Dua ( 1 ) THIS appeal arises in the following circumstances. The appellant who was a plaintiff in the Court of first instance, instituted asuit for mandatory injuction directing the defendants to vacate the property in question or in the alternative; for their ejectment from the above property and for a decree for Rs. 590. 00 on account of licence-fee, rent and damages for use and occupation. Value for purposes of jurisdiction and court-fee was fixed in two counts. For relief of mandatory injuction directing the defendants to vacate the property, the value was fixed at Rs. 200. 00 For the purpose of ejectment, value was fixed at Rs. 240. 00 which was stated to be one year s rent. ( 2 ) IN the written statement, a number of preliminary objections were raised apart from the defence on the merits. The suit was pleaded not to be maintainable in the present form and value for purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction was also questioned. These preliminary pleas gave rise to two preliminary issues. On the question of maintainability of the suit in the present form, the decision was given in favour of the plaintiff. It was observed that a suit for mandatory injunction in the circumstances of the present case was maintainable. Reliance for this view was placed on Messrs. Delhi Gate Service Private Ltd. v. Messrs. Caltex {india) Ltd. . and P. N. Nandny v. N -. V. Nunday". On the question of valuation, however, the Court gave the decision against the plaintiff by relying on Sisir Kumar Dutta v Susil Kumar Dutta". according to which the suit has to be valued for purposes of court-fee in accordance with section 7 (v) of the Court Fees Act. The plaint was in the circumstances returned to the plaintiff for proper amendment. ( 3 ) THE second appeal in this Court was dismissed in default on 2nd December, 1965 but was restored by me on 29th April, 1966 on payment of Rs. 50. 00 as costs which were paid and deposited in Court. ( 4 ) WHILE arguing the appeal on the merits, the learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of P. N. Nanday" and has tried to distinguish the later Full Bench decision of that Court in the case of Sisir Kumar Dutta. ( 4 ) WHILE arguing the appeal on the merits, the learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of P. N. Nanday" and has tried to distinguish the later Full Bench decision of that Court in the case of Sisir Kumar Dutta. Further support has been sought by him from a Bench decision of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Th. Milka Singh v. Th. Diana and others. The counsel has in addition made a reference to Jagat Singh v. Districtb ad,amritsaift,iot the purpose of developing his contention that an allottee under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act is merely a licensee. Adecision by Tek Chand, J. in Pooran Chand v. Malik Mukhbain Singh, has been relied upon for drawing a distinction between a lease and a licence and for the proposition that a suit for permanent injunction can be instituted against a licensee who refuses to leave the premises after the termination of the agreement. For the same purpose, reference has been made to another Single Bench decision by Falshaw, C. J. in the case of Messrs. Delhi Gate Service Private Ltd. In both these cases, the Calcutta decision in the case of P. N. Nanday" was approvingly referred. Passing reference has also been made to a Bench decision of this Court in Thakar Das Labhu Ram v. The Custodian, Evacuee Property", in which it is laid down that if the Custodian of Evacuee Property cancels an allotment under section 10 of the East Punjab Evacuee Property (Administration) Ordinance (IX of 1949), the allottee has no remedy. The basis of this view was that an allottee had a mere licence which could be revoked at any time. A. S. Bhasin v. Custodian Evacuee Property, a decision by J. L. Kapur, J. also appears to have taken the view that an allottee has no remedy when the allotment is cancelled because an allottee is a mere licensee. Of course, Kapur, J. followed the earlier Bench decision. My attention has also been drawn to a Supreme Court decision in Amar Singh v. Custodian Evacuee Property, according to which the sum total of the various incidents of a quasi-permanent allotment has been held in no sense to constitute even qualified ownership of the land allotted. Of course, Kapur, J. followed the earlier Bench decision. My attention has also been drawn to a Supreme Court decision in Amar Singh v. Custodian Evacuee Property, according to which the sum total of the various incidents of a quasi-permanent allotment has been held in no sense to constitute even qualified ownership of the land allotted. This decision, however, does not seem to me to be of much assistance to the appellant. Reference has also been made to an English decision reported as Minister of Health v. Bellotti, but that is hardly in point. The respondents learned counsel has sought assistence from a Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court in /. C. Ghose v. B. K. Bose^. It has been held in this case that a suit fer eviction of the licensee, who continues to live in the licensed premises inspite of termination of his licence, and for possession has to be valued under section 7 (v) (e) of the Court Fees Act. If a licensee, s ) proceed the observations in this decision, continues to be in possession of certain premises after expiry of reasonable time from the date his licence is revoked, he does so only as a trespasser and, therefore, if a suit is instituted for his eviction, it is clearly a suit for recovery of possession from a trespasser. With this proposition, there can hardly be any quarrel. Reference to a Full Bench apparently was necessitated in this case because an earlier decision of that Court in Mst. Barkatunnisa Begum v. Mst. Kaniza Fatma, had held differently. ( 5 ) IN my opinion the decisions of this Court approvingly referring to the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Nanday are binding on me and I have not been persuaded in the present cise to refer the question to a larger Bench because the interests of justice in this case do not demand such a course. I have also not been persuaded to hold that the view taken by this Court in the decisions mentioned above is so clearly erroneous as to require re-examination. ( 6 ) ONCE it is held that a suit for an injunction is competent, the question of court-fee looses much of its importance. I have also not been persuaded to hold that the view taken by this Court in the decisions mentioned above is so clearly erroneous as to require re-examination. ( 6 ) ONCE it is held that a suit for an injunction is competent, the question of court-fee looses much of its importance. In the Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Sisir Kumar Dutta", the question referred for determination by the Special Bench was framed as follows:- "what is the proper valuation of a suit for ejectment of a licensee upon revocation or termination of his licence for purposes of (1) Court-fees and (2) jurisdiction ? Is there any difference in the matter between a case of revocation of licence and a case of termination as distinguished from revocation of licence ?"it is obvious that the Full Bench -was called upon to apply its mind to an entirely different problem and the question of court fee required on a plaint seeking only an injuction was not before the Bench. The Bench, of course, during the course of judgment, referred to the hardship that the view taken by them may operate on those who seek eviction of licensees on determination of their licences as compared to the landlord seeking to evict a tenant on determination of the tenancy so far the question of court-fee is concerned, but the Bench was only concerned with the law as it stood irrespective of the hardship it may entail. The Full Bench decision is, therefore, in my opinion, not at all germane to the question of court-fee on a plaint seeking an injunction and not ejectment, as is the position in the case in hand. ( 7 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, I am constrained to allow this appeal which I hereby do, and setting aside the orders of the two Courts below, remit the case back to the trial Court for further proceedings in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. Parties are directed to appear in the Court below on 12th July, 1966 whsa another short date would be given to the parties for further proceedings. There would be no order as to costs in this Court.