P. N. BHAGWATI, A. D. DESAI, J. ( 1 ) THIS Revision Application raises a question as to the true interpretation of sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Rent Act ). The question is at what stage must a dispute as to the standard rent and permitted increases be in existence in order to repel the applicability of sec. 12 (3) (a ). A Division Bench of this Court in Ambalal v. Babaldas (1962) III G. L. R. 625 held that on a proper interpretation of sec. 12 (3) (a) and the scheme of the entire section the dispute in regard to the standard rent or permitted increases contemplated is the one which is in existence at the date of the notice under sec. 12 (2) or at any rate before the expiry of one month from the date of its service and not the one raised subsequently in a written statement with a view to avoiding the operation of sec. 12 (3) (a ). But this view it is contended can no longer stand and must be held to be overruled by the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Vora Abbasbhai v. Haji Gulamnabi (1964) V G. L. R. 55 and having regard to the Supreme Court decision the dispute can be raised at any stage in order to take the case out of sec. 12 (3) (a ). In view of this contention Divan J. before whom the Revision Application originally came up for hearing referred it to a Division Bench and that is how the matter has come before us. ( 2 ) IN order to appreciate how the question arises it is necessary to state briefly a few facts giving rise to the Revision Application. Prior to the termination of his tenancy on 31st March 1958 the defendant was a tenant of the plaintiff in respect of certain premises hereinafter referred to as the suit premises situate in the Town of Surat. The contractual rent of the suit premises was Rs. 19/per month and according to the plaintiff the defendant was also liable to pay permitted increases at the rate of Rs. 2/per month. The contractual rent of the suit premises was Rs. 19/per month and according to the plaintiff the defendant was also liable to pay permitted increases at the rate of Rs. 2/per month. The defendant fell in arrears of rent from Kartak Sud 1 Samvat Year 2014 and the plaintiff therefore addressed a notice dated 10th March 1958 to the defendant terminating the tenancy of the defendant on 31st March 1958 and calling upon the defendant to pay up the arrears of rent within one month from the receipt of the notice. The defendant did not reply to the notice nor did he comply with the requisitions contained in the notice. The plaintiff therefore ultimately filed Civil Suit No. 442 of 1958 in the Court of the Civil Judge Junior Division Surat on 25th April 1958 claiming to recover arrears of rent and possession of the suit premises from the defendant. There were two grounds on which possession of the suit premises was sought by the plaintiff. The first ground was that the suit premises were required for the immediate purpose of demolition ordered by the Municipality within the meaning of sec. 13 (1) (hhh) of the Rent Act but this ground does not survive for it was rejected by both the Courts below and it has not been pressed before us on behalf of the plaintiff. The second ground was the one which formed the main subject matter of controversy between the parties and that ground was non-payment of rent. The plaintiff urged that the defendant was in arrears of rent from Kartak Sud 1 Samvat Year 2014 and though the plaintiff had given the notice dated 10th March 1958 under sec. 12 (2) the defendant had neglected to make payment of the arrears of rent within one month from the receipt of the notice and the defendant was therefore not entitled to the protection of sec. 12 (1) and a decree for eviction was bound to go against the defendant by reason of non-compliance with sec. 12 (1) or in any event under sec. 12 (3) (a ). 12 (1) and a decree for eviction was bound to go against the defendant by reason of non-compliance with sec. 12 (1) or in any event under sec. 12 (3) (a ). The defendant disputed that he was in arrears of rent from Kartak Sud 1 Samvat Year 2014 and alleged that he had paid rent upto Ashad Vad Samvat Year 2014 and was always ready and willing to pay the standard rent and permitted increases and was therefore entitled to the protection of sec. 12 (1 ). The defendant raised a dispute in the written statement in regard to the standard rent of the suit premises and contended that the contractual rent of Rs. 19 per month was excessive and that the standard rent should be fixed at Rs. 12 per month. The defendant also denied that the plaintiff was entitled to recover any amount from the defendant by way of permitted increases. During the pendency of the suit the defendant deposited in the trial Court various amounts aggregating to Rs. 705/which were sufficient to cover all the arrears of rent even if they were calculated at the rate of Rs. 19 per month from Kartak Sud 1 Samvat Year 2014 and on the strength of this deposit urged that in any event the defendant was entitled to the protection of sec. 12 (3) (b ). The trial Court on a consideration of the evidence recorded in the suit determined the contractual rent of Rs. 19 per month to be the standard rent of the suit premises but held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover any amount from the defendant by way of permitted increases. The trial Court found that the defendant was in arrears of rent from Kartak Sud 1 Samvat Year 2014 and was therefore not ready and willing to pay the standard rent of the suit premises so as to be entitled to the protection of sec. 12 (1) but inasmuch as the defendant had deposited all the arrears of rent during the pendency of the suit the defendant could claim the protection of sec. 12 (3) (b) The trial Court negatived the applicability of sec. 12 (3) (a) on the ground that the defendant had raised a dispute in regard to the standard rent of the suit premises in his written statement and one of the conditions requisite for the applicability of sec. 12 (3) (b) The trial Court negatived the applicability of sec. 12 (3) (a) on the ground that the defendant had raised a dispute in regard to the standard rent of the suit premises in his written statement and one of the conditions requisite for the applicability of sec. 12 (3) (a) was therefore not satisfied. The trial Court accordingly refused to pass a decree for eviction against the defendant and dismissed the plaintiffs suit in so far as the claim for recovery of possession of the suit premises was concerned. The plaintiff thereupon preferred an appeal in the District Court Surat. The lower appellate Court agreed with the view taken by the trial Court and held that the defendant had failed to pay the rent from Kartak Sud 1 Samvat Year 2014 and that the rent was therefore in arrears for a period of over six months at the date of the notice under sec. 12 (2) but since the defendant had raised a dispute in regard to the standard rent in the written statement it could not be said that there was no dispute in regard to the standard rent and the conditions of sec. 12 (3) (a) were therefore not satisfied and the defendant was accordingly entitled to claim the protection of sec. 12 (3) (b) by complying with the requirements of that section and inasmuch as the defendant had complied with the requirements of sec. 12 (3) (b) no decree for eviction could be passed against the defendant. The lower appellate Court accordingly confirmed the decree passed by the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. This led to the filing of the present Revision Application by the plaintiff. ( 3 ) WHEN the Revision Application came up for hearing before Divan J. it was conceded on behalf of the plaintiff as it is conceded before us now that if the case of the defendant did not fall within sec. 12 (3) (a) the defendant was not liable to be evicted for he had complied with the conditions of sec. 12 (3) (b) and was entitled to protection under that section. But the argument of the plaintiff was that the case was covered by sec. 12 (3) (a) and the plaintiff was therefore. entitled to a decree for eviction against the defendant. Now there are four conditions which must be satisfied to attract the applicability of sec. 12 (3) (b) and was entitled to protection under that section. But the argument of the plaintiff was that the case was covered by sec. 12 (3) (a) and the plaintiff was therefore. entitled to a decree for eviction against the defendant. Now there are four conditions which must be satisfied to attract the applicability of sec. 12 (3) (a) and they are (1) the rent must be payable by the month; (2) there must be no dispute regarding the amount of standard rent and permitted increases; (3) such rent or increases must be in arrears for a period of six months or more; and (4) the tenant must have neglected to make payment thereof until the expiration of a period of one month after the notice under sec. 12 (2 ). There was no dispute that conditions (1) (3) and (4) were satisfied in the present case. The rent was admittedly payable by the month; the defendant had failed to pay rent from Kartak Sud 1 Samvat Year 2014 according to the finding of the lower appellate Court which finding being one of fact must be regarded as beyond challenge in revision and the rent was therefore in arrears for a period of over six months on 10th March 1958 when the notice under sec. 12 (2) was given and despite the notice under sec. 12 (2) the defendant had neglected to make payment of such arrears within a period of one month from the date of service of such notice. The only dispute was as regards the fulfillment of the second condition. There was admittedly no dispute in regard to the standard rent or permitted increases upto the date of the filing of the written statement and the dispute was raised for the first time only in the written statement but the argument of the defendant was that the raising of the dispute in the written statement was sufficient to constitute non-fulfillment of the second condition so as to take the case out of sec. 12 (3) (a ). This argument was clearly unsustainable in view of the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Ambalal v. Babaldas (supra) where it has been held that the dispute in regard to the standard rent or permitted increases contemplated is the one which is in existence at the date of the notice under sec. 12 (3) (a ). This argument was clearly unsustainable in view of the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Ambalal v. Babaldas (supra) where it has been held that the dispute in regard to the standard rent or permitted increases contemplated is the one which is in existence at the date of the notice under sec. 12 (2) or at any rate before the expiry of one month from the date of its service and not the one raised subsequently in a written statement with a view to avoiding the operation of sec. 12 (3) (a ). It was apparent that if this decision was good law the second condition would have to be held to be fulfilled and the case of the defendant would directly fall within sec. 12 The defendant however urged that this decision was no longer good law in view of the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Vora Abbasbhai v. Haji Gulamnabi (supra) and in view of the Supreme Court decision it must be held that even if a dispute in regard to standard rent or permitted increases were raised for the first time in the written statement that would be sufficient to avoid the operation of sec. 12 (3) (a ). The question which therefore arose before Divan J. was whether the decision of this Court in Ambalal v. Babaldas (supra) must be held to be overruled by the Supreme Court decision in Vora Abbasbhai v. Haji Gulamnabi (supra) in so far as this point was concerned. Another question was also raised before Divan J. and that was in regard to the scope and ambit of the power of this Court to interfere in the present Revision Application. The question was whether the amended sec. 29 (2) of the Rent Act governed the decision of the Revision Application or the Revision Application fell to be decided by reference to sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If the Revision Application was to be decided in the light of sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure it was apparent that the Revision Application would fail for admittedly no question touching the jurisdiction of the Court was involved in the Revision Application. It was only if the amended sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If the Revision Application was to be decided in the light of sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure it was apparent that the Revision Application would fail for admittedly no question touching the jurisdiction of the Court was involved in the Revision Application. It was only if the amended sec. 29 (2) of the Rent Act was applicable that this Court could interfere and set aside the decision of the lower appellate Court on the ground that the lower appellate Court had committed an error of law in applying sec. 12 (3) (b) when the proper section applicable was sec. 12 (3) (a ). Now there was a decision of Vakil J. sitting as a single Judge in Punamchand Joshi v. Ramjibhai Maganlal Civil Revision Applications Nos. 13 and 26 of 1962 dated 2nd December 1965 (now reported at (1966) VII G. L. R. 807) in which the view was taken that the amended sec. 29 (2) of the Rent Act was retrospective in operation and governed not only Revision Applications filed subsequent to the amendment but also Revision Applications pending at the date of the amendment and according to this decision the amended sec. 29 (2) applied to the present Revision Application notwithstanding that it was filed prior to the amendment but the validity of this decision was also questioned before Divan J. The learned Judge therefore having regard to the importance of the questions raised before him referred the Revision Application to a Division Bench. ( 4 ) OF the two questions arising in the Revision Application that relating to the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court was not pressed on behalf of the defendant and it was conceded by Mr. C. G. Shastri learned advocate appearing on behalf of the defendant that the decision of Vakil J. in Punamchand Joshi v. Ramjibhai Maganlal laid down the correct law and he did not wish to challenge the correctness of that decision. We must therefore proceed on the basis that the amended sec. 29 (2) of the Rent Act is retrospective in operation and governs Revision Applications filed prior to the amendment and the present Revision Application must therefore be decided in the light of the extended jurisdiction conferred under the amended sec. 29 (2) of the Rent Act. This Court has under the amended sec. 29 (2) of the Rent Act is retrospective in operation and governs Revision Applications filed prior to the amendment and the present Revision Application must therefore be decided in the light of the extended jurisdiction conferred under the amended sec. 29 (2) of the Rent Act. This Court has under the amended sec. 29 (2) jurisdiction to interfere with the decision of the lower appellate Court if that decision is found to be contrary to law and since the challenge of the plaintiff is grounded on an error of law alleged to have been committed by the lower appellate Court this Court is competent to entertain the challenge and to set aside the decision of the lower appellate Court if the challenge is well founded. ( 5 ) THAT takes us to the next question which was the main question debated between the parties and which really necessitated the reference to the Division Bench. Before we proceed to examine this question it is necessary to understand its precise scope and extent. The question is not as to what is the correct construction to be placed on sec. 12 (3) (a) but it is a more narrow and limited question namely whether the decision in Ambalal v. Babaldas (supra) which has placed a certain construction on sec. 12 (3) (a) continues to be good law after the decision in Vora Abbasbhai v. Haji Gulamnabi (supra) and whether in view of the latter decision a different construction is required to be placed on sec. 12 (3) (a ). In order to arrive at a proper determination of this question it is necessary first to ascertain the ratio of the decision in Ambalal v. Babaldas (supra) and to see what were the reasons which guided the Court in reaching that decision. In Ambalal v. Babaldas (supra) the question directly arose as to what is the stage at which dispute in regard to the standard rent or permitted increases must be raised in order to take the case out of sec. 12 and Shelat J. (as he then was) delivering the judgment of the Court answered the question by saying:-ON a proper interpretation of sub-sec. 12 and Shelat J. (as he then was) delivering the judgment of the Court answered the question by saying:-ON a proper interpretation of sub-sec. (3) (a) and the scheme of the entire section it appears to us that the dispute in regard to the standard rent or permitted increases contemplated is the one which is in existence at the date of the notice or at any rate before the expiry of one month after its service and not the one raised subsequently in a written statement with a view to avoid the operation of subsec. (3) (a ). . . The reasons which prevailed with the Court in reaching this conclusion may be stated in the words of the learned Judge himself as follows:-IN order that sub-sec. (3) (a) may apply four conditions are as stated earlier necessary. The words such rent in sub-sec. (3) (a) are used with reference to the preceding words viz. monthly rent in respect of which there is no dispute. Then follow two more conditions viz. that such rent is in arrears for six months or more at the date of the notice and further that there is neglect on the part of the tenant to make payment thereof even after the lapse of one month after the date of service of the notice. It may be observed that the neglect contemplated by sub-sec. (3) (a) is in respect of payment thereof that is of such rent monthly and not in dispute as regards the standard rent or permitted increases and which is in arrears for six months or more. It follows therefore that such arrears of six months or more must be due at the date of the notice because in order to avoid sub-sec. (3) (a) the tenant has to pay such arrears before the expiry of one month from the date of the notice under sub-sec. (2 ). It is clear that the object of enacting sub-sec. (3) (a) was to give an absolute right to a landlord to possession in a gross case where the tenant is in arrears of rent for a period of six months or more where he has no excuse not to pay as such rent is not in dispute and where he yet neglects to pay such arrears although he is given a locus penitentiae to pay up the arrears by a notice under sub-sec. (2) before a month expires from the date of service of such notice. It will be seen from this extract from the judgment that the reasoning of the Court was based almost entirely on the use of the words such rent and thereof in sec. 12 (3) (a ). One of the conditions of sec. 12 (3) (a) required that such rent must be in arrears for six months or more at the date of the notice under sec. 12 (2) and in the light of the preceding words such rent meant rent which was payable by the month and in respect of which there was no dispute. It was therefore necessary in order to attract the applicability of sec. 12 (3) (a) that the dispute must not be in existence at the date of the notice under sec. 12 (2 ). The other condition of sec. 12 (3) (a) provided that there should be neglect on the part of the tenant to make payment thereof until the expiration of one month from the date of service of the notice under sec. 12 (2) and the word thereof in the context stood for such rent that is rent payable by the month not in dispute as regards standard rent or permitted increases and in arrears for six months or more. The neglect for a period of one month from the date of service of the notice contemplated by sec 12 was in respect of payment of rent which was monthly and not in dispute as regards the standard rent or permitted increases and which was in arrears for six months or more. This condition therefore required for its fulfillment that there should be no dispute as regards the standard rent or permitted increases for the entire period of one month from the date of service of the notice under sec. 12 (2 ). This condition therefore required for its fulfillment that there should be no dispute as regards the standard rent or permitted increases for the entire period of one month from the date of service of the notice under sec. 12 (2 ). If a dispute in regard to the standard rent or permitted increases were raised prior to the expiration of the said period of one month the neglect would no longer be a neglect in respect of payment of rent of which it could be said that there was no dispute as regards the standard rent and permitted increases and it would not be possible to say that there was neglect in respect of payment thereof that is of such rent until the expiration of the said period of one month. The Court therefore held relying primarily on the words such rent and thereof that in order to attract the operation of sec. 12 (3) (a) there should be non-existence of the dispute not only at the date of the notice under sec. 12 (2) but that such non-existence must continue upto the date of expiration of a period of one month from the date of service of the notice under sec. 12 (2 ). If there is non-existence of the dispute right upto the expiration of a period of one month from the date of service of the notice under sec. 12 (2) the condition of sec. 12 (3) (a) which requires that there should be no dispute as regards the standard rent or permitted increases would be satisfied and the case would fall within that section. It was for this reason that the Court said that the dispute in regard to the standard rent and permitted increases contemplated in sec. 12 (3) (a) is the one which is in existence at the date of the notice or at any rate before the expiry of a period of one month after its service and not the one raised subsequently in a written statement with a view to averting the operation of sec. 12 (3) (a ). ( 6 ) NOW let us see whether this conclusion of the Division Bench in Ambalal v. Babaldas (supra) or the reasoning behind it is in any manner affected by the decision of the Supreme Court in Vora Abbasbhai v. Haji Gulamnabi (supra ). 12 (3) (a ). ( 6 ) NOW let us see whether this conclusion of the Division Bench in Ambalal v. Babaldas (supra) or the reasoning behind it is in any manner affected by the decision of the Supreme Court in Vora Abbasbhai v. Haji Gulamnabi (supra ). The facts of the case before the Supreme Court were that the tenant was in arrears of rent for a period of more than six months and the landlord therefore gave a notice dated 1st December 1956 to the tenant under sec. 12 (2) calling upon the tenant to pay up the arrears of rent. The tenant replied to the notice on 7th December 1956 and in his reply he contended that the contractual rent was excessive. The tenant also preferred an application on 5th January 1957 praying for fixation of the standard rent under sec. 11 (1 ). Thereafter whilst the application for fixation of the standard rent was pending the landlord filed a suit for ejectment against the tenant on 27th January 1957. The tenant in the written statement filed by him in answer to the suit reiterated his contention that the contractual rent was excessive and submitted that the standard rent should be fixed by the Court. On these facts the question arose whether the case fell within sec. 12 (3) (a) or sec. 12 (3) (b ). Now the rent was admittedly payable by the month and was in arrears for a period of over six months at the date of the notice under sec. 12 (2) and the defendant had neglected to make payment of the same until the expiration of the period of one month from the date of service of the notice and conditions (1) (3) and (4) of sec. 12 (3) (a) were therefore satisfied. But the point in controversy was as to whether the second condition which required that there should be no dispute as regards the standard rent or permitted increases was fulfilled. Mr. Chatterjee who appeared on behalf of the plaintiff contended that the dispute concerning standard rent or permitted increases contemplated by sec. 12 (3) (a) is one which must have been raised before service of the notice under sec. 12 (2) and since there was admittedly no dispute in regard to the standard rent or permitted increases at the date of service of the notice under sec. 12 (3) (a) is one which must have been raised before service of the notice under sec. 12 (2) and since there was admittedly no dispute in regard to the standard rent or permitted increases at the date of service of the notice under sec. 12 (2) by the landlord on the tenant the second condition was satisfied and the case was governed by sec. 12 (3) (a ). This contention of Mr. Chatterjee was rejected by the Supreme Court and in rejecting that contention Shah J. delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court made the following observations which were strongly relied upon by the defendant in the present case:-THE claim made by the defendant fell within the terms of sec. 12 (3) (b) and not sec. 12 (3) (a ). The defendant had contended by his reply dated December 7 1956 to the notice served by the plaintiff that the contractual rent was excessive; he had then raised the same contention in the application filed for fixation of standard rent and in his written statement filed in the suit. There is nothing in sec. 12 to support the contention raised by Mr. Chatterjee on behalf of the plaintiff that the dispute concerning standard rent contemplated by clause (b) of sub-sec. (3) is one which must have been raised before service of the notice under sec. 12 (2 ). The entire tenor of the section is against that interpretation. It was contended on behalf of the defendant that in view of these observations the first part of the conclusion of the Division Bench in Ambalal v. Babaldas (supra) namely that the dispute in regard to the standard rent or permitted increases must be in existence at the date of the notice under sec. 12 (2) must be held to be expressly overruled and if the first part of the conclusion was overruled the second part namely that the dispute contemplated is the one which must be in existence at any rate prior to the expiry of one month from the date of service of the notice and not the one subsequently raised in the written statement could not stand since both parts were based on a common reasoning and overruling of one part must therefore by necessary implication carry with it the overruling of the other. The argument was that when the first part of the conclusion was overruled the reasoning behind it must be deemed to have been rejected as invalid and if the reasoning was rejected as invalid the second part of the conclusion based upon the same reasoning must also fall to the ground. The premise on which this contention was founded was that the first part of the conclusion in Ambalal v. Babaldas (Supra) was overruled by the observations of the Supreme Court quoted above and this premise was accepted as correct by Divan J. in his referring judgment. But with the greatest respect to the learned Judge we do not think this premise is well-founded. We see nothing in these observations which has the effect of overruling any part of the decision in Ambalal v. Babaldas (supra) so far as the construction of sec. 12 (3) (a) is concerned. As a matter of fact these observations are wholly and completely in accord with the conclusion reached in Ambalal v. Babaldas. These observations were made in reference to the contention of Mr. Chatterjee that the dispute concerning standard rent contemplated by clause (b)clause (b) here seems to be a printers devil for clause (a)of sub-sec. (3) is one which must have been raised before service of the notice under sec. 12 (2) and in rejecting this contention the only proposition asserted by the Supreme Court was that in order to avoid the operation of sec. 12 (3) (a) it is not necessary that the dispute must be in existence at the date of service of the notice under sec. 12 (2 ). This was the limited proposition laid down by the Supreme Court in these observations and it was no different from that formulated in Ambalal v. Babaldas (supra ). Ambalals Case did not decide that in order to take the case out of sec. 12 (3) (a) the dispute in regard to the standard rent must necessarily be in existence at the date of service of the notice or else the case would fall within that section. If that had been the effect of the decision in Ambalals Case then surely it would have been in conflict with the observations of the Supreme Court. But what Ambalals Case decided was that in order to attract the applicability of sec. If that had been the effect of the decision in Ambalals Case then surely it would have been in conflict with the observations of the Supreme Court. But what Ambalals Case decided was that in order to attract the applicability of sec. 12 (3) (a) there must be non-existence of the dispute at the date of the notice and such non-existence must continue right upto the expiration of one month from the date of service of the notice so that if the dispute is raised at any time prior to the expiration of the said period of one month the operation of sec. 12 (3) (a) would be excluded. The latest point of time at which according to Ambalals Case the dispute in regard to the standard rent must be raised in order to avoid the operation of sec. 12 (3) (a) is the expiry of one month from the date of service of the notice. Ambalals Case did not say that the dispute concerning standard rent must be raised before service of the notice in order to repel the applicability of sec. 12 (3) (a ). The dispute may be raised at any time prior to the expiration of one month from the date of service of the notice or in other words the dispute must be in existence at the date of the notice or at any rate prior to the expiry of one month after service of the notice If the dispute is in existence period to the expiry of one month after service of the notice though subsequent to the date of the notice that would be sufficient according to Ambalals Case to oust the operation of sec. 12 (3) (a ). It is therefore not correct to say that Ambalals Case decided in the first part of its conclusion that the dispute in regard to standard rent must be in existence at the date of the notice and that the said part must be held to be overruled by the observations of the Supreme Court in Vora Abbasbhais Case. The fallacy lies in splitting up the conclusion in two parts and regarding each part as embodying a distinct and independent conclusion liable to be tested by referonce to the observations of the Supreme Court. The fallacy lies in splitting up the conclusion in two parts and regarding each part as embodying a distinct and independent conclusion liable to be tested by referonce to the observations of the Supreme Court. There are no two independent parts of the conclusion but the conclusion is one and single and it is that in order to exclude the operation of sec. 12 (3) (a) the dispute must be in existence at the latest before the expiry of one month after service of the notice. The words at any rate used by the Division Bench clearly bring out this meaning. And if this be the true ratio of the decision in Ambalals Case there is nothing in the observations of the Supreme Court which conflicts with it. It may be noted that in the case before the Supreme Court the dispute was in fact raised before the expiry of one month from the date of service of the notice and therefore according to the ratio of Ambalals Case the operation of sec. 12 (3) (a) was excluded but Mr. Chatterjee tried to bring the case within sec. 12 by contending contrary to the decision in Ambalals Case that the dispute must be raised at the latest before service of the notice and this contention was rejected by the Supreme Court. This contention was as a matter of fact contrary to the Explanation to sec. 12 which contemplates raising of a dispute within a period of one month from the date of service of the notice and that is why presumably the Supreme Court Observed that the tenor of the section was against that interpretation. The observations of the Supreme Court cannot therefore be regarded as having the effect of overruling the decision in Ambalals Case and Ambalals Case must still be regarded as good law. ( 7 ) IT was then contended on behalf of the defendant that in any event the decision in Ambalals Case in regard to the construction of sec. 12 (3) (a) must be held to be overruled by the decision of the Supreme Court in the more recent case of Ratilal Nazar v. Ranchhodbhai Shankerbhai A. I. R. 1966 Supreme Court 439. In this case the Supreme Court decided the appeal on a consideration of sec. 12 (3) (a) must be held to be overruled by the decision of the Supreme Court in the more recent case of Ratilal Nazar v. Ranchhodbhai Shankerbhai A. I. R. 1966 Supreme Court 439. In this case the Supreme Court decided the appeal on a consideration of sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure but certain observations were made by Mudholkar J. delivering the judgment of the Court on which the strongest reliance was placed on behalf of the defendant. The appellant before the Supreme Court was a tenant of certain premises belonging to the respondent. The contractual rent was Rs. 50/per month. According to the landlord the tenant was required under the terms of the tenancy to pay in addition to rent municipal taxes and electric charges for the electricity consumed by him. The tenant did not pay rent from June 1 1956 for a period of over six months in consequence of which the landlord gave a notice dated February 20 1957 terminating his tenancy and demanding payment of arrears of rent and other charges. As the tenant did not vacate the premises or pay the arrears of rent due from him the landlord instituted a suit on April 1 1957 for recovery of possession and arrears amounting to Rs. 838-11-0. This amount included rent in arrears proportionate electric charges municipal taxes and notice charges. In his written statement the tenant contended that the rent of Rs. 50 per month was inclusive of municipal taxes and electric charges. The tenant then applied for leave to amend the written statement and by an amendment which was allowed by the trial Court the tenant contended that the contractual rent was excessive and the standard rent should be fixed at Rs. 30/per month. The dispute in regard to the standard rent was thus raised for the first time in the amended written statement. The trial Court held that the standard rent was. 50/per month inclusive of municipal taxes and electric charges and since at the first hearing of the suit the tenant had deposited a sum larger than the amount due to the landlord according to this rate the trial Court refused the relief for possession to the landlord under sec. The trial Court held that the standard rent was. 50/per month inclusive of municipal taxes and electric charges and since at the first hearing of the suit the tenant had deposited a sum larger than the amount due to the landlord according to this rate the trial Court refused the relief for possession to the landlord under sec. 12 On appeal the learned Principal Judge of the City Civil Court held that the tenant was bound to pay municipal taxes and electric charges and there was a bona fide dispute between the parties about the standard rent but upon a construction placed by him on the provisions of sec. 12 the learned Judge held that the case fell under sec. 12 (1) read with the Explanation and not under either Clause (a) or Clause (b) of sub-sec. (3) of sec. 12 and since the tenant had not complied with the conditions of sec. 12 (1) or the Explanation the landlord was entitled to a decree for eviction against the tenant. The revision application of the tenant was summarily rejected by the High Court. The tenant thereupon appealed to the Supreme Court and the contention of the tenant was that he was entitled to the protection of sec. 12 (3) (b) since there was a dispute in regard to the standard rent and the case was covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in Jashwantrai Malukchand v. Anandilal Bapalal A. I. R. 1965 S. C. 1419 (VI G. L. R. 329) where it was held that if there is a dispute in regard to the standard rent the case would fall within sec 12 Referring to this contention Mudholkar J. said and these were the observations relied on strongly on behalf of the defendant:-PRIMA facie the decision of this Court supports the contention of the appellant. . . . . . No doubt by an erroneous construction of the relevant provision the Principal Judge of the City Civil Court granted relief of possession to the respondent to which he would not have been entitled had the provision been rightly construed. The defendant contended that these observations clearly showed that according to the Supreme Court on a correct construction of the provisions of sec. 12 the landlord was not entitled to the relief of possession against the tenant and the tenant was entitled to the protection of sec. The defendant contended that these observations clearly showed that according to the Supreme Court on a correct construction of the provisions of sec. 12 the landlord was not entitled to the relief of possession against the tenant and the tenant was entitled to the protection of sec. 12 despite the fact that the dispute in regard to the standard rent was raised for the first time only in the amended written statement and these observations had therefore the effect of overruling the decision in Ambalals Case. But this contention plausible though it may seem is not well-founded. If we look at the judgment of the Supreme Court it is clear that the Supreme Court decided the appeal on the limited ground that the High Courts jurisdiction to interfere with the decision of the learned Principal Judge was circumscribed by the provisions of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and therefore even if the construction placed by the learned Principal Judge was erroneous the High Court was not entitled to interfere in revision and the limitation placed on the powers of the High Court under sec. 115 of the Code also circumscribed the power of the Supreme Court to interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution. In this view taken by the Supreme Court as to its jurisdiction it was altogether unnecessary for the Supreme Court to consider whether the construction placed on the provisions of sec. 12 by the learned Principal Judge was erroneous and whether on the facts of the case the tenant was entitled to the protection of sec. 12 (3) (b ). The Supreme Court did not therefore inquire into the merits of the question and observed after referring to the earlier decisions on the limited scope of the revisional jurisdiction under sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure:-WE are bound by these decisions and therefore it is not open to us to examine the merits of the contention advanced by Mr. Peerzada. The words which we have underlined above clearly show that the Supreme Court did not examine the merits of the question which was sought to be raised before them but disposed of the appeal merely on the ground of jurisdiction. Peerzada. The words which we have underlined above clearly show that the Supreme Court did not examine the merits of the question which was sought to be raised before them but disposed of the appeal merely on the ground of jurisdiction. It is no doubt true that the Supreme Court made the aforesaid observations relied upon on behalf of the defendant but these observations were in the context mere expression of prima facie opinion which did not constitute the decision of the Court. They were not expression of opinion of the Supreme Court on the question of construction of sec. 12 and particularly sub-sec. (3) (a) of that section. If the Supreme Court had intended to express an opinion on this question of construction despite its view that it was not open to it to do so the Supreme Court would have dealt with the various arguments bearing upon the construction of sec. 12 and examined whether on a true construction of sec. 12 (3) (a) the dispute contemplated is the one which must be in existence prior to the expiry of one month from the date of service of the notice under sec. 12 (2) or it can be raised at any time prior to the passing of the decree for example the written statement. The Supreme Court would not have contented itself by merely setting out its conclusion leaving the reasoning to be gathered by implication. As a matter of fact we do not know what arguments were advanced before the Supreme Court on the question of construction we do not know whether it was urged on behalf of the landlord that the dispute having been raised for the first time in the amended written statement the operation of sec. 12 was not excluded. It is therefore not possible to regard these observations as expression of opinion of the Supreme Court on the question as to when the dispute in regard to the standard rent must be raised in order to avoid the operation of sec. 12 (3) (a) But even if these observations be read as embodying the opinion of the Supreme Court on this question of construction such opinion has no binding effect. Obviously it does not constitute the ratio decidendi of the case. 12 (3) (a) But even if these observations be read as embodying the opinion of the Supreme Court on this question of construction such opinion has no binding effect. Obviously it does not constitute the ratio decidendi of the case. It is also not an obiter dictum for obiter dictum is an opinion expressed by the Court which opinion is expressed after careful consideration of all the arguments and which is deliberately and advisedly given Vide Jaswantlal v. Nichhabhai (1964) V G. L. R. 161 at 169. These observations cannot therefore be regarded as overruling the decision of this Court in Ambalals Case. ( 8 ) IT is therefore clear that Ambalals Case still continues to be good law and as a matter of fact the following observations of Raghubar Dayal J. in Punjalal v. Bhagwatprasad (1963) IV G. L. R. 37 namely:-THE landlord became entitled to recover possession when the tenant failed to pay rent and this right in him is not taken away by any other provision in the Act seem to lend support to the decision in Ambalals Case in so far as it lays down that there must be non-existence of the dispute as regards the standard rent or permitted increases at the date of expiration of the period of one month after the notice under sec. 12 (2 ). These observations have also been relied upon by Diwan J. in the referring judgment as overruling the view taken in Ambalals Case that even where a case falls under sec. 12 (3) (a) but the tenant pays or is ready and willing to pay the standard rent and permitted increases before the institution of the suit the tenant can claim the protection of sec. 12 (1) but that question does not arise for consideration in the present case and we do not therefore deem it proper to express any opinion on the same. We may however point out that the question whether a tenant can claim the protection of sec. 12 (1) by paying up the arrears of rent before the institution of the suit in a case falling within sec. 12 (3) (a) was not before the Supreme Court and it would not be right to construe any observations made by the Supreme Court while dealing with a totally different question as containing an expression of opinion of the Supreme Court on the aforesaid question. 12 (3) (a) was not before the Supreme Court and it would not be right to construe any observations made by the Supreme Court while dealing with a totally different question as containing an expression of opinion of the Supreme Court on the aforesaid question. ( 9 ) WE are therefore of the view that as laid down in Ambalals Case in order to avoid the operation of sec. 12 (3) (a) the dispute in regard to standard rent or permitted increases must be raised at the latest before the expiry of one month from the date of service of the notice under sec. 12 (2) and it is not enough to raise a dispute for the first time in the written statement. In this view of the matter the case must be held to be covered by sec. 12 (3) (a) and the plaintiff must be held to be entitled to a decree for eviction against the defendant. There will therefore be a decree for eviction against the defendant. The defendant will hand over possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff on or before 1st December 1966. There will be no order as to costs of the Revision Application. Appeal allowed. .