another or on behalf of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the building were let to a tenant.” Raiu Servai is a person who is entitled to receive the rent of the building in his capacity as usufructuary mortgagee and is therefore a ‘landlord’ within the meaning of the definition and, as I have said, the learned Counsel himself concedes it. The argument however, is that it is only the owner who is entitled to evict the tenant for personal occupation under section 10(3)(a)(i). The argument however, is that it is only the owner who is entitled to evict the tenant for personal occupation under section 10(3)(a)(i). There is however nothing in that section to limit the benefit thereof to. the owner. The benefit thereof is given to a landlord and for that we must turn to the definition in section 2(6) and we have seen that Raju Servai is a ‘landlord’ within the meaning of that definition. Learned Counsel raises the question whether that means that a person like an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or guardian could claim the benefit of section 10(3)(a)(i). It is unnecessary to answer that question in the present case, because Raju Servai is a person entitled to receive the rent of the building on his own account and therefore comes squarely within the first portion of the definition of ‘landlord’ and there is no principle of law by which his right could be defeated. If the original owner had sold the property to Raju Servai, Raju Servai would have become the owner and could have filed the petition for eviction. By getting an usufructuary mortgage instead, he still gets the same benefit. Sri Sankaran admitted that he could not say that the mortgage was nominal or collusive. He however prays that because there appears to be no decided case either way on the question, the petition may be admitted. I do not think it necessary to admit the petition on that ground, when the matter seems to me to be clear. The petition is accordingly dismissed The petitioner is, however, given two months’ time from to-day to vacate the premises. V.K. ----- Petition dismissed.