ORDER P. Govinda Menon, J. These revision petitions arise out of the orders passed by the District Magistrate, Tellicherry in two criminal cases C.C. 63/64 and C.C. 64/64 which are pending before him. In both the cases the petitioner who is an Inspector of Police is being tried along with others for assaulting and wrongfully confining the complainants. Since a common question of law is involved, they are disposed of by this common judgment. In Calendar case 63/64 the complaint was that the petitioner along with the Sub-Inspector of Police went over the complainant's house, made a search of his house, abused him and the inmates of his house, removed him to the police station and after putting him in the lock up fisted and kicked him and when bail was offered it was refused and he was wrongfully confined in the lock up. It is seen from the objection petition that the complainant is an accused in crime No. 54/64 of Panur Police Station who was said to have been absconding and on getting information that he was in his house the Circle Inspector of Police and party went to the house, the Sub-Inspector of Police arrested and removed him to the police station end nothing else had taken place. In Calendar case 64/64 the case was that when the complainant was sitting on the veranda of his house the petitioner along with others went there, made enquiries of his son and finding that his son was not there abused and beat him, got inside the house and opening a wooden box took away Rs. 40. In the objection petition filed by the Inspector the allegations in the complaint were denied and it was stated that the complainant's son is an accused in crime No. 54/64 of the Panur Police Station and that night they went over to the house to ascertain whether the son was there and when they found that he was not there they advised the complainant to produce the son and came away. Allegations of assault and theft of money were denied. In both the cases preliminary objection is raised before the District Magistrate that the petitioner being a public servant removable from office by the State Government prosecution for offences alleged to have been committed by him cannot be taken cognisance of except with the previous sanction of the State Government. Allegations of assault and theft of money were denied. In both the cases preliminary objection is raised before the District Magistrate that the petitioner being a public servant removable from office by the State Government prosecution for offences alleged to have been committed by him cannot be taken cognisance of except with the previous sanction of the State Government. It has been conceded in the court below that the petitioner being an Inspector of Police is removable from office only by the State Government. Learned District Magistrate held that on the allegations in the complaint, which alone need be taken note of at the time cognisance is taken it cannot be said that, the provisions contained in section 197 Cr.P.C. is attracted and the complaint against the petitioner cannot be thrown out at that stage for want of sanction. The correctness of the decision is challenged in these petitions. It is clear that when a complaint is made to a criminal court against any public servant who is removable only by the State Government and allegations are made that the police officer had acted or purported to act in the discharge of his official duty and in so doing committed some offence complained of, the court will not entertain the complaint unless it appears that the State Government had sanctioned the prosecution of the officer. If on the other hand, the allegations in the complaint do not indicate such facts, the court can have no ground for looking to the sanction of the Government and in the absence of such a sanction for refusing to entertain the complaint. In such cases it must proceed with the complaint in the same manner as it would have done in connection with complaints against any other person. I might, in this connection, refer to the observation of Jackson, J., in Raja Rao v. Ramaswami A.I.R. 1927 Madras 566: "Section 197 Cr.P.C. presents no difficulty if the obvious intention of the legislature is borne in mind. It is no part of British Policy set an official above the common law. If he commits a common offence he has no peculiar privilege. But if one of his official acts is alleged to be an offence, the State will not allow him to be prosecuted without its sanction for the obvious reason that otherwise official action would be beset by private prosecution. If he commits a common offence he has no peculiar privilege. But if one of his official acts is alleged to be an offence, the State will not allow him to be prosecuted without its sanction for the obvious reason that otherwise official action would be beset by private prosecution. Judges would be charged with defamation, policemen with wrongful restraint, and distrainers with theft. This privilege of immunity from prosecution without sanction only extends to acts which can be shown to be in discharge of official duty, or fairly purporting to be in such discharge." In Amrik Singh v. State of Pepsu A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 309 His Lordship Venkatarama Ayyar, J., discussed the earlier cases of the Federal Court and the Privy Council bearing on this matter and summed up the position as follows: "It is not every offence committed by a public servant that requires sanction for prosecution under section 197(1) Cr.P.C, nor even every act done by him while he is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties; but if the act complained of is directly concerned with his official duties so that, if questioned it would be claimed to have been done by virtue of the office, then sanction would be necessary, and that would be so, irrespective of whether it was, in fact a proper discharge of his duties, because that would really be a matter of defence on the merits, which would have to be investigated at the trial, and could not arise at the stage of the grant of sanction, which must precede the institution of the prosecution." In the case in Matajog Dobey v. Bhari A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 44 Their Lordships held that sanction under section 197 was necessary and stated that the test would be whether there is a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty and whether the act bears such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable, but not a pretended or fanciful claim that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty. Learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the following observations contained in Shreekntiah Ramayya Munipalli v. State of Bombay A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 297 "Now it is obvious that if section 197 Cr.P.C., is construed too narrowly it can never be applied, for of course it is no part of an official's duty to commit an offence and never can be, but it is not the duty we have to examine so much as the act, because an official act can be performed in the discharge of official duty as well as in dereliction of it." So learned counsel would say that if only the complaint and the sworn statement should be looked into and not any other circumstance or documents for the purpose of deciding whether the prosecution is barred for want of sanction it would follow that the complainant by appropriate assertion in his complaint and sworn statement could deprive police officers of the protection which the legislature has given them under the code. The answer to the question is contained in the decision of the Supreme Court in Nagraj v. State of Mysore A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 269. Dealing with the contention that it is not enough to look into the complaint alone, it is stated: "Just as a complainant is likely to omit mentioning the facts which would necessitate the sanction of Government before he can prosecute the accused, the accused too is likely to make such allegations which may lead to the rejection of the complaint for want of sanction. It is well settled that the jurisdiction of the court to proceed with the complaint emanates from the allegations made in the complaint and not from what is alleged by the accused or what is finally established in the case as a result of the evidence recorded." It is unnecessary to refer to the various cases cited at the bar as they are cases which were ultimately decided on the basis that the allegations either in the complaint or taken together with what had appeared from the evidence on record justified the conclusion that the act complained of came under the mischief of the provisions contained in the code and showed that no action could be instituted in court without sanction. As stated by Chandrasekhara Iyer,J., in Matajog Dobey v. Bhari A.I.R. 1956 S.C.44. "The question may arise at any stage of the proceedings. As stated by Chandrasekhara Iyer,J., in Matajog Dobey v. Bhari A.I.R. 1956 S.C.44. "The question may arise at any stage of the proceedings. The complaint may not disclose that the act constituting the offence was done or purported to be done in the discharge of official duty; but facts subsequently coming to light of a police or judicial inquiry or even in the course of the prosecution evidence at the trial may establish the necessity for sanction. Whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage. The necessity may reveal itself in the course of the progress of the case." Therefore, the contention that a police officer cannot be prosecuted without sanction from the State Government for any offence which is alleged to have taken place during the course of his performing the duties as an officer is too broadly stated and cannot be accepted. His mere allegation will not suffice for the purpose and will not force the court to throw away the complaint of which it had properly taken cognisance of on the basis of the allegations in the complaint. Learned District Magistrate was, therefore, right in holding that the stage has not reached when the question could be decided. If on the evidence which will be adduced in court he is satisfied that the facts would bring the case within the mischief of section 197 of the Code then he would be at liberty to reject the complaint holding that it is barred by section 197 Cr.P.C. The revision petitions are dismissed.