S. K. Kapur, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner joined the Income-tax Department in 1933 as Income-tax Officer and he was promoted as Assistant Commissioner in 1950. He was confirned as Commissioner of Inocme-tax on 29th April, 1960. From July 1959 to October 1961 he worked as Commissioner of Income-tax (Central) at Calcutta. On 2nd September, 1963, the petitioner was served with a charge-sheet dated 29th August, 1963, containing the following charges:- " (a) Being a Class I Officer of the Government of India, he placed himself under obligation of Directors of Messrs. Kalimpong Properties Ltd. , with which concern he had official dealings, by getting his son Shri G. P. Goyal, employed with Messrs. Suraj Udyog (P) Ltd. , as its Managing Director, which said concern had received substantial assistance from the Director of Messrs. Kalimpong Properties Ltd. , (b) That during the aforesaid period and while functioning in the aforesaid office, the said Shri Goyal placed "himself under pecuniary obligation of Messrs. Sohan Lal Pachisia and Co. by occupying flat on Eastern Wing, groundfloor of House No. 117, Southern Avenue, Calcutta, for which Messrs. Sohanlal Pachisia and Co. were paying a rent of Rs. 550. 00 per month and making them shift to the flat rented to him for Rs. 350. 00 per month although he continued to pay only Rs. 350. 00 per month to the landlord for the original flat rented out to him and Messrs. Sohan Lal Pachisia and Co. paid Rs. 550. 00 per month as rent for the portion occupied by him. " ( 2 ) ACCORDING to the charge-sheet the above acts constituted failure to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty in violation of rules 3 and 3a of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955. A statement of allegations explaining the said charges was annexed to the charge-sheet and so far as charge (b) is concerned, the statement reads as under :- "shri P. C. Goyal while functioning as the Commissioner of Income-tax Calcutta (Central) took on rent, the Western Wing flat, ground-floor of House No. 117, Southern Avenue, Calcutta, from Shri Chhotalal Sethia, a businessman of Calcutta. The rent was Rs. 350. 00 p. m. and was paid from August, 1959 to October, 1961. Shri P. C. Goyal exchanged his fiat with Messrs. Sohanlal Pachisia and Co. The rent was Rs. 350. 00 p. m. and was paid from August, 1959 to October, 1961. Shri P. C. Goyal exchanged his fiat with Messrs. Sohanlal Pachisia and Co. , a "firm of Share Brokers of Calcutta, who were occupying a flat in the Eastern Wing, ground-floor, of the same building on a monthly rent of Rs. 550. 00 p. m. but continued to pay Rs. 350. 00 p. m. as rent. Shri P. C. Goyal, thus placed himself under pecuniary obligations of Shri Chhotulal Sethia and/or Messrs. Sohan Lal Pachisia and Co. , etc. ". ( 3 ) I have quoted the statement because considerable arguments have been addressed to me on behalf of the petitioner that the enquiry report is vitiated on account of the fact that the Enquiry Officer based his decision substantially on the ground of the petitioner s failure to have an electric meter installed in the flat occupied by him or to have the existing meter mutated in his name. One of the findings arrived at by the Enquiry Officer is that though the electric meter, through which electricity was being supplied to the eastern flat occupied by the petitioner, being meter No. 404242, was exclusively for that flat and yet the petitioner paid only 50 per cent, of the electricity bills prepared in accordance with the recording on that meter. In this connection the Enquiry Officer observed :- "this would mean that meter No. 404242 was exclusively for lhe eastern flat then in occupation of Shri P. C. Goyal. There was therefore no question of realising from Shri P. C. Goyal, only 50 per cent of the bills. The fact that M/s. Sohanlal "pachisia and Co. claimed only 50 per cent. of the payment and that too at a very late stage-shows that the unauthorized exchanged of flats had made confusion worse confounded. Shri Goyal was liable to pay the entire dues on account of meter No. 404242. Inasmuch as he had taken the more advantageous eastern flat for residential purposes and inasmuch as he did not pay the electric charges in full, he had paced himself under obligation of Shri Sheochandrai Dabriwala of M/s Sohanlal Pachisia and Co. Shri Goyal was liable to pay the entire dues on account of meter No. 404242. Inasmuch as he had taken the more advantageous eastern flat for residential purposes and inasmuch as he did not pay the electric charges in full, he had paced himself under obligation of Shri Sheochandrai Dabriwala of M/s Sohanlal Pachisia and Co. The conduct of Shri Goyal (a) in giving effect to the exchange without consulting the landlord (b) tendering rent every month for the western flat although he occupied the eastern flat and (c) in taking no action to get an electric meter installed or to have the existing meter mutated in his name is blameworthy. To this extent, charge Noll has been established. " ( 4 ) THE President of India appointed Mr. Saran Singh, Commissioner for Department Enquiries, to enquire into the charges on 13th January, 1964, and on 12th August, 1964, the Enquiry Officer made the report holding that the second part of the charge that is charge (b) was partly proved. By letter dated 29th December, 1964, the Disciplinary Authority expressed a prima facie opinion that aminor punishment by way of censure would serve the ends of justice and forwarded the matter to the Union Public Service Commission for advice in accordance with rule 15 (ii) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957, (hereafter REFERRED TO as C. C. A. Rules ). The Union Public Service Commission, however, expressed the view that the major punishment under rule 13 of the C. C. A. Rules was called for. In view of this recommendation of the Union Public Service Commission a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 12th August, 1965, under rule 15 (10) of the C. C. A. Rules and on consideration of the recommendation of the Union Public Service Commission received on the November, 1965, the respondent passed an order of compulsory retirement against the peti- net on 27th November. 1965. This order of compulsory retirement has been impugned in the present writ petition. 1965. This order of compulsory retirement has been impugned in the present writ petition. ( 5 ) THE following contentions have been urged on behalf of the petitioner :- (1) The decision has been arrived at by the Enquiry Officer on consideration of various irrelevant matters such as omission to get a separate electric meter installed, to have the existing meter mutated in his name and in exchanging the flat originally in his occcupation (hereafter REFERRED TO as the western flat) with the eastern flat under the tenancy of Messrs. Sohanlal Prchisia and Co, and this Tenders the decision invalid; $ (2.)$ The Enquiry officer has come to the conclusion that the petitioner placed himself under obligation of Shri Sheochandrai Dabriwala of Messrs. Sohanlal Pachisia and Co. without considering the main defence of the petitioner to the effect that the eastern flat occupied by the petitioner provided no extra advantage to him. Sohanlal Pachisia and Co. without considering the main defence of the petitioner to the effect that the eastern flat occupied by the petitioner provided no extra advantage to him. It is said that the report arrived at without considering the main defence of the petitioner violates the rules of natural justice and can also be termed as a reportbased on no evidence; (3) Even the finding of the Enquiry Officer taken at their face- value do not amount to any misconduct within the meaning of rule 3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955 (hereafter REFERRED TO as the Conduct Rules) ; and ; (4) the C. C. A. Rules have been violated in four respects- (a) The Disciplinary Authority did not apply its mind to an important aspect, namely, whether the evidence clolected by the Special Police Establishment established, a prima facie case as required by rule 15 of the C. C. A. Rules ; (b) The Disciplinary Authority failed to consider the petitioner s representation while issuing the show cause notice and thus violated rules 15 (8) and 15 (9) of the C. C. A. Rules ; (c) The Disciplinary Authority having "decided in the first instance that the case called for a minor punishment could not change its decision and then come to the conclusion that a major punishment was called for becase in coming to that decision the Disciplinary Authority was acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, and (d) on receipt of the second recommendation from the Union Public Service Commission on 15th November, 1965, the Disciplinary Authority did not consider the petitioner s representation thus violating rule 15 (10) (ii) (b) of the C. C. A. Rules. 5. I propose to deal with the contentions in the same order in which they have been set out above. ( 6 ) REGARDING the first contention it is true that there was no mention in the statement of allegations annexed to the charge-sheet or even in the charge, of the various facts mentioned in the petitioner s first contention and consequently there may have been force in the petitioner s contention that decision on said matters is decision outside the range of the charge but that question does not very much arise for consideration here for the reasons which I shall presently discuss. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that consideration of such irrelevant and extraneous matters vitiates the decision and reliance has been placed principally on R. v. Fulham. etc. Rent Tribunal Railway Board, New Delhi, v. Niranian Singh, and Ramashwar Shaw v. District Magistrate. Burdwan, The question before the Enquiry Officer, however was whether the facts set out in the second part of the charge about the exchange of flats constituted contravention of rule 3 of the Conduct Rules. The Enquiry Officer has, on consideration of the various facts and material on the record, came to the conclusion that by exchanging the flats the petitioner stood to gain. I shall discuss separately under the third contention as to what is the meaning and scope of rule 3 of the Conduct Rules. If, however entering into an arrangement of exchange of the flats can fall within the ambit of the said rule 3 then there can be no doubt that that would constitute violation of the said rule. No doubt, in certain circumstances consideration of irrelevant or extraneous matters may vitiate a decision but if certain facts, found on proper appreciation of evidence, are sufficient to establish a charge, the fact that the Enquiry Officer goes into certain other circumstances as well and comes to an additional finding, such a finding cannot vitiate the entire decision. The Enquiry Officer has found two things- (i) the petitioner was a gainer by the arrangement, and (ii) he did not get an electric meter installed in the flat in his occupation or have the existing meter mutated in his name. I would be prepared to ignore the finding regarding the meter but soia I am not prepared to say that the entire report should be quastill because if the finding as to (i) above and constitute a misconduct by way of contravention or rule 3 of the Conduct Rules then the charge stands proved. It is not one of those cases where one finding of fact is arrived at by consideration of partly relevant and partly irrelevant materials. It is, on the other hand) a case where two independent findings of fact have been arrived at and one of the findings is relevant to the change as framed. In the circumstances, the first contention must be repelled. It is, on the other hand) a case where two independent findings of fact have been arrived at and one of the findings is relevant to the change as framed. In the circumstances, the first contention must be repelled. ( 7 ) COMING now to the second contention, the argument is that there would be no violation of rule 3 of the conduct Rules unless it was found that by exchanging the flats the petitioner had gained an advantage. The defence of the petitioner was that the rent of Rs. 550. 00 per month for the eastern flat was on account of the main residential flat, parking space for two cars and two servant quarters while the petitioner availed of only the residential flat and acoommodation for parking one car. The rent for the accommodation availd of was in no case more than Rs. 350. 00 per month and, therefore the petitioner had gained no advantage by exchanging the flats. The Enquiry Officer noticed that defence and hold. "the issue for determination is not what ought to be the fair rent of the eastern flat, not that Messrs. Sohanlal Pachisia and Co. might have purposely negotiated a higher rent simply because the rent was payable from the funds of the firm and not from the pocket of an individual. We are concerned with the facts as they stood. Throughout the relevant period, Messrs. Sohanlal Pachisia and Co had been paying rent at the rate of Rs. 550. 00 per month and the "receipts issuse by the landlord categorically mention that the rent was for the eastern flat, on ground floor. Likewise, during the same period Shri Goyal had been paying rent to the landlord at Rs. 350. 00 per month for the Western flat although he lived in the eastern flat. If is against all reason to say that Shri Goyal was under the impression that the rent for eastern flat was Rs. 350. 00 only Shri Goyal preferred the eastren flat because it had certain distinct advantages. To say that he left the matter in the hands of Shri Sheochandria to be straightened up with the landlord (viz. If is against all reason to say that Shri Goyal was under the impression that the rent for eastern flat was Rs. 350. 00 only Shri Goyal preferred the eastren flat because it had certain distinct advantages. To say that he left the matter in the hands of Shri Sheochandria to be straightened up with the landlord (viz. that Messrs Sohanlal Pachisia and Co, would volutarily surrender their eastern flat and take up tenancy of the Western flat to enable the landlord to give the eastern flat to Shri P. C. Goyal) is to betray a degree of naivete inconceivable in a. person of Shri Goyal s experience. It is hardly surprising that Shri Sheochandrai has, in his deposition, tried to shield Shri P. C. Goyal in this matter by saying that he did not think it necessary to go to through the formality of executing a fresh lease of tenancy. Month after month, receipts were issued to Shri Goyal by the landlord for the western flat and yet he did not take the trouble to set the score right by the landlord. The glaring fact that the exchange mutually agreed to between Shri Sheochandrai Dabriwala and "shri Goyal both tenants-was never recognised by the landlord who continued to issue receipts as if Shri Goyal was the occupant of the Westren flat would itself show that Shri Goyal was the gainer by the arrangements. " ( 8 ) THE findings in short is that the petitioner did gain by the said arrangement. It is possible that another Enquiry Officer may have, on consideration of the defence put forth by the petitioner, come to a different conclusion, but it cannot be said that the conclusion arrived at in the impugned enquiry report that the petitioner was a gainer is not a possible one. The facts setout in the passage from the enquiry report extracted above clearly show that the decision of the Enquiry officer is not one which no judicial mind could have arrived at. In the circumstances, I am not willing to hold that there has been failure on the part of the Enquiry officer to consider the defence or that there has been any violation of natural justice as alleged. In the circumstances, I am not willing to hold that there has been failure on the part of the Enquiry officer to consider the defence or that there has been any violation of natural justice as alleged. I would like here to repeat what I said in C. P, Govil v. Union of India, at p. 25 :- "we are unmindful of the limitations imposed on our powers to review the findings of the Inquiry officer, the scope of which review is fairly limited. But whatever be the limitations it is open to us to consider and hold unlawful and set aside any agency action, findings and conclusions found to be (1) arbitary, "capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law ; (2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege. or immunity ; (3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, limitations or short of statutory rights, (4) without observance of procedure required by law ; (5) violative of principles of natural justice; and (6) unsupported by any evidence. " ( 9 ) THE ground on which the report of the Enquiry officer is sought to be quashed does not fall under any of the categories mentioned above. I say so because it is a possible view to take that irrespective of what accommodation was being enjoyed by the petitioner and whatever be the rent attributable to that accommodation there were distinct advantages which the petitioner gained in the exchange. That being a possible view I do not consider it within my powers to interfere under Article 226. ( 10 ) THIS takes me to the third contention of the petitioner. It is said that neither Shri Sheochandrai nor Messers. Sohanlal Pachisia and Go. had any business dealings within the jurisdiction of the petitioner and there was no likelihood of the petitioner to deal with any one of their cases and, therefore, even if an advantage be taken from them it could not constitute misconduct under rule 3 of the Conduct Rules. It is further pointed out that the only occasion when the petitioner had something to do in his official capacity with them was when he granted a clearance certificate to Sagarmal Bengani. It is further pointed out that the only occasion when the petitioner had something to do in his official capacity with them was when he granted a clearance certificate to Sagarmal Bengani. This fact had been relied upon by the respondents to show a shady link between the petitioner on the one hand and Shri Sheochandrai on the other, but the Enquiry Officer had found that there was no undue favour shown to Sagarmal Bengani in issuing the said certificate. Rule 3 of the Conduct Rules reads- "every Goverment servant shall at all times maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty. " There is no findings that the petitioner did not maintain devotion to duty. The question is whether in the circumstances of this case it could be held that he failed to maintain absolute integrity. This rule undoubtedly provides a part of what is called as Unwritten code of conduct which must beobserved by a Government Servant. Integrity means uprightness and honesty. Whether or not there has been a violation of rule 3 must depend on facts and circumtances of each case. In given circumstances taking some advantage from a relation or a friend may not amount to violation of rule 3 yet it may constitute lack of integrity in another set of circumtances. Whatever be the scope of this rule it appears fairly clear that the object of the rule is that the Go eminent servants should not place themselves in a position where their duty conflicts, or is likely to come in conflict, with their interest. The petitioner was a Commissioner of Income-tax and Messrs. Sohan Jal Pachisia and Co. were carrying on business in Calcutta and consequently there was every likelihood of the businessman taking advantage of association with the Commissioner of Income-tax for even their income-tax matters coming for consideration before the petitioner. As a matter of fact, the matter of clearness certificate did come before him. He may have decided that matter wiehout any favour being shown to them but that is hardly a question relevant for the purposes of an equiry as to violation of rule 3 of the Conduct Rules. As a matter of fact, the matter of clearness certificate did come before him. He may have decided that matter wiehout any favour being shown to them but that is hardly a question relevant for the purposes of an equiry as to violation of rule 3 of the Conduct Rules. The test in such cases is, as I have already said, does the official position of the person concerned justify taking advantage from the businessman when there is every likelihood of a conflict arising between duty and interest or of the businessman taking advantage of the official position of the employee ? I am not uninfluenced by the fact that the advantage was taken for a considerable time and it is not a case where it was done only to tide over a temporary difficulty. The Public officer owes an undivided duty to the public whom he serves, and is not permitted to place himself in a position which will subject him to conflicting duties or expose him to the temptation of acting in any manner other than in the best interests of the public. They are trustees of the confidence reposed in them. The overall picture of the circumstances does leave an impression on my mind that the circumstances could lead ajudicial mind to the conclusion that lack of integrity was involved and that is enough to reject contention of the petitioner. It is impossible to lay down a rigid rule of conduct applicable to all cases. The facts have to be judged as they emerge taking into consideration the overall broad picture of the position. Having regard to the circumstances of this case, the impact left on my mind is that the conclusion arrived at by the Enquiry Officer was not an impossible one. ( 11 ) THAT takes me to the fourth contention which is based on the interpretation of rule 15 of the C. C. A. Rules. The first contention of the petitioner under this head is that the Disciplinary Authority did not apply its mind to the question whether the evidence collected by the Special Police Establishment established a prima facie case. I have been taken through the reply affidavit and the relevant record and I find that the Disciplinary Authority applied its own mind to the various facts and circumstances before taking the decision to frame the charges. I have been taken through the reply affidavit and the relevant record and I find that the Disciplinary Authority applied its own mind to the various facts and circumstances before taking the decision to frame the charges. It is suggested on behalf of the petitioner that the entire proceedings starting with the framing of the charges by the Disciplinary Authority to the award of punishment by that Authority are judicial proceedings and the Disciplinary Authority must apply its own mind before the charges are framed. Once it is held that the Disciplinary Authority did apply its own mind the contention loses all force. The next contention is about the violation of rule 15 (8) and 15 (9) of the C. C. A. Rules and the contention is that under rule 15 (8) the record of enquiry includes inter alia the written statement of defence and the oral evidence taken in the course of the enquiry and these two materials were not considered while issuing the show cause notice to the petitioner. Again the reference to the files and the reply affidavit shows that there is no merits in this contention and the entire record, including the statement of defence and the oral evidence, was considered by the Disciplinary Authority before recording its finding on each charge. The next submission is a little more complicated one. It appears that the Disciplinary Authority in the first instance, came to the conclusion, having regard to its findings, that a penalty of censure would do and in accordance with the proviso to rule 15 (11) of the C. C. A. Rules forwarded the papers to the Union Public Service Commission which advised imposition of a major punishment. The Disciplinary Authority, therefore; without passing an order under rule 15 (11) took resort to proceedings under rule 15 (10) and thereafter passed an order of compulsory retirement. The contention of Mr. C. B Aggarwal appearing for the petitioner is two-fold (i) the Disciplinary Authority having, in the first instance, decided that a minor punishment should be inflicted could not review that decision which was a Judicial decision, and (ii) the decision of the Disciplinary Authority that a minor punishment should be inflicted was final and the Union Public Service Commission could not suggest imposition of a major punishment instead of a minor punishment. So far as the first contention is concerned, I will assume that there is no power to review an order passed by the Disciplinary Authority but in coming to the tentative conclusion that a minor punishment should be inflicted the Disciplinary Authority had, in fact, passed no order. Reading of rule 15 (11) with the proviso shows that the order is to be passed only after the advice of the Union Public Service Commission has been obtained, which, in this case, was admittedly necessary. That being so. there was no earlier order which the Disciplinary Authority reviewed on the recommendation of the Union Public Service Commission. Coming now to the second part of the contention, I find that there isno force in the same. In my opinion, it is competent to the Union Public Service Commission to advise that instead of the minor punishment recommeded the servant should be awarded a major punishment. The only difference is that on such recommendation it would be necessary to have recourse to rule 15 (10) which was in this case done. Mr. Aggarwal contends the if that the be so then the recommendation by the Union Public Service Commission to substitute a major punishment for a minor punishment an order under rule 15 (11) can never be passed. It appears that it is not necessary that in all cases an order under rule 15 (11) must bepassed even though the punishment suggested be a major one. Reading of rules 15 (10) and 15 (11) shows that the Disciplinary Authority has first to come to the conclusion as to punishment proposed. If upon the advice of the Union Public Service Commission also only a minor punishment is to be inflicted an order may be passed under rule 15 (11), while if the Disciplinary Authority prima facie agrees with the opinion of the Union Public Service Commission to inflict a major punishment it has to take resort to rule 15 (10 ). Since there was no order at the time of consultation with the Union Public Service Commission the question of reviewing any order does not arise. This takes me to the last contention of Mr. Aggarwal. Since there was no order at the time of consultation with the Union Public Service Commission the question of reviewing any order does not arise. This takes me to the last contention of Mr. Aggarwal. The perusal of the reply affidavit and the relevant files placed before me shows that the petitioner s representation was considered by the Disciplinary Authority before passing the appropriate orders and, therefore, there was no violation ofrule 15 (10) (ii) (b ). Mr. Aggarwal has in the end laid considerable emphasis on the verification of the affidavit by the respondents. Relying on certain Supreme Court decision it has been contended that the affidavit should be rejected for lack of proper verification. The affidavit has been verified by Shri M. G. Thomas that "the facts stated above are to my knowledge derived from official records. " All that it means is that the verification is based on information derived from official records. No doubt it is only proper on the part of the persons swear- ing affidavits to mention the precise records from which the information is derived but having regard to the fact that the only records relevant were the records relating to the enquiry proceedings before the Disciplinary Authority and the consulatation with the Union Public Service Commission it cannot be said that the verification is so improper as to justify rejection of the affidavit. In any case, the official records have been shown to me and they fully bear out the allegations mentioned in the affidavit. In these circumstances, I do not feel called upon to omit to take notice of the statements of fact contained in the reply affidavit. ( 12 ) WHEN the arguments in the case started yesterday the respondents had claimed privilege to the production of the relevant files which claim was, in the course of the arguments, abandoned. Inspection was allowed to the petitioner and it was argued by the learned counsel that in case the petitioner wishes to make any further submission on the basis of the inspection he may do so. The parties appeared again today and four alleged infirmities were pointed out on behalf of the petitioner. Inspection was allowed to the petitioner and it was argued by the learned counsel that in case the petitioner wishes to make any further submission on the basis of the inspection he may do so. The parties appeared again today and four alleged infirmities were pointed out on behalf of the petitioner. Firstly, it was suggested that under rule 15 (2) of the C. C. A, Rules the charges were to be framed by the Disciplinary Authority while the record shows that the then Finance Minister on perusal of a note by Shri V. V. Chari gave approval to the framing of the charges on 8th August, 1963, but the draft of the actul charges to be framed was prepared later on 23rd August, 1963. It, however, appears that the note by Shri V. V. Chari was self-contained and had set out the allegations relevant to the charge. It also suggested that charge (b) as drafted by the Special Police Establishment may be adopted. In view of this there appears to be no merit in the contention of the petitioner. Secondly, it is pointed out that when the matter was REFERRED TO the Vigilance Commission they made a factual mistake in observing : "nevertheless the firm being an inco. ne-tax assessee and so potentially within the purview of his work he should not have placed himself under any obligation to them. Consequently, the charge must be held to have been established. " The suggestion on behalf of the petitioner is that Messrs. Sohanlal Pachisia and Co. were not assessees within the jurisdiction of the petitioner. But the Vigilance Commission itself pointed out that the firm was potentially within the purview of the petitioner s work, which, as I have discussed earlier, appears to be quite correct. This alleged error is, therefore, not fatal to the respondents s case- it is then said that the Vigilance Commission should not have been consulted and thereby allowed to prejudice the mind of the Disciplinary Authority. Perusal of the record shows that the Disciplinary Authority itself applied its mind to all the facts and documents which under the Rules it was expected to do. The advice of the Vigilance Commission was not binding and, therefore, it does not vitiate the impugned order. The next contention is based on violation of rule 15 (10) (i) of C. C. A. Rules. The advice of the Vigilance Commission was not binding and, therefore, it does not vitiate the impugned order. The next contention is based on violation of rule 15 (10) (i) of C. C. A. Rules. The argument is that on 12th August, 1965, a note was recorded by Shri S. P. Pande, Duputy Secretary, that a notice should be issused to the petitioner to show cause why he should not be removed from service. In the said note he suggested that the case may be REFERRED TO the Finance Minister for. approval of the action proposed. The said note was countersigned by the Chairman who apears to have suggested "that the Finace Minister need not be bothered. " According to the learned counsel for the petitioner this shows that the Disciplinary Authority, while acting under rule 15 (10) (i) of the C. C. A. Rules, never applied its mind and the notice was issued to the petitioner only on the note of Shri S. P. Pande, Deputy Secretary. I find no firm allegation in the petition that Shri S. P. Pande, Deputy Secretary, was not authorised to act on behalf of the Disciplinary Authority, that is, the President of India. In the absence of such allegation the respondents never got an opportunity to meet the same. From the note of Shri Pande it also appears that the notice was issued in the name of the President In these circumstances it cannot be assumed that rule 15 (10) (i) of the C. C. A. Rules was violated. The last contention is that on receipt of the advice of the Commission the entire file was not placed before the Disciplinary Authority resulting in violation of rule 15 (10) (ii) (b) of the C. C. A. Rules. Refernce to the file, however, does not bear out that suggestion. ( 13 ) IN the result, the petition must fail and is dismissed with no order as to costs.