The civil revision petition fil­ed by Surjya Kanta Bhowmik is directed against the judgment and decree of learned Subordinate Judge, Tripura, whereby he dis­missed the appeal and affirmed the judgment and decree of learned Munsiff, Sadar. (2) The facts leading upto this revision peti­tion "are that the plaintiff let out one house to the defendant on a .monthly rent of Rs. 15 in the year, 1368 B. S". The defendant paid the rent for sometime and thereafter from the month of Aswin to Chaitra of the year, 1369 B. S., he did not pay the rent; therefore, the plaintiff instituted the suit for the recovery of Rs. 105 as rent for 7 months. (3) The defendant in his written statement pleaded that the house was let out by the plaintiff to him on taking two months' rent in advance at the rate of Rs. 15 per month. It was further alleged that this house was situat­ed at a great distance from the house of the plaintiff, therefore, he proposed to sell the house to the defendant at the price of Rs. 250. According to the terms of the contract arrived at between the parties the plaintiff received Rs. 250 from the defendant and granted a re­ceipt to him on 25-1-1963 A. D. The defendant after purchasing the house erected other huts after taking permission from the Municipality. It was further alleged that the house having been sold to the defendant the plaintiff cannot claim any rent from the defendant after the month of Aswin, 1369 B. S. (4) The learned Munsiff on the pleadings of the parties framed 3 issues and after record­ing the evidence and hearing the Advocates decreed the suit. Being aggrieved with the judgment and decree of learned Munsiff, the defendant went in appeal to the Court of learn­ed District Judge. The learned District Judge transferred the case to the file of learned Subor­dinate Judge. The learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judg­ment and decree of learned Munsiff. The de­fendant has now come to this Court in revi­sion. (5) I heard the learned counsel for the peti­tioner and the opposite party and perused the record of the case. The learned District Judge transferred the case to the file of learned Subor­dinate Judge. The learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judg­ment and decree of learned Munsiff. The de­fendant has now come to this Court in revi­sion. (5) I heard the learned counsel for the peti­tioner and the opposite party and perused the record of the case. (6) The sole contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that in this case the receipt regarding the purchase of the shop hut issued by the opposite party was pro­duced before the trial Court but the learned Munsiff did not admit it as it was produced at a late stage. But the decision of this case hin­ges on this receipt, therefore, if the petitioner won't be allowed to produce this receipt he won't get justice. It was further averred that the defendant in ms written statement mentioned about the existence of this receipt. It was next alleged that it was handed over to tit learned counsel to tender it in the Court, bi due to inadvertence of his lawyer it was m produced along with the written statement But, for the act of the negligence of his lean ed lawyer he should not be penalised. The petitioner has also filed an affidavit to substantial this fact. The respondent did not file any counter affidavit to rebut it. (7) The learned counsel for the opposite party contended that the provisions of O. 4 R. 27 are not intended to allow a litigant who has been unsuccessful in the lower Court patch up the weak parts of his case and fill up omission in the Court of appeal. It is not the business of the Appellate Court to supplement the evidence adduced by one party or the other in the lower Court. Hence, in the absence of satisfactory reasons for the non production of the evidence in the trial Com additional evidence should not be admitted in appeal as a party guilty of remissness in the lower Court is not entitled to the indulgent of being allowed to give further evidence under this rule. So a party who had ample opportunity to produce certain evidence in the lower Court but failed to do so, or elected not to t so, cannot have it admitted in appeal. So a party who had ample opportunity to produce certain evidence in the lower Court but failed to do so, or elected not to t so, cannot have it admitted in appeal. The inadvertence of the party or his inability to understand the legal issues involve or the wrong advice of the Pleader or the negligence of a Pleader does not constitute "substantial cause" within the meaning of the rule. The mere fact that certain evidence important is not of itself a sufficient ground for admitting that evidence in appeal. He further averred that in the instant case the petitioner did not produce the document along with the written statement as it was not ready at that time. He produced it at a late stage after forging it with the help of the scribe. In view of these facts, this document should n be admitted in appeal. (8) After having given my most anxious consideration to the arguments advanced on both sides, I find that in view of the facts of the case the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner carries weigh. As regards the question of admission of additional evidence in appellate Court, the general principle is that the Appellate Court should not travel outside the record of the lower Court and cannot take any evidence in appeal. The rule elucidates the provisions of S. 107, clause (d) of the Code and is an exception to the general rule stated above in that it enables the Appellate Court to take additional evidence in the circumstances mentioned therein. Therefore the Appellate Court is entitled to call for fresh evidence only when the conditions laid down in this rule are found to exist. On the other hand, the Court is not bound under the circumstances mentioned in the rule to allow additional evidence and the parties are not entitled, as of right, to the admission of such evidence; the matter is entirely in the Court, though that discretion is only a judicial discretion circumscribed by the limitation specified in this rule and not an arbitrary one. But while exercising the dis­cretion the Court should see that the new evi­dence has a direct and important bearing on a main issue in the case. But while exercising the dis­cretion the Court should see that the new evi­dence has a direct and important bearing on a main issue in the case. By keeping in view this principle I find that in the circumstances of the case this document has a direct and important bearing on the case as the decision of the case hinges solely on it- In the absence this document no satisfactory judgment can passed by any Court. From the record it transpires that the existence as well as the date of execution of this document was mentioned in the written statement, therefore, it cannot be said that it was forged afterwards as alleged by the respondent. From the record it is also clear that it was produced in the Court of Munsiff at a late stage by the counsel for the petitioner. The petitioner has explained the cause of delay in filing the document late by an affidavit to that effect. There is no counter affidavit from the side of the respondent to rebut it. From this affidavit it is clear that the defendant handed over this document to his lawyer for tendering it in evidence at the time of preparing the written statement. But it appears that due |p inexperience, negligence or inadvertence of the learned lawyer for the petitioner it was not produced along with the written statement, but it, was produced at a late stage. : In view of the facts of the case even if it was produced at a late stage of the case, it should have been admitted in evidence on pay­ment of costs in order to avoid a gross mis­carriage of justice. The learned Munsiff by refusing to admit it in evidence debarred the petitioner from a valuable right of proving his case The decision of this case hinges on this document, therefore, for a proper decision of the case as well as to avoid a gross miscarri­age of justice this document must be admitted in evidence. In such cases, in order to meet the ends of justice the negligence of the lawyer should not be allowed to stand in the way of justice. This document was not admitted in evidence, hence no evidence was led to prove it, by the petitioner. In such cases, in order to meet the ends of justice the negligence of the lawyer should not be allowed to stand in the way of justice. This document was not admitted in evidence, hence no evidence was led to prove it, by the petitioner. I am, therefore, left with no other alternative but to remand the case to the trial Court with a direction to admit the 'document on payment of costs to the respon­dent and to allow an opportunity to; the par­ties to lead evidence. I (9) I, therefore, accept this revision petition and remand the case back to the lower Court to accept the document on payment of costs to the respondent and to allow the parties to adduce evidence and to decide the case afresh on merits. Petition allowed.