Gurdev Singh, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an appeal by Satjit Singh against the order, dated 4th February, 1965, of Shri M. L. Jain, one of the Additional District Judges at Delhi, striking oil his delence in a petition for dissolution of marriage brought against him by his wife Shrimati Amarjit Kaur for non-payment of litigation expenses and maintenance pendente lite, which was awarded to the wife by an earlier order of the Court under section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956. ( 2 ) IT has been veheroently argued that the learned Additional District Judge had no power to strike off the appellant s defence, and even if he was of the view that the appellant was contumaciously refusing to comply with the order of payment under section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, he could at best proceed to take action for contempt against the appellant but had no jurisdiction to deprive him of his defence. ( 3 ) ON the other hand, it is "cotended on behalf of the respondent wife that the Court has ample power to prevent abuse of its process and to see that there is no interference with the course of justice by the husband refusing to pay litigation expenses to the wife who has been compelled to come to the Court seeking divorce, and in exercise of that power the Court was fully competent to strike off the defence of the husband. Reliance in this connection is placed upon a Single Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Mahalittgam Pillai v. Amsayalli where, on consideration of the various authorities including the English and American decisions, Ramaswimi, J held that orders granting maintenance pendents life could not only be executed by the wife but where these payments were made a condition precedent for the taking up of the trial of the petition on hearing of an appeal therefrom, and are not complied with, the petition or the appeal can be dismissed. No other authority has been brought to my notice in which the extreme step of striking off the defence of the defaulting defendant has been taken. No other authority has been brought to my notice in which the extreme step of striking off the defence of the defaulting defendant has been taken. On the other hand; in Prithyirajsinhji Mansinghji v. Bai Shivprabha kumari and another", a learned Judge of that Court ruled that normally, the Court in the exercise of its matrimonial jurisdiction cannot order that that the defence of the party sh3uld be struck off for failure to pay interim maintenance unless the refusal is contumacious. In support of this proposition reference was made to an earlier decision of that Court in With elmina Codd v. Bartie Elijah Codd, where Marton, J. had observed:- "i had occasion in another case of Rodgar v. Rodgar to point out that as far as I can see the English authorities do not strike out a husband s petition or strike out his defence to his wife s petition, merely because he has failed to given security. What they do as far as I ca. n see and as far as counsel s researches have so far been brought before me, is to stay the husband s petition and as regards the wife s petition to proceed against the husband for contempt. If he is proved to be able to pay oat but contumaciously refuses to do so. "the English decisions from which this proposition has been deduced are not REFERRED TO in that judgment. Mr. Naubat Rai Suri, appearing for the respondent, has, however, REFERRED TO Rayden on Divorce 7th edition) page 382, where it has been observed that apart from other steps which may be taken by the Court to enforce payment, the Court may, in its discretion, refuse to permit the party so in contempt to take a further step in the litigation. ( 4 ) SO far as this Court is concerned, only two cases have been brought to my notice by the parties counsel. ( 4 ) SO far as this Court is concerned, only two cases have been brought to my notice by the parties counsel. The first one of them is a Division Bench Judgment in Shrimati Malkan Rani v. Krishen Kumar where it was held that if in proceedings started by a wife under the Hindu Marriage Act the husband refuses to pay maintenance and litigation expenses for which an order is made under section 24 of that Act, the Court is not powerless to exercise its inherent powers to advance the course of justice, and in exercise of those powers the Cource cannot only stay proceedings where the main petition is by the husband but also take action for contempt. In this connection, the learned Judges observed:- "in cases where the defaulter s spouse has initiated proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act, stay of proceedings may not be adequate and other steps may have to be taken to put the indigent spouse in funds to prosecute the proceedings. When the defaulter gives reasonable grounds for non compliance with the order, then it may be sufficient merely to adjourn the proceedibgs to enable him (or her) to comply with the order. If, however, the defaulter wilfully neglects or wilfully refuses to comply with the order, then I see no reason why contempt proceedings in accordance with law should uoi be taken against such a defaulter, even if ultimately these proceedings reutin imprisonment because his conduct obstructs the judicial proceedings and prevents the trial to be equitably conducted. "later, in Dr. Tarlochan Singh v. Shrimati Mohinder Kaur, Dua, J. , who was a party to the earlier Division Bench judgment, reiterated this proposition. Both those cases, however, arose out of the matrimonial proceedings started by the husband who had been in the course of the proceedings ordered to pay maintenance fendenle lite and litigation expenses to his wife. Accordingly, in that situation an order staying the proceedings was sufficient to compel the defaulting husband to comply with the order of the payment of maintenance ete. In the instant case, the position is just the reverse. Here, the wife came to the Court with a petition, for dissolution of her marriage on the ground of adultery. For prosecuting the proceedings, she was fround entitled to maintenance pendents lite and litigation expenses, and, accordingly, an order to that effect was made. In the instant case, the position is just the reverse. Here, the wife came to the Court with a petition, for dissolution of her marriage on the ground of adultery. For prosecuting the proceedings, she was fround entitled to maintenance pendents lite and litigation expenses, and, accordingly, an order to that effect was made. More than one opportunity was granted to the husband to comply with that order under section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, and all along he has been refusing to make the payment. In fact, when this appeal was admitted an undertaking was given on his behalf by his counsel that the payment of the amount in question will be made within a month, but despite that assurance not a single penny has been paid to the wife and the amount which is at present due from the appellant comes to about Rs. 2,300. 00. ( 4 ) IN the circumstances of the present ease the procedure of staying the proceedings cannot be adopted as that would far from affording any relief to the aggrieved wife result in penalizing her for coming to the Court and asking for maintenance pendents lite. Moreover proceedings started by her cannot be allowed to hang on indefinitely till the appellant chooses, to make the payment. In fact, from the conduct of the appellant it appears that he would welcome such a situation. It was in the light of this difficulty that the trial Court appears to have taken the extreme step of striking off the appellant s defence. Though I respectfully agree with the observations contained in the decision of this Court cited earlier that the Court has ample power to prevent abuse of its process and pass orders in exercise of its inherent iurisdiction to see that its orders are carried out and there is no obstruction to the course of justice, yet I do not find any authority for the proposition that in exercise of that inherent power, which is recognized under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, the Court has the authority to strike off the defence of the defaulting party, or if the defaulting party happens to be the petitioner himself to dismiss his petition. No decision has been brought to my notice in which the husband who has come to the Court with a petition under the HinduMarriage Act for divorce etc. No decision has been brought to my notice in which the husband who has come to the Court with a petition under the HinduMarriage Act for divorce etc. , has been deprived of the hearing by dismissing his petition. for his refusal to comply with an order under section 24 of the Act. Even if it be conceded that in ordinary causes it nay be open to a Court to adopt that procedure, yet it is open to question if such a procedure should be adopted in cases under the Hindu Marriage Act, as the proceedings under that Act do not relate merely to the adjudication of the rights of the parties but concern the vital question of social justice and social structures. doubt very much if it is in the interests of the society or even justice that matrimonial causes should be heard ex-parte despite the facts that the parties concerned may be anxious to place their respective cases before the Court and seek its verdictor. This aspect of the natter his been dealt with in various American decisions as would appear from the following quotation from 17 American Jurisprudence found in the judgment of Ramaswami, J. in Mahalingan Pillai v. Amsayalli (supra) :- "there are numerous dita and a few decisions to the effect that where a wife brings suit for a divorce and the defendant failsto comply with an order of the Court awarding alimony compensation pendents lite, the Court has the power by reason of the defendent s contempt, to strike out his answer and proceed with the cause as though none had ever been interposed. According to some decisions, this mode of punishment can only be resorted to where the husband has pur posely absconded from the jurisdiction in order to avoid the process of the Court and cannot be punished for contempt in any other manner. A majority of the authorities hold that, as a rule , a Court has no power when the defendant in a divorce action is in contempt in disobeying an order to pay alimony, to strike out his answer or otherwise prevent him from interposing a defence on the merits, for such a course not only deprives the defendant of his say in Court, but it ignores the public interest in the preservation of the marriage relation. " ( 5 ) FROM what has been said above, it is obvious that there is no clear authority on the question which has arisen in this case. Even the English and the American decisions are not uniform, and the point does not appear to have been considered in this Court previously. Since the Courts are quite often faced with the situation created by the husbands refusal to comply with an order under section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, I think it is but proper that in view of the importance of the question involved it should be settled by a larger Bench. I, accordingly, refer this case to a Division Bench. ( 6 ) I would like to notice that it has been argued on behalf of the respondent that the appellant is not entitled to be heard even in this Court as he had failed to honour his undertaking given to the Motion Bench that he would pay the amount due within a month, this point will also be considered by the Bench hearing the appeal. Let the papers be placed before my Lord the Chief Justice for constituting the Bench. I would like to note that in order to avoid hardship to the respondent- wife, it will be expedient that this case be heard at a very early date and not later than end of July, 1966. ( 7 ) THIS appeal has been referred by a learned Sing e Judge to a Division Bench owing to the difficulty involved in the decision of the question whether in the event of non-compliance of an order made in a wife s petition for dissolution of marriage for payment of litigation expenses and maintenance pendent lite the Court could order the defence of the husband to be struck off. ( 8 ) THE parties in the present case were married in 1980. They have three children. In July, 1965 the wife filed a petition under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter called the Act) for dissolution of the marriage on the ground that the husband was living in adultery with another woman. She also filed a petition for payment of expenses for litigation and for maintenance pendent lite On 20th November, IS65 the Court below directed that the husband should pay her Rs. 500. 00 as expenses for litigation and should continue to pay Rs. 200. She also filed a petition for payment of expenses for litigation and for maintenance pendent lite On 20th November, IS65 the Court below directed that the husband should pay her Rs. 500. 00 as expenses for litigation and should continue to pay Rs. 200. 00 per mensem as maintenance pendente lite. The amount of maintenance was fixed keeping in view the fact that the three children are living with the wife and are being maintained by her. It is mentioned in the order of the Court below that time was granted to the husband till 6th January 1966 for the payment of the amounts fixed but he was absent on that day. At the request of his counsel another adjournment was granted but the husband stated his inability to make payment and applied for another adjournment for one month. It was in these circumstances that the court directed the defenence to be struck off for the disobedience of its orders. The husband filed an appeal against that order which was beared by Gur dev Singh, J. who has referred the same to a Division Bench, as stated before. ( 9 ) THERE are certain preliminary matters which stand in the way of the maintainability of the appeal and also whether the appellant should at all he heard In P. C. Jairath v. Mrs. Amrit Jairath (First Appeal from Order No. 40-D of 1966) decided by S. B. Capoor and H R. Khanna JJ. On 22nd July, 1986, the question which had been REFERRED TO the Division Bench was- "whether an order refusing to stay the proceedings of a case under the Hindu Marriage Act under section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure is appealable under section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act or not ?"it was held that no appeal was competent and the question was answered in the negative. The learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to show anydistinction in principle between the aforesaid decision and the present case. The Court below has ordered defence to be struck off owing to non-compliance with its orders. In that case also an argument was raised that an appeal lay under section 28 of the Act against an order refusing to stay the proceedings. This argument was repelled after consideration of a number of authorities. The Court below has ordered defence to be struck off owing to non-compliance with its orders. In that case also an argument was raised that an appeal lay under section 28 of the Act against an order refusing to stay the proceedings. This argument was repelled after consideration of a number of authorities. It must be remembered that in the present case an appeal would have been perfectly competent against the order of the Court directing the payment of expenses for litigation and maintenance pendente lite under section 28 of the Act but the question before us now is whether any appeal would lie against an order striking out the defence. On a parity of reasoning in P. C. Jairath s case such an appeal would not be competent at all. ( 10 ) I am aware of certain observations of my learned brother S. K. Kapur, J. in the judgment delivered by him, sitting in Division Bench with S. S. Dulat, J. , in The Central Bank of india Ltd. v. Gokal Chand", which may seem to support the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that an appeal would lie in the present case from the order striking out the defence. It was observed in the Central Bank s rase" that every order made by the Rent Controller under the Delhi Rent Control Act either under the express provisions of the Act or under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure incorporated into it by virtue of section 37 (2) would be appealable provided such an order finally decided a dispute between the parties or deprived a party of a substantial and important right and was not a mere formal or interlocutory order, but in that case the scheme and the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act came up for consideration whereas in the Bench decision in P. C. Jairath s case, it were the provisions of the Act which were examined and the view, which has already been mentioned, was expressed that no appeal was competent against an order refusing to stay the p:o- ceedings of a case under the Act. I do not consider that in these circumstances any question arises of referring the matter to a larger Bench as for the purposes of this appeal the decision in P. C. Jairath s case" is binding on us. I do not consider that in these circumstances any question arises of referring the matter to a larger Bench as for the purposes of this appeal the decision in P. C. Jairath s case" is binding on us. It would follow that no appeal is competent against the order of the first Court dated 4th February, 1966. The second preliminary matter is of equal importannce and it is that when the appeal was admitted on 25th February, 1906 the Motion Bench made the following order :- "mr. D. D. Sharma says payment will be made within a month. Notice. Stay of operation of order and proceedings meanwhile. "now, in spite of the above undertaking which was given at the time of admission of the appeal on which apparently the appeal was admitted, no payment has yet been made of any amount whatsoever. The learned counsel for the appellant as also the appellant who was present in Court were asked by us to make payment of the amounts due pursuant to the order dated 25th February 1966 even now within a reasonable time to be fixed by us but we were told in unmistakable terms that the appellant was not in a position to deposit any amount and that he could make payments only in very small instalments. It is significant that the order by which the expenses for litigation as also the maintenance pendente lite were fixed, was never appealed against. It is abundantly clear that the financial condition of the appellant as determined by the Court below was accepted as correct and was not challenged. It is difficult to believe, as has been suggested now that the appellant is in indigent circumstances and is so poor that he cannot even pay the expenses for litigation as also the maintenance allowance at the rate of Rs. 200. 00 per mensem although the wife has admittedly to support not only herself but also the three children. have very little doubt in my mind that when the undertaking was given before the Motion Bench on 25th February 1966, that also was done purely with the object of securing admission of the appeal and there was no intention even at that time to carry out the undertaking; otherwise there could be no reason why no payment whatsoever has been made to the wife of the amounts in question. The conduct of the appellant is, therefore, such as would hardly give him any right even to be heard. In Mahalingam Pillai v. Amsavalli, it has been observed that the orders granting alimony pendente lite can not only be executed by the wife but where these payments are made a condition precedent for the taking up of the trial of the petition or hearing of an appeal therefrom and if these are not complied with, the petition or appeal can be dismissed. Further the following observations are pertinent :- Bearing these principles in mind, if we examine the facts of this case we find, that the order of Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, J. , directing the husband to pay alimony pendente lite has been contumaciously disobeyed. On account of the fact, however, that this payment has not been made a condition precedent for the hearing of the appeal, the appeal cannot be straightway dismissed and an opportunity should be given to the husband cither to pay up or in the alternative the appeal would stand dismissed by a fixed date after the expiry of a reasonable time given to him to comply with the order. This question does not arise here because the husband has not only not printed or typed the papers but has also shown no inclination to vigorously prosecute the appeal which on the merits is wholly devoid of any substance. " ( 11 ) IN Halsbury s Laws of England, Volume 8, (Third Edition), the position of a party in contempt is set out in paragraph 73 in the following words :- "the general rule is that a party in sontempt, that is aparty against whom a writ of attachment has issued or an order forcommital has been made, cannot be heard or take proceedings in the same cause until he has purged his contempt, nor while he is in contempt can be heard to appeal from any order made in the cause: but this is subject to exceptions. Thus a party in contempt may apply to purge the contempt, he may appeal with a view to setting aside the order in which his contempt is founded, and in some cases he may be entitled to defend himself when some application is subsequently made against him. Thus a party in contempt may apply to purge the contempt, he may appeal with a view to setting aside the order in which his contempt is founded, and in some cases he may be entitled to defend himself when some application is subsequently made against him. Even the plaintiff in contempt has been allowed to prosecute his action, when the defendant had not applied to stay the proceedings. Probably the true rule is that the party in contempt will not be heard only on those occasions when his contempt impedes the course of justice and there is no other effective way of enforcing his obedience. "it is quite clear that the contempt of the appellant in the present case has impeded not only the course of justice but there s no other effective way of enforcing his obedience. The learned counsel for the appellant when confronted with the situation about the incompetency of the appeal, prayed that it be treated as a revision. In the first place, there is no reason why such a prayer should be entertained and secondly, substantial justice has been done and that would be an additional reason for not exercising any discretion in favour of the husband on the revisional side. ( 12 ) IN view of what has been stated above, no other question need be decided in the present appeal which is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. ( 13 ) I agree.