S. K. Kapur, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner, a citizen of India, joined the Indian Air Force in 1939 and held the rank of a Wingcommander at the time of his impugned dismissal from service. Thepetitioner alleges that he made a complaint to the Central Governmentunder section 27 of the Air Force Act against a Superior Officer whichresulted in a counter-complaint against him whereupon he was subjected to certain investigation by the Special Police Establishmentregarding some bribery and corruption. It is claimed by the petitionerthat the Special Police Establishment informed him that there wasno truth in any of the allegations made against him. Ultimately acharge-sheet was framed against the petitioner on 12/03/1958,which contained allegations that :- 1. (a) the petitioner mortgaged a car with the President of Indiaas security for a loan of Rs. 10,000. 00 though the car didnot belong to him; (b) the petitioner furnished a false sale receipt for the saidcar; (c) the petitioner made some false statements in his application to the Chief Controller of Imports for the purpose ofgetting an import licence; and ( 2 ) THE petitioner obtained a free ticket from one S. Sundra Managing Director of Messrs Electronics Limited, New Delhi and thiswas done in consideration of his agreement to render certainservices to S. Sundra. On 11/04/1958, another charge-sheet was framed against thepetitioner alleging that be permitted certain deviations in the design ofmilitary boxes to be supplied to the Army by two firms thereby causing a considerable loss to the State. This charge-sheet is alleged tohave been framed against the petitioner on the basis of certain factsemerging out of an enquiry by Wing Commander Bhaskaran. It isalleged that in that enquiry Wing Commander Bhaskaran had examinedcertain persons and recorded their statements at the back of thepetitioner and without his knowledge. In the second charge sheet it wasinter alia recited - "in the event of your having no satisfactory explanationor defence. I propose to recommen to the Central Government todismiss you from service. "the petitioner submitted replies to the charge-sheets on 18/04/1958, and 30/04/1958, denying the charges. By his letter dated 18/04/1958 (copy Annexure c to the petition), the petitionerasked for an opportunity to cross-examine certain witnesses and examine certain files and documents. I propose to recommen to the Central Government todismiss you from service. "the petitioner submitted replies to the charge-sheets on 18/04/1958, and 30/04/1958, denying the charges. By his letter dated 18/04/1958 (copy Annexure c to the petition), the petitionerasked for an opportunity to cross-examine certain witnesses and examine certain files and documents. In reply to this request of thepetitioner he was informed by a letter dated 19/04/1958, asfollows:- " It is correct that the misconduct attributed to you in the show cause notice dated 11/04/1958, has been based on information which came to the notice of this Headquarters during another investigation. If the officer conducting the investigation hadblamed you without allowing you to be present or cross-examined thewitnesses, it would have been held to be legally incorrect. But inserving a show cause notice for the termination/dismissal from aservice on the grounds of misconduct, it is not material from whichsource the information concerning the misconduct was received bythis Headquarters and as long as all evidence relevant to the misconduct attributed to you is furnished, you cannot justifiably claimthat you have been prejudiced in submitting your defence. "the petitioner alleges that though he submitted this reply dated 30/04/1958, to the second charge-sheet he could not give anadequate explanation since the necessary facilities had been denied to him. It is alleged that after the petitioner had submitied his replies he wasnot informed whether they were found to be satisfactory or not thatthere was no trial by a Court-Martial, that no witnesses were examinedin support of the charges alleged, and that he was not even given anopportunity to cross-examine the witnesses whose statements had beenearlier recorded at his back or to adduce any oral or documentaryevidence in support of his defence. The petitioner on 1/09/1958, received a communication from the Commanding Officer, Airforce Station, dismissing him from service under section 19 of theindian Air Force Act on the ground of "moral turpitude. " The dismissal was to take effect from 1/09/1958. The petitioneron 12/09/1958, addressed another letter asking for an opportunity to explain the case personally and, if necessary, to producewitnesses. By the said letter he also made an enquiry as to whichof the two charges mentioned in the two charge-sheets had been foundproved against him. The petitioner received a reply dated 27/10/1958, saying inter alia that his dismissal was validly and properlyordered. By the said letter he also made an enquiry as to whichof the two charges mentioned in the two charge-sheets had been foundproved against him. The petitioner received a reply dated 27/10/1958, saying inter alia that his dismissal was validly and properlyordered. and that he had been dismissed on account of his misconductreferred to in the second show cause notice dated I 1/04/1958. Inparagraphs 22 to 24 of the petition an effort has been made by thepetitioner to explain the delay in filing the writ petition, which wasfiled in January, 1963 It is alleged that the petitioner had beenmaking various representations seeking redress of his grievance. Tworepresentations are alleged to have been made to the Prime Ministerof India on 24/11/1958, and 5/02/1959, and onerepresentation to the President of India on 6/10/1961. Replyto the representation made to the President of India is stated to havebeen received by him on 12/12/1961 The allegations inthe petition proceed to say that when the petitioner was making allthese representations prosecution was launched against him in Courtwith respect to the first charge-sheet, being trial No. 34 of 1960 indecember, 1960, but he was acquitted on 2/11/1962, and anappeal against his acquittal was also dismissed. Mr. C. B. Aggarwala,the learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the prosecutionin fact started in August, 1959 and it was in view of these circumstances that the petitioner could not file his petition before January, 1963. I. must confess that I am not at all satisfied with the explanationabout delay. It is admitted on behalf of the petitioner that the statutedees not give any right of making representations and I do not thinkthat the time spent in making representations to the Prime Ministerand the Presidentof India by way of mercy appeals can be pleadedin justification of delay. It is then said that his prosecution startedin August, 1959. Which completely occupied petitioner s attention. Here again l would say that the mere fact of commeacement of prosecution could not stand in the way of the petitioner seeking redressin this Court against the order of his dismissal. Apart from thatthe dismissal order was made in September, 1958, and s still for aboutone year thereafter no writ petition was filed. Having regard toall these circumbtances, I would say that the petitioner has failedto explain the delay and the petition should be dismissed on thatground. Apart from thatthe dismissal order was made in September, 1958, and s still for aboutone year thereafter no writ petition was filed. Having regard toall these circumbtances, I would say that the petitioner has failedto explain the delay and the petition should be dismissed on thatground. ( 2 ) SINCE considerable arguments have been addressed to meregarding the construction of the statute and violation thereof, Iwould briefly deal with the same out of reference to the argumentsat the Bar. The first contention on behalf of the petitioner is that noorder against the petitioner could have been made under section 19,a-, has been done, dismissing him except after trial by a Court-Martial. The argument proceeds that power to dismiss under section 19 is merelya power of execution of an order passed by a Court-Martial Chaptervi of the Air Force Act, 1950, prescribes the various offences andsection 73 the punishments awardable by Courts-Martial. Clause (f)of section 73 provides dismissal from service as one of the punishments. The contention of Mr. Aggarwala, the learned counsel for the petitioner, is that since the allegations made against him fell withinchapter VI, the only alternative available to the respondent was toput the petitioner on trial and if the Court-Martial awarded him thepunishment of dismissal from service, dismiss him in exercise ofpowers under section 19. According to Mr Aggarwala, the punishment awarded by a Court-Martial under section 73 does not take effectproprio vigore but I as to be given effect to by the Central Governmentunder section 19. He has drawn my attention also to Chapter XIIIproviding for execution of sentences. There appears to be no forcein the contention of Mr. Aggarwala and, in my opinion, the punishments awarded by the Courts-Maitial take effect proprio vigore subjectof course to certain confirmations provided by the statute. It is not,in my opinion, correct to suggest that even though the sentence awardedby a Court Martial is confirmed under Chapter XII yet if the punishments be dismissal it has to be given effect to by the Central Government under section 19. Chapter XIII dealing with execution of sentences merely deals v with the procedure and the method in which thesentence is to be executed and does not, as is sought to be contendedat the Baron behalf of the petitioner, provide that some externalauthority has to give effect to the punishment awarded by the Court-Martial. Moreover, if Mr. Chapter XIII dealing with execution of sentences merely deals v with the procedure and the method in which thesentence is to be executed and does not, as is sought to be contendedat the Baron behalf of the petitioner, provide that some externalauthority has to give effect to the punishment awarded by the Court-Martial. Moreover, if Mr. Aggarwala s argument is accepted therewould be no method provided in the Act for executing some of thepunishments mentioned in section 73. One of such punishments, whichi may quote by way of illustration, would be the punishment ofreprimand. After attending to all the provisions of the Act and thecircumstances my conclusion is that the power conferred on the Centralgovernment to terminate service is independent and not dependenton any punishment awarded by a Court-Martial. ( 3 ) THERE then remains to consider the other argument of Mr. Aggarwala that if the Central Government exercised powers to dismiss,it must do so after due enquiry and due compliance with the demandsof natural justice, particularly when dismissal is by way of punishment. The argument is that a stigma has been attached to the petitioner in the dismissal order which has been passed without due inquiryin disregard of rules of natural justice and, therefore, is not a validorder. On behalf of the respondent on the other hand, it has beencontended that dismissal under section 19 does not confer a justiciableright and, in any case, the show cause notice having been issued tothe petitioner and his replies considered, the requirements of naturaljustice had been met. Having heard the learned counsel thus far Ireserve orders to consider whether it is open to me at all to go into thequestion of violation of natural justice. Having considered the arguments at the Bar in my opinion, there is no merit in the contentionof the petitioner. Section 18 of the said Act provides the tenure ofservice to be during the pleasure of the President. Section 19 givesan absolute power to the Central Government to dismiss or removefrom service any person subject to this Act. Having considered the arguments at the Bar in my opinion, there is no merit in the contentionof the petitioner. Section 18 of the said Act provides the tenure ofservice to be during the pleasure of the President. Section 19 givesan absolute power to the Central Government to dismiss or removefrom service any person subject to this Act. It is abundantly recognised that persons who enter the military service and take the State spay, and who are content to act under the President s commission, although they do not cease to be citizens in respect of responsibility, yetthey do, by a compact which is intelligible, and which requires only thestatement of it to recommend it to the considerition of any one ofcommon sense become subject to military rule and military discipline. In case of civil servants certain special safegurd, have been providedby Article 311 of the Constitution Those safeguards admittedly donot extend to the army personnel. Admittedly, no rules have beenframed in this behalf and there is, therefore, no question of anyviolation thereof. If any rules had been framed and violated, possiblydifferent considerations may have arisen As the law however standsatpresent it seems to recognise that employment in Army is not aright but only a privillege revocable by the sovereign at will andefficient management demands that power to appoint should necessarilyinclude the power to dismiss. In Army matters the Legislature hasconferred on the Government the same proprietary rights as providedto employers to hire and fire without restrictions. Reliance has beenplaced by Mr. Aggarwala on certain decisions under the Industrialdisputes Act holding that even in a case where under the standingorders it is parmissible to terminate the services with one month snotice or payment in lieu thereof without assigning any reason, it isnot open to the employer to exercise that power in an arbitiary orcapricious manner and the bona fides as well as the justifiability of theemployer s act can be enquired into by the Tribunals constitutedunder the Industrial Disputes Act. I do not think that that principlecan be extended to matters of army discipline. In my opinion, anyalleged violation of natural justice in the matter of dismissal or removal from service does not confer a justiciable right on the persons subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 ( 4 ) IN the result, this petition must fail and is dismissed with noorder as to costs.