R. S. Narula ( 1 ) KEWAL Ram, petitioner, filed a suit on February 1, 1963 for a permanent injunction being granted against the Delhi Development Authority prohibiting them from demolishing "the plaintiff s shop cum house on about 945 square feet of land situate on the New Link Road, Jandewalan, Delhi" on the allegation that the plaintiff is in possession of the said prorty "built by him about 13 years ago" and on the further allegation that the officials of the defendant-respondent had on 28th January, 1963, inspite of vehement protests of the plaintiff, demolished a part of the structure. In the plaint the plaintiff further proceeded to state that the action of the defendant in demolishing part of the structure and the defendant s threat to demolish the whole of the structure was wrongful as the defendant had no right to take the law in its own hands. It was also pleaded in the plaint that the defendant cannot just send its officials and servants to demolish the structure belonging to the plaintiff without following the procedure prescribed by the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958. A definite allegation of the threatened act of the defendant being improper and amounting to unlawful interference with the plaintiff s rights of property was made in the plaint. ( 2 ) IN its written statement dated 6th March, 1963 the defendant pleaded, inter alia, that the plaintiff is a trespasser on the plot of land in question and has, therefore, no right, title or interest therein. It was claimed by the defendant that "the plaintiff being a trespasser can be evicted without recourse to the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958". In para 5 of the written statement it was averred that the plaintiff had no cause of of action. ( 3 ) THE trial Court framed a preliminary issue to the following effect :- "whether the plaint discloses causes of action ? By order dated March 25, 1963 the trial Court rejected the plaint of the suit under Order 7, rule 11 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that the plaint did not disclose any cause of action. By order dated March 25, 1963 the trial Court rejected the plaint of the suit under Order 7, rule 11 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that the plaint did not disclose any cause of action. The appeal of the plaintiff under Order 41, rule I of the Code having been dismissed on t2th September, 1963 by the Court of Shri K. S. Sidhu, Senior Sub Judge, Delhi, the plaintiff has invoked the second appellate jurisdiction of this Court under section 100 of the Code. ( 4 ) WHILE upholding the order of the trial Court the learned Senior Sub Judge took into consideration the averments of the defendant in its written statement. It is observed in the judgment of the learned Senior Sub Judge, iter alia, as follows :- "the Delhi Development Authority contested this suit and pleaded that the plaintiff was atraspasser, who had no right, title or interest in the land in suit. It pleaded that the plaintiff. . . . . . . . . ". ( 5 ) REFERRING to the judgment of the Patna High Court in Govini Dutta v. Jagnarain Dutta, the learned Senior Sub Judge observed that the law laid down in that case was not applicable to the instant litigation as the contest in the Patna case was between two persons who had acquired possession of the jagir in a lawful manner whereas in the present case the plaintiff seemed to the learned Senior Sub Judge to concede title in the defendant and had, therefore, no right whatsoever to protect his possession. The learned Senior Sub-Judge appears to have given way to the plea of the defendant by deciding the case on the basis of the plaintiff being a trespasser. This is obvious from the following observations in the judgment of the lower appellate Court : - "a trespasser cannot derive any assistance from a ruling dealing with the rights of a person having a recognised estate in property called the possessory estate or posessory title. All that the plaintiff has pleaded in the plaint is that he has been in possession of the suit land for some years. He has scrupulously avoided explaining the nature of that possession, which can, therefore, be quite safely assumed to be that of a tespasser. All that the plaintiff has pleaded in the plaint is that he has been in possession of the suit land for some years. He has scrupulously avoided explaining the nature of that possession, which can, therefore, be quite safely assumed to be that of a tespasser. " ( 6 ) I think, the learned Senior Sub-Judge exceeded his jurisdiction in assuming the plaintiff to be a tresspasser when he had not made any such admission in his plaint and when the assumption was based on a plea taken in the written statement which had not been admitted by the plaintiff to be correct. The plea of the plaintiff to the effect that even if he was assumed to be in unauthorised occupation of public premises he was not liable to eviction therefrom save in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958, was turned down by the learned Senior Sub-Judge on the basis of the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in State of Bengal v. Birendra Nath Basunia", and on the basis of the judgment of the Madras High Court in Alagi Alamelu Achi v. Ponniah Vudaliar". The lower appellate Court held that section 4 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act was merely an enabling provision of law and was not intended to create rights which do not otherwise exist in law and that the defendant was, therefore, not obliged to seek the aid of the estate officer under that Act to evict a trespasser on their land. Towards the close of his judgment the learned Senior Sub-Judge observed that the plaintiff sought to protect his possession of the land in suit which "admittedly" belonged to the defendant. ( 7 ) I have carefully gone through the plaint of the suit from which the present proceedings have arisen. There appears to me to be no doubt that if all the allegations in the plaint are proved the plaintiff would be entitled to obtain a prohibitory injunction against the respondent restraining it from demolishing the plaintiff s shop-cum-house in dispute. For example, if it is proved that the plaintiff built the construction at his cost 13 years ago and that the defendant has no right to demolish the same as alleged by the plaintiff there could be no reason of declining to give relief to the plaintiff. For example, if it is proved that the plaintiff built the construction at his cost 13 years ago and that the defendant has no right to demolish the same as alleged by the plaintiff there could be no reason of declining to give relief to the plaintiff. The superstructure is definitely and clearly claimed to be the property of the plaintiff appellant. The defendant wants to deprive him of the same by demolishing it or destroying it. It is settled rule of law that whenever any authority of the State wants to interfere with the liberty or property of a citizen and the latter questions the right of the State authorities to interfere in the same it is for the Govement officials to justify their action, In these circumstances it appears to be impossible to uphold the order of the Courts below to the effect that the plaint of the petitioner in. this case did inot disclose any cause of action. ( 8 ) IN order -to reject aplaint under Order 7, Rule 11 (a) of the Code of Civil Proccdure a Court is not entitled to look to anything except the conten,te :of the plaint. For the purpose of deciding an objection under Order 7,rule11 (a) of the Code the defendant must be presumed to adroit, for the sake of argument, that all the allegaitions of fact and law-made :in the plaint are entirely correct In so doing the defendant no doubt reserves his right to show in due coruse that the allegations of fact or law are not correct and that either the suit; is barred,by any law and, "therefore, the plaint is liable to be rejection under 0rder 7, rule-11 (d) of the Code or the suit is not maintainable or the allegations made therein are false and is, therefore, liable to be dismissed. The Court cannot take into account the averipents and pleas of fact contained in the written statement of a contesting defendant for deciding whether the plaint discloses a cause or action or not. It is settled law that a plaint can be rejected on the ground that it does not disclose any cause of. action only if the gourt comes to a clear finding that on all the allegations made in the plaint being proved to the hilt, the plaintiff would not be entitled to any relief whatsoever. It is settled law that a plaint can be rejected on the ground that it does not disclose any cause of. action only if the gourt comes to a clear finding that on all the allegations made in the plaint being proved to the hilt, the plaintiff would not be entitled to any relief whatsoever. I have already held abovethat that is not the case here. I am inclined to think that the plaint in this case clearly discloses a definite cause of action and that if all the allegations in the plaint are proved the plaintiff would be entitled to some relief. ( 9 ) THIS second appeal is, therefore, allowed with costs. The judgments and orders of the Courts below are set aside and the trial Court is directed to proceed to try the suit on merits in accordance with law.