J. S. Bedi, J. ( 1 ) THE facts which have given riseto this appeal briefly are as under : Smt. Phool Devi is alleged to be theowner of the premises involved in this case while Nahar Singh is her tenant in a portion of the building paving Rs. 6-6-0 as rent per month. Smt. Phool Devi made an application under S. 14 of the Delhi Rent Controlact, 1958, for the ejectment of Nahar Singh on the grounds that Naharsingh had sublet or otherwise paried with posseesion of the premises tokidar Nath without her written consent that neither the tenant nor anymember of his family had been residing in the premiss for the lastone-and-a half years before the application, and that she needed thepremises for bona fide personal necessity. The application was contested by Nahar Singh who admitted the tenancy and also the rent butcontroverted the other grounds. The partiesded evidence. The Rentcontroller held that the tenant Lad parted with possession of the premises to Kidar Nath, that neither the tenant or any member of hisfamily had been residing there for the last more than six months priorto the institution of the application and that the landlady required thepremises bonafide for the residence of herself and of her family members, and vide his order dated 24/05/1962 ordered ejectment ofnahar Singh He felt dissaisfied and went up in appeal before therent Control Tribunal Delhi (Shri Pritam Singh) who after hearing theparties decided all the points in favour of the tenant except that thepremises were bona fide rejuired by the landlady and thus dismissed theappeal on 13/09/1902. Nahar Singh still felt dissatisfied andpreferred this appeal in this Court. ( 2 ) THE first point raised by the appellant s counsel is that beforeejectment of Nahar Singh could be ordered the landlady should have,besides other things, proved that she was owner of the premises. Itis not enough for her to say, but prov that she is the landlady. Nahar Singh still felt dissatisfied andpreferred this appeal in this Court. ( 2 ) THE first point raised by the appellant s counsel is that beforeejectment of Nahar Singh could be ordered the landlady should have,besides other things, proved that she was owner of the premises. Itis not enough for her to say, but prov that she is the landlady. Inthis connection the counsel has invite I my attention to section 14 (i) (e) of the Act which lays down that :- 14, Protection of terants against eviction--- (1) Notwithstandinganything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract,no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premisesshall be made by any Court or Controller in tazour of the landlordagainst a tenant :provided that the Controller may, on an application to him inthe prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of thepremises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely :- (e) that the premise- let for residential purposes are requitedbonafide by the landlord for occupation as a residente for himself orfor any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the ownerthereof or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held andthat the landlord or such person has no other reasonable suitableresidential accommodation. The counsel has maintained that even in the plaint the only thingmentioned is that Phool Devi is a landlady and not that she is theowner of the premises as well. Learned counsel for the respondentwhen confronted with his position added, that although the objectionraised is valid yet he could lead evidence to show that Phool Devi isthe owner of the premises in question and that evidence consists of thestatement of Manohar Lal, her son. Appellant s counsel has contendedthat this cannot be done and has cited Siddik Mohomed Shah v. Mrsarar, and Trojan and Co. Ltd. v. Rm. N. N. Nagappa Chettiar From tehseauthorities it is clear that the decision of a case cannot be based ongrounds outside the pleadings of the parties. As stated above, no wherein the plaint the landlady asserted that she was the owner of thepremises which was a statutory obligation. Under the circumstances,to oral evidence can be allowed to be led to prove ownership of thelandlady. The respondent s counsel cited Krishan Lal Seth v. Smt. Pritam Kumari, but the facts in that case were different. As stated above, no wherein the plaint the landlady asserted that she was the owner of thepremises which was a statutory obligation. Under the circumstances,to oral evidence can be allowed to be led to prove ownership of thelandlady. The respondent s counsel cited Krishan Lal Seth v. Smt. Pritam Kumari, but the facts in that case were different. In fact, the proposition laid down by the authorities cited bythe appellant s counsel is well settled and there cannot be twoopinions about it. For the sake of argument even if we come to theconclusion that although Smt. Phool Devi was not specifically mentioned in the plaint to be the owner of the premises yet evidencecould be led on this point ; the appellant s counsel has pointed outthat the only evidence to prove the ownership is the statement ofher son Manohar Lal according to whom the house involved wasgifted to Phool Devi by her father. The counsel has then drawn myattention to section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act read withsection 91 of the Evidence Act. Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act runs as under :- "123. For the purpose of making a gift of immovable property,the transfer must be effected by a registered instrument signed byor on behalf of the donor, and a tested by at least two witnesses. "section 91 of the Evidence Act provides as follows :- "91. When the terms of a contract, or of a grant, or of any otherdisposition of property have been reduced to the form of a document,and in all cases in which any matter is required by law to be reducedto the form of a document, no evidence shall be given in proof of theterms of such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or ofsuch matter, except the document itself, or secondary evidence, of itscontents, in cases in which secondary evidence is admissible underthe provisions hereinbefore contained. The counsel has objected that if the property was gifted to Mst. Phool Devi as alleged, she could have produced the gift deed and mereipse dixit of Manohar Lal, her son, who is naturally interested, is obviously of no value. The counsel for the respondent has nothing to sayagainst the above proposition but has prayed for an adjournment toreply to the above argument which cannot be allowed. Phool Devi as alleged, she could have produced the gift deed and mereipse dixit of Manohar Lal, her son, who is naturally interested, is obviously of no value. The counsel for the respondent has nothing to sayagainst the above proposition but has prayed for an adjournment toreply to the above argument which cannot be allowed. It may be mentioned here that the landlady did not come into the witness box. Anapplication was also made by the tenant appellant on 13/07/1966,a copy of which was given to the respondent by the appellant In thispetition it has been alleged that the appellant has come to know thatthe landlady has got one of her other tenants, Badri Nath, evictedfrom some other premises and let the same out to one Ravi Dutt;meaning thereby that if the landlady in fact was in genuine need of thepremises she could have occupied the portion vacated by Badri Nath. This petition has not been controverted by the respondent. ( 3 ) THE counsel for the respondent has then drawn my attentionto section 39 (2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act and has submitted thataccording to that provision no second appeal shall lie to the High Courtunless the appeal involves some substantial question of law. In thepresent case, this objection also cannot stand because the legal pointsraised above are no doubt substantial questions of law. No other point has been raised before me. ( 4 ) FOR the foregoing reasons I allow this appeal and set aside theorders of the Rent Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal; but leavethe parties to bear their own costs.