JUDGMENT Untwalia, J. As the main points involved in these two applications tiled under Article 226 of the Constitution attacking the validity of the prosecution of the petitioners in both the cases under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (Central Act 10 of 1955) are common they have been heard together and this judgment will govern them both. 2. The petitioners 2 to 4 in Cr. W. J. C. 11 of 1956 are respectively the General Manager, the Works Manager and the Cane Manager of Shri Krishna Gyanoday Sugar Ltd" shortly known as S. K. G. Sugar Ltd., owing and possessing a sugar mill at village Lauriya, Police Station Laurip in the district of Champaran, Shri A. K. Jain, petitioner no. 1, is also being prosecuted. But his case is that he is neither an occupier nor a director nor in any other way connected with the management of the Company. One Shri Kailash Prasad Ray, Secretary of Nandan Cooperative Development and Cane Marketing Union Ltd., Lauriya, lodged an information before the Officer-in-charge, Lauriya Police Station opposite party no. 4, on January 15, 1966, alleging default in payment of sugarcane price by the petitioners, describing petitioner no. 1 as occupier and petitioner no. 2 as Secretary. The case made out in the written report, on the basis of which the first information report has been drawn up and investigation is proceeding against the petitioners, is that S. K. G. Sugar Ltd. entered into an agreement with Nandan Co-operative Development and Cane Marketing Union Ltd. for the supply or sugarcane in the season 1965-66. According to the terms of the agreement the Union supplied a large quantity of sugarcane between the period 8.12 65 to 7.1.66 of the total value of Es. 5,86,686.87 and submitted bill to the factory as per details given in the report. The petitioners have been withholding the payment of cane price of the bins in spite of repeated reminders. According to the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955, as amended in 1957 and 1961, issued by the Central Government under Section 3 of Act 10 of 1955 it was incumbent upon the petitioners to pay cane price within 14 days of the delivery of the sugarcane. By having not complied with the requirement of the provision of the Control Order, the petitioners are said to have committed an offence under Section 7 of the said Act. By having not complied with the requirement of the provision of the Control Order, the petitioners are said to have committed an offence under Section 7 of the said Act. 3. An information on the basis of the written report of Shri Kailash Prasad Ray was entered in the station diary of the Lauriya Police Station on 15.1.66 in Entry No. 254, but on receiving orders from the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Bettiah, Lauriya P. S. Case No. 8 was instituted on January 20, 1966 under Section 7 of the said Act and investigation was taken up. 4. The case of the petitioners is that according to the Bihar Sugar Factories Control rules, 1938 and the practice and custom prevalent in the factory, payment of the sugarcane price used to be made within a reasonable time after submission of bills. The suppliers of sugarcane also fully appreciated the difficulty of the management when they were faced with shortage of adequate fund at their disposal due to the policy of the Government in fully controlling sale of sugar and strictness of the Reserve Bank of India in advancing credit to the industrialists in their effort to check inflation. The suppliers were aware of the difficulties of the management to pay the price when they submitted their Gills. Their further case is that though the management has paid up the dues in spite of great financial hardship created due to control over distribution and sale of sugar, the police of Lauriya Police Station has taken a vindictive attitude and is bent upon arresting the petitioners and causing harassment to them though they are respectable persons of status. The Sub-divisional Magistrate, Bettiah, opposite party no. 3, on receipt of a copy of the first information report, directed by his order dated 22.1.66 to put up the matter before him with final report without taking any cognizance of' the case in accordance with the requirement of Section 11 of Act 10 of 1955. The Sub-divisional Magistrate, Bettiah, opposite party no. 3, on receipt of a copy of the first information report, directed by his order dated 22.1.66 to put up the matter before him with final report without taking any cognizance of' the case in accordance with the requirement of Section 11 of Act 10 of 1955. The petitioners challenge their prosecution as being illegal, invalid and without jurisdiction on several grounds and assert that though the price of the sugarcane in question has been fully paid up, and even though the law fixing the period of payment to be within 14 days of the date of delivery is void, the petitioners are being treated as offenders by the police of Lauriya Police Station and the petitioners have learnt that the Sub-divisional Magistrate has been moved for issuing non-bailable warrant of arrest and taking action under Sections 87 and 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. They have, therefore, prayed for a direction, order or writ in the nature of mandamus and/or certiorari and/or prohibition to quash the proceeding fur their prosecution and the order of the Sub-divisional Magistrate in Lauriya P. S. Case No.8 dated 20.1.66 and to command them not to proceed with that case. The Government of India in the Department of Food and Agriculture is opposite party no.1 and the State of Bihar is opposite party no. 2. 5. The facts of Cr. W. J. C. 31 of 1966 are, more or less, similar to those of the other case. In this case, the three petitioners are respectively the Chairman of the Board of Directors, the Mill Manager and the Cane Manager of the Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. owning and possessing a sugar mill at Harinagar, Police Station Ramnagar in the district of Champaran. The petitioners' case is that the Company has to withhold the sale and stock of sugar and mohsses indefinitely till the permits are received from the prescribed authorities and such being the position the Company has been rendered helpless in the matter of payment including payment of cane price in time. The State Bank of India previously used to advance on a margin of 35 per cent, but from the beginning of the cane crushing season of 1965-66 it did not agree to continue cash credit account with the result that the economic structure of the Company virtually collapsed. The State Bank of India previously used to advance on a margin of 35 per cent, but from the beginning of the cane crushing season of 1965-66 it did not agree to continue cash credit account with the result that the economic structure of the Company virtually collapsed. With difficulties, the Company started crushing sugarcane in that season, requesting the Central Government to give special release of sugar quotas to meet the emergency. For the reasons aforesaid, the payment of cane price to the suppliers was delayed. The Cane Inspector, Hamnagar Circle, opposite party no. 5, who is a public servant vested with the power to file a complaint before the Sub-divisional Magistrate (opposite party no. 3), sent his written report on February 8, 1966 to the Officer-in-charge, Hamnagar Police Station, opposite party no. 4. The fourth opposite party has drawn up first information report on the basis of the said report and has started investigation and taken steps for issuing processes of arrest against the petitioners. An order has been passed by the 3rd opposite party on 12.2.66 on receipt of a copy of the first information report" similar to the one passed by him on 22.1.66 in the other case, directing to put up the matter on receipt of the final report. The petitioners obtained the rule from this Court on 16.2.66 and an ad interim order restraining opposite parties 3 and 4 c from proceeding further with G. R. Case No. 148 of 1965 and Ramnagar P. S. Case No. 2 of 8.2.66 was passed. In this application, State of Bihar is opposite party no. 1 and the Union of India is opposite party no. 2. 6. The charge made out by opposite party no. 5 against the petitioners in his written report to opposite party no. 4 is non-payment of the price of sugarcane to the suppliers by the producer, namely, the petitioners within 14 days of the actual delivery in respect of the supplies made from the 15th of November 1965 during the season 1965-66. A supplementary affidavit has, been filed on behalf of the petitioners on the 6th of May, 1966 showing that a copy of the written report was forwarded by opposite party no. 5 to opposite party no 3 on February 6, 1966. A supplementary affidavit has, been filed on behalf of the petitioners on the 6th of May, 1966 showing that a copy of the written report was forwarded by opposite party no. 5 to opposite party no 3 on February 6, 1966. On receipt of this report, the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Bettiah, has made the following order on 21.2.66 : - "Seen the Official complaint filed by the Cane Inspector, Hamnagar Circle, Bettiah. Cognizance taken under Sub-clause (3) of Clause (3) of the Sugarcane (Control) Order 1955 as per amendment of 1957 and 1961, framed under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, read with Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act 1955 and the case transferred to the file of Shri V. Lakra, Judicial Magistrate, 1st class, for favour of disposal." 7. No counter-affidavit has been put in either of the two cases on behalf of the State of Bihar or its officers, counter-affidavits on identical lines have been filed, however, on behalf of the Government of India or the Union of India as the case may be. It is not necessary to reproduce any of the statements made in• the counter-affidavit as, more or less, they are in the nature of submissions on the question of law involved in these cases. 8. It must be mentioned at the outset that at this stage of the prosecution of the petitioners, this Court cannot and will not go into and concern itself with the disputed questions of fact, such as whether the payment of the price of sugarcane has been made in time or not, whether petitioner no. 1 in Cr. W. J. C. 11 of 1966 is an occupier of S. K. G. Sugar Ltd. or not and the like. No argument has been advanced to press those questions before us nor is this Court called upon to examine at this stage as to whether there was any justification or lawful excuse for delayed payment or non-payment. The common points urged in both the cases in the argument of Mr. S. N. Datta Counsel for the petitioners in Cr. W, J. C. 11/66, and adopted by Mr. Basudeo Prasad, Counsel for petitioners in Cr. W. J. C. 31/66, are the following :- 1. The common points urged in both the cases in the argument of Mr. S. N. Datta Counsel for the petitioners in Cr. W, J. C. 11/66, and adopted by Mr. Basudeo Prasad, Counsel for petitioners in Cr. W. J. C. 31/66, are the following :- 1. That Sub-clause (3) of Clause 3 of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955 is ultra vires of the Central Government as it is not authorised under Section 3 of Act 10 of 1955 to make any order in relation to sugarcane or, in any event. to provide and fix the time limit of 14 days from the date of delivery for payment of the price. 2. That if it be held that Section 3 of the Act authorises the making of an order in relation to sugarcane, the Act itself is void and ultra vires the Parliament to the extent it so authorises being beyond its legislative competence. 3. That Sub-clause (3) of Clause 3 of the order imposes an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the petitioners guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (f) and (g) of the constitution and is, therefore, void. 4. That fixing the time-limit for payment of sugarcane price by the Control Order is a discriminatory law and is violative of the fundamental right of equal protection' guaranteed under Artic1e 14 of the Constitution. 5. That action taken against the petitioners either by the Officer-in-charge of the Police Station or the Sub-divisional Magistrate is without jurisdiction, illegal and invalid being in contravention of the Bihar Sugar Factories Control Act, 1937 (Bihar Act 7 of 1937) and the Bihar Sugar Factories Control Rules, 1938 framed by the Governor of Bihar under the said Act. Mr. Basudeo Prasad urged two more points in Cr. W. J. C. 31/66- (i) That in view of the provisions of Section 11 of Act 10 of 1955 the police has no power of investigation in cases of the alleged commission of offences under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955; and (ii) That on the special facts of this case, when cognizance has been taken by the Sub-divisional Magistrate on 21.2.66, the investigation by the police, in any event, is no longer necessary and must be stopped as proceeding with it will be mala fide exercise and abuse of the power of investigation. The first point urged in this case has also been adopted and reiterated by, and on behalf of, the petitioners in Cr. W. J. C. 11/66. 10. Mr. Lal Narayan Sinha, Advocate General of Bihar, has appeared for the Union of India in these cases and has mainly combated and replied to the five common points aforesaid urged on behalf of the petitioners. Mr S. Sarwar Ali, Additional Government Pleader of Bihar, who, as he informed us, has appeared for the State of Bihar, opposite party no. 1, and its officers -the other opposite parties in the cases-has not joined issue on the questions of law urged on behalf of the Union of India, but he has combated and replied to the two points urged by Mr. Basudeo Prasad. 11. In order to appreciate and decide the various points involved in these cases, I shall do better to briefly refer with advantage to the history of the law on the question as mentioned in the decision of the Supreme Court in (I) Ch. Tika Ramji, V. The State of Uttar Pradesh (A. I. R. 1956 Supreme Court 676). On April 8, 1932, the Central Legislature passed the Sugar Industry (Protection) Act, 1932 (Act 13 of 1932) to Provide for the fostering and development of sugar Industry in India in pursuace of the policy of discriminating protection of industries. As a result of the protection granted to the sugar industry, the number of sugar factories in the then United Provinces of Agra and Oudh (now the State of Uttar Pradesh, hereinafter, for the sake of brevity, called U. P.) and in the province (now the State) of Bihar registered a rapid rise. There was a large expansion in the cultivation of sugarcane and millions of cultivations in U. P. and Bihar took to growing sugarcane. In order to protect their interest and for the purposes of assuring to them a fair price for their produce, the Central Legislature enacted on may 1, 1934 the Sugarcane Act, 1934 (Act 15 of 1934) to regulate the price at which sugarcane intended to be used in the manufacture of sugar might be purchased by or for factories. In order to protect their interest and for the purposes of assuring to them a fair price for their produce, the Central Legislature enacted on may 1, 1934 the Sugarcane Act, 1934 (Act 15 of 1934) to regulate the price at which sugarcane intended to be used in the manufacture of sugar might be purchased by or for factories. Sugarcane was grown in various provinces and the declaration of controlled areas and the fixing of minimum price for the purchase of sugarcane intended for use in any factory in any controlled area was of necessity left to the Provincial Governments and they were also empowered to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the objects of the Act including, in particular, the organisation of growers of sugarcane into Co-operative Societies for the sale of sugarcane to Factories. 12. "Under the Government of India Act, 1935, there was a distribution of legislative powers between the Dominion Legislature and the Provincial Legislatures and agriculture (Entry No. 22), trade and commerce within the Province (Entry No. 27), and production, supply and distribution of goods, development of industries subject to the provision in list 1 with respect to' development of certain industries under Dominion Control (Entry No. 29) were included in List 2, the Provincial Legislative List. Entry No. 34 of List 1 was in regard to Development of industries where development under Dominion control is declared to be in the public interest", As a result of the distribution of the legislative powers under the Government of India Act, 1935, the entire subject matter of Act 15 of 1934 fell within the Provincial Legislative List. It was felt that Act 15 of 1934 was not sufficiently comprehensive for dealing with the problems of the sugar industry and it was found necessary to replace it by a new measure which would provide for the better organisation of cane supplies to sugar factories. 13. The Government of U. P. and Bihar, therefore, decided in consultation with each other to introduce legislation on similar lines for both the provinces. 13. The Government of U. P. and Bihar, therefore, decided in consultation with each other to introduce legislation on similar lines for both the provinces. The U. P. Legislature enacted on 10.2.38 the U. P. Sugar Factories Control Act, 1938 (U. P. Act 1 of 1938) to provide for the licensing of the sugar factories and for regulating the supply of sugarcane intended for use in such factories and the price at which it may be purchased and for other incidental matters. The Bihar Sugar Factories Control Act, 1937 (Bihar Act 7 of 1937) was enacted on the similar lines and for the same purpose. It provided for-(a) the licensing of sugar factories, (b) the regulation of the supply of sugarcane to factories, (c) the minimum price of sugarcane, (d) the establishment of Sugar Control Board and the Advisory Committees and (e) imposition of cess and tax on cane intended for use in factories. 14. The Bihar Sugar Factories Control rules, 1938, were framed under Bihar Act 7 of 1937 to carry out the provisions of the Act. Rule 41 of the said Rules deals with the matters of payment and, inter alia, provided "Payment for cane shall be made within a fortnight of the date of weighment." Under rule 43. "Any person who- X X X (g) fails to comply with or contravenes any of the provisions of rules 40 or 41- Shall be liable, on conviction, to a fine which may extend to fine of hundred rupees......" Section 28 (1) of Act 7 of 1937 says- "No prosecution under this Act shall be instituted except upon complaint made by or under authority of a Cane Com. missioner." 15. On the commencement of the Second World War, an emergency was declared by the Governor-General under Section 102, Government of India Act, 1935. The Dominion Legislature acquired power to make laws for the Provinces with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the Provincial Legislative List. The result was in effect to make the Provincial Legislative List also a concurrent Legislative List for the operation of the Dominion Legislature but if any provision of a Provincial Law was repugnant to any provision of the Dominion Law made in exercise of that power, the Dominion law was to prevail and the Provincial law was to be void to the extent of the repugnancy. The proclamation of emergency was revoked on 1.4. 1946 and the laws made by the Dominion Legislature in the field of Provincial Legislative List were to cease to have effect after 30. 9. 1946. 16. Acting under the power reserved to the Central Legislature under Section 2 (1) (a) of the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946 (9 & 19 6, Chapter 39) enacted by the British Parliament, the Central Legislature enacted on November 11, 1946, the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 (Act 24 of 1946) to provide for the continuance during the limited period of powers to control production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, certain commodities. The said Act remained operative until March 31, 1947 only. It is not necessary to recapitulate the entire history subsequent to that period; suffice it to say that the life of Act 24 of 1946 was extended upto 31, 3. 50. 17. With the advent of the Constitution of India on January 26, 1950, Parliament was invested under Article 369 of the Constitution with power for' a period of 5 years from the commencement of the Constitution to make laws with respect to the following matters as if they were enumerated in the concurrent list: "(a) trade and commerce within a State in, and the production, supply and distribution of... ..."foodstuffs (including edible oil seeds and oil... ...)" By virtue of this power, the life of Act 24 of 1946 was extended from time to time upto January 26, 1955. This Act defined an "essential commodity" to mean any of the following classes of commodities; "(1) Food-stuffs... ..." In Clause (b) of Section 2, it was said-"food, crop shall include crops of sugarcane" and in Clause (c) it was provided- . "Foodstuffs shall include edible oilseeds and oils." On October 7, 1950, the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred upon it by section 3 of Act 24 of 1946 promulgated the Sugarcane, Gur Control Order, 1950, inter alia, empowering it to prohibit or to restrict the export of sugarcane from any area, to direct that no gur or sugar shall be manufactured from sugarcane except under and in accordance with the conditions specified in the license issued in this behalf and to prohibit or to restrict the despatch of gur or sugar from any State or any area therein. Power was also given to fix minimum price of sugarcane and no person was to sell or agree to sell sugarcane to a producer and no producer was to purchase or agree to purchase sugarcane at a price lower than that notified thereunder. This power of fixing the price of sugarcane was exercised by the Central Government from time to time by issuing notifications fixing the minimum prices to be paid by the producers of sugar by vacum pan process or their agents for sugarcane purchased by them during the 1950-51 crushing season in various States. 18. On October 31, 1951, Parliament enacted the Industries (Development and regulation) Act, 1951 (Act 65 of 1951) to provide for the development and regulation of certain industries. By Section 2 of the Act it was declared that it was expedient in the public interest that the Union should take under its control the industries specified in the 1st schedule which includes sugar. It is undisputed that sugar industry is one, the control of which by the Union has been declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest within the meaning of entry 52 if List 1 of 7th Schedule appended to our Constitution. Act 65 of 1951 was brought into force with effect from May 8, 1952. 19. In view of the coming into force of Central Act 65 of 1951 and also in pursuance of the recommendation of the Swaminath Committee, the U. P. Sugar Factories Control Act, 1938 (U. P. Act I of 1938) became inoperative. The U. P. Legislature therefore, passed on June 29, 1952 the U. P. Sugar Factories Control (Amendment) Act, 1952, deleting those provisions as were apparently in conflict with Act 65 of 1951 and putting the amended Act permanently on the Statute Book. It remained in force for sometime and finally the U. P. Sugarcane (regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 (U. P. Act 24 of 1953) was enacted. It would be of use to state the object of the said Act as quoted at page 687 of the decision of the Supreme Court in Tika Hamji's case- "With the promulgation of the Industries (Development and regulation) Act, 1951, with effect from 8.5.1952, the regulation of the sugar industry has become exclusively a Central Subject. The State Governments are now only concerned with the supply of sugarcane to the sugar factories. The State Governments are now only concerned with the supply of sugarcane to the sugar factories. The Bill is being introduced in order to provide for a rational distribution of sugarcane to factories, for its development on organised scientific lines, to protect the interests of the cane growers and of the industry and to put the new Act permanently on the Statute Book (vide State of objects and reasons published in the U. P. Gazette Extraordinary dated 15.7. 1953)." 20. The State of Bihar, however, seems to have taken no notice of the coming into force of Central Act 65 of 1951. And, in spite of the fact that several of the provisions, if not all, of Bihar Act 7 of 1937 were in conflict with the Central Act 65 of 1951 in relation to the controlled industry of sugar, the Act, as it was, was almost left intact. Eventually, Bihar Act 7 of 1937 was to remain in force until 30th of June, 1955. The provisions in Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the parent Act limiting its life until 30th June 1955 was simply deleted by Bihar Act 7 of 1955 without making any, other amendment in the Act. Nor was a separate Act enacted on the lines of the U. P. Sugarcane (regulation of Supplies and Purchase) Act, 1953. Thus, the rules framed in 1938 under the said Act were also kept intact and in force. 21. Act 65 of 1951 was amended by Act 26 of 1953 and by adding Chapter III B, it invested the Central Government, inter alia, with power so far as it appeared to it necessary or expedient for securing the equitable distribution and availability at fair prices of any article or class of articles, relatable to any Scheduled industry to provide by notified order for regulation of supply or distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein. 22. On April 1, 1955, Parliament enacted the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (Act 10 of 1955) to provide in the interests of the general public for the Central. production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, certain commodities. 22. On April 1, 1955, Parliament enacted the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (Act 10 of 1955) to provide in the interests of the general public for the Central. production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, certain commodities. In Section 2 (a) of the said Act ('essential commodity" was defined to mean any of the following classes of commodities :- "(v) food-stuffs, including edible oilseeds and oils." Clause (b) of the definition Section 2 says :- "Food crops ,include crops of sugarcane." Section 3 empowered the Central Government, if it was of opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do for maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential commodity at fair prices, to provide, by order, for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein. According to Subsection (2) without prejudice to the generality of the power conferred by Subsection (I), an order made thereunder may provide, inter alia"(b) for bringing under cultivation any waste or arable land, whether appurtenant to a building or not, for the growing thereon of food-crops generally or of specified food-crops, and for otherwise maintaining or increasing the cultivation of food-crops generally, or of specified food-crops and for otherwise maintaining or increasing the cultivation of food-crops generally, or of specified food-crops." Section 6 of the said Act states- "Any order made under Section 3 shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other than this Act or any instrument having effect by virtue of the enactment other than this Act." 23. The Essential Commodities Ordinance, 1955 had preceded the Act and it was repealed by Clause (a) or Sub-section (1) of the 16th Section of the Act, Clause (b) of which provided the repeal of- "any other law in force in any state immediately before the commencement of this Act in so far as such law controls or authorizes the Central of the production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, any essential commodity." 24. In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3 of the Act, the Central Government promulgated on August 27, 1955, the Sugar Control Order, 1955 and the Sugarcane Control Order 1955. The latter was amended from time to time in 1958, 1960, 1961 and 1964. In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3 of the Act, the Central Government promulgated on August 27, 1955, the Sugar Control Order, 1955 and the Sugarcane Control Order 1955. The latter was amended from time to time in 1958, 1960, 1961 and 1964. The provision for the payment of price within 14 days from the date of delivery of sugarcane was introduced in 1961 in Sub-clause (3) of Clause (3) of the Order and the provision for reservation of area, etc. was introduced in Clause 4 by notification no. G. S. R 243 dated 14th February 1964. 25. U. P. Act 24 of 1953 was attacked by the petitioners in Tika Hamji's case before the Supreme Court with reference to the provisions of that Act and those of Central Act 10 of 1955 and Sugarcane Control Order, 1955 as existing then on the ground that (i) The State of U. P. had no power to enact the impugned Act, as it was with reference to the subject of industries, the control of which by the Union was declared by Parliament by Jaw to be expedient in the public interest within the meaning of Entry 52 of List 1 and was, therefore, within the exclusive province of Parliament. (ii) The said U. P. Act was repugnant to Act 65 of 1957 and Act J 0 of 1955. (iii) The said Act stood repealed to the extent that it had been repealed by Section 16 of Act 10 of 1955 and by Clause 7 of the Sugarc8ne Control Order, 1955 which Clause had provided, inter alia, that any order made by a State Government or other authority regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution of sugarcane and trade and commerce therein were thereby repealed. (iv) The impugned Act infringed the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 14 inasmuch as wide powers were given to the Cane Commissioner which could be used in a discriminatory manner. (iv) The impugned Act infringed the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 14 inasmuch as wide powers were given to the Cane Commissioner which could be used in a discriminatory manner. (v) It violated the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (c) (f) and (g) and Article 31 of the Constitution, The Supreme Court held that (i) Act 10 of 1955 was enacted by Parliament in exercise of the power conferred upon it by Entry 33 of List 3, the Concurrent List, and that all the Acts and the notifications issued thereunder by Centre in regard to sugar and sugarcane were enacted in exercise of the concurrent jurisdiction. (ii) The legislation which was enacted by the Centre with regard to sugar and sugarcane could not be said to have fallen within Entry 52 of List 1. Before sugar industry became a controlled industry, both sugar and sugarcane fell within Entry 27 of List 2, but after declaration was made by Parliament in 1951 by Act 65 of 1951 sugar industry became a controlled industry and the product of that industry, viz. sugar was comprised in Entry 33 of List 3 taking it out of Entry 27 of List 2. Even so, the Centre as well as the State Legislatures had concurrent jurisdiction in regard to the same. (iii) U. P. Act 1 of 1938 covered both sugar and sugarcane within its compass while U. P. Act 24 of 1953 was confined only to sugarcane leaving sugar to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Centre and, therefore, the latter Act confining itself to the regulation of the supply and purchase of sugarcane required for use in sugar factories and not concerning itself at all with the controlling or licensing of the sugar factories with the productions or manufacture of sugar or with the trade and commerce in, and the production, supply and distribution of, sugar) did not encroach upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the Centre in regard to the sugar industry under Entry 52 of List 1. The U. P. Legislature had jurisdiction to enact the law with regard to sugar cane and had legislative competence to enact it. The U. P. Legislature had jurisdiction to enact the law with regard to sugar cane and had legislative competence to enact it. (It seems the competence of the U. P. Legislature was upheld with reference to its power under Entry 33 of List 3, the Concurrent List.) (iv) There was no repugnancy at all between the impugned U. P. Act and the Rules made thereunder and the provisions contained in Act 65 of 1951 as amended by Act 26 of 1953 or Act 10 of 1955 and the Sugar Control Order issued thereunder. (v) Ordinarily Parliament would not have the power to repeal a law passed by the State Legislature even though it be a law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List and under the proviso to article254 (2) the Parliament will have power to add to, amend, vary or repeal a law made by the State Legislature with reference to a matter in the Concurrent List containing provisions repugnant to an earlier law made by the Parliament and with the consent of the President in accordance with Clause (2) of Article 254. It. is only such a law that could be altered, amended or repealed under the proviso. The impugned Act of 1953 was not a law relating to any matter which was the subject of an earlier legislation by Parliament. In this view of the matter, it was held that Section 16(1) (b) of Act 10 of 1955 and Clause 7 (1) of Sugarcane Control Order, 1955 could not repeal the impugned U. P. Act, 1953. It was also pointed out that the power of repeal, if any, was vested in Parliament and Parliament alone could exercise the power by incorporating appropriate provision in regard thereto. It could not delegate this power in any executive authority. The U. P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954 could not, therefore, be validly repealed by the Central Government as was purported to be done by Clause 7 of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955. (v) The impugned U. P. Act did not infringe the fundamental right under Article 14 or 19 (1) (c), (f) and (g). 26. The U. P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954 could not, therefore, be validly repealed by the Central Government as was purported to be done by Clause 7 of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955. (v) The impugned U. P. Act did not infringe the fundamental right under Article 14 or 19 (1) (c), (f) and (g). 26. Now taking up the discussion of the points urged on behalf of the petitioners in the order they have been mentioned above, it is to be noted at the outset that in Tika Ramji's case it has been held by the Supreme Court that the word 'foodstuffs' in Clause (b) of Entry 33 of List 3 includes within its ambit not only sugar but• also sugarcane and "Act 10 of 1955 included within the definition of essential commodity foodstuffs which.........would inc1ude sugar as well as sugarcane." 27. In (2) State of Bombay V. Virkumar Gulabchand Shah (A.I.R. 1952 Supreme Court 335), it was held that turmeric is a 'foodstuff' within the meaning of Clause 3 of the Spices (Forward Contracts Prohibition) Order, 1944 read with Section 2 (a) of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946. It was also held that the term 'foodstuffs' is wide enough to cover matter which would Got normally fall within the definition of what is called food proper and turmeric is as much a 'foodstuff' in its wider meaning as sausage skins and baking power and tea. 28. The term 'food-crops', it was argued by Mr. Datta, has been separately defined in Clause (b) of Section 2 of Act 10 of 1955 and hence the term which according to the special definition, includes crops of sugarcane, must be excluded from the general term 'foodstuffs' defined in Sub-clause (v) of Clause (a) of Section 2. It is, no doubt, true that under the rules of Interpretation of Statutes different words, terms or expressions used in the same Statute must be given different meanings. But this is not an inflexib1e rule. Their content and meaning must depend on the context and the set up they have been used in. The terms 'foodstuffs' has not been given a definition in the Act. Merely edible oilseeds and oil have been included in it; so is the case with the term 'food-crops' in which only crops of sugarcane have been included. Their content and meaning must depend on the context and the set up they have been used in. The terms 'foodstuffs' has not been given a definition in the Act. Merely edible oilseeds and oil have been included in it; so is the case with the term 'food-crops' in which only crops of sugarcane have been included. One has to fall back upon the dictionary and common meanings of the terms 'food-crops' and 'food-stuffs' for ascertaining their content, Viewed in this light and specially in the background of the legislative power contained in Entry No. 33 of List 3 where only the term 'food-stuffs' has been used, it must be held that food-crops are included in the term 'food-stuffs', and so is sugarcane. The object of mentioning the term 'food-crops' in Clause (b) of the definition Section seems to be to lay stress and make the meaning clear of the provision contained in Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 3. In (3) Emperor V. Sibnath Banrrji (A.I.R. 1945 Privy Council 156), their Lordships of the Privy Council have pointed out with reference to the rulemaking power of the Central Government contained in Section 2 of the Defence of India Act, 1939 that- "the function of Sub-section (2) is merely an illustrative one; the rulemaking power if conferred by Sub-section (1) and the rules' which are referred to in the opening sentence of Sub-section (2) are the rules which are authorised by, and made under, Sub-section (1); the provisions of Sub-section (2) are not restrictive of Sub-section (1), as indeed is expressedly stated by the words 'without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by Sub-section (1)." This view of the Privy Council is beyond any debate or dispute now. It has been followed in several decisions by the Supreme Court, to wit, Santosh Kumar Jain v. The State (A. I. R 1951 Supreme Court 201). 29. It is to be noticed that the illustrative powers conferred by Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 must relate to the main object mentioned in Sub-section (1) for maintaining or increasing supply of any essential commodity or for securing its equitable distribution or availability at fair price. The thing in respect of which the power has to be exercised by making provision in an Order must be an essential commodity. The thing in respect of which the power has to be exercised by making provision in an Order must be an essential commodity. That being so, it also follows that the term 'food-crops' mentioned in clause (b) of Sub-section (2) is and must necessarily be an essential commodity, namely, foodstuffs. It is only for the purposes of clarification and emphasis that the terms 'foodstuffs' has been used in Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 3 and has been separately mentioned in Clause (b) of the definition Section. 30. Viewed in the light of the opinion expressed above that the Central Government is empowered under Section 3 of Act 10 of 1955 to make an order in relation to sugarcane, it is manifest that it is empowered to provide in such Order the time limit within which a producer of sugar purchasing sugarcane has to make payment of its price to the supplier. Such a provision, undoubtedly, is one which has got reasonable and probative relationship with the object of maintaining or increasing supplies of sugarcane which, in its turn, will maintain or increase the supply of sugar, its production, supply and distribution at fair prices. It is also covered by the latter part of Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) as the Order may provide for otherwise maintaining or increasing the cultivation of sugarcane by asking the producers of sugar to make prompt payments to the cane-growers for the cane supplied to them. Under the ordinary law of Sales of Goods Act delivery of goods and payment of price thereof are concurrent conditions unless there is an agreement to the contrary. Sub-clause 3 of Clause 3 of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955 provides "Where a producer of sugar purchases any sugarcane from a grower of sugarcane or from a Sugarcane Growers Co-operative Society, the producer shall, unless there is an agreement in writing to the contrary between the parties, pay within fourteen clays from the date of delivery of the cane sold at the rate fixed under Sub-clause (1) either at the gate of the factory or at the cane collection centre of transfer or deposit, the necessary amount in the Bank Account of the Seller or the Co-operative Society as the case may be. Where sugarcane is purchased through an agent, the producer or the agent shall pay or tender payment of such price within the period and in the manner aforesaid and if neither to them has so paid or tendered payment each of them shall be deemed to have contravened the provisions of this Clause. At the time of payment at the gate of the factory or at cane collection centre receipt, if any, given by the purchaser, shall be surrendered by the cane grower or Co-operative Society. Where payment has been made by transfer or deposit of the amount to the Bank Account of the seller or the Co-operative Society, as the case may be, the receipt given by the purchaser, if any, to the grower or the Co-operative Society, not returned to the purchaser, shall become invalid." In my judgment, therefore, there is no substance in the first point urged on behalf of the petitioners. 31. The simple answer to the second point urged on behalf of the petitioners is to be found in the decision of the Supreme Court in Tika Hamji's case wherein it has been held, as already stated, that the law relating to sugarcane is within the ambit of the power of the Central Parliament under Entry 33 of List III. And, Act 10 of 1955 has been enacted in exercise of this power. Mr. Datta, however, contended that making of the law in relation to sugarcane is, in substance, a law relating to agriculture which is covered under Entry 14, List II of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution. The Central Parliament, therefore, has no power to enact such a law. He, particularly, referred to some cases relating to taxation law on this point in support of his argument aforesaid, to wit (4) "In the matter of the Bikanpur Sugar Concern" (1 I. T. C. 29) (5) Raja Visheshwar V. Province of Bihar (2 S. T. C. 129), (6) R. B. N. S. Borawaka V. The State of Bombay (11 S. T. C. 8), (7) Muhammed V. Sales Tax Officer, Kozhikode (13 S. T. C. 54) and (8) Commissioner of Inland Revenue V. Williamson Brothers (31 T. C. 370). Learned Counsel further submitted that Entry 24 in List II in regard to 'industries' is subject to the provisions of Entries 7 and 52 of List I and so are Entries 26 and 27 in express terms subject to the provisions of Entry 23 of List III. But Entry 14 is not subject to Entry 33 and must take precedence over it. In my opinion, the argument is not sound and must be rejected. The cases on taxation law are not relevant and of any aid in determining the point at issue. It may well be rather it would be quite correct to say that sugarcane is a product of agriculture and, therefore, income derived by an agriculturist by sale of sugarcane will not be an income of a dealer or a trader within the meaning of sales tax law or the income-tax law but would be an agricultural income within the scope of taxation under the agricultural income-tax law. That's not the question here. The dominant object of the law or the pith and substance of it contained in Act 10 of 1955 is not one in relation to agriculture. The phrase "trade and commerce in, and the production, supply and distribution of," in Entry 33 is not to be conjunctively read, as was argued on behalf of the petitioners. The word 'and' between the expressions "trade and commerce in" and "the production, supply and distribution of" is, to my mind, disjunctive It is not necessary that the element of trade and commerce also must be present, in the law to be enacted in relation to the production, supply and distribution of any of the articles mentioned in Clauses (a) to (e) of Entry 33. This would be clear from the bifurcated and separate expressions used in Entries 26 and 27 of List II, the former being "trade and commerce" and the latter being "production, supply and distribution of goods". It follows, therefore, that it is within the competence of the Central Parliament in exercise of its concurrent power to make law in relation to production, supply and distribution of foodstuffs, cattle fodder, raw cotton and raw jute under Clauses (b) to (e) of Entry 33, List Ill. It is obvious that all these products are agricultural products. It follows, therefore, that it is within the competence of the Central Parliament in exercise of its concurrent power to make law in relation to production, supply and distribution of foodstuffs, cattle fodder, raw cotton and raw jute under Clauses (b) to (e) of Entry 33, List Ill. It is obvious that all these products are agricultural products. But if the law, in pith and substance, is one either in relation to trade and commerce in those products or in relation to production, supply and distribution thereof, it would be manifestly in the exercise of the power of Entry 33 whether it be by Central Parliament as observed by the Supreme Court in Tika Eamji's case or must be in exercise of the similar power even though it may be by the State, for, in express terms, exercise of powers under Entries 26 and 27 of List II is subject to the provisions of Entry 33 of List 3. Even assuming that the law made. in respect of the production, supply and distribution of the agricultural productions mentioned in Clauses (b) to (e) of Entry 33 trenches upon the field of agriculture in Entry 14 of List 2 under Clause (3) of Article 246 of the Constitution, the power of the State Legislature must be held to have been cut down to that extent as the said power is subject to Clause (1) and (2) of the said Article. The principle of law in relation to three lists of the Government of India Act 1935 laid down by the Federal Court of India in (9) Subramnayan Chettiar V. Muttuswami Goundan (A.I.R. 1941 F. C 47; 1940 F.C. R. 188) has been approved by the Privy Council in Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee V. Bank of Commerce Ltd. Khulra (A.I.R. 1947 Privy Council 60). Finally it has been said by Lord Porter delivering the judgment of the Board that- “This view places the precedence accorded to the three lists in its proper perspective. No. doubt where they come in conflict List I has priority over Lists III and II and List III has priority over List II..........,' An incidental encroachment upon the domain of the other list is not the true list. 32. No. doubt where they come in conflict List I has priority over Lists III and II and List III has priority over List II..........,' An incidental encroachment upon the domain of the other list is not the true list. 32. In my opinion, therefore, the argument put forward on behalf of the petitioners that Section 3 of Act 10 of 1955 should be so construed as not including sugarcane within its ambit of the order-making power so that the Act should not be void and ultra vires the Parliament being beyond its legislative competence, cannot be accepted as correct. 33. The answer to the third and the fourth points urged' on behalf of the petitioners is again to be found in the decision of the Supreme Court in Tika Ramji's case. Even apart from it, I find no substance in the argument as in the first place making law in relation to sugarcane for the normal and full working of the sugar factories so that sugar may be available to the general public at fair price, is not a discriminatory piece of legislation. There is a reasonable basis for its classification. Sugarcane like other food-crops cannot be sold in open market. By necessity, almost the entire product has got to be sold to the sugar mills. And that is why it is quite reasonable to pick up this - product out of so many food crops and make special law in regard to it. It can never be a fundamental right of a mill-owner to make payment of price of the sugarcane supplied to him whenever he pleases. Even assuming that he has a fundamental right to do so, on a parity of reasoning it must be said that it is the fundamental right of the cane growers and cane suppliers also to receive payment of the price promptly. In such a situation, they cannot be left to the whims and caprices of the mill-owners. Sub-clause (3) of Clause 3 of Sugar Control Order, 1955 makes provision for the payment of the price within 14 days subject to any agreement to the contrary. Under the general law, as observed above, the delivery of cane and payment of price are concurrent conditions. It must be so from the point of commercial exigency. Sub-clause (3) of Clause 3 of Sugar Control Order, 1955 makes provision for the payment of the price within 14 days subject to any agreement to the contrary. Under the general law, as observed above, the delivery of cane and payment of price are concurrent conditions. It must be so from the point of commercial exigency. Viewed in this background, it could not be seriously suggested on behalf of the petitioners that the provisions, as it is, puts any unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the mill-owners under Article 19 (1) (f) and (g). 34. It was, however, argued on behalf of the petitioners that the restriction is unresonable in two regards. Firstly, non-payment of the price of the cane delivered will be a civil breach entitling the aggrieved party to seek his remedy in a Civil Court. To make this breach a criminal offence punishable under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act providing for maximum punishment of three years' rigorous imprisonment is wholly unreasonable and unrelated to the object of the restriction. Secondly, the product of the industry, namely sugar is controlled. The mill-owner cannot sell the product either the sugar or the bye-product, molasses-without permits. Huge stocks are found accumulated blocking up the capital of the millowner. Over and above that, the bank facilities have been withdrawn. In such a situation, to ask the mill owner to make prompt payment of the price of the sugarcane supplied under the pain of penalty is wholly unjustified and atrocious. I have no difficulty in rejecting this argument. The object of the law is to maintain or increase supply of sugarcane and consequently of sugar by maintaining or increasing the cultivation of the former. This object cannot be achieved if the cane-growers or suppliers are left to seek their remedy in a Civil Court for nonpayment of the price of the cane supplied in time. They will feel disgusted and harassed and give up growing of the sugarcane crop resulting in its reduced supply and consequent, reduced production of sugar. It is, therefore, quite reasonable to impose the restriction and to say to the mill-owner that if he does not pay the price of the sugarcane supplied by the cane-growers within the time specified, he will be prosecuted and convicted under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act. It is, therefore, quite reasonable to impose the restriction and to say to the mill-owner that if he does not pay the price of the sugarcane supplied by the cane-growers within the time specified, he will be prosecuted and convicted under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act. The fear of criminal prosecution and conviction will make him make the prompt payment of the price which, in its turn, would enable the canegrowers to take to regular cultivation of sugarcane. Since in the very nature of this product, there is an element of compulsion in regard to the person to whom it is to be sold and supplied, compulsion in the matter of payment of price under the pain of penalty has got to be brought about by legislation. The factors as to the financial capacity of the mill-owner are not germane to the issue. Non-availability of bank credit or blocking up of the capital in the accumulated stock of the products of the industry cannot justify, in principle or equity, non-payment of the price of the sugarcane to the cane growers or the suppliers. The third and the fourth points, therefore, also fail and must be rejected. 35. The fifth point urged on behalf of the petitioners presented some difficulty. As it is, two laws apparently are in co-operation-one made by the State and the other by the Union. As for example, rules for the reservation of areas of sugarcane, its supply and payment of price are to be found in the Bihar Sugar Factories Control Rules, 1938 framed under Bihar Act 7 of 1937 and similar provisions are contained in the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955 made by the Central Government in exercise of its power under Section 3 of Act 10 of 1955. It is manifest that both the laws cannot prevail. The question is which would prevail or which of the two is a valid law. This question has got to be answered in these cases for the simple reason that the maximum punishment provided under Rule 43 of the Bihar Rules for non-payment of price in infraction of rule 41 is a fine of Rs. 500/only and under Section 28 of Bihar Act 7 of 1938 the prosecution has to be instituted upon complaint made by or under authority of the Cane Commissioner of Bihar. 500/only and under Section 28 of Bihar Act 7 of 1938 the prosecution has to be instituted upon complaint made by or under authority of the Cane Commissioner of Bihar. Under Sub-section 2 of Section 28 of the offence is compoundable also. It is obvious under the said law that the offence is non-cognizable, while according to Central law, the offence is cognizable under the Criminal Procedure Code in accordance with the second schedule appended thereto and is Dot compoundable either. The procedure for taking cognizance and the question as to whether the police has power of investigation are also to be determined on determination of the question as to which of the two laws is validly in force. 36. The learned Advocate-General of Bihar appearing for the Union of India put forward a strong argument which was not controverted rather acceded to-by the learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the State of Bihar, that the State law contained in the Bihar Sugar Factories Control Rules, 1938 and Bihar Act 7 of 1937 is void and invalid and must give way to the Central law contained in the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955 and Act 10 of 1955. He based his argument on two grounds (i) that Bihar Act 7 of 1937 is an 'existing law' as defined in Clause (10) of Article 366 of the Constitution and, therefore, must be deemed to have been repealed by Clause (b) of Section 16 of Act 10 of 1955, and (ii) that the said Bihar Act is a legislation primarily and mainly in regard to the control of sugar industry which is now a controlled industry within the exclusive power of legislation of the Central Parliament under Entry 52 of List I. Bihar Act 7 of 1955 extending the period of termination of Bihar Act 7 of 1937 from 30th of June, 1955 to an indefinite period is an encroachment in the field of Entry 52 of List I and, therefore, beyond the legislative competence of, and ultra vires, the State Legislature. 37. Mr. 37. Mr. S. N. Datta, in rep1y, submitted that as held by the Supreme Court in Tika Ramji's case the Bihar law contained in the Act and the Rules could be repealed neither by Section 16 of Act 10 of 1955 nor by the Central Sugarcane Control Order, 1955, and, on the doctrine of severability, Chapters IV onwards of Bihar Act 7 of 1937, which deal primarily with sugarcane and consequently the Rules in relation to it are still good law and not covered by Entry 52 of List I although Chapters I to III of the said Act relating to sugar industry have got to be held to be unenforceable and inoperative after the 30th of June, 1955 because Bihar Act 7 of 1955 could not extend the life of those Chapters beyond that period. 38. Bihar Act 7 of 1937, as originally enacted, was to remain in force until the 30th June, 1941. Its life was extended from time to time by Bihar Acts 9 of 1940, 4 of 1943, 12 of 1946 and finally by Bihar Act 6 of 1950. Before the passing of the last one, the Act was to remain in force until 30th June, 1950. Bihar Act 6 of 1950 received the assent of the Governor on the 6th of January, 1950 and the assent was first published in the Bihar Gazette Extraordinary of the 9th January, 1950. Under Section 5 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (Act 10 of 1897) where any?? Central Act is not expressed to come into operation on a particular day then it shall come into operation on the day on which it receives the assent of the Governor General or the President, as the case may be. Under Section 6 of the Bihar and Orissa General Clauses Act, 1917 where any Bihar Act is not expressed to come into effect on a particular day then it shall come into operation on the day on which the assent to the Act received from the Governor-General or the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is first published in the official gazette. Under Section 2 of Bihar Act 6 of 1950, which accordingly, came into force on the 9th January, 1950, Bihar Act 7 of 1937 was made to remain in force until 30th January 1955. Under Section 2 of Bihar Act 6 of 1950, which accordingly, came into force on the 9th January, 1950, Bihar Act 7 of 1937 was made to remain in force until 30th January 1955. The said Act and the rules framed thereunder were existing law within the meaning of Clause (10) of Article 366. After the coming into force of the Constitution under Article 372 such law in force was to 'continue in Bihar until altered, repealed or amended by competent legislature. The question is which legislature was competent to alter, repeal or amend this law after the enforcement of the Constitution. This question has to be answered with reference to the provisions contained in Articles 246. 39. Under Section 2 of Bihar Act 7 of 19 S 5, the words and shall remain in force until the 30th June; 1955 occurring in Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of Bihar Act 7 of 193, were omitted. That is to say the Act was to remain in force for an indefinite period and was not to be inoperative after the 30th of June, 1955. This amending Bihar Act 7 of 1955 had received the assent of the Governor on the 30th of March, 1955. But before it came into force by the first publication of the assent in Bihar Gazette of the 20th April, 1955 Central Act 10 of 1955 was enacted and came into force on the 1st April, 1955. Under Section 16 (1) (b) of this Act, it was expressly provided that "any other law in force in any State immediately before the commencement of this Act in so far as such law controls or authorizes the control of the production, supply and distribution of, and' trade and commerce in any essential commodity" was repealed. Assuming here that Bihar Act 7 of 1937 is severable and can be bifurcated into two parts, one dealing with the control of sugar industry, a topic falling under Entry 52 of List I, and the other dealing with sugarcane, a topic, as held by me above, falling under Entry 33 of List III, it follows that the Central Parliament was competent under Article 246 to repeal law in relation to sugarcane and thus the Bihar Act and the Rules in relation to sugarcane stood repealed and became unenforceable in accordance with the provisions of Articles 372 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court in Tika Hamji's case was not dealing with the repeal of an existing law under Section 16 of Act 10 of 1955. There the question was as to whether the U. P. Act of 1953, a post Constitution State Act, stood repealed by Section 16 aforesaid. The other part of Bihar Act relating to the control of Sugar Industry and the Rules in connection therewith undisputedly came to an end on 30th June, 1955 as the Bihar Legislature was not competent to extend their life beyond that time by passing Bihar Act 7 of 1955. 40. On the question as to whether Bihar Act 7 of 1937 is capable of being several in two parts, as argued on behalf of the petitioners, and whether the law is primarily and mainly in regard to the control of Sugar Industry and all the provisions of the Act are so interwoven and inextricably connected as not to make it possible to apply the doctrine of severability to it, as argued on behalf of the Union of India, I do not consider it necessary to enter into an elaborate discussion. Several decisions of the Privy Council and the Supreme Court and passages from Coolly's Constitutional Limitation, 8th Edition Volume 1, were cited in support of the respective views, it will be sufficient to refer to only one decision of the Supreme Court in (10) R M. D. Chamarbaugwalla V. ' Union of India (A. I. R 1957 S. C. 628) whereon a review of various authorities several rules of construction laid down by the American Courts for the determination of this question have been referred to and applied by Venatrama Ayyar, J. for deciding a similar question with reference to an amending Act the subject matter of considerations before the Supreme Court. For the application of those tests, a brief summary of the Bihar Act has to be given. 41. Chapter II makes provisions for the constitution of Advisory Committee, the Sugar Control Board and other authorities. Their functions are prescribed. They are in relation to both sugar and sugarcane. Chapter III deals with licensing of factories. Obviously, the whole of this Chapter relates to the control of the sugar industry. 41. Chapter II makes provisions for the constitution of Advisory Committee, the Sugar Control Board and other authorities. Their functions are prescribed. They are in relation to both sugar and sugarcane. Chapter III deals with licensing of factories. Obviously, the whole of this Chapter relates to the control of the sugar industry. Chapter IV concerns itself with the purchase of cane, viz., Section 14 provides for estimate of quantity of cane required by factory, Section 15 for declaration of reserved area, Section 16 for survey of reserved area, Section 17 for maintenance of register, Section 18 for purchase of cane in a reserved area Section 19 for declaration of assigned areas and purchases of cane therein and Section 20 for purchase of cane outside reserved area. It is interesting to note that Bihar Act 7 of 1937, as the preamble indicates, was, if I may use the expression a composite Act to provide for (i) the licensing of sugar factories and (ii) for regulating the supply of sugarcane for use in such factories and the price at which it may be purchased. The two portions of the U. P. Act of 1938 were severed and the U. P. Act of 1953 was corrected as the preamble indicates to regulate supply and purchase of sugarcane required for use in the sugar factories. In this U. P. Act provisions similar to the ones contained in Chapter IV and other Chapters of Bihar Act relating to sugarcane were made. I fail to see any unsurmountable difficulty in severing the Bihar Act, as it is in theory or in practice on the lines of the U. P. Act of 1953, which, in fact, was taken out by severing the Act of 1938. Similarly Chapter V of the Bihar Act deals with price to be paid for cane, Chapter VI makes provision for miscellaneous matters both in regard to sugar and sugarcane. Some of the Sections, namely, Section 23 dealing with licensing or purchasing agents, etc., Section 24 in regard to prohibiting, distribution of certain kinds of seed cane and the like, can remain intact. So can Section 28 in respect of proceedings and Section 30, the rule-making power of the State Government. Some of the Sections, namely, Section 23 dealing with licensing or purchasing agents, etc., Section 24 in regard to prohibiting, distribution of certain kinds of seed cane and the like, can remain intact. So can Section 28 in respect of proceedings and Section 30, the rule-making power of the State Government. On the point of severability applying the tests laid down by the Supreme Court in A. I. R. 1957 Supreme Court 628 (ibid) and the rules of construction as enumerated at pages 636 and 637, I am of the view that(i) the Bihar Legislature would ha ve enacted the valid part of the Bihar Act of 1937 had it known that the rest of the Statute was invalid, as was done by the U. P. Legislature, (ii) the valid and invalid provisions are not so inextricably mixed up that they can not be separated from one another, (iii) the valid provisions do not form part of a single scheme which was intended to be operative as a whole, they do form part of the two different schemes of controlling the sugar industry and the supply of sugarcane for feeding that industry, (iv) after omitting the invalid portion of the Act the remaining portion is not so thin and truncated as to be in substance different from what it was when it emerged out of the legislature, (v) The severability of the valid and invalid provisions is a matter of form but, in substance of the matter, it is feasible to separate the valid Chapters from the invalid ones and the valid Sections from the invalid ones, (vi) it is possible to enforce the remaining portion of the Statute even after the invalid portion is expunged without making alterations or modification therein, and (vii) on taking into account the history of legislation, its object, the title and the preamble to it, the legislative intent on the question of severability can be determined. 42. I need not enter into a discussion and give a precise decision on the question as to which part of the Bihar Act and the rules relating to sugarcane and the miscellaneous matters in connection therewith are seperable. 42. I need not enter into a discussion and give a precise decision on the question as to which part of the Bihar Act and the rules relating to sugarcane and the miscellaneous matters in connection therewith are seperable. On the view which I have expressed above, even the validly separate part of the Bihar Act relation to production, supply and distribution of sugarcane will fall under Entry 33 of List III, a matter within the concurrent legislative competence of both the Central Parliament and the State Legislature. The State Legislature was not competent to enact Bihar Act 7 of 1955 and to extend the life of even the severable part of the Bihar Act 7 of 1937 relating to sugarcane without taking recourse to the procedure prescribed in Clause 2 of Article 254 of the Constitution for on the same subject Act 10 of 1955 enacted by the Central Parliament had come into force on the 1st April, 1955 before coming into force of Bihar Act 7 of 1955 on the 20th of April, 1955. Section 6 of the Central Act, as already referred to provides" Any order made under Section 3 shall have effect notwithstanding any thing inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other than this Act or any instrument having effect by virtue of any enactment other than this Act." The expression any order mader under Section 3" of this Act must in the context, mean any order deemed to have been made under Section 3 or to be made under that Section, it is undisputed that the amending Bihar Act 7 of 1955 extending the life of Bihar Act 7 of 1937 made the whole law as one made by the Legislature of a State in the post Constitution period 'within the meaning of Clause (2) of Article 254. And, this is the reason that the Bihar State Legislature was incompetent as even conceded to on behalf of the petitioners, to enact the law extending the life of the parent Act dealing with the subject of control of sugar industry. The other portion of the Act dealing with sugarcane, after coming into force of Bihar Act 7 of 1955, was a law with respect, to one of the matters enumerated in the concurrent list and as already pointed out, contained provisions repugnant to those of an earlier law made by Parliament. The other portion of the Act dealing with sugarcane, after coming into force of Bihar Act 7 of 1955, was a law with respect, to one of the matters enumerated in the concurrent list and as already pointed out, contained provisions repugnant to those of an earlier law made by Parliament. Hence, the law so made by the legislature of Bihar State not reserved for the consideration of the President and not having received his assent could not and cannot prevail in the State of Bihar, it must be dubbed as void law on this ground also. Incidentally it may be mentioned that U. P. Act of 1953, which was the subject matter of consideration in the Supreme Court in Tika Ramji's case could not be successfully attacked as it was held that the provisions contained therein were not repugnant to Central law as it then existed. I may also add that the U. P. Act of 1953 had been reserved for the consideration of the President and had received his assent before it was applied to that State. 43. In any view of the matter, in my judgment the existing law and the law in force in the State of Bihar as contained in Bihar Act 7 of the 1937 and the Rules framed thereunder came to an end on the 30th June, 1955. At the relevant date when the offences on account of the alleged failure to pay in time the price of sugarcane supplied are said to have been committed, Central Act 10 of 1955 and the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955, validly held the field and was the law in force. In that view of the matter, the fifth point urged on behalf of the petitioners also must fail. 44. The first point urged by Mr. Basudeo Prasad adopted and reinforced by Mr. S. N. Datta is also without substance. In that view of the matter, the fifth point urged on behalf of the petitioners also must fail. 44. The first point urged by Mr. Basudeo Prasad adopted and reinforced by Mr. S. N. Datta is also without substance. Section 11 of Act 10 of 1955 merely provides- "No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act except on a report in writing of the facts constituting such offence made by a person who is a public servant as defined Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code." Offences under the said Act made punishable under Sub-clause (ii) of Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 7 are cognizable within the meaning of Clause (f) of Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in accordance with the Second Schedule of the Code. That being so, there is nothing in the 11th Section of Act 10 of 1955 taking away the power of the police to investigate under Chapter XIV of the Code. After such investigation, the report submitted by the Police, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in (II) Pravin Chandra Mody V. State of Andhra Pradesh (A. I. R 1965 Supreme Court 1185) following the decision of that Court in Bhagwati Saran V. State of U. P. (A. I. R 1961 Supreme Court 928), is, to all intents and purposes, a report in writing of a person who is a public servant within the meaning of Section 11 of Act 10 of 1955, and is not a charge sheet, as popularly called, or a report under Section 173 Cr. P. C. The provisions of Section 11, in my opinion, do not either expressly or by necessary implication take away the power of the Police under Chapter XIV or any other provision of the law contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure in regard to a cognizable offence. Nor does it completely supersede or annul the procedure prescribed in Sub-section (1) of Section 190 of the Code for taking cognizance of an offence. It merely modifies the procedure in that it does not authorise the taking of cognizance of a case by a court upon receiving a complaint of facts from any person unless that person is a public servant as defined in Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. It merely modifies the procedure in that it does not authorise the taking of cognizance of a case by a court upon receiving a complaint of facts from any person unless that person is a public servant as defined in Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. If that report be a report in writing of a police officer who is a public servant within the ambit of the said provision of law, taking cognizance upon such report can still be said to be taking cognizance upon a report in writing of such fact made by a police officer within the meaning of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 190 of the Code. Observations of the Supreme Court in Pravin Chandra's case referred to above do lend support to this view of mine and that would determine the procedure which has to be followed at the trial by the magistrate under Chapter XXI. If it is case instituted on a police report within the meaning of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 190 fulfilling at the same time the conditions laid down in the 11th Section of Act 10 of 1955, the procedure prescribed in Section 251 A of the Code has to be followed. If it is a case instituted otherwise than on a police report within the meaning of Clause (a) or (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 190 ag;1in fulfilling at the same time the requirement of Section 11 of Act 10 of 1955, the procedure prescribed in Section 252 of the Code will have to be followed. Decision to the contrary in (12) State of M. P. v. Baital N ahar Singh (A. I. R 1966 Madhya Pradesh 5), in my opinion and I say so with very great respect, does not seem to be correct and is against the trend of the decision of the Supreme Court in Pravin Chandra's case. 45. In this connection it was pointed out on behalf of the petitioners that it seems remarkable that a Court cannot take cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 7 of Act 10 of 1955 except on a report in writing made by person who is a public servant but the police can act and even arrest the alleged offender under Section 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on an information received from a private individual. The very safeguard granted to the citizen against frivolous prosecutions and unnecessary harassments at the instance of competitive trade or the like as pointed out by the Supreme Court in the earlier case, becomes nugatory if it be not held that the police has no power to arrest or investigate in a case under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act although it is a cognizable offence. The grievance in this regard seems to be partly justified although not wholly, it is an anomolous position, no doubt, to some extent. But it is for the Legislature to look into this matter and remove the anomaly, if any. It is for them to say that an offence under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act will be noncognizable or to curtail the power of the police under the Code of Criminal Procedure in dea1ing with such an offence. Cases may be there where an offender committing an offence under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act must necessarily be arrested and detained by the police in exercise of its power under Section 54 of the Code. As for example, an offender taking a truckload of rice from the State of Bihar to Nepal against the law of Control must necessarily be apprehended when he is about to cross the border, if caught by a police officer. Cases may be there where it may not be necessary to exercise the power of arrest. As for example, where neither the alleged offender is about to abscond nor is any evidence to be collected during the course of investigation after arresting the alleged offender. But it is not for me to lay down any hard and fast rule as to in which cases the power of arrest is to be exercised by the Police Officer under Section 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. I can only observe that while exercising this power the principle of protection granted to the citizens under Section 11 of Act 10 of 1955 should be kept in view by the Police Officer concerned and power should not be exercised merely for the sake of putting pressure, causing humiliation or harassment. 'In law, I find no words in the 11th Section of the Essential Commodities Act to hold that the power of the Police to arrest or investigate under the Code of Criminal Procedure has been abrogated. 46. 'In law, I find no words in the 11th Section of the Essential Commodities Act to hold that the power of the Police to arrest or investigate under the Code of Criminal Procedure has been abrogated. 46. The second point urged by Mr. Basudeo Prasad on the particular facts of Cr. W. J. C. 31 of 1966 is were founded and must be accepted as correct. As already stated in the beginning of my judgment, cognizance has been taken by the Sub-divisional Magistrate on the copy of the report of the Cane Inspector forwarded to him. The learned Additiona1 Government Pleader submitted that as the report was addressed to the Officer-in-charge of Ramnagar Police Station and not to the Sub-divisional Magistrate, it was not a complaint within the meaning of Clause (h) of Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Hence cognizance was not validly taken under Section 11 of Act 10 of 1955. In reply, it was pointed out on behalf of the petitioners that Section 11 does not speak about taking cognizance of any offence under the Essential Commodities Act only upon a report in writing of a public servant when it is a complaint as defined in the Code. Cognizance can be taken as has been validly taken in this case, Counsel submitted, under Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 190 provided the requirement of the 11th Section of the Essential Commodities Act is also fulfilled. In my opinion, the argument put forward on behalf of the petitioners is sound. It would be useful to point out again that under Section 28 of Bihar Act 7 of 1937 the prosecution is to be instituted upon complaint made by, or under authority of, a Cane Commissioner, while the requirement of the 11th Section of Act 10 of 1955 is that cognizance can be taken on a report in writing of a public servant. The latter requirement, therefore, can be fulfilled in any of three cases provided in Clauses (a) to (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 190 of the Code. The latter requirement, therefore, can be fulfilled in any of three cases provided in Clauses (a) to (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 190 of the Code. In this case, the copy of the report of the Cane Inspector addressed to the Officer-in-charge of the Police Station was an information received from any person other than a Police Officer that an offence under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act has been committed by the persons against whom the report was made, within the meaning of Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 190. That being so, cognizance has been validly taken by the Sub-divisional Magistrate. In that view of the matter, it is quite unnecessary on the facts of this case to proceed with its investigation by the Police rather, in my opinion, it will be a mala fide exercise or an abuse of power to proceed with the investigation. No evidence is to be collected by the Investigating Officer at the spot. Almost the entire evidence will be a matter of record and documents. Nor can any useful purpose be served by arresting the alleged offenders. The purpose of investigation would merely be submission of a report by a Police officer in order to enable the Sub-divisional Magistrate to take cognizance treating that report as a report by a public servant within the meaning of Section 11 of Act 10 of 1955. That object and purpose has already been achieved by taking cognizance upon the copy of the report of the Cane Inspector. Learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the State of Bihar and their officers clearly conceded and stated that it is not necessary on the facts of this case to proceed with the investigation any longer and they will not proceed with it. 47. Before I conclude the judgment, I would like to point out that Mr. S. N. Datta endeavoured in his reply to press an argument on behalf of Shri A. K. Jain, petitioner no. I in Cr. W. J. C. 11 of 1966, that from the records and relevant documents it is manifest that he is not an occupier as alleged by the prosecution in that case and the counter-affidavit put on behalf of the Union of India controverting that fact is recklessly false. I in Cr. W. J. C. 11 of 1966, that from the records and relevant documents it is manifest that he is not an occupier as alleged by the prosecution in that case and the counter-affidavit put on behalf of the Union of India controverting that fact is recklessly false. 'We did not feel persuaded to go into this question and examine for ourselves as to which of the rival contentions is correct. As already stated, disputed questions of fact are not to be decided in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. The proper forum to decide those facts, if need be, will be the Court trying the alleged offenders. 48. For the reasons stated above I would dismiss the application in Cr. W. J. C. 11 of 1966 and allow the one in Cr.W. J. C. 31 of 1966, and by grant of a writ of mandamus I command the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Bettiah, opposite party no. 3, and the officer-in-charge, Ramnagar Police Station, opposite party no. 4, not to take any further step or do anything in the matter of investigation of this case on the basis of, or in connection with, the first information report drawn at Ramnagar Police Station on a written report dated 8th February, 1966 of the Cane Inspector, being Ramnagar P. S. Case No.2 (2) 66 and G. R 148 of 1966 in the Court of the Sub-divisional Magistrate. On the facts and circumstances of the case, I will make no order for cost in either of the cases. K. K. DUTTA, J. I agree.