JUDGMENT Krishnan, J. - 1. This is a miscellaneous appeal filed by the decree-holder from the order of the executing Court dismissing his prayer under Order 21, Rule 95, C.P.C., dated 19-12-1963 as time barred under section 48, C.P.C. According to that Court the earlier proceedings for the same purpose had been "closed" by the order dated 28-10-1963 and this was a new application in execution. The questions for decision are, primarily, whether the order dated 28-10-1963 was really one dismissing the execution application No. 77 of 1959 or was only an order of abeyance pending the proceedings in the High Court which had passed an order restraining the decree-holder from proceeding with the execution till its disposal of two appeals before it; secondly, whether the subsequent petition by the decree-holder dated 31-7-1964 was really one for amendment and if it was, whether it was rejected properly. Besides these there is a preliminary question posed by the respondent that no appeal lies from the order dismissing the application of 18-12-1963. 2. Stated thus the problem is not difficult or complicated; but the instant case is yet another illustration of the considerable harassment and delays suffered by litigants, especially decree-holders and auction-purchasers trying to realise the legitimate fruits of their success, by the use of loose language by the Courts and the covering up of simple problems with a quantity of unnecessary arguments and veribiage, 3. The decree-holder brought two suits as long ago as 1945 consolidating which he obtained decrees for a total of Rs. 23,000/- in 1949. A house about the identity of which there is no dispute had already been attached pending judgment and was accordingly brought up for sale and purchased by the decree-holder himself who obtained the sale-certificate. Sometime in 1959 the decree-holder applied for possession which application was registered as Miscellaneous Case No. 77 of 1959. The judgment, debtors conveniently retired into the background but quite a number of persons were found in portions of the house claiming to be there by virtue of sale or usufructuary mortgages or leases. Several of them filed objections which were all dismissed after proceedings at different levels, remands and final orders by the High Court. The judgment, debtors conveniently retired into the background but quite a number of persons were found in portions of the house claiming to be there by virtue of sale or usufructuary mortgages or leases. Several of them filed objections which were all dismissed after proceedings at different levels, remands and final orders by the High Court. But two or rather two batches of the obstructors filed title suits one of them being the present respondent number 1 and the other being the respondents numbers 2 and 3 son and widow respectively of the original claimant Saudagarsingh. Their suits themselves having been dismissed by the lower Courts, they filed two second appeals in the High Court, numbers 355 and 356 of 1963, which came up before that Court in September of that year. There were provisional orders of interim injunction restraining the decree-holder from proceeding with his application for possession which were in time confirmed. To anticipate the course of events we may note even here that in the second appeals the suits were remanded and have, subsequently to the events with which we are directly concerned, been dismissed by the lower Courts and have been again taken up in appeal by the respective claimants. Obviously whatever is stated in this order will have no effect 'on the merits of those appeals. Meanwhile in view of the High Court's order stalling further proceedings in execution the executing Court ordered that Misc. Case No. 77 of 1959, that is the decree-holder's original application for being put into possession was "closed". 4. On 19-12-1963 the decree-holder prayed again that he might be put into possession of those portions of the house over which be had not yet been put into possession. The executing Court treated it as a fresh application and after hearing the parties rejected it as being time-barred, the effect of that order being that in spite of the dismissal of the suits brought by the objector-respondents the decree-holder to whom the entire house had been sold could not get possession of these portions. The applicant suggested in course of this proceeding that he was amending the application to the effect that he was only reviving the Miscellaneous Case No.77 of 1959. The applicant suggested in course of this proceeding that he was amending the application to the effect that he was only reviving the Miscellaneous Case No.77 of 1959. That was also rejected on the ground that it was "mala fide device to deprive the opposite party of the advantage it had gained by the operations of limitation." The decree-holder purchaser has come up in appeal from the order of dismissal of the application. 5. The preliminary question whether or not an appeal lies is not of much practical consequence in the instant case. The Court is that of the Additional District Judge and the valuation is more than 20,000/-. Thus whether it is an appeal or a revision it will be before this Court, and it is only a question of form whether we treat it as the one or the other, because in any view of the matter we are dealing with questions of law pure and simple. I am inclined to hold that section 47, C.P.C; is wide and these orders are appealable being ones passed in execution on questions arising between the decree-holder-purchaser on the one hand, and on the other the persons resisting the decree-holder's claim to possession on their own title derived from the judgment debtor. Besides this Court is competent to deal with this case as one in revision if not in appeal. 6. On merits the question is quite simple.- Whether the order "closing" Misc. Case Number of 77 of 1959 on 28-10-1963 is really one dismissing it? I am in principle against the use by the lower Courts of loose and equivocal language as "closing" a case or "filing" it or "consigning" it to the record room, all of which we come across from time to time though the Code bas not used them. They cause confusion and embarrassment to the parties. If the Court tells the parties that it is "dismissing" the application they can at least take it on its face value and go up in appeal or revision as the case may be ; but they cannot do so from a "closing" order. Again whatever the wording of the order, I would in this regard consider the effect and the context in which it is passed, and whether it has been made with or without the bearing of the parties on merits. Again whatever the wording of the order, I would in this regard consider the effect and the context in which it is passed, and whether it has been made with or without the bearing of the parties on merits. In the instant case the immediate provocation for the "closing" of the application was the order of the High Court stalling further proceedings in execution in view of the two second appeals filed by the objector in course of their independent litigation. At that stage there has been no occasion for the final disposal of the petition under Order 21, Rule 95. The decree-holder-purchaser had got possession over portions of the property but there were still two slices over which he had not got possession and again over which his claim to possession had not been rejected either. The thing was, as it were, hanging in mid-air awaiting the orders of the High Court. Whatever the merits of these suits the executing Court could do nothing and the decree-holder-purchaser himself could take no further steps. By whatever formula the executing Court stays its hands for the time it is only a provisional step reducing the execution case to dormancy but not killing it altogether. Thus the closing having meant only that for the time no steps could be taken, it is obvious that the subsequent prayer by the decree-holder-purchaser was one for continuing the old one and not a fresh application. Nor would I put it on him to explain the confused language used by the Courts; it is for the latter to clear the vagueness of confusion it had created by its language, and treat the decree-holder purchaser's prayer as it should be in the context. 7. The view taken by me is the only one consistent with our duty of doing justice to the parties and not to pose as umpire over competitions in quibbling and verbal gymnastics. Fortunately this view has been clearly laid down in the Supreme Court itself in the ruling reported in Pentapati China Venkauns v. Pentapati Banagararaju AIR 1964 SC 1454 . "The application mentioned in section 48 is a fresh substantive application and not an application to revive or continue a substantive application already pending on the file of the Court. Fortunately this view has been clearly laid down in the Supreme Court itself in the ruling reported in Pentapati China Venkauns v. Pentapati Banagararaju AIR 1964 SC 1454 . "The application mentioned in section 48 is a fresh substantive application and not an application to revive or continue a substantive application already pending on the file of the Court. Where the previous execution petition is "closed" for statistical purposes because the High Court stayed the execution pending the appeal filed by the judgment-debtors, and the decree-holders were not in a position to proceed with the execution petition the execution petition must be held to be pending on the file of the executing Court and the subsequent application is only an application to continue the previous application and not a fresh one." The caution that Court has administered against the use of loose language by subordinate Courts is worth repeating because that practice seems to be almost rampant here. It is difficult to avoid the impression that subordinate Courts are doing this as a mere device to create the impression on their superiors that they are really disposing of more cases than they actually do. Disposal frankly meant clearing the controversy and giving a final decision in accordance with law and principles of justice and not merely shelving away the record on one pretext or another. The Supreme Court itself has said" It is true that Courts have condemned the practice of executing Courts using expressions like "closed", "closed for statistical purposes", "struck off", "recorded" etc., and they also pointed out that there was no provision in the Code of Civil Procedure for making such orders but assuming that the Court has no such power, the passing of such an order cannot tantamount to an order of dismissal, for the intention of the Court in making an order "closed" for statistical purposes is manifest. It is intended not to finally dispose of the application but to keep it pending. Whether the order was without jurisdiction or whether it was valid, the legal position would be the same; in one case it would be ignored and in the other, it would mean what it stated. In either case the execution petition would be pending on the file of the Court. Whether the order was without jurisdiction or whether it was valid, the legal position would be the same; in one case it would be ignored and in the other, it would mean what it stated. In either case the execution petition would be pending on the file of the Court. That apart, it is not the phraseology used by the execution Court that really matters, but it is really the substance of the order that is material. Whatever terminology may be used, it is for the Court to ascertain having regard to the circumstances under which the said order was made whether the Court intended to finally terminate the execution proceedings, If it did not intend to do so, it must be held that the execution proceedings were pending on the file of the Court." 8. In the order that was the subject matter of the ruling of this High Court reported in Ganpat v. Gendalal 1965 JLJ 1070 , the actual word used was "dismissed", Even then in view of the context and the circumstances it was held that the original application was still pending on the file and the subsequent prayer was not a fresh application hit by section 48 but one for the continuation of the old application ; "It is well settled that whether in a particular case an execution petition is a continuation of the earlier one or is a fresh petition is a question of fact to be determined having regard to the entire circumstances which the earlier petition was disposed of. The use of the word "dismissed" or "disposed of" is also not decisive in this regard. It is possible to conceive of cases in which even where the word used is "dismissed" it is still a disposal for statistical purposes and the decree-holder is really not to be blamed for not proceeding with the earlier petition and its course might have been impeded by reason something beyond his control. In such cases it will be incorrect to hold that there was termination of the earlier proceeding so as to render the Court fane/us officio for its purpose". 9. Thus there was no occasion in the instant case for the application of section 48, C.P.C. or as for that matter any other rule of limitation. In such cases it will be incorrect to hold that there was termination of the earlier proceeding so as to render the Court fane/us officio for its purpose". 9. Thus there was no occasion in the instant case for the application of section 48, C.P.C. or as for that matter any other rule of limitation. All that was sought by the decree-holder purchaser was a revival or continuation of his application made in 1959. Nor would I penalise him for failure to mention this in so many words in his prayer. All that he is to do is to pray that the Court might proceed to give him what the law entitles him to and it is for us to see whether it is in effect a fresh application or one for the continuation of the one already pending before the Court. 10. In view of what has been said above his prayer for the so called amendment was superfluous. Certainly, if it was a fresh application in the proper sense of the word, a subsequent amendment cannot deprive the opposite party of what it might have gained already by the operation of limitation. But where it is not a fresh application the mere prayer for amendment in view of the confusion created by the language used by the Court itself cannot deprive the decree• holder purchaser of what he is independently entitled to. 11. Accordingly I would allow this miscellaneous appeal and set aside the order rejecting the appellant's prayer for the possession over the portions of the house from which he has been obstructed. The executing Court should proceed with this prayer treating it as one for the continuation of the miscellaneous case No. 77 of 1959 subject of course to such orders or decrees, if any as might be passed by competent Courts in one or both of the two second appeals by the present respondents we are told at the bar are still pending. The respondent should pay the appellant's costs of this appeal along with pleader's fee calculated according to rules.