ORDER 1. This order shall also govern the disposal of Civil Revision No. 673 of 1965 (Kumari Qamarunnisa vs. Abdul Samad). These two revisions have been filed by the plaintiffs, who are real sisters and who had filed independent suits claiming damages for libel against the respondents. The present revision arises out of the order of remand, dated 24.6.1965, passed by the District Judge, Bhopal, in Civil Appeal No. 17-B of 1964, arising out of the decree, dated 17.6.1963, passed by the II Civil Judge, Class 2, Bhopal, in Civil Suit No. 53-B of 1959. The connected revision (C.R. No. 673 of 1965) arises out of the order of remand passed by the District Judge, Bhopal on 24.6.1965, in Civil Appeal No. 18-B of 1964, arising out of the decree, dated 17.6.1963 passed by the Second Civil Judge Class II, Bhopal, in Civil Suit No. 53-B of 1959. 2. The respective petitioners filed separate suits claiming damages from the respondents alleging that they had defamed them by printing some pamphlets and by holding public meetings protesting against the conduct of the petitioners attributing them to such actions which would cast an aspersion on their character. 3. The respondents denied to have issued the pamphlets or to have convened any public meetings. They denied that they defamed the respective plaintiffs in any manner so as to entitle them to claim any damages. 4. The trial Court held the respective plaintiffs entitled to damages. Therefore, a decree for Rs. 5,000 in favour of each of the petitioners was passed. Although there were separate suits, the same had bet n consolidated by the trial Judge and instead of passing a separate decree in each case, he purported to pass a consolidated decree holding the plaintiffs to be entitled to a sum Rs. 10,000 as damages. As was rightly observed by the learned District Judge, there ought to be two separate decrees Com c1idation of suit~ is merely for the purpose of facilitating the trial; and duplication of evidence is avoided. Consolidation of suits does not mean that the two suits are blended into one, with the result that the Court need not pass a separate decree in each of the suits. Therefore, I would endorse the view of the learned District Judge that separate decrees and separate judgments were necessary in both the cases. Consolidation of suits does not mean that the two suits are blended into one, with the result that the Court need not pass a separate decree in each of the suits. Therefore, I would endorse the view of the learned District Judge that separate decrees and separate judgments were necessary in both the cases. However, even now it is open to this Court or the first appellate Court to direct the parties to apply to the trial Court for drawing up separate decrees in the two suits; and if the trial Court refuses to draw up separate decrees, such an order would be revisable, as laid down by a Full Bench of this Court in Baliram vs. Manohar 29 MPLC 316=ILR 1943 Nag. 241. It would be for the respondents, who are appellants in the first appellate Court, to apply to the trial Court for drawing up separate decrees in the two suits and after obtaining certified copies of those decrees, the same may be filed in the first appellate Court. 5. Against the decree of the trial Court, the defendants filed separate appeals before the District Judge. In the course of those appeals, the defendants filed amendment applications in that Court seeking an amendment of their written-statement alleging that:- (i) On a previous occassion, two other sisters of the plaintiffs had filed a suit which was dismissed. Therefore, that judgment will operate as resjudicata; (ii) That during the pendency of the litigation, some of the joint tort-feasors had died and their legal representatives had not been brought on record. Therefore, according to the defendants, the cause of action had abated in its entirety; (iii) That the plaintiffs had deliberately abandoned their claim against some of the joint tort-feasors, with the result that it operated as a discharge of the other joint tort-feasors; (iv) That as the trial Court had passed a consolidated decree for a sum of Rs. 10,000 in favour of the two plaintiffs, the consolidated decree was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court and therefore, it was rendered illegal. 6. The learned District Judge thought that it was necessary to have these issues tried introduced by way of amendment at the appellate stage. 10,000 in favour of the two plaintiffs, the consolidated decree was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court and therefore, it was rendered illegal. 6. The learned District Judge thought that it was necessary to have these issues tried introduced by way of amendment at the appellate stage. Therefore, in exercise of inherent powers, the learned appellate Judge, after allowing the amendment applications in the two suits, remanded the cases for a fresh trial with special reference to the pleas introduced by way of amendment. The present revisions are directed against the order of remand passed by the District Judge in the two appeals respectively. 7. As regards the tenability of a revision, it is clear that this Court does not ordinarily entertain a revision where a specific remedy by way of an appeal is provided for. As against an order of remand passed under Order 41, Rule 23 C.P.C., an appeal is provided by virtue of Order 43, Rule 1 (u) C.P.C. As regards an order of remand passed under Order 41 Rule 25 C.P.C., there can be no doubt that it will be revisable and no appeal against such an order will lie, for the simple reason that an appeal is not provided for against it in the Code of Civil Procedure; and moreover it will not amount to a decree within the meaning of section 2 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, as regards an order of remand passed in exercise of inherent powers, it has been the view of this Court as laid down by a Division Bench in Sheolal vs. Jugalkishore, 25 MPLC 252=ILR 1940 Nag. 538, that where a remand is made in exercise of inherent powers, it will be appealable if it fulfills the conditions mentioned in section 2 (2) C.P.C. and if it amounts to a decree. It will be useful to reproduce the observations of the Division Bench at page 547 (of ILR and page 258 of MPLC), as follows:- "What are the cardinal points in this case? One is whether the family of the mortgagors is joint or separate. According to their Lordships that has been finally decided by the lower appellate Court. Then again there is the question of redemption. That also is finally decided so far as the lower appellate Court is concerned. One is whether the family of the mortgagors is joint or separate. According to their Lordships that has been finally decided by the lower appellate Court. Then again there is the question of redemption. That also is finally decided so far as the lower appellate Court is concerned. Neither of these points could be raised again either in that or the trial Court. Now, the definition of a 'decree' is the formal expression of an adjudication which. "So far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final." If we have interpreted their Lordships in Saiyad Muzhar Hussain vs. Mussamat Bodha Bai (1894) ILR 17 All. 112, a right then it is clear that the decision of the lower appellate Court conclusively determines, so far as that Court is concerned, two at least of the cardinal issues in the suit and therefore fulfils the provisions of the definition. We cannot see how the decision can be lifted out of the ambit of the definition simply because the Legislature, whether by way of abundant caution or otherwise, has taken other decisions, which would also have fallen within this definition, out of it and made them appealable as others. We consider therefore, that the order in question is appealable. 8. Therefore, an appeal will lie where an order of remand passed by the first appellate Court amounts to a decree. It means that the first appellate Court must have decided some cardinal issues finally binding on the parties, as laid down in Sheolal vs. Jugalkishore (supra). In this connection, I may also refer to the case of Mst. Zenab Bi vs. Wajahat Husen, 1959 JLJ 294 = AIR 1959 MP 384 decided by Dixit, J. (as he then was), wherein the learned Judge followed the Division Bench case of the Nagpur High Court in Sheolal vs. Jugalkishore (supra) and held that where the first appellate Court has not disposed of any cardinal issue, but has merely sent back the case to the Court of first instance for a retrial, such an order of remand will not amount to a decree and in that event, the order of remand will be revisable and not appealable. In this connection, it may be pertinent to note the Full Bench case of Manohar vs. Baliram, ILR 1952 Nag. 471 decided by Sinha, C.J. (as he then was) Hidayatullah and Mudholkar, JJ. (as they then were), wherein the question with reference to different kinds of remand orders was considered by the learned Judges for the purpose of deciding whether such an order will amount to a judgment which in effect means a decree for the purposes of Clause 10 of the letters Patent. This case was not brought to the notice of my lord, the Chief Justice in the case of Mst. Zenab Bi vs. Wajahat Husen (supra). The main judgment was delivered by Hidayatullah, J. with which Sinha, C.J. agreed and Mudholkar, J. dissented. The proposition laid down by the majority judgment is that when a remand order by a single Judge of the High Court sitting in second appeal merely remits an issue for trial or orders some evidence to be taken, but does not decide the controversy either wholly or partially, the remand order cannot be treated as a judgment within the meaning of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Nagpur High Court but where the Court sets aside a decree and making a binding order on the merits of the controversy, remits the case for trial according to its decision, the order must be treated as a judgment within the meaning of the Clause. This means that where the Court passes an order of remand under Order 41, Rule 25 C.P.C. and remits an issue to the Court below, it will not amount to a decree. But where inherent powers of remand arc exercised and a binding order is made against the parties by setting aside the decree of the Court below, which is directed to decide the case again in accordance with the view expressed in the remand order, such an order will undoubtedly amount to a decree. After dealing with the question exhaustively in all its aspects, Hidayatullah, J. answered the question as mentioned above, with which Sinha, C.J. agreed. In his dissenting judgment, Mudholkar, J. opined that such an order will not amount to a decree. I may observe that the view as expressed by Dixit, J. (as he then was) in Mst. After dealing with the question exhaustively in all its aspects, Hidayatullah, J. answered the question as mentioned above, with which Sinha, C.J. agreed. In his dissenting judgment, Mudholkar, J. opined that such an order will not amount to a decree. I may observe that the view as expressed by Dixit, J. (as he then was) in Mst. Zenab Bi vs. Wajahat Husen (supra) would be in consonance with the minority view of Mudholkar, J., but contrary to the majority view of Sinha, C.J. and Hidayatullah, J. in the said Full Bench case. Therefore, being bound by the view of the Full Bench, I would, in all humility, express the opinion that in accordance with the principles laid down in Sheolal vs. Jugalkishore (supra) and Manohar vs. Baliram (FB) (supra) where a Court in exercise of inherent powers sets aside a decree of the Court below and passes an order of remand directing the Court below to decide the case afresh in accordance with the directions given in the remand order, such an order will amount to a decree and, therefore, be appealable. For this reason, 1 am unable to subscribe to the view expressed by Dixit, J. (as he then was) following the minority view of Mudholkar, J. in Manohar vs. Baliram (FB) (supra) that where a Court merely remits a case for a fresh decision, such an order will not amount to a decree and therefore, it will be revisable. The result of the case would not turn on this question, as in the present case, an appeal as also a revision will lie to this Court; and it is immaterial whether this Court entertains the case as an appeal or a revision. An appeal can be converted into a revision and vice versa. Therefore, without dilating on the question further, but merely following the majority view in Manohar vs. Baliram (FB) (supra), I would hold that properly speaking an appeal lies against the remand order in the present case. 9. The further question is whether the learned appellate Judge was justified in allowing an amendment sought by the defendants at the appellate stage. Therefore, without dilating on the question further, but merely following the majority view in Manohar vs. Baliram (FB) (supra), I would hold that properly speaking an appeal lies against the remand order in the present case. 9. The further question is whether the learned appellate Judge was justified in allowing an amendment sought by the defendants at the appellate stage. It is no doubt true that all amendments which are necessary for the purposes of deciding the real questions of controversy between the parties ought to be allowed, as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in P.H. Patil vs. K.S. Patil, AIR 1957 SC 363 . If I had found that an adjudication of any of the points raised by the defendants by way of an amendment was necessary, I would have been inclined to uphold the order of remand. But as presently I propose to illustrate, the meaningless pleas which are concluded by well considered decisions and which are contrary to the accepted propositions of law have been allowed to be raised by way of amendment and but for this aspect, I would not have been inclined to interfere with the order of remand passed by the learned District Judge. Earlier, I have already mentioned the points which are sought to be introduced by the defendants by way of amendment. The question is whether those points at all need adjudication. Instead of leaving that question to the trial Court, I feel that they ought to be finally disposed of in the present revisions, as they are wholly unnecessary and they are meaningless pleas which have been raised for the sake of raising some defence. 10. As regards the question whether a consolidated decree is rendered illegal as being in excess of the pecuniary limit of the trial Court's jurisdiction it is difficult to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the decree should be considered to be one and indivisible. In fact, the trial Judge committed a procedural error in failing to pass separate decrees. But he purported to pass a consolidated decree saying that the claim of both the plaintiffs is decreed to the extent of Rs. In fact, the trial Judge committed a procedural error in failing to pass separate decrees. But he purported to pass a consolidated decree saying that the claim of both the plaintiffs is decreed to the extent of Rs. 10,000, which means Rs.5,000 for each of the plaintiff's. Earlier, I have already indicated that as laid down by a full Bench of this Court in Baliram vs. Manohar (supra), the respondents ought to make an application to the trial Court for drawing up of separate decrees. Therefore, that question does not need any fresh adjudication at the hands of the trial Judge, and a remand for that purpose only would be wholly unnecessary. 11. As regards the question whether the previous decision in the suit filed by two other sisters operates as resjudicata, it is clear that if four sisters were defamed by a single action of the defendants, each one of them will get a separate cause of action. Their causes of action cannot be said to be joint and in divisible. But each one can file a suit separately against the defendants. It may be that there may be common questions of fact and law involved in such suits. But the plaintiffs in such a case cannot be said to be representatives of each other; and they cannot be said to be claiming through each other. Their causes of action being purely individual and separate, no judgment passed in one case can operate as resjudicata in other suit filed by one of them. For the applicability of section 11 C.P.C., it is necessary that the matter directly and substantially in issue must have been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties or between the parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title. Therefore, if two persons are defamed by a single action of the defendants, they do not become each other's representative or they cannot be said to be claiming under the said title. It is, therefore, clear that although the previous suit filed by two other sisters may have been dismissed, the present plaintiffs at least are not bound by that decision, as it is not inter-parties and the plaintiffs are not their representative. Therefore, the question about the previous judgment operating as resjudicata against the tenability of the present suit is wholly immaterial and meaningless. Therefore, the question about the previous judgment operating as resjudicata against the tenability of the present suit is wholly immaterial and meaningless. It will not serve any useful purpose by requiring the trial Judge to adjudicate on this question raised by way of an amendment introduced by the defendants. 12. As regards the question about the suit or appeal abating on account of the death of some of the joint tort-feasors in the absence of legal representatives being brought on record, the case law is settled. Joint tort-feasors have no legal representatives except the remaining tort-feasors. Therefore, on account of the death of some of the joint tort-feasors, the suit or appeal does not abate, if their personal heirs are not brought on record. Their legal representatives will be the reaming tort-feasors who are on record. In this connection, I may only refer to the observations of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Pramada Nath Roy vs. Secretary of State, ILR 53 Cal. 992, as also a Division Bench of this Court in S. Chatterjee vs. Dr. T.B. Sarvate, 1960 JLJ 976 =ILR 1960 MP 448= 1960 MPLJ 877 . Therefore, there is no propriety in having an adjudication on this point to be made by the trial Judge as regards the fact of death of some of the joint tort-feasors. Clearly a suit or appeal would not abate; and the cause of action will survive against the reaming tort-feasors. Therefore, a remand was wholly unnecessary for the decision on this point as well. 13. As regards the question whether the other joint tort-feasors were discharged on account of the action of the plaintiffs in deliberately abandoning their claims against some of the tort-feasors, it is well known proposition of law that where a plaintiff compromises with some of the joint tort-feasors in respect of the entire wrong, other tort-feasors would be discharged by such an action. But joint tort-feasors would not be released from their obligation merely because the plaintiff fails to sue or after having sued, fails to prosecute the suit against some of the joint tort-feasors. In this connection, I may refer to the Division Bench case of Devendra Kumar vs. Nirmalabai, 31 MPLC 4=ILR 1945 Nag. 349, which has later on been followed by a Division Bench of the M.P. High Court in S. Chatterjee vs. Dr. T.B. Sarvate (supra). 14. In this connection, I may refer to the Division Bench case of Devendra Kumar vs. Nirmalabai, 31 MPLC 4=ILR 1945 Nag. 349, which has later on been followed by a Division Bench of the M.P. High Court in S. Chatterjee vs. Dr. T.B. Sarvate (supra). 14. Thus, according to the allegations made in the amendment application, the other tort-feasors are said to have been discharged from their obligation because the respective plaintiff has deliberately abandoned her claim against some other tort-feasors. This is nothing, but a failure to sue, or a failure to prosecute after having sued. Such an action, in no case, can result in discharging the obligation of the other joint tort-feasors. So this point also does not need any adjudication at the hands of the trial Judge, and I feel that the learned appellate Judge allowed the amendment application mechanically without applying his mind whether the so-called points of controversy were really the points of controversy or were meaningless or imaginary points of controversy. From this point of view, allowing an amendment application itself constituted an action of exercise of jurisdiction with material irregularity so as to bring the case within the scope of section 115 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The meaningless and wholly infructuous amendments based on imaginary questions have been allowed by the learned District Judge and as such, the order of remand in exercise of inherent powers was not at all warranted in the circumstances. If the learned District Judge had applied his mind to the questions sought to be raised by way of amendment he would undoubtedly have come to the conclusion that no remand was at all necessary and if necessary, he could as well have decided those questions of law himself instead of remanding the case to the trial Court; I may observe that the questions sought to be raised by way of amendment are pure questions of law which are not dependent on any facts pleaded. From this point of view also, the order of remand was absolutely unwarranted. 15. As a result of the discussion aforesaid, I set aside the order of remand passed by the learned District Judge and instead remit this case to that Court for a decision of the appeal on merits. The respective petitioners will be entitled to the costs of this Court. Counsel's fee in this Court shall be Rs. 15. As a result of the discussion aforesaid, I set aside the order of remand passed by the learned District Judge and instead remit this case to that Court for a decision of the appeal on merits. The respective petitioners will be entitled to the costs of this Court. Counsel's fee in this Court shall be Rs. 50, if certified in each case.