JUDGMENT : 1. This is a revision by the plaintiff-landlord against the order, dated 20-9-1965, passed by the II Civil Judge, Class II, Burhanpur, in Civil Suit No. 79-A of 1964, directing the petitioner-landlord to place the respondent tenant in possession of an open plot of land purporting to act under section 151 read with section 18 (3) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. 2. The petitioner filed a suit for eviction of the tenant on the ground that the building was required to be reconstructed and that it was in a dilapidated condition. That suit was compromised on 5-1-1965, whereby the parties agreed that the tenant would vacate the premises on 6-2-1965 and the landlord would complete reconstruction of the building within four months of that date. The construction was, however, not completed within four months; and the trial Court further granted an extension of time by another four months. As such, the petitioner was expected to complete the reconstruction of the building by 6-10-1965. On the landlords failure to complete the reconstruction by 6-10-1965, the tenant applied for taking action against the landlord under section 18 (3) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. It was the landlords contention that he was unable to complete the construction within the time granted for reasons beyond his control. According to him, the neighbouring building had also fallen down and, therefore, he was required to submit a fresh plan to the Municipal Council. According to him, the old plan had become useless on account of the neighbouring building falling down. 3. It was the respondents contention that the landlord was deliberately postponing the reconstruction of the building, and, therefore, she elected to take possession of the open plot of land where the building was previously standing. 4. At this stage, it is not necessary to go into the merits of the case whether the landlord has committed a default in the matter of reconstruction of the building. That is a question which the trial Court should decide properly upon the material that may be brought on record. In connection with that, the parties may be allowed to lead the necessary evidence. The learned Judge of the trial Court has casually remarked that the landlord does not appear to be in default. That is a question which the trial Court should decide properly upon the material that may be brought on record. In connection with that, the parties may be allowed to lead the necessary evidence. The learned Judge of the trial Court has casually remarked that the landlord does not appear to be in default. I may observe that the order that came to be passed was without giving proper opportunity to the parties to adduce whatever material they might furnish on the question of the default of the landlord in completing the reconstruction. Therefore, the trial Judge ought not to have been influenced by the mere contentions of the respective parties in the absence of proper evidence whether oral or documentary. Under these circumstances, it is necessary to set aside the order under revision which has come to be passed without a proper inquiry. 5. As regards the power under section 18 (3) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 is concerned, it envisages redelivery of possession to the tenant after the reconstruction of the building is complete, or in the alternative if the Court finds that the landlord has committed a default in the matter of completing the reconstruction, the Court can order compensation to be paid to the tenant. It may be relevant to reproduce the said sub-section, which is as follows: “If, after the tenant has delivered possession on or before the date specified in the order, the landlord fails to commence the work of repairs or building or rebuilding within one month of the specified date or fails to complete the work in a. reasonable time or having completed the work fails to place the tenant in occupation of the accommodation in accordance with sub-section (2), the Court may on an application made to it in this behalf by the tenant/within such time as may be prescribed, order the landlord to place the tenant in occupation of the accommodation or part thereof or to pay to the tenant such compensation as the Court thinks fit.” 6. Under the said sub-section, the Court has two alternatives: It can either place the tenant in possession of the accommodation, or it can award compensation to the tenant in case it finds that there is a default on the part of the landlord in respect of failure to recommence the work, or failure to complete the work in a reasonable time, or failure to redeliver possession to the tenant after completion of the reconstruction work, These are the only alter natives according to which the Court can take action in such a matter. 7. However, the learned counsel for the respondent urged that the word accommodation in this section will include even an open plot of land. In this connection, attention is invited to the definition provided by section 2 (a) of the Act, which is as follows: “In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, accommodation means any building or part of a building, whether residential or non-residential and includes, (i) Any land which is not being used for agricultural purposes, (b) garden, grounds, garages and out-houses, if any, appurtenant to such building or part of the building; (iii) any fittings affixed to such building or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof; (iv) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or part of building;” Thus, the phrase accommodation, according to this definition, will certainly include any land which is not being used for agricultural purposes. However, the phrase will have to be interpreted with reference to the context. Suppose if two rooms have been let out to a tenant, they will certainly constitute accommodation. Not only that, if there is some land roundabout these two rooms, that will also be included in the definition of an accommodation. So far as this proposition is concerned, it is perfectly correct. Similarly, if an open plot of land has been leased out, that may also constitute accommodation if it is not used for agricultural purposes. But if a constructed superstructure is let out to a tenant and if that falls down, the word accommodation cannot be interpreted to mean the vacant plot of land. It may be a vacant plot of land where the vacant plot itself is the subject-matter of the lease. But if a constructed superstructure is let out to a tenant and if that falls down, the word accommodation cannot be interpreted to mean the vacant plot of land. It may be a vacant plot of land where the vacant plot itself is the subject-matter of the lease. Therefore, I am unable to agree with the view of the learned Judge of the trial Court that accommodation in the present case means the vacant plot of land, although the lease was in respect of superstructure along with the land appurtenant thereto. 8. From this point of view, there can be no doubt that the kind of order that was passed by the trial Judge was not warranted by the provisions of section 18 (3) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The learned Judge could only act within the limitation prescribed by the said sub-section which I have reproduced above. In this view, the order of the trial Judge cannot be sustained in law. 9. The learned Judge also felt that the matter may not exactly be governed by section 18 (3) of the Act and, therefore, he purported to exercise inherent powers analogous to the powers conferred by the section. In this connection, I may observe that it has been laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Manoharlal Chopra. v. R. B. Seth Hiralal ( AIR 1962 SC 527 ) that if a case is not governed by section 10, Civil Procedure Code, no stay can be granted under inherent powers; and the only remedy of a person under exceptional circumstances would be to seek a temporary injunction in exercise of inherent powers apart from the provisions of Order 39, rules 1 and 2, Civil Procedure Code. It is, therefore, clear that inherent powers cannot be invoked so as to set at naught the specific provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure or any other statute or to contravene those provisions. Of course inherent powers can be invoked and the Court can exercise them in suitable cases as being supplemental to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, where no specific provision may have been made in that behalf; and the Court finds that in the interests of justice adopting such a course is absolutely necessary. Of course inherent powers can be invoked and the Court can exercise them in suitable cases as being supplemental to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, where no specific provision may have been made in that behalf; and the Court finds that in the interests of justice adopting such a course is absolutely necessary. In this connection, I may refer to the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in B. V. Patankar v. C. G. Sastry (AIR 1001 SC 212), wherein their Lordships have laid down that where a decree had been executed by ignoring the statutory provision so as to render it a nullity, redelivery of possession could be ordered by invoking the inherent powers read with section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But the fact remains that inherent powers cannot be so exercised as to set at naught the specific provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure or any other statute. As a specific provision has been made in section 18 (3) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, I am of opinion that a resort to inherent powers would be wholly unwarranted and would be contrary to the dictum laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the two cases mentioned above. 10. As a. result of the discussion aforesaid, this revision succeeds and is allowed. The order impugned is set aside. The case is remanded to the trial Court for passing a fresh order after holding a proper inquiry into the question of default on the part of the landlord in the matter of completing the construction. If the construction has been completed in the meantime, the trial Court can redeliver possession to the tenant. If the same has not been completed on account of the default of the landlord, the trial Court may fix such suitable compensation being made payable to the tenant as the circumstances of the case may warrant. The tenant could have some justifiable grievance about the construction not being completed in spite of lapse of considerable time. In view of this fact, I direct that there shall be no order as to costs of this Court, which shall be borne as incurred.