JUDGMENT S.S. Dhavan, J. - This is a tenant's application under Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against an order of ejectment passed by the 1st Munsif Bulandshahr under Sec. 7-B of the U.P. control of rent and Eviction Act. The plaintiff respondent Jai Prakash alleged in his application under Sec. 7-B that the applicant Smt. Sarwati Devi became his tenant in pursuance of an allotment order passed on 20th June 1959, that her husband was her Pairokar and agent and therefore jointly liable with her for payment of rent; that she and her husband, had not paid the rent from 23rd December, 1960, till 31st December, 1963, and a sum of Rs. 925/- was due from them; that he had filed a suit for their ejectment on the ground of non-payment of rent which was decreed by the trial court but dismissed by the appellate court and he had filed a second appeal in this Court which was pending; that he wanted the ejectment of Sarwati Devi and her husband. 2. The court issued notices of the application to Smt. Sarwati Devi and her husband. These were served on them on 27th April 1964. On 11th May 1964 they filed a joint written statement showing cause against their ejectment. The husband pleaded that he was not the tenant and should not have been made a party while Smt. Sarwati Devi contended that the present application was barred by the principle of res judicata. But no security was filed by either of them as required under sub-Sec. (vii) of Sec- 7-B. Consequently court held that the objections could not be considered. He passed an order for the ejectment of the tenant from the accommodation. Smt. Sarwati Devi and her husband have come here in revision. 3. Mr. J. C. Bhargava urged the following argument in support of this revision. First he contended that Sec. 7-B of the Act which requires the tenant to furnish security before he can file an objection is unconstitutional violates the petitioners right under Secs. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. There is no substance in this argument in view of the previous decisions of this Court. In Saroj Devi v. Rent Control Officer, A.I.R. 1956 Alld. 100 it was held that Sec. 7-B is not discriminatory as it applies to all tenants and landlords alike. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. There is no substance in this argument in view of the previous decisions of this Court. In Saroj Devi v. Rent Control Officer, A.I.R. 1956 Alld. 100 it was held that Sec. 7-B is not discriminatory as it applies to all tenants and landlords alike. In Hardwar Singh v. Satendra Kumar, AIR 1955 Allahabad 305 it was held that the proviso to sub-Sec. (vii) of Sec. 7-B requiring security from a tenant before permitting him to file an objection is not inconsistent with Article 19(1) (f) of the Constitution. 4. Secondly, learned counsel urged that Sec. 7-B of the Act does not empower a court to pass a decree for ejectment against a tenant whose tenancy has not been formally terminated by the landlord in accordance with the law. Learned counsel admitted that sub-Sec. (v) of Sec. 7-B provides that where a tenant has failed to deposit the rent within the time allowed and does not file any objection the court shall, notwithstanding anything in the transfer of property Act make an order directing the eviction of the tenant, but he contended that the words "notwithstanding anything in the Transfer of Property Act" do not absolve the landlord from his duty to terminate the tenancy before filing an application for ejectment under Sec. 7-B. Learned counsel contended that there is no inconsistency between Sec. 7-B and the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act which require the termination of the tenancy; and in fact the two go together. Counsel urged that a landlord can ask for ejectment under Sec. 7-B only if he has previously terminated the tenancy in accordance with the law, and if he has not done this the application for ejectment is incompetent and the court has no power to eject a person who continues to be a tenant. Counsel further argued that in spite of the summary nature of the proceedings under Sec. 7-B, they are not different in character from an ordinary suit for the ejectment of the tenant; and therefore in both the landlord must determine the tenancy before bringing an action for the defendants eviction. Learned counsel contended that as in this case there had been no termination of the tenancy the application was incompetent and the court could not pass a decree for ejectment. 5. Learned counsel contended that as in this case there had been no termination of the tenancy the application was incompetent and the court could not pass a decree for ejectment. 5. The argument is ingenius and plausible at first sight but in reality without substance. Sec. 7-B applies only to a certain class of tenants I namely, those who acquire tenancy rights in pursuance of an order made under Sec. 7 (2) of the Act, known as "an allotment order". Under these provisions the Distt. Magistrate has the power to direct the landlord to let the accommodation to any person of his (the District Magistrate's) choice. Therefore a person who becomes a tenant by virtue of such order acquires tenancy rights which he could not have acquired under the ordinary law. But this tenancy is subject to the conditions contained in Sec. 7-B. In my opinion Sec. 7 (2) and Sec. 7-B must be read together. The result is that a person who acquires a tenancy under Sec. 7(2) must accept all the conditions I contained in Sec. 7-B exactly, as if they were a part of his contract of tenancy. Sec. 7-B provides a special mode of termination of tenancy in certain special circumstances. If the landlord makes an application alleging that the tenant has not paid rent for more than three months and the latter after receiving notice neither deposits the rent nor furnishes security within the prescribed period. he shall be ejected by the Court. Learned counsel contended that this condition is very harsh and discriminatory but the short answer is that a person who obtains rights under one section of the Act must accept the conditions attached to that right. No tenant can be permitted to say that he will accept the right under an allotment order but not the conditions attached to it under Sec. 7-B. 6. Learned counsel then argued that Sec. 7-B enables any landlord to file an application claiming a fantastic amount of rent and thus compel the tenant either to furnish security or face ejection. I am not much impressed by this arguments. The proviso requiring furnishing of security says that it shall be "to the satisfaction of the court". Therefore the court has ample power, if it feels that the application for ejectment is frivolous, to permit the tenant to give personal security. I am not much impressed by this arguments. The proviso requiring furnishing of security says that it shall be "to the satisfaction of the court". Therefore the court has ample power, if it feels that the application for ejectment is frivolous, to permit the tenant to give personal security. The tenant has the right, even before filing his objection, to ask for permission to furnish personal security on grounds specified by him and the court may take all the relevant circumstances before accepting personal security. One of the relevant circumstances may be that the application for ejectment appears to be frivolous. 7. Lastly learned counsel argued that the furnishing of a security as a condition precedent to the exercise of the right to file an objection is unconstitutional. He relied on Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner U. P., A.I.R. 1963 SC 996. But that case has no application here, because the petitioner was contending that his fundamental right to move the Supreme Court under Article 32 was retarded by the rules of the Supreme Court demanding security. The court held that the rule was invalid because the demand for security retarded the assertion or vindication of the fundamental right to move the Supreme Court. But in the present case the tenant is merely seeking to assert his right of tenancy which was created in pursuance of an order passed under Sec. 7(2) of the Act but subject to the condition laid down in Sec. 7-B. The conditions are an integral part of the right and the applicant cannot complain if he availed of a right which Avas limited by them. 8. Counsel argued that application under Sec. 7-B was barred under the principle of res judicata. He contended that as the landlord's suit for ejectment had been dismissed he could not re-agitate the same matter under Sec. 7-B. Counsel argued that proceedings for ejectment under Sec. 7-B are judicial and governed by the principle of res judicata. These are two short answers to this argument. First, res judicata must be pleaded but the applicants disentitled themselves to plead res judicata or any other defence. Secondly, the previous suit for ejectment was dismissed on a technical ground and there was no finding that the applicant was not the tenant or that the rent was not due. These are two short answers to this argument. First, res judicata must be pleaded but the applicants disentitled themselves to plead res judicata or any other defence. Secondly, the previous suit for ejectment was dismissed on a technical ground and there was no finding that the applicant was not the tenant or that the rent was not due. An application for ejectment under Sec. 7-B is founded on the allegations that (1) the tenant is in occupation in pursuance of an order, and (2) is in arrears of rent for more than three months. There was no previous decision on either of these two allegations. 9. For these reasons, Shrimati Sarwati Devi's application must be rejected. 10. But the court had no jurisdiction to pass an order of ejectment against the husband, as he was not the tenant. The landlord did not allege that he was a tenant jointly with his wife but merely that "her husband was pairokar and agent." This allegation was not sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to proceed against him under Sec. 7-B. Even if an objection to an application under Sec. 7-B is rejected as incompetent, the Court is under a duty, before proceeding against the respondent, to satisfy itself that the application under Sec. 7-B contains allegations of fact which confer on it jurisdiction to proceed further. In this_ case, there was no jurisdiction to issue notice to the husband. 11. The husband's application is allowed and order of ejectment set aside as against him.