JUDGMENT S.N. Singh, J. - This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution arises out of a suit under Sec. 209 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. 2. The plaintiff petitioner was a minor at the date of suit. He instituted the suit alleging himself to be the sirdar of the land in suit and asserted that the defendant was a trespasser. 3. The defendant contested the suit on the ground that the plaintiff was not the sirdar and that he himself was a sirdar and was in cultivatory possession since the year 1260 F.; hence the suit was barred by time. 4. The trial court accepted the plaintiff to be the sirdar of the plots now in dispute but having held that the suit was barred by time dismissed the suit. It held that See. 6 of the Indian Limitation Act not having been impleaded in the plaint the plaintiff was not entitled to the benefit thereof. This decision of the trial court was affirmed in appeal by the Commissioner as well as by the Board. 5. The only point raised in this petition by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that Sec. 6 of the Indian Limitation Act should have been applied in the circumstances of this case. Learned counsel has submitted that by virtue of Sec. 341 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act the whole of the Limitation Act has been made applicable to proceedings under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, consequently he submits that the benefit of Sec. 6 of the Indian Limitation Act should have been given to the petitioner, the Board while repelling this submission of the petitioner very rightly observed that by virtue of Sec. 341 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act if the entire Limitation Act has been made applicable Sec. 6 as well as Sec. 29 of the Limitation Act must be read together. Secs. 6(1) and 29(2) (b) of the Indian Limitation Act are as follows: 6 (1). Secs. 6(1) and 29(2) (b) of the Indian Limitation Act are as follows: 6 (1). Where a person entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree is, at the time from which the period of limitation is to be reckoned, a minor, or insane, or an idiot, he may institute the suit or make the application with the same period after the disability has ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time prescribed therefor in the third column of the first schedule. 29 (2). Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule, the provisions of Sec. 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefor in that schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law - (b) the provisions contained in Sec. 4, Secs. 9 to 18, and Sec. 22 shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special local law; and the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply. 6. A bear reading of Sec. 6 of the Indian Limitation Act would show that it extends the period of limitation prescribed in the third column of the first schedule. In this case the period of limitation relied is not the period prescribed in the first schedule rather period of limitation which is given in the rules framed under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Sec. 29(2) (b) clearly says that the provisions contained in Sec. 4, Secs. 9 to 18 and Sec. 22 of the Limitation Act would apply to Special and Local laws unless they are expressly excluded but the remaining provisions of this Act would not apply. This would show that Sec. 6 of the Indian Limitation Act would be covered by Sec. 29(2) (b) of the Indian Limitation Act. 9 to 18 and Sec. 22 of the Limitation Act would apply to Special and Local laws unless they are expressly excluded but the remaining provisions of this Act would not apply. This would show that Sec. 6 of the Indian Limitation Act would be covered by Sec. 29(2) (b) of the Indian Limitation Act. Even apart from this the language of Sec. 6 of the Act itself makes it amply clear that it cannot be held to be applicable to limitation prescribed by the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, The Board appears to be right when it observes that the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act is a complete Act in itself which had provided its own period of limitation and it no where specifically provides that the provision of Sec. 6 of the Indian Limitation Act would also be made applicable. I am in entire agreement with the views expressed by the Board on this point. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to satisfy me that there is any mistake much less any mistake apparent on the face of the record. 7. Accordingly this petition lacks force arid is hereby dismissed with costs.