JUDGMENT W. Broome, J. - This writ petition, filed by Shujaat Ullah Khan, Executive Officer of the Bareilly Municipal Board, challenges an order passed by the State Government on 17-2-61 under Sec. 34 (1-B) of the Municipalities Act prohibiting the execution of a resolution passed by the Board on 28-11-59 exonerating the petitioner from certain charges that had earlier been framed against him. Those charges, it appears, had been enquired into by Sri L. D. Singhal, acting President of the Board, who passed orders on 20-11-59, recommending that the Executive Officer be exonerated from the charges and directing that his findings be laid before the Board. A meeting of the Board was accordingly called for 28-11-59, which was attended by 29 out of the 50 members of the Board, and a resolution was unanimously passed accepting Sri Singhals recommendations for the exoneration of the petitioner. But when the matter came up before the Government for consideration, the Government felt that the dropping of the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner was not justified and proceeded to pass an order under Sec. 34 (1-B) quashing the Board's resolution, on the ground that it was illegal, not having been passed by ?rd of the members constituting the Board, and prejudicial to the public interest. 2. Sri S.C. Khare, who appears for the petitioner, has advanced three arguments: (1) that no order under Sec. 34 (1-B) could be passed in the circumstances of this case because the resolution of the Board had been fully implemented and nothing remained to be executed in respect thereof; (2) that Sec. 34(1-B) could not be resorted to in this case because there was nothing "prejudicial to the public interest" in the resolution of the Board - a mere legal flaw in the resolution would not be sufficient to attract the provisions of the Sec. (3) that ,in any case there was no legal flaw in the Boards resolution as a ?rd majority is not required for passing a resolution exonerating the Executive Officer (such a majority being required only in the case of punishment, dismissal or removal of the officer as required by Sec. 58 of the Act). 3. Each one of these contentions appears to be sound. 3. Each one of these contentions appears to be sound. Sec. 34 (1-B) of the Municipalities Act, as it stood before 1964, ran as follows:- "The State Government may, of its own motion or on report or complaint received by order prohibit the execution or further execution of a resolution or order passed or made under this or any other enactment by a board or a committee of a board or a joint committee or any officer or servant of a board or of a joint committee, if in its opinion such resolution or order is prejudicial to the public interest, and may prohibit the doing or continuance by any person of any act in pursuance of or under cover of such resolution or order." 4. It is clear that the only order that can be passed by the State Government under this sub-section is a prohibitory order to prevent something being done in the future. It is not open to the Government, acting under this sub-section, to give any positive direction such as has been given in the present case, where the Government has ordered the Board to reconsider its report and to make a further enquiry and take a fresh decision. The resolution passed by the Board on 28-11-59, exonerating the Executive Officer and dropping the charges against him, exhausted itself as soon as it was passed, for the charges were straight away dropped and the Executive Officer stood exonerated. There remained nothing to be done in the future and there was nothing left for "execution or further execution" that could be prohibited by the State Government under Sec. 34 (1-B). 5. It is further clear that an order could be passed under Sec. 34 (1-B) only when the resolution objected to by the State Government was found to be "prejudicial to the Public interest." But in the impugned order of the State Government (Annexure F) in the present case the only reason disclosed for holding the resolution of 28-11-59 to be bad is that it had not been passed by ?rds of the members constituting the Board. Even assuming that an illegality had been committed in this respect, it is obvious that such an illegality would not make the resolution "prejudicial to the public interest"; and the State Government, therefore, had no justification for taking action under Sec. 34(1-B). Even assuming that an illegality had been committed in this respect, it is obvious that such an illegality would not make the resolution "prejudicial to the public interest"; and the State Government, therefore, had no justification for taking action under Sec. 34(1-B). That this is a correct interpretation of the ambit of sub-Sec. (1-B), as it stood in 1961, is shown by the fact that this sub-section was amended in 1964 so as to confer on the State Government the power to interfere not only if the resolution was found to be prejudicial to the public interest but also where it "has been passed or made in abuse of power or flagrant breach of any provision or any law for the time being in force." 6. Furthermore the view taken by the Government that the resolution in question required a ?rd majority does not appear to be correct. Sec. 69-A deals with enquiry into charges against Executive Officers and other officers of the Municipal Board, and sub-sections (4) and (5) of this section run as follows:- "(4) After the enquiry is completed, the President shall submit the record with his own recommendation to the State Government or to the board as he may consider fit. The State Government or the board, as the case may be, shall thereupon, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 58, or 67 or 69, proceed to consider the report and may, after such further enquiry as it may deem necessary, punish, dismiss, remove or exonerate the executive officer or the secretary or such other officer to whom Sec. 69 applies, as the case may be. (5) Whenever the board acts under sub-section. (4) the condition prescribed in Sec. 58 shall apply and an appeal shall lie to the State Government in the manner and to the extent provided in the said section." 7. It will be seen that by virtue of sub-Sec. (5) the Board has to comply with the conditions prescribed in Sec. 58 when passing orders under sub-Sec. (4). Sec. 58, however, merely lays down that a special resolution supported by not less than ?rd of the members constituting the Board is required for punishing, dismissing or removing an Executive Officer - it lays down no such requirement for exonerating an Executive Officer. Sec. 58, however, merely lays down that a special resolution supported by not less than ?rd of the members constituting the Board is required for punishing, dismissing or removing an Executive Officer - it lays down no such requirement for exonerating an Executive Officer. In my view, therefore, even though a Board, acting under Sec. 69-A (4), has to observe the condition prescribed in Sec. 58, this only means that if it proposes to punish, dismiss or remove an Executive Officer it must pass its resolution by a ?rd majority; but when it proposes merely to exonerate the Executive Officer a ?rd majority is not necessary as Sec. 58 lays down no such requirement in the case of exoneration. 8. This petition is accordingly allowed with costs against the State, the impugned order of the State Government" dated 17-2-61 being quashed. Petition allowed.