BALVANTSINGH BHIMSINGH v. N. RAMA IYER,i. G. P. — 1966 DIGILAW 67 (GUJ)

J. B. MEHTA, N. M. MIABHOY, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the constitution of India in which the main point for consideration is whether the revisional power over an acquittal order conferred on the Inspector General of Police by an amendment introduced on 4th January 1962 in rule 17 of the Bombay Police (Punishments and Appeals) Rules 1956 (hereafter called the rules) has or has not retrospective action. Petitioner Balvantsingh Bhimsingh was at the relevant time an unarmed police constable attached to the Dabhoi Police Station. On May 9 1961 an incident took place in which a bribe is alleged to have been taken by another member of the police force in the presence and with the connivance of petitioner. On 12th July 1961 petitioner was suspended. On 18 July 1961 petitioner and two more constables were charge-sheeted the charge being that they had committed gross dereliction of duty and moral turpitude involving corruption on 9th May 1961 inasmuch as petitioner and those two others after arresting three persons who were found drunk had allowed all of them to go away without taking any further legal action after accepting an illegal gratification of Rs. 20/through one Vechan Jiva near the lake at Dabhoi. One Chaudhary the D. S. P. Kaira who was petitioners superior officer held an enquiry into the aforesaid charge. That officer held the charge to be proved and issued a show cause notice to petitioner stating that he intended to dismiss petitioner as he was satisfied that the charge was proved. Petitioner replied to the show cause notice in November 1961 However on 20th December 1961 the D. S. P. held finally that the charge was proved and passed an order of dismissal. Petitioner then filed an appeal under rule 6 of the rules to the Deputy Inspector General of Police. This appeal was filed on 1st January 1962 On that date rule 17 of the rules did not confer power in terms to revise any order of acquittal whether original appellate or revisional. However on 4th January 1962 the State of Gujarat in exercise of the power conferred on it by clause (c) of subsection (2) of sec. 25 read with clause (b) of sec. 5 of the Bombay Police Act 1961 (hereafter called the Act) amended rule 17. However on 4th January 1962 the State of Gujarat in exercise of the power conferred on it by clause (c) of subsection (2) of sec. 25 read with clause (b) of sec. 5 of the Bombay Police Act 1961 (hereafter called the Act) amended rule 17. Substantially by that amendment the Inspector General of Police was given the power of revising an order of acquittal whether original appellate or revisional. On 27th July 1962 the D. I. G. the appellate authority allowed petitioners appeal set aside the order of dismissal passed by the D. S. P. and ordered petitioners reinstatement in police service. On 24th August 1962 petitioner reported for duty and he was posted at the Sankheda Police Station. On 21st May 1963 Nagarwala the then I. G. P. and the predecessor-in-office of first respondent issued a show cause notice purporting to act under the amended rule 17. In that notice he recorded a provisional finding that petitioner was guilty of the charge levelled against him and called upon petitioner to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service. After petitioner had shown cause Nagarwala by his order dated 19th September 1963 held petitioner to be guilty and ordered his dismissal from police service. Petitioner preferred an appeal to the State Government respondent No. 2. That respondent by its order dated 27th July 1964 dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved by the orders of Nagarwala and second respondent dated respectively 19th September 1963 and 27th July 1964 petitioner filed the present petition in which he prayed for an appropriate writ or order or direction for quashing the order of dismissal passed by Nagarwala and for restoring the order passed be the Deputy Inspector General of Police. ( 2 ) PETITIONER has attacked the impugned order on a number of grounds in the memo. of petition. However at the time of the arguments Mr. Thakore learned advocate for petitioner stated that though he proposed to challenge the impugned orders only on two grounds now he could not press one of them in view of the decision recorded by this Court in Special Civil Application No. 913 of 1963 by the judgment dated 30th June/1st July 1966 Ranchhodbhai v. J. D. Nagarwala now reported at VII G. L. R. 1091 ). That point which Mr. That point which Mr. Thakore stated he could not press was that sub-rule (1) of rule 17 was ultra vires sec. 25 sub-sec. (2) clause (c) of the Act in the contest of an order of acquittal. Therefore the point which Mr. Thakore formulated and pressed for decision was the second point and that point was that having regard to the facts of the present case the then I. G. P. had no power to revise the order of acquittal passed in appeal by the D. I. G. under amended rule 17 sub-rule (1) on the ground that the amended sub-rule cannot have retrospective operation. ( 3 ) THEREFORE the point which arises for determination in the present petition is whether on a true construction of the amended sub-rule (1) of rule 17 the power of the I. G. P. to interfere in revision against an order of acquittal can or cannot act retrospectively on an order of acquittal recorded in an appeal which was pending at the time when the rule was amended. ( 4 ) IN order to decide the aforesaid point it will be convenient to mention the true position obtaining in regard to the action taken against petitioner before the rule was amended and the position obtaining after the same was so amended in case the amendment is held to be retrospective. The incident on the basis of which petitioner has been dismissed took place on 9th May 1961. It cannot be disputed that if that incident is established then petitioner is liable to be punished with any one of the punishments mentioned in sec. 25 sub-sec. (1) and rule 3 by any one of the authorities mentioned in that section or rule 5. Amongst the authorities mentioned in sec. 25 and rule 3 is the D. S. P and one of the punishments which can be inflicted by that officer on an officer of the subordinate rank to which rank petitioner belongs is the punishment of dismissal. Under sub-sec. (2) clause (c) of sec. 25 the exercise of that power of dismissal is subject to the rules to be made by the State Government. Sec. 5 clause (b) of the Act also confers power upon the State Government to make rules subject to the provisions of the Act in regard inter alia to the conditions of service of the police force. 25 the exercise of that power of dismissal is subject to the rules to be made by the State Government. Sec. 5 clause (b) of the Act also confers power upon the State Government to make rules subject to the provisions of the Act in regard inter alia to the conditions of service of the police force. By virtue of these powers the then Government of Bombay issued the rules. Rule 2 enacts that no police officer to whom the rules apply shall be departmentally punished otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the rules. There is no doubt that petitioner being a member of the subordinate police force is and was at all relevant times governed by the aforesaid rules. Rule 3 sub-rules (1) and (2) prescribe various kinds of punishments including the punishment of dismissal. Rule 4 again emphasises what has been provided in rule 2 in regard to certain specified punishments. It says that in regard to such specified punishments no punishment shall be imposed on any police officer unless a departmental enquiry into his conduct is held. The rules themselves do not provide specifically as to the manner in which a departmental enquiry is to be held except that in rule 4 it is provided that a note of the enquiry with the reasons for passing an order imposing a specified punishment shall be made in writing under the signature of the punishing authority. This manner in which an enquiry is to be held is provided for by special orders circulars or resolutions of the Government some of which are reproduced in the Police Manual Volume I. Rule 5 then mentions the officers who have the power to inflict punishments and the schedules mention the kinds of punishments which each officer can inflict. Rule 6 then provides that every police officer shall have a right of appeal to the authority specified in rule 5 against an order of punishment of the kind specified in rule 6 and says that no second appeal shall lie from an appellate order. Rule 15 mentions the duties of the appellate authority and says that such authority may after considering the matters provided therefore in the rule pass such orders as it thinks just and proper. The appellate authority has also been given the power of enhancing punishment. Rule 15 mentions the duties of the appellate authority and says that such authority may after considering the matters provided therefore in the rule pass such orders as it thinks just and proper. The appellate authority has also been given the power of enhancing punishment. Rule 17 as it stood before it was amended gave power to the Inspector General of Police to call for and examine the record of any case in which an order had been made by a subordinate authority and in which an appeal lay. The proviso to rule 17 gave the Inspector General of Police the power to enhance punishments. Rule 19 gives power to an immediately superior officer to revise an order passed by an authority from whose order an appeal does not lie to any other authority. Rule 18 confers on the State Government a general power of revision. It confers a power not only to revise an order of conviction but also an order of acquittal whether original appellate or revisional. ( 5 ) THUS on the date on which petitioner committed the delinquency on the basis of which he has been dismissed he was liable to be departmentally prosecuted under the rules. One of the authorities who had the power of holding a departmental enquiry was the D. S. P. In case the D. S. P. passed an order of conviction petitioner had the right of filing an appeal to the D. I. G. and in case the D. I. G. dismissed his appeal petitioner had a right of going in revision to the I. G. P. and in case that officer confirmed the order of punishment he had a further right of going in revision to the State Government. In case a non-appealable order was passed against petitioner had the right of preferring a revision application to the immediately superior officer of the D. S. P. As we have pointed out in our judgment dated 30th June/1st July 1966 in Special Civil Application No. 913 of 1966 (Ranchhodbhai v. J. D. Nagarwala) a delinquent has also a right of preferring an appeal under sec. 27 of the Act from any order original appellate or revisional passed by any of the authorities mentioned in the rules and passed in a departmental enquiry held under the rules. 27 of the Act from any order original appellate or revisional passed by any of the authorities mentioned in the rules and passed in a departmental enquiry held under the rules. But however if during the course of the departmental enquiry the competent officer happened to pass an order of acquittal then there is no doubt whatsoever that under the rules as they existed at the time when the delinquency was committed the department had no right of preferring an appeal from the order of acquittal nor had any authority other than the State Government the power of revising the order of acquittal. Under the rules the power of revising an order of acquittal. rested with the Government and this power was conferred on the State Government by rule 18. ( 6 ) PETITIONER was convicted on 20th of December 1961 and he preferred his appeal to the D. I. G. on 1st January 1962. Therefore on 1st January 1962 the position was that petitioner had already been punished and unless his order of conviction was set aside by the competent authority under the rules he was bound to suffer the punishment. But when petitioner filed the appeal the order of conviction became fluid and became subject to any order which the appellate authority might pass in appeal. However it was not possible to say on 1st January 1962 what order would be passed by the appellate authority in petitioners appeal. The order might have been one of confirmation of reversal or of remand. Different consequences might flow according as the appellate authority happened to pass one or the other kind of the order. Therefore it was not possible to postulate as to what exactly would be the position which petitioner would occupy on the date all which the appellate authority happened to pass the order. Having regard to the fact that on 1st January 1962 there was already an order of conviction against petitioner it is quite clear that petitioner cannot get any advantage from out of the order of acquittal which came to be passed subsequently after rule 17 was amended. Having regard to the fact that on 1st January 1962 there was already an order of conviction against petitioner it is quite clear that petitioner cannot get any advantage from out of the order of acquittal which came to be passed subsequently after rule 17 was amended. Petitioner can take advantage of his having filed an appeal only if on a construction of the amended rule the Court comes to the conclusion that it is not retrospective or if it comes to the conclusion that as a result of the proceeding having been started at a date earlier to the date of the amendment some right of petitioner which had become vested in him was either destroyed or impaired. But even the order of acquittal which was passed by the appellate authority had not the attribute of absolute finality in it under the rules As already pointed out that order of acquittal was subject to the revisional power of the State Government under rule 18. Therefore there is no doubt whatsoever that on the date on which the delinquency took place on the date on which the departmental enquiry started and on the date on which the appeal was filed on all these three material dates the exercise of the authority by any of the officers empowered to deal with the delinquency was subject to the over-all revisional power of the State Government and in that particular sense any order passed by any of the aforesaid series of authorities cannot be said to be final. ( 7 ) AFTER the amendment was made the change which took place was that whereas an order of acquittal which if passed either by the original authority or the appellate authority could have been revised only by the State Government became also revisable by the I. G. P. In other words the change which took place was that the revisional authority of the I. G. P. was interposed between the order of acquittal and the revisional authority of the State Government. However it is noteworthy that any order of conviction which the I. G. P. may pass or any order of confirmation of an order of acquittal which that officer may pass was itself subject to the revisional authority of the State Government. However it is noteworthy that any order of conviction which the I. G. P. may pass or any order of confirmation of an order of acquittal which that officer may pass was itself subject to the revisional authority of the State Government. Therefore as a result of the aforesaid amendment the quality which an order of acquittal possessed of being revised by the State Government did not come to be affected by the amendment at all. ( 8 ) BEARING in mind the aforesaid effects of the rules and the amendment we proceed now to consider the various aspects which were presented by learned advocates on both sides on the question regarding the retrospectively of the amended rule. Mr. Thakore first contends that the amended portion must be read with reference to the date of the amendment and if it is read in that particular manner then the amended part as it stands does not take within its purview the revisional authority of the I. G. P. on the appellate order of acquittal. The words which are used in rule 17 sub-rule (1) as introduced by the amendment are any case arising under these rules in which an order of acquittal. . . . has been made by such authority. Mr. Thakore argues that the word case in the context must be interpreted as the appellate case and in order that the amended part may apply that case must arise under the rules and it is that case in which the order of acquittal must be passed. He contends that it is only when all those conditions are satisfied that the amended part will attract the revisional authority of the I. G. P. His contention is that though there was an appellate case that case did not arise under rules before they were amended by the amended rule. He contends that the appellate case arose under rules before they were so amended. Therefore according to Mr. Thakore the case having arisen at the time when rule 17 was unamended the phrase arising under these rules cannot apply to the facts of the present case. Secondly Mr. Thakore emphasises the use of the expression has been made. He contends that at the time when the appellate case arose there was no order of acquittal made at all. Mr. Secondly Mr. Thakore emphasises the use of the expression has been made. He contends that at the time when the appellate case arose there was no order of acquittal made at all. Mr. Thakore contends that if the rule-making authority had intended the revisional power to attach to a pending appellate case then instead of saying that the case must be one in which an order of acquittal has been made the proper expression which would be used would be a case in which an order of acquittal may happen to be made. In our judgment the whole approach of Mr. Thakore is wrong. In the first instance we must bear in mind that the amendment was introduced by an amendatory rule and not by a repealing rule. The amendatory rule is of a kind where by the amendment on addition is engrafted on the main rule which remains intact. There is high authority for the proposition that when such is the case the earlier rule must be thereafter read and construed (except where that would lead to a repugnancy. inconsistency or absurdity) as if the amended words were there from the beginning. This is what their Lordships have observed in Shamrao v. Parulekar v. District Magistrate Thana Bombay and others reported in A. I. R. 1952 S. C. page 324 at page 326 :-THE construction of an Act which has been amended is now governed by technical rules and we must first be clear regarding the proper canons of construction. The rule is that when a subsequent Act amends an earlier one in such a way as to incorporate itself or a part of itself into the earlier then the earlier Act must thereafter be read and construed (except where that would lead to a repugnancy inconsistency or absurdity) as if the altered words had been written into the earlier Act with (sic the same) pen and ink and the old words scored out so that thereafter there is no need to refer to the amending Act at all. Therefore in our judgment it would not be proper to construe the amended rule in the manner suggested by Mr. Thakore. Therefore in our judgment it would not be proper to construe the amended rule in the manner suggested by Mr. Thakore. Reading the amended rule in the manner laid down by their Lordships in the aforesaid case there cannot be any doubt that the amended part of the rule will apply to the appellate order of acquittal passed by the D. I. G. in favour of petitioner. However that does not answer the question as to whether the aforesaid part of the rule has or has not retrospective action. That the aforesaid rule of construction cannot be a sufficient guide on the question of retrospectively of a legislative enactment is quite clear from the way in which their Lordships have explained the aforesaid passage in Ram Narain v. S. B. and I. Co. reported in A. I. R. 1956 S. C. page 614 at page 621. After quoting the aforesaid passage which we have reproduced above their Lordships proceed to explain the passage in the following way :-NOW there is no question about the correctness of this dictum. But it appears to us that it has no application to this case. It is perfectly true as stated therein that whenever an amended Act has to be applied subsequent to the date of the amendment the various unamended provisions of the Act have to be read along with the amended provisions as though they are part of it. This is for the purpose of determining what the meaning of any particular provision of the Act as amended is whether it is in the unamended part or in the amended part. But this is not the same thing as saying that the amendment itself must be taken to have been in exist existence as from the date of the earlier Act. That would be imputing to the amendment retrospective operation which would only be done if such retrospective operation is given by the amending Act either expressly or by necessary implication. Under the circumstances the question has yet to be answered as to whether the amended part of the rule has or has not retrospective operation Now on that point judicial approach is now well settled. The question in the ultimate analysis resolves itself into discovering what the legislative will on the subject is. Under the circumstances the question has yet to be answered as to whether the amended part of the rule has or has not retrospective operation Now on that point judicial approach is now well settled. The question in the ultimate analysis resolves itself into discovering what the legislative will on the subject is. If the Legislature decides in express words that that particular enactment should be given retrospective action then the Court is bound by the expression of such will and nothing further needs to be decided. The Legislature may also express its will by necessary intendment. If that is so then also once the Court reaches the conclusion that the Legislature has by necessary intendment expressed its will that a legislative provision should have retrospective action then the Court is bound by the expression of the will and must give effect to it Now in the present case it is not the contention of Mr. Sompura learned Assistant Government Pleader that the rule-making authority has expressed its intention in express terms on the aforesaid subject. What Mr. Sompura contends is that there are two provisions in the Act which shows that the Legislature had willed that any rule or order which may be passed in exercise of the authority to be presently mentioned the rule or the order must always have a retrospective action. On the other hand strangely enough. Mr. R. C. Mankad who was heard by us in support of the aforesaid submission of Mr. Thakore raises quite a contrary contention that the same provisions on which Mr. Sompura relies enacts that the rule-making authority cannot give retrospective action to any of its rules or orders. The provisions on which Mr. Sompura relies are sec. 25 sub-sec. (2) clause (c) and sec. 5 (b) of the Act under which the aforesaid rules including the amending rule were made by the State Government. Sec. 25 sub-sec. (2) clause (c) enacts that the exercise of any power conferred by sub-sec. (2) shall be subject always to such rules and orders as may be made by the State Government in that behalf. Sec. 5 clause (b) enacts that subject to the provisions of the Act amongst others the conditions of service of police force shall be such as may from time to time be determined by the State Government by general or special order. Mr. Sec. 5 clause (b) enacts that subject to the provisions of the Act amongst others the conditions of service of police force shall be such as may from time to time be determined by the State Government by general or special order. Mr. Sompuras contention is that the use of the word always in clause (c) and the expression from time to time in clause (b) aforesaid show that the Legislature has enacted in express terms that whenever a rule happens to be made i. e. whenever the Government is exercising its power of subjecting the exercise of the authority of any of the police officers or laying down a rule relating to the condition of service of any such officer necessarily that rule or order must have retrospective action. On the other hand Mr. Mankad contends that under clause (c) the only power which the State Government has been given is the power to subject not the power of any police officer but the exercise of that power to its rule-making authority and he contends that the rule-making power can be exercised by the State Government only so long as the exercise of the authority of the police officer subsists and not after the exercise of power has been exhausted. Similarly he contends that under clause (b) also the conditions of service can be affected by the rule-making authority only so as to operate after the date on which the rule is published and not before. In our judgment both the aforesaid constructions are wrong. The construction for which Mr. Mankad contends must necessarily be rejected because otherwise the use of the word always in clause (c) aforesaid would be rendered superfluous as also the expression from time to time used in clause (b) of sec. 5. In our judgment both the aforesaid constructions are wrong. The construction for which Mr. Mankad contends must necessarily be rejected because otherwise the use of the word always in clause (c) aforesaid would be rendered superfluous as also the expression from time to time used in clause (b) of sec. 5. In our judgment the expression always emphasises that the use of the power is at all times subject to the rule-making authority of the State Government and having regard to the fact that that subjection can be effected not only by a rule but even by an order and having regard to the further fact that the subordination of all police officers has been placed in the hands of the State Government which has full powers of superintendence over the whole police force the intention of the Legislature by using the word always appears to make the exercise of the power of police officers subject to the over-all will of the State Government which has the final control over all actions of the police including discipline. But in our judgment whilst this is so it does not necessarily follow that the aforesaid language yields this construction that the rule-making authority has no choice when it makes a rule that the rule must always be retrospective and not prospective. In our judgment the aforesaid expressions always and from time to time only emphasize that the rule-making authority has the power of enacting or retrospective rule or making a retrospective order the choice being left to the State Government as to whether in a given case it should or should not exercise its power one way or the other. In our judgment therefore the aforesaid two provisions of the Act on which reliance has been placed by rival sides only mean that the State Government has the power of enacting or making retrospective rules or orders and that is all. ( 9 ) IT is not the contention of Mr. Sompura that a retrospective operation is intended by necessary intendment. But what Mr. Sompura contends is that even though this is so the Court must act on presumptions arising from the entire enactment itself. For example it is well-known that when the Court deals with a declaratory enactment then usually the Court presumes that the Legislature intends to give it a retrospective operation. But what Mr. Sompura contends is that even though this is so the Court must act on presumptions arising from the entire enactment itself. For example it is well-known that when the Court deals with a declaratory enactment then usually the Court presumes that the Legislature intends to give it a retrospective operation. Therefore the nature of the enactment the retrospectively of which has got to be determined plays an important role in aiding Court in answering the question as to whether a particular enactment is prospective or retrospective. The rival contentions on this particular subject are as follows:-ACCORDING to Mr. Thakore the amendatory rule is penal in character and according to Mr. Sompura it is essentially procedural. Mr. Sompura further contends that in any case the amendatory rule is remedial in character and in the submission of Mr. Sompura in the case of the both aforesaid kinds of enactments a presumption must be raised that the intention of the rule-making authority is retrospective. On the other hand Mr. Thakore and Mr. Mankad contend that the amendatory rule being penal in character the presumption must be that no retrospective action is intended. In the alternative Mr. Thakore contends that even if the rule is procedural or remedial the rule must be given prospective operation only on the ground that the rule affects if not destroys valuable vested rights of petitioner or in any case creates a fresh liability which did not exist at the time when the amendatory rule was enacted. ( 10 ) NOW we cannot uphold the contention that the amendatory rule is penal in character In order that a rule may be penal in character the rule itself must prescribe a punishment. It is quite clear that the amendatory rule does not do anything of the kind. The punishment for the delinquency is prescribed by sec. 25 of the Act and rule 3 That punishment is neither changed nor added to by the amendatory rule. What the amendatory rule does is that whereas formerly an authority which had the power of inflicting punishments happened to pass an order of acquittal it was not subject to the revisional authority of the I. G. P. it now subjects such an order of acquittal to such authority. Therefore the rule itself does not prescribe any punishment. What the amendatory rule does is that whereas formerly an authority which had the power of inflicting punishments happened to pass an order of acquittal it was not subject to the revisional authority of the I. G. P. it now subjects such an order of acquittal to such authority. Therefore the rule itself does not prescribe any punishment. What the rule only does is to give power to the I. G. P. to determine the correctness or otherwise of the order of acquittal on the merits and if he is satisfied that the order of acquittal is wrong then he has been given the power of setting the matter right on the basis that the delinquent was in fact guilty though he had been held by I. G. P. s subordinate officer not to be guilty Such a distinction is pointed out by Maxwell in his Interpretation of Statutes Tenth Edition at page 225 in the following passage:-IT matters not that the effect of a procedural alteration is to make a prosecution under a penal Act possible. where formerly it had been impossible. Although to make a law punish that which at the time when it was done was not punishable. is contrary to sound principle a law which merely alters the procedure may with perfect propriety be made applicable to past as well as future transactions. In our judgment this passage also supports the submission of Mr. Sompura that the amendment is procedural in character. There is no doubt whatsoever that the amendment does not in any way deal with any substantive rights of petitioner as such nor does it create a new liability nor does it affect an old one. We shall deal with an argument advanced by Mr. Thakore based on rule 2 against this proposition just in a moment. The rule provides that before inflicting a punishment upon a delinquent the competent authority shall hold a departmental enquiry. The rules further provide for appeals and revisions from orders passed in such departmental enquiries. It cannot be denied that the question regarding the institution of a departmental enquiry and the manner in which a departmental enquiry is to be held relate to the procedure to be adopted at the departmental enquiry. When the rule confers a right of appeal it certainly confers a substantive right. It cannot be denied that the question regarding the institution of a departmental enquiry and the manner in which a departmental enquiry is to be held relate to the procedure to be adopted at the departmental enquiry. When the rule confers a right of appeal it certainly confers a substantive right. But when the rule provides that as to who shall be the authority who shall hold a departmental enquiry it is difficult to accede to the argument that such a provision relates to any substantive right. The question as to who shall be the competent authority to hold an enquiry is a question relating to the power of the officer concerned or his jurisdiction to deal with the matter. It cannot be said that the forum created by the authority concerned confers a substantive right upon the delinquent. A delinquent who commits a delinquency has no right that his case shall be tried only by a particular and no other. That is a matter which the law must deal with and to which the delinquent must submit. Therefore when the amendatory rule confers revisional authority it gives power to the I. G. P. to revise an order of his subordinate. In our judgment this is essentially a matter relating to procedure. The power has been given to the I. G. P. more in the interests of the discipline and to advance interests of justice than for any other reason. The I. G. P. is the highest police authority charged with the duty of administering police functions and upholding the discipline in the department. It is in the interest of the discipline of the department and consequently public interest that if and when a delinquency happens to be committed by a member of the police force the correctness or otherwise of a decision regarding the commission or non-commission of the delinquency should be ultimately left in the hands of the highest authority. According to the rules as they existed before the amendment the final power of reaching a decision on such a subject was with the State Government. The I. G. P. was also given the same power but the power was restricted only to orders of conviction and it could not operate against orders of acquittal. The latter power vested only in the State Government. The I. G. P. was also given the same power but the power was restricted only to orders of conviction and it could not operate against orders of acquittal. The latter power vested only in the State Government. By the amendatory rule the intention of the rule-making authority was to give complete powers including the power against orders of acquittal to the I. G. P. too. In our judgment the provision was introduced more with a view to fill in a gap noticed in the procedure of the I. G. P. not having power of revising an order of acquittal and giving that officer such a power so that before the revisional power of the State Government the highest authority is invoked the I. G. P. may exercise such a power if it is necessary to do so. That a matter conferring power of appeal or revision is procedural is also decided by the highest authority in the land in Indira Sohanlal v. Custodian of Evacuee Property Delhi and others reported in A. I. R. 1956 S. C. 77. In that case their Lordships had to deal with the East Punjab Evacuees (Administration of Property) Amendment) Act 1948 (East Punjab Act 25 of 1948) which inserted two new secs. 5a and 5b prescribing the requirement of confirmation of transactions relating to evacuee property and providing a right of appeal or revision therefrom. In connection with the providing for appeal and a right of revision their Lordships observed at page 84 as follows:-IT is difficult to see that such provisions in those circumstances are anything more than alterations in procedure. In our judgment the circumstances obtaining in the present case are not different from the circumstances prevailing when sec. 5a was introduced in the aforesaid Punjab Act. In a still later case in Memon Abdul Karim Haji Tayab v. Deputy Custodian General New Delhi and others reported in A. I. R. 1964 S. C. 1256 their Lordships had to deal with the Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1950 sec. 48 of which was amended by the Amending Act No. 91 of 1956. By the amendment the power of deciding the question whether any sum is payable to the Government or to the Custodian in respect of an evacuee property was conferred for the first time on the Custodian. 48 of which was amended by the Amending Act No. 91 of 1956. By the amendment the power of deciding the question whether any sum is payable to the Government or to the Custodian in respect of an evacuee property was conferred for the first time on the Custodian. In connection with the conferment of this power their Lordships observed at page 1258 that sub-sec. (2) was procedural in character. Under the circumstances in our judgment there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the amendatory rule was procedural in character. As their Lordships have pointed out in the latter case that when such is the case then the presumption is that the enactment is retrospective unless the enactment or the rule destroys or impairs vested rights. In this view of the matter it is not necessary for us to consider the further submission of Mr. Sompura that the aforesaid provision is remedial in character. ( 11 ) BUT Mr. Thakore contends that the amendatory rule destroys a vested right of petitioner. His submission is based on rule 2 of the rules. As already stated that rule prohibits police officer from punishing another police officer otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the rules. Mr. Thakore contends that at the time when the delinquency was committed and also at the time when the appeal was filed petitioner had a right not to be punished except in accordance with the provisions of the rules which would mean the rules prevailing then. Therefore Mr. Thakore contends that at the time when either the delinquency was committed or the appeal was filed in case there was an order of acquittal according to the rules subsisting before the amendment petitioner was not liable to be punished by an order of the I. G. P. in case any one of his subordinates passed an order of acquittal. Mr. Thakore contends that by the amendatory rule he was deprived of the aforesaid right and a new liability was created of being punished by the I. G. P. We are unable to agree with this contention. It is difficult to construe rule 2 as conferring any right on a delinquent of the kind mentioned by Mr. Thakore. It would be strange if the Legislature had given the power to the State Government to create rights of the aforesaid character. It is difficult to construe rule 2 as conferring any right on a delinquent of the kind mentioned by Mr. Thakore. It would be strange if the Legislature had given the power to the State Government to create rights of the aforesaid character. The rules as already stated are framed under the power vesting in the Government under clause (c) of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 25 and sec. 5 (b) of the Act. Those provisions confer power on the Government to regulate the exercise of the punitive power vested in certain officers mentioned in sub-sec. (1) and to provide for the conditions of service. In our judgment rule 2 has got to be read in this context. Read in that context it can only mean that the rule-making authority has given a directive to the punitive officers that they shall not punish any police officer except by holding a departmental enquiry in accordance with the rules and perhaps it is one of the conditions of service which has been mentioned. Therefore in our judgment the aforesaid rule is more a directive issued by the rule-making authority to the punitive officers than the conferment of a right on the subordinate police officers. Under the circumstances in our judgment there was no right in petitioner not to be subjected to the revisional authority of the I. G. P. at the time when either the delinquency was committed or the appeal was filed and therefore there is no question of the destruction or impairment of any such right. ( 12 ) WE also cannot agree with the submission of Mr. Thakore that a new liability is created against petitioner by the amendatory rule. We have already pointed out the exact effect of the amendatory rule. It does not create any punishment. All that it does is that it invests the highest police authority with the power of reaching a decision in regard to any delinquency which can be the subject matter of punishment either under the Act or under the rules. ( 13 ) THEN Mr. Thakore contends that in any case when the order of acquittal was made that order had a qualified finality in the sense that though it could be disturbed by the State Government it could not have been disturbed by the I. G. P. and by the amendatory rule that qualified finality was taken away. ( 13 ) THEN Mr. Thakore contends that in any case when the order of acquittal was made that order had a qualified finality in the sense that though it could be disturbed by the State Government it could not have been disturbed by the I. G. P. and by the amendatory rule that qualified finality was taken away. It is true that the amendatory rule has such an effect. But the question is whether such an effect can rebut the presumption which otherwise arises in the case of a procedural law that it is retrospective in character. There is highest authority for the proposition that such is not the case even when an order has the quality of finality. In Indira Sohanlals case their Lordships say that no one has a vested right in an order which has the attribute of finality. The Legislature can by a retrospective piece of legislation deprive an order of finality which it otherwise possessed. But this is a case much stronger than Indira Sohanlals case. In the present case the order had not the quality of absolute finality at all. The order of acquittal had only a qualified finality and that order could have been before the amendatory rule was introduced disturbed by the State Government. What has happened in the present case is that the revisional authority of the I. G. P. is interposed between the order of acquittal and the revisional power of the State Government. There is no question of any prejudice having been caused to petitioner at all by the amendatory rule because as we have already pointed out even from the order of the I. G. P. revision under rule 18 or an appeal under sec. 27 lies. ( 14 ) THEN Mr. Thakore argues that in any case the forum of revision has been changed by the amendatory rule and he submits that when such is the case the presumption of retrospectively is rebutted. However Mr. Thakore is not able to point out to us any authority in support of the proposition that when a revisional forum is changed any vested right is affected or a new liability is created. On the facts of the present case it does not appear to be a case of a change of forum at all. The forum of revision which the State Government was remains intact. On the facts of the present case it does not appear to be a case of a change of forum at all. The forum of revision which the State Government was remains intact. Only the revisional authority which the I. G. P. formerly possessed happens to be enlarged. We are not prepared to proceed on the assumption that a person has a vested right in a forum. The question as to whether a particular Court or authority should or should not have jurisdiction over a cause of action is a matter essentially for the legislative authority to determine and even in a pending action it is possible for the Legislature to do this. The matter may require an examination if the original forum is totally destroyed and the forum which was destroyed was of the highest authority. But we are not called upon to decide any such question of this character and therefore we do not propose to express any opinion on this aspect. ( 15 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons we have come to the conclusion that the rule as amended on 4th January 1962 has retrospective action and it confers power on the I. G. P. to revise an order of acquittal passed in a case which arose before the date of the amendment. In that view of the matter we do not propose to consider the efficacy of another argument which Mr. Sompura made in opposition to the petition. The argument was that the order of acquittal having been passed after the rule was amended there was no question of giving retrospective operation to the amendatory rule and that on the facts of the present case the rule was applied prospectively. ( 16 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons in our judgment the petition has no merit and deserves to be dismissed. Rule discharged. In the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. Rule discharged. .