JUDGMENT : Misra, J. - The Petitioner has been convicted under Sections 467 and 409, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for one year for each of the offences, the sentences to run concurrently. Accused was the extra-departmental agent (Branch Postmaster) of Kulana Branch Post Office. The Deputy Inspector of Schools, Bhadrak, (p.w.1) had remitted Rs. 35/ - in favour of Baishnab Charan Lenka (p.w.14), a teacher of Soro, Special School, by Bhadrak Money-Order No. 2981 on 2-12-1960. Kshetrabasi Khandai (p.w.10) was the extra-departmental delivery agent (Postman). On 10-12-1960 the money-order form with the money was entrusted by the accused to p.w.10 for payment to the payee. As p.w.14 was not available, p.w.10 returned the money-order form and the money to the accused. Upto this stage, there is no dispute. Prosecution case is that on 12-12-1960 the accused forged r the signature of the payee at two places of the money-order form to be signed by the payee. He asked p.w.10 to make an endorsement that the latter paid the amount to the payee. Accordingly p.w.10 made an endorsement in the money-order form showing that he himself had paid the money to the payee. In fact, there was no payment on that day. As this fact came to light on 14-12-1960 the accused sent for p.w.14: and offered the amount to him. The latter refused to accept the money as already there had been some uproar in the matter. Ultimately, however, p.w.14 accepted the amount on 17-12-1960. A case was launched on the report (Ex. 14) of the Inspector of Post Offices. The case had a chequered career. The Petitioner pleaded guilty to the charges before the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Bhadrak on 6-11-1961. The S.D.M. convicted the Petitioner under Sections 467 and 409. Indian Penal Code but let him off on probation of good conduct for one year u/s 562(1), Criminal Procedure Code. On a reference by the A.D.M. (Judicial), the High Court set aside the order of the S. D M. in Criminal Reference No. 13/62. The S.D.M., Bhadrak was directed to commit the Petitioner to the Court of Sessions after holding an inquiry in accordance with law. The accused's defence was that p.w.10 returned the money-order form to the accused on 10-12-1900 containing the endorsements (Exs. 3/1 and 4/1) showing payment to the payee (p.w.14). The S.D.M., Bhadrak was directed to commit the Petitioner to the Court of Sessions after holding an inquiry in accordance with law. The accused's defence was that p.w.10 returned the money-order form to the accused on 10-12-1900 containing the endorsements (Exs. 3/1 and 4/1) showing payment to the payee (p.w.14). P.w.10 informed him that he had got the money-order form signed by the brother of the payee and had kept the money with him. P.w.10 asked to be forgiven, paid back Rs. 35/ - to the Petitioner and requested him to make the payment to the payee. This fact he reported to the Postal Overseer (p.w.4). As p.w.10 was a friend of p.w.4, a false case was started against him. He admitted that he offered payment to p.w.14 on 14-12-1960, but the payee refused to accept. Ultimately he received the amount of remittance on 17-12-1960 in presence of p.w.4 by granting a plain paper receipt. Thus he denied to have committed the offences of forgery and criminal breach of trust. 2. The Courts below have concurrently found that the Petitioner forged the signatures and the endorsements purporting to have been done by p.w.14 and temporarily misappropriated the amount of Rs. 5/ -. 3. The conviction of the Petitioner has been based on the following pieces of evidence (i) The evidence of p. ws. 4 and 10 is that the endorsement (Ex. B) made by p.w.10 was to the dictation of the accused though p.w.10 was not in fact entrusted with the money and did not make payment to p.w.14; (ii) The signature and endorsement (Exs. 3/1 and 4/1) were in the handwriting of the accused; (iii) In his statement u/s 342, Code of Criminal Procedure before the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Bhadrak, the accused confessed his guilt; (iv) In the extra-judicial confession (Ex. 13) before the Postal Inspector (p.w.3), the accused gave a statement on 27-12-1900 admitting the entire prosecution case; (v) The conduct of the accused in offering Rs. 35/ - on 14-12-1960 and making payment to p.w.14 on 17-12-1960. 4. Ex. B is to the following effect "Paid by me on 12-12.1900". The endorsement had been signed by Kshetrabasi Khandai (1\. Khandai), p.w.10 at two places. P.w.10 admits that the endorsement and the signatures are his. He, however, says that the date "12" has been overwritten to "10" not by him but by somebody else. 4. Ex. B is to the following effect "Paid by me on 12-12.1900". The endorsement had been signed by Kshetrabasi Khandai (1\. Khandai), p.w.10 at two places. P.w.10 admits that the endorsement and the signatures are his. He, however, says that the date "12" has been overwritten to "10" not by him but by somebody else. To the naked eye it appears that "12" has been converted to "10". The original "2" is, however, discernible. The evidence of p.w.10 that the original date was "12" is correct inasmuch as, according to the admitted case of both the prosecution and the defence, there was no payment on the 10th. The Petitioner himself states that on the 10th the money-order form was returned back by p.w.10 stating that the latter obtained the endorsements of the brother of p.w.14 as per Exs. 3/1 and 4/1 without making any payment of Rs. 35. The date of Ex. B must therefore be taken as 12-12-1960 and not 10-12-1960. Mr. Das contends that once the endorsement (Ex. B) is admitted by p.w.10 to be in his own hand, the onus is on the prosecution to establish beyond reasonable doubt that in point of fact there was no payment on 12-12-1960 by p.w.10. This contention has no substance. Even, according to the Petitioner's case, there was no payment on 12th. The money was offered to p.w.14 on 14-12-1960 when he refused to take it on that day. The amount was ultimately paid to p.w.14 by the Petitioner on 17 -12-1960 in presence of p.w.4. The Petitioner states that p.w.10 took the money-order form with the money on 12-12-1960 and made endorsement (Ex. B) but did not pay the amount. When he came to know this fact, he got the money from p.w.10 under threat of proceeding against him and offered the amount to p.w.14 both on 12th and 14th. Though p.w.10 himself is a condemned liar inasmuch as he made the endorsement (Ex. B) without making payment and appears to have been in league with the Petitioner, his version of the story is supported by p.w.4 stating that on 12-12-1900 the Petitioner asked p.w.10 to make the endorsement (Ex. B) saying that he had already paid the money. His explanation that he had no suspicion at the time to probe into the matter is acceptable. Doubtless p.w.10 got his appointment through him. B) saying that he had already paid the money. His explanation that he had no suspicion at the time to probe into the matter is acceptable. Doubtless p.w.10 got his appointment through him. But that is no ground why he would make a false statement against the Petitioner. The conduct of the accused also supports the version of p.w.4. On the Petitioner's case that p.w.10 returned the money-order form with the money on 12-12-1960 with the two endorsements (Exs. 3/1 and 4/1), he should have made a report to the higher authorities against the conduct of p.w.10 that he obtained the endorsements of the brother of p.w.14 without making payment and returned the money-order form and the money. On the aforesaid reasoning, the version of p w. 10 as to in what circumstances he made the endorsement (Ex. B) appeal's to be true. It was for the Petitioner to further establish that on 12-12-1960 p.w.10 paid him Rs. 35/ back to be paid to p.w.14. In the absence of such evidence it must be concluded that RE!. 35/ -, ultimately paid to p w. 14, was not returned back by p.w.10 but was paid by the Petitioner from his own pocket. Such a version is inconsistent with defence case and is incriminating circumstance by itself. No honest Officer, however nervous, would pay money from his own pocket which has been misappropriated by his subordinate. 5. It is to be recalled that the S.D.M., Bhadrak, had convicted the accused on his own confession, but had released him on probation u/s 562(1), Criminal Procedure Code. In his statement u/s 342, Code of Criminal Procedure (Ex. 30) made on 6-11-1961, the Petitioner clearly admitted that he had himself forged the endorsements (Exs. 3/1 and 4/1) and had temporarily misappropriated Rs. 35/ - until payment was subsequently made. The Magistrate (p.w.13) deposed that Ex.30 was recorded by him in accordance with the statement given by the Petitioner. It was contended for the prosecution that this confession concludes the matter. The judgment of the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate was ultimately quashed by the High Court and he was directed to make an inquiry for commitment. - After holding the inquiry, the case was committed to Sessions. The trial in which the Petitioner made the statement (Ex. 30) was therefore without jurisdiction. Ex. The judgment of the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate was ultimately quashed by the High Court and he was directed to make an inquiry for commitment. - After holding the inquiry, the case was committed to Sessions. The trial in which the Petitioner made the statement (Ex. 30) was therefore without jurisdiction. Ex. 30 may, however, be utilised as a judicial confession by the accused made before a Magistrate. It would have been admissible in evidence if the provisions of Section 164, Code of Criminal Procedure would have been complied with. Under Sub-section (3) of that section, a Magistrate shall, before recording any such confession, explain to the person making it that he is not bound to make a confession and -that if he does so it may be used as evidence against him and no Magistrate shall record any such confession unless, upon questioning the person making it, he has reason to believe that it was made voluntarily; and when, he records any confession, he shall make a memorandum at that foot of such record as mentioned in the Sub-section. Ex. 30 was not recorded by following the provisions of Section 164(3), Code of Criminal Procedure and is therefore inadmissible in evidence. 6. The next piece of evidence is Ex. 13, the extra-judicial confession made by the Petitioner on 27-12-1960 before the Postal Inspector (p.w.3). Ex. 13 is written by the Petitioner in his own hand. It may be translated in his own words as far as practicable: The postal money-order was returned by the E.D.D. A (extra-departmental delivery agent). I took back the money order form and the money of Rs. 35/ -. Baishnab Charan had verbally told me that if any money came in his name, I should accept it on his behalf as his school had closed for holidays. So on 12-12-1960 I endorsed his signature on the money-order form and accepted payment. I had kept the money with me. I did not realise that it would be illegal to sign on his behalf. I did not get the signature of any attesting witness on the money-order form. I knew that it was compulsory to take the signature of attesting witness on money-order forms at the time of payment to villagers. I signed at about 10 A.M. that day. There were none else in the office at the time. Thereafter the Overseer (p.w.4) came to the office. I knew that it was compulsory to take the signature of attesting witness on money-order forms at the time of payment to villagers. I signed at about 10 A.M. that day. There were none else in the office at the time. Thereafter the Overseer (p.w.4) came to the office. When the Overseer was in the office, Kshetrabasi Khandai reached the place. I asked him to sign in the money-order form at the place "Paid by me". I told him that I had already paid the money. According to my words he made the endorsement on that place, signed it and put the date. I knew that the person who paid the money should fill up that column. On that day, payment was less than Rs. 40/ - and so I asked the K D.D.A. to make the endorsement. That was a mistake of mine. On that very day the Overseer took Kshetrabasi with him to Soro, sent for Baishnab and asked him whether the money had been paid. On 14-12-1960 Baishnab came to the office. I offered him the money on grant of a receipt. He, however, did not agree. On 17-12-1960 the Overseer came again and the amount of Rs. 35/ - was paid to Baishnab. He passed a receipt in token of payment. Thus from 12-12-1900 (when payment was shown to have been made) till 17-12-1960 (when actual payment was made), the money was with me. I confess my guilt, I might be excused. Though the Petitioner admits to have written Ex. I is in his own hand, he states that it was under threat and promise of p.w.3 that he wrote it. The extra-judicial confession is thus retracted. A conviction can be based on the retracted extra-judicial confession if it is voluntary and true. 7. The contention of Mr. Das that the extra-judicial confession is not voluntary is mainly based on the evidence of p.ws. 3, 10 and 14. P.w.3 stated as follows I had at first made the enquiry from the accused on 26-12-1960 while inspecting his office. I interrogated him next day on 27-12-1960 and got his written statement (Ex. 13). Ex. 12 was written on my interrogation. Ext 13. contains the answers of the accused to my questions: It is not a fact that Ext. 12 was written by the accused on my dictation and persuasion. I interrogated him next day on 27-12-1960 and got his written statement (Ex. 13). Ex. 12 was written on my interrogation. Ext 13. contains the answers of the accused to my questions: It is not a fact that Ext. 12 was written by the accused on my dictation and persuasion. It is not II, fact that the accused bad written Ext. 13 on my persuasion that he would be excused if he wrote as in Ext. 13. It is not a fact that I had threatened the accused saying that unless he wrote out Ext. 13 some action would be taken against him. It is not a fact that I had extorted Ext. 13 statement from the accused in order to save Khandai. In cross-examination he, further stated- All these statements are in answer to my questions. I asked questions to them and they wrote down their answers. I asked them to put in writing whatever they answered to my questions. It is not a fact that I had obtained the statements by dictating them in order to save Khandai and to put the accused in trouble. It is not a fact that I and Mirza Mahammad have concocted this case and the documents in order to appoint Khandai as the Branch Post Master in place of the accused On a perusal of the statement of p.w.3 it is quite clear that he as an official superior made enquiries from the accused in proper discharge of his duties. It was natural for him to put all relevant questions. The statement cannot be said to be not voluntary merely because the answers were given in response to the question. That is the usual method which any superior officer would follow. P.w.3 denies any threat or promise made by him. P.w.4 attested Ext. 13. He deposed that the accused made that statement voluntarily to p.w.3. He had not been cross-examined regarding Ext. 13. P.w.10 stated- As the Postal Inspector asked for written statements I and accused gave the written statements. The Inspector then forgave me It is contended by Mr. Das that just as p.w.10 was forgiven after he gave the statement, similarly the accused was promised to be forgiven if he gave a statement in terms of Ext. 13. There is no substance in this contention. The forgiveness given to p.w.10 does not affect the voluntary character of his statement. Das that just as p.w.10 was forgiven after he gave the statement, similarly the accused was promised to be forgiven if he gave a statement in terms of Ext. 13. There is no substance in this contention. The forgiveness given to p.w.10 does not affect the voluntary character of his statement. When a defalcation takes place in the office, it is the duty of the official superior to make a thorough inquiry into the matter and find out the delinquent. If p.w.3 was satisfied that p.w.10 endorsed Ext. B to the dictation of the accused, who was his official superior, it was open to him to forgive P.w.10 and not to start a proceeding against him. To say that a person would be excused if he divulges the real truth does not amount to extortion of confession on promise. It would all depend on facts and circumstances of each case. There is no doubt that p.w.3 is a person in authority. But Section 24, Evidence Act, postulates many other ingredients before a confession is declared involuntary. It must appear to the Court that the confession was caused by inducement, threat or promise having reference to the charge against the accused and sufficient in the opinion of the Court to give the accused person grounds which would appear to him reasonable for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him. There are no materials on record to show as to why the accused would make a false statement to gain the advantage of being excused. On the contrary, the endorsement (Ext. B) was in the handwriting of p.w.10. If in fact the accused had made the .payment of Rs. 35/ - to the peon for delivery to p.w.14, he would adhere to the truth and disclaim involvement in criminal breach of trust. In Pyare Lal Bhargava Vs. State of Rajasthan, ., the legal position has been fully elucidated p.w.10 affirmatively stated in cross-examination. "My written statement is true. My present deposition is also true." Some emphasis was put by Mr. Das on the statement of p.w.14 to the effect On 26-12-60 I had given another written statement to the Postal Inspector. The subject of the statement was suggested by the Inspector (Kaana Lekha, Jiba Inspector Babu Kahile). "My written statement is true. My present deposition is also true." Some emphasis was put by Mr. Das on the statement of p.w.14 to the effect On 26-12-60 I had given another written statement to the Postal Inspector. The subject of the statement was suggested by the Inspector (Kaana Lekha, Jiba Inspector Babu Kahile). It is to be noted that p.w.14 is not a witness to Ext. 13 and does not depose about it. Assuming even that some statement given by him was written according to the dictation of the Inspector, no inference can be drawn that Ext. 13 was written to the dictation of the Inspector. That apart, the expression "Karma Lekha Jiba Inspector Babu Kahile" does not mean that p.w.14 did not given his own version but gave in writing a version concocted by the Inspector. Without further clarification and without obtaining a categorical and clear statement that what was written was not his statement but was one, as suggested by the Inspector the inference suggested by Mr. Das cannot be accepted. As I have already stated, p.w.14 does not at all depose to Ext. 13. Having given anxious consideration to the criticism of Mr. Das I am satisfied that it is without substance. I accept the evidence of p. ws. 3 and 4 and that Ext. 13 was voluntarily made by the accused. 8. The next question for consideration is whether the extra judicial confession is true. As it has been retracted, it requires general corroboration both with regard to the commission of the offence and the complicity of the accused. On examination of other evidence on record it is clear that the extra-judicial confession is corroborated in material particulars. The accused gave the statement that the postal money-order form with the money was returned by p.w.10 on 10-12-60. This fact is now admitted and the documents fully corroborate it. His statement that he had kept the money with him on 12-12-60 is established by the fact that he offered to pay the money to p.w.14 on the 12th and the 14th. That he did not get the signatures of any attesting witnesses in the money-order form is established by the absence of their signatures. His statement that he had kept the money with him on 12-12-60 is established by the fact that he offered to pay the money to p.w.14 on the 12th and the 14th. That he did not get the signatures of any attesting witnesses in the money-order form is established by the absence of their signatures. That he asked p.w.10 to sign in the money-order form at the place "Paid by me" and that he had told him that he had already paid the money is supported by the evidence of p.w.4. That p.w.10 made the endorsement (Ext. B) according to his request is supported by the evidence of p. ws. 4 and 10. That he offered payment to p.w.14 on 14-12-60 on grant of a receipt and that the latter did not agree to accept is supported by the evidence of p.w.14. That he paid Rs 35/ to p.w.14 on 17-12-60 in presence of p.w.4 is established by the evidence of p. ws. 4: and 14. That p.w.14 passed a receipt in token of payment is proved by the receipt produced in the case. His statement that he himself retained money from 12-12-1960 to 17-12-60 is established by his own admission in this case and by the evidence of p. ws. 4 and 14. The extra-judicial confession is thus corroborated in material particulars both with regard to the commission of the crime and the complicity of the accused. On the retracted extra-judicial confession alone, which has been proved to be voluntary and true, the conviction is well founded. 9. It is necessary to examine whether Exts. 3(1 and 4/l were in the handwriting of the accused. The accused was asked to furnish his specimen hand writing. On his refusal, his handwriting was not sent to the expert. The prosecution as well as the learned Assistant Sessions Judge appear to be entertaining a wrong notion of law that under Article 20(3) of the Constitution, the accused could not be compelled to given his specimen hand writing. This view has been exploded in The State of Bombay Vs. Kathi Kalu Oghad and Others. Procurement of the handwriting of the accused for examination by an expert has been held as not amounting to testimonial compulsion within the meaning of Article 20(3). P. ws. 4 and 10 stated that Exts. 3/1 and 4/1 were in the handwriting of the accused. Kathi Kalu Oghad and Others. Procurement of the handwriting of the accused for examination by an expert has been held as not amounting to testimonial compulsion within the meaning of Article 20(3). P. ws. 4 and 10 stated that Exts. 3/1 and 4/1 were in the handwriting of the accused. Both of them had full opportunity of knowing his handwriting of p.w.10 worked under the accused as the delivery peon. P.w.4 was the Overseer who inspected and checked up the work of the accused. Exts. 3/1 and 4/1 were sent to the handwriting Expert (p.w.12) to say whether those were in the handwriting of p.w.10 or 14. P.w.12 was clearly of opinion that those exhibits were not in the handwriting either of p.w.10 or of p.w.14. The specimen handwriting of the accused could not be sent as he refused to give his specimen. The short question is whether on the evidence of p. ws. 4 and 10, these two exhibits can be said to be in the handwriting of the accused. Section 67 of the Evidence Act lays down that if a document is alleged to be signed or to have been written wholly or in part by any person, the signature of the handwriting of so much of the document as is alleged to be in that person's handwriting must be proved to be in his handwriting. Section 45 prescribes that the opinion of an expert is relevant. u/s 47, when the Court has to form an opinion as to the person by whom any document was written or signed, the opinion of, any person acquainted with the handwriting of the person by whom it is supposed to be written or signed that it was or was not written or signed by that person, is a relevant fact. The explanation to the section is to the effect that a person is said to be acquainted with the handwriting of another person when he had seen that person write, or when he had received document purporting to be written by the person in answer to documents written by himself or under his authority and addressed to that person, or when, in the ordinary course of business, documents purporting to be written by that person have been habitually submitted to him. The evidence of p. ws. The evidence of p. ws. 4 and 10 satisfies the tests laid down in Section 47, p.w.4 is the Overseer who habitually inspected the work of the Petitioner. P.W. 10 is the delivery peon who worked under the accused and 'was acquainted with his handwriting when he saw him writing. On the evidence of p. ws. 4 and 10 the conclusion of the Courts below that Exts. 3/1 and 4/1 were forged by the Petitioner is well founded. 10. The Petitioner was rightly convicted under Sections 467 and 409, Indian penal Code. The accused is a young man. Initially he had no intention to misappropriate. After return of the money-order form and the money on the 10th, he seems to have been influenced by this weakness but made the payment soon after the fact came to light. Ends of justice should he met if the Petitioner is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for two months under each of the sections; the sentences to run concurrently. Subject to this modification on the question of sentence the revision is demised. Revision dismissed; sentence modified. Final Result : Dismissed