JUDGMENT.- The plaintiff whose claim to a mandatory injunction for restoration of wall on the basis of easement rights has been rejected by the Courts below is the appellant before me. In between the plaintiff’s house and the house of the defendants there is a strip of land used as a lane and the wall in question was built by the plaintiff between the strip of land and the defendant’s property but over the defendant’s land. This is pursuant to a registered agreement, Exhibit A-1. This agreement was executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendants and their father The plaintiff has come forward with this suit on the allegation that contrary to the agreement and understanding between the parties as brought out under Exhibit A-1 the defendants have demolished the wall. The Courts below have held that the plaintiff cannot rest his claim either as easement or as licence and dismissed the suit. There was also a claim by the plaintiff with regard to the lane that it is his exclusive property. That has also been found against as it went against the tenor and terms of the agreement, Exhibit A-1 on which the plaintiff rested his claim to mandatory injunction and as it may not be open to the plaintiff to rely on Exhibit A-1 for one purpose and discredit it for another. The first question for consideration is whether the plaintiff can lay any claim to the wall in question and compel the defendants to retain the wall. The agreement Exhibit A-1 recites that in the absence of a compound wall on the defendant’s site and there being only a fence, the members of the plaintiff’s family experienced difficulty in going over the common lane and that with a view to get over this difficulty at the request of the plaintiff, the defendants had permitted him to put up the wall at his expense. Under the agreement the wall was to be raised on the defendants’ land at about 10 feet high on a 2 feet foundation. It was to be a brick and mud wall to be plastered with chunam on both sides. At the top the plaintiff could have glass pieces inserted for protection. Under the agreement the wall was to be raised on the defendants’ land at about 10 feet high on a 2 feet foundation. It was to be a brick and mud wall to be plastered with chunam on both sides. At the top the plaintiff could have glass pieces inserted for protection. The agreement recognises the right of the defendants to put up house, roofing etc., on the wall which the plaintiff erected It is stated therein that the plaintiff had no objection to any such course. It is further provided in the agreement that the wall was erected only for the convenience of the plaintiff and that the plaintiff had no right in the wall and no further recourse in respect of the wall. The only question is whether under this agreement the plaintiff could compel the defendants to retain the wall as a dividing wall. Ex facie it is difficult to maintain the claim on the basis of a licence. Considering whether there could be an easement, easements are defined under section 4 of the Easements Act thus: “ An easement is a right which the owner or occupier of certain land possesses, as such, for the beneficial enjoyment of that land, to do and to continue to do something, or to prevent and continue to prevent something being done, in or upon, or in respect of certain other land not his own........ In the Explanation it is set out: ” In the first and second clauses of this section, the expression ‘land ‘includes also things permanently attached to the earth: the expression ‘beneficial enjoyment’ includes also possible convenience, remote advantage, and even a mere amenity .......... A.V. Narayanaswami Iyer, learned Counsel for the appellants, contends that he has, by erecting this wall, and making the defendants themselves owners of this wall, provided for himself a possible convenience, which may be even a remote advantage. The agreement specifically states that it is for the plaintiff’s convenience and enjoyment that the wall has been erected. No doubt, the wall is erected between the strip of land referred to as the common lane and the defendants’ property. Still learned Counsel submits that the common lane is appurtenant to his own house and he would have the protection and benefit of this dividing wall while going over the common lane. No doubt, the wall is erected between the strip of land referred to as the common lane and the defendants’ property. Still learned Counsel submits that the common lane is appurtenant to his own house and he would have the protection and benefit of this dividing wall while going over the common lane. It is therefore contended that he has provided for and secured for himself an easement right. In this connection reference is made to the several descriptions of party wall found in Watson v. Gray1. Fry, J., referring to “ partywall” as being used in four different senses sets out the four meanings thus: “ They may mean, first, a wall of which the two adjoining owners are tenants-in-common..........In the next place the term may be used to signify a wall divided longitudinally into two strips, one belonging to each of the neighbouring owners...............Then, thirdly, the term may mean a wall which belongs entirely to one of the adjoining owners, but is subject to an easement or right in the other to have it maintained as a dividing wall between the two tenaments .............Lastly, the term may designate a wall divided longitudinally into two moieties, each moiety being subject to a cross easement in favour of the owner of the other moiety.” Learned Counsel for the appellant submits that the present wall could come under the third category of party wall referred to by Fry, J., He contends that it is a dividing wall and he has an easement right to have that wall maintained as a dividing wall between the two tenements. Of course, the tenement immediately adjoining the party wall is under the very document shown as common property. That, the learned Counsel submits, is not of much consequence as the benefit of the wall enures to the main building which he owns himself, the lane being used by him for passage. Assuming that the plaintiff can claim an easement right in the wall as a dividing wall, the only difficulty in accepting this right in the present case is that the document is vague in the matter. It does not provide for the wall being retained there and the burden of the wall being borne by the defendants as a dividing wall between two tenements. It does not provide for the wall being retained there and the burden of the wall being borne by the defendants as a dividing wall between two tenements. In fact it is provided that the plaintiff will have no further recourse against the wall and that the wall is the absolute property of the defendants. No doubt the wall can be the absolute property of the defendants and still be a party-wall in the third sense given by Fry, J. But the question is whether the agreement provides for its being a party-wall in that sense. No doubt, when the plaintiff incurred expenses in putting up the wall 10 feet high and the defendants agreed to it, the parties must have intended that the wall has to be retained at least as long as it lasted. No obligation has been undertaken by the defendants to maintain the wall in repair ; nor has the plaintiff retained in himself or acquired for himself the power to repair the wall as and when necessary. Even assuming that one can infer in the particular circumstances of this case that this is a dividing wall of the third category referred to by Fry, J., still the question has to be considered whether the plaintiff is at all entitled to the mandatory injunction which he claims. In the very plaint it is stated that the defendants have demolished the above wall and dug the foundation for construction of a wall of their own in the place where the disputed wall stood with the idea of having, in the wall a door and windows opening into the lane. As pointed out in Katiar’s Law or Easements and Licences, 5th edition at page 555: There is.............ample authority for the view that it is permissible to a tenant-in-common of a party-wall to decrease it or pull it down altogether temporarily with the object of renovating it provided the demolition is carried out in such a way as not to cause any injury or damage to any of the parties concerned " , Here even it is stated, the wall has been pulled down to put up a fresh wall in that place. The earlier grievance of the plaintiff was the inconvenience felt by him by there being only a fence separating the defendant’s property from the common lane. The earlier grievance of the plaintiff was the inconvenience felt by him by there being only a fence separating the defendant’s property from the common lane. It is to remove that inconvenience and difficulty experienced by the members of this; family he, at his expense, built the wall and left it to the defendants absolutely. Now the defendants for the purpose of their own convenience and for putting up buildings have found it necessary to pull down the wall and admittedly are going to put up another construction in the same place. That being so, I do not think a case has been made out for the grant of mandatory injunction as prayed for. A point has been made that the defendants propose to open up a door-way and window in the new wall. The plaintiff has not made out any right of privacy. He cannot prevent the defendants having any openings in the wall which they propose to put up. The learned Counsel for the plaintiff points out that though he has not prayed for any declaration of his exclusive right over the lane in question, the Court below has given a finding against him in the matter. It is submitted that this question was not gone into in the trial Court, and any decision on the matter is likely to prejudice him. The finding of the lower appellate Court in regard to the ownership of the property referred to as the common lane in Exhibit A-1 has properly to be discharged. It is therefore discharged without reference to the merits of the claims of either party regarding the same. The Second Appeal fails and is dismissed No costs. No leave. V.K. ------------- Appeal dismissed.