Devaki Antharjanam v. Assistant Commissioner Hindu Religious And Charitable Endowments Department Palghat
1966-03-07
C.A.VAIDIALINGAM
body1966
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER C.A. Vaidialingam, J. 1. In this Civil Revision, Petition, on behalf of the plaintiff petitioner, Mr. M. K. Narayana Menon, learned counsel challenges the decrees of the two subordinate courts dismissing the suit filed by. His client O.S. 324/57; on the ground that no proper notice as contemplated in section 80, C.P.C. has been issued. 2. The plaintiff had instituted the suit S.C.S -298/55 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court, Ottapalam, against one C. Narayanan Nair who was the then Executive (Officer of the Chelakat Devaswom. in that suit the plaintiff had also attached certain amounts, which, according to her, were due from the Department concerned, representing a sum, of Rs. 500 as security deposit and a sum of Rs. 180 payable to the said officer as arrears of' salary. Those amounts had been attached before judgment in S.C.S. 298/55. The plaintiff was appointed Receiver on 7th June 1957 for realising those amounts; and for that purpose she instituted the present suit, O.S. 324/57 on the file of the Munsiff's Court, Perinthalmanna, for recovery of the said amounts. The present suit was instituted against the Assistant Commissioner, H.R. and C.E. Department, Palghat. Later on, it is seen that the 2nd defendant, namely the Commissioner, H.R. and C.E. (Administration) Department, Board of Revenue, Trivandrum, was impleaded as additional 2nd defendant. There are also two other supplemental defendants, namely the then Executive Officer of Chelakkat Devaswom, who has now vanished out of the picture, and the present 3rd defendant who is the Uralan and Manager of the Chelakkat Devaswom. 3. The present suit O.S. 324/57, as already indicated, was for recovery of amounts from the H.R. and C.E. Department, and which, according to the plaintiff, are due from the department to the said Executive Officer C. Narayanan,Nair, against whom, the decree in. Small Cause Suit No. 298/55 had been obtained by the plaintiff. The 1st defendant in his written statement contended that the suit as framed is not maintainable and that it should have been instituted against the State of Kerala represented by the Collector of Palghat, or against the Commissioner, H.R. and C.E. (Administration) Department. There was a further contention taken by him that notice under section 80, C.P.C., has not been issued to the proper per- son. Then various., other defences on merits have also been raised in the written statement of, the 1st defendant.
There was a further contention taken by him that notice under section 80, C.P.C., has not been issued to the proper per- son. Then various., other defences on merits have also been raised in the written statement of, the 1st defendant. The 2nd defendant was impleaded party, on an application filed by the plaintiff on 4th June 1958, I.A. No 571/58. The suit itself was instituted on 30th November 1957. The 2nd defendant raised a contention that no notice under section 80, C.P.C has been sent to him, and therefore the suit is not maintainable. There are various other defences also raised by him in the written statement, on the merits of the plaintiff's claim. 4. Both the Subordinate courts, it must be stated, have over-ruled the various objections raised by the defendants on merits, and on those aspects the findings are in Department, favour of the plaintiff. But in respect of the plea raised by the 2nd defendant particularly, that no proper notice has been issued under section 80 of the Code, the view of the subordinate courts is that the said contention will have to be accepted. Though the plaintiff has relied on the issue of the suit notice Ex. A-2 dated 22nd August 1957 addressed to the 1st defendant, it was urged that a copy of the said notice had been sent to the Secretary, Board of Revenue, Trivandrum, and that the Commissioner himself has sent a reply Ex. A-6 dated 11th December 1957 to the plaintiff, rebutting her claim. On the basis of Exts.A-2 and A-6 the plaintiff urged that there was proper notice issued to the 2nd defendant also and therefore the plea raised on behalf of the defendants should not be accepted. On this aspect the view of both the sub?rdinate courts appears to be that Ex. A-2 cannot be considered to be a suit notice issued to the 2nd defendant, as required by section 80 of the Code; and even other?ise both the courts were not satisfied that it can be considered to be sufficient notice issued in accordance with the provisions of section 80, C.P.C. Therefore both the subordinate courts have accepted the plea raised on behalf of the defendants regarding issue of proper notice under section 80 of the Code, and on that sole ground the plaintiff's suit was dismissed.
It must be stated that in the lower courts the stand taken by the plaintiff appears to be that defendants 1 and 2 are Officers of the State Government, and if that is so, the action is to be deemed to be against the State Government. It is also seen that there was no dispute either that the action was directed against the two officers not in their personal capacity, but in respect of acts done by them in the course of their official duties. It is also seen that inasmuch as the Administration of the Religious and Charitable Endowments has been vested in a Department of the Government constituted under the H. R. and C. E. Act, the provisions of that Act apply and that position was also not challenged by the plaintiff before the subordinate courts; and it was on that basis that both the lower courts have considered the question as to whether the issue of notice evidenced by Ex. A-2 can be considered to be proper notice under section 80 C,P.C. 5. Mr. M. K. Narayana Menon, learned counsel for the plaintiff petitioner raised two grounds of attack as against the views expressed by the subordinate courts for dismissing the suit of his client, namely (1) that no notice under section 80, C.P.C. is at all necessary to be issued to the Commissioner, 2nd defendant, inasmuch as the said officer is a corporation sole as referred to in section 80 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (Madras Act 19 of 1951), hereinafter to be referred to, as the Act; (2) in any event, even if a notice is necessary it has been sent under Ex. A-2, and it has been so understood as a notice sent to the Commissioner, as will be seen from his reply Ex. A-6. If that is so, the learned counsel for the petitioner points out that as laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in State of Andhra Pradesh v. G. V. Surianarayana A.I.R. 1965 S.C.11 all the four ingredients which are essential to constitute valid notice must be considered to be satisfied in this case, having due regard to the suit notice Ex. A-2 issued by the plaintiff and the reply Ex. A-6 sent on behalf of the Commissioner.
A-2 issued by the plaintiff and the reply Ex. A-6 sent on behalf of the Commissioner. Therefore the learned counsel pointed out that considering the question from either point of view, the dismissal of the suit by the courts below is not correct. 6. On the other hand, the learned Government Pleader appearing for the Commissioner, 2nd defendant, has referred me to various decisions of the Supreme Court including the latest one reported in Ratilal v. Ranchhodbhai A.I.R. 1966 S.C.439 wherein Their Lordships have explained the scope and limits of the jurisdiction to be exercised by the High Court under section 115, C.P.C. The learned Government Pleader also pointed out that having due regard to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, even if this Court is of opinion that there has been an erroneous decision on the question of requirement of notice under section 80, C.P.C, or of the sufficiency of the notice under Ex. A-2, and the reply Ex. A-6, and even if there is any error committed by the subordinate courts in that regard in coming to a conclusion as against the plaintiff, there is no scope for interfering with that decision by this Court exercising jurisdiction under section 115, C.P.C. The learned Government Pleader also pointed out that even going by the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. G.V, Surianarayana A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 11 referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it will be seen that the notice Ex. A-2 does not satisfy the requirements of section 80, C.P.C. The learned Government Pleader also referred to the fact that the notice Ex. A is addressed to the Assistant Commissioner, H.R. and CE. Department, Palghat, who is the 1st defendant in the case, who cannot in law represent either the Commissioner or the Department as such. No, doubt, the learned Government Pleader pointed out, a copy of the said notice is stated to have been sent to the Secretary, Board of Revenue, Trivandrum; but that cannot be considered to be notice issued either to the Government in terms of section 80, C.P.C. or even to the Public Officer concerned, namely the Commissioner, H.R. and C.E. (Administration) Department, in accordance with the provisions of the Statute. Therefore according to the learned Government Pleader, Ex.
Therefore according to the learned Government Pleader, Ex. A-2 will not in any manner assist the learned counsel for the petitioner in this case in satisfying this Court that proper notice under section 80 of the Code has been issued. 7. With regard to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that in view of section 80 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951, the Commissioner has been constituted as a corporation sole and therefore it is unnecessary to issue notice to him under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the. learned Government Pleader pointed out that this contention also should not be accepted because the purposes for Department, which the provisions in section 80 of the Act and occurring in Chapter IX of the Act were introduced, have been elaborately dealt with by the Supreme Court in the decision in S.T. Swamiar v. Commissioner, H.R, and C.E. A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 966 which has also been reviewed recently by my learned brothers Velu Pillai and Mathew, JJ. in their decision in Govinda Menon v. Union of India I.L.R. 1966 (1) Kerala 526 .The learned Government Pleader pointed out that having due regard to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court and as explained by the learned Judges of this Court in the decision referred to above, merely because the Commissioner has been constituted as a corporation sole it does not also mean that no notice under section 80 of the Code necessary. Notwithstanding the fact, the learned Government Pleader points out, that the Commissioner has been constituted as a corporation sole under section 80 of the Act, nevertheless he is a public officer inasmuch as he is head of a department of Government, and the suit itself should have been instituted by the plaintiff as against the State Government represented by the Commissioner. Therefore, the learned Government Pleader pointed out that even considering the question from this point of view, namely that the Commissioner can be treated as a public officer, proper notice must be issued as contemplated under section 80, C.P.C. 8.
Therefore, the learned Government Pleader pointed out that even considering the question from this point of view, namely that the Commissioner can be treated as a public officer, proper notice must be issued as contemplated under section 80, C.P.C. 8. In my opinion, this Court must certainly have due regard to the limitations in the exercise of its jurisdiction under section 115, C.P.C. especially as interpreted by various decisions of the Supreme Court, the latest of which, as pointed out earlier, is the one reported in Ratilal v. Ranchhodbhai A.I.R.1966 S.C 439. It has been categorically laid down by the Supreme Court in various decisions, including the one referred to above that can erroneous construction placed upon a statue by the trial court does not amount to exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity and that would not furnish a ground for interference under section 115, C.P.C. In this case, it will be seen that the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that merely because the Commissioner has been constituted as corporation sole under section 80 of the Act it has also to be held that no notice at all is necessary under section 80 of the Code. The purpose for which the Commissioner has been constituted as corporation sole has been very elaborately dealt with by the Supreme Court in the decision in S.T. Swamiar v. Commissioner, H.R. and C.E A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 966 and that has also been dealt with by Velu Pillai and Mathew, JJ., in the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Govinda Menon v Union of India I.L.R. 1966 (1) Kerala 526 referred to above. The general scheme of the Act also will show that the Department is a Department of Government of which the Commissioner is the head. It will also be seen that the mere circumstance that the Commissioner has been constituted as a corporation sole, will not derogate from the position that notice under section 80 of the Code is necessary, and the purpose for which he is so constituted is also a very limited one. If that is so, the first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that no notice under section 80 of the Code is necessary, cannot be accepted. 9. Coming to the second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the sufficiency of the notice under Ex.
If that is so, the first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that no notice under section 80 of the Code is necessary, cannot be accepted. 9. Coming to the second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the sufficiency of the notice under Ex. A-2, I am no doubt free to admit that two views are possible on it. Ex. A-2 is no doubt a notice directly addressed to the Assistant Commissioner, H.R. and C.E. Department, Palghat, namely the 1st defendant to the action. A copy of the same has also been sent to the Secretary, Revenue Board, Kerala Government, Trivandrum. Ex. A-2 is dated 22nd August 1957. Exts. A-7 and A-8 clearly show that copy of the notice. Ext.A-2 687 addressed to the Secretary, Revenue Board, Kerala Government, Trivandrum, was received by that officer on 28th August 1957. Ex. A-6 is the reply dated 11th December 1957 sent to the plaintiff, and it, emanates from the office of the Commissioner, H. R. and C.E. (Adm.) Department, Board of Revenue, Trivandrum,' and is sent on behalf of the Commissioner. The subject matter of this notice is stated to be the suit notice dated 23rd August 1957 received from the plaintiff, and that must obviously refer to Ex- A-2. Then there are two other communications referred to in Ex.A-6, namely a report dated 30th September 1957 from the Assistant Commissioner, Palghat, and a further report dated 27th November 1957 from the Deputy Commissioner. In Ex. A-6 the Commissioner informs the plaintiff that the security amount of Sri. C. Narayanan Nair is the first charge against the liability as it is secured earlier by agreement. The plaintiff is also informed that the department is not liable for the arrears of pay due to the ex-Executive Officer from the temple funds and that the plaintiff will be held responsible for the costs if a suit is filed against the department unnecessarily. 10. No doubt much reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. G. V. Surianarayana A.I.R.1965 S.C.11 referred to already.
10. No doubt much reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. G. V. Surianarayana A.I.R.1965 S.C.11 referred to already. In that decision the Supreme Court has no doubt laid down that the four matters adverted to at page 15 of the report will have to be taken into account, and the notice issued by the party must be considered from those points of view. The learned counsel for the petitioner points out all those four matters, which the court will have to take into account, are contained in the suit notice Ext. A-2, and that that notice has been so understood, is also clear from the reply notice Ext. A-6. If that is so, the learned counsel points out, the mere fact that Ext. A-2 is addressed to the Assistant Commissioner, H. R. and C. E. Department Palghat, is of no consequence whatsoever, and it must be considered to be only a misdescription. The learned counsel also relied upon the observation of the Supreme Court in the said decision that " every venial error or Palghat defect cannot be permitted to be treated as a peg to hang defence to defeat a just claim ". Therefore, having due regard to these principles, the learned counsel points that , Ext. A-2, taken along with Ext. A-6, fully satisfies the requirements of section 80 of the Code. 11. The learned Government Pleader on the other hand points out that the suit notice Ext. A-2 is not certainly addressed to the Commissioner; and even assuming that a copy of the same has been sent to the Secretary, Revenue Board, Trivandrum, that officer has no jurisdiction at all to receive the notice on behalf of the Commissioner. That officer, the learned Government Pleader points out, is the Secretary of the Revenue Board, and he cannot certainly receive any communication addressed to the Commissioner, so as to satisfy the requirements of section 80 of the Code. 12. As I have already indicated, on this aspect, opinions may differ.
That officer, the learned Government Pleader points out, is the Secretary of the Revenue Board, and he cannot certainly receive any communication addressed to the Commissioner, so as to satisfy the requirements of section 80 of the Code. 12. As I have already indicated, on this aspect, opinions may differ. But in view of the limited jurisdiction exercised by this Court and also having due regard to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the decisions referred to above, in my opinion, even though the two subordinate courts may be considered to have committed an error in construing the issue of notice and coming to the conclusion that it is not in accordance with the provisions contained in section 80 of the Code, in my opinion, that alone will not justify interference with the orders of those courts under section 115, C P. C. 13. On this short ground, the decrees of the two courts below are confirmed and this Civil Revision Petition dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.