J. S. Bedi,j. ( 1 ) THIS judgment will dispose of 17 Letters Patent appeals Nos. 55-D, 70-D to 73-D, 76-D to 81-D and 83-D to 88-D of 1966 filed under clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the oder dated 7th Aprl 1966, of S. K. Kapur, J. dismissing the writ. petition cf the appellants. ( 2 ) THE fasts in all these appeals are almost similar It would therefore, be convenient to refer to facts as set out in L. P. A. No. 55-D preferred by Bhagwan Das. He brought a writ petition in this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution praying for a suitable writ or order restraining the respondent, the New Delhi Municipal Committe, from interfering with his trade. According to his averments, the appellant was a sallar of potato. chips and squatted at a site in a corner of Odeon Cinema Hall, Connaught Place, New Delhi. The site was an open ground and not a part of public street and his watres did not in any manner interfere with the traffic or cause any inconvenience to members of the public. It was stated that he had been carring on this trade at the aforesaid site since 1946. In 1953 all the squatters within the area of the respondent-committee formed themselves into an association to press their demands for the grant of licences. After a considerable deal of. efforts, on 14th may 1963, Shri Gajraj Singh President of the respondent-committee made a press announcement that all squatters and stall holders within the area of the respondent-committee, who had been squatting or holding stalls since 1957, would be granted licences. In pursuance thereof a survey was carried out and a list of all such squatters etc. , was prepared wherein the appellant name also apeared. On 23th December, 1963,the respondent committee passed a resolution for the grant of licences to all the squatters/ stall holeers as mentioned above. The appellant was accordingly granted a. licence to run his potato-chips shop at-a- monthly fee-of Rs. 25. 00 and was alloted a site REFERRED TO above. However, sometime in July 1964, the respondent-committee wanted to impose a condition that the still-holders, who had been granted licences, should remove their stalls everyday. after sunset and re-establish after sunrise which was challenged by the stall-holders by way of writ petitions and civil suits. 25. 00 and was alloted a site REFERRED TO above. However, sometime in July 1964, the respondent-committee wanted to impose a condition that the still-holders, who had been granted licences, should remove their stalls everyday. after sunset and re-establish after sunrise which was challenged by the stall-holders by way of writ petitions and civil suits. This was resented by the respondent-committee who, as a retaliatory measure, stopped accepting licence-fee from any stall-holder or squatter. Ultimately, most of the stall-holders withdrew their cases on assurances being given by the respondent-committee that they would not be disturbed in their trade. Thereafter the respondent committee called upon. the squattars and stall-holders to submit declarations to the effect that they had paid tehbazari fee upto 30th June 1965, that they had been allotted alternative accommodation and that, therefore, they had ceased to squat on the previous site and would not seek any reference in a Court of law pertaining to their squatting right. Acting on the aforesaid assurance, the appellant and others duly submitted this declaration and the respondent-committee in return assured that the tehbaiari fee would be accepted from them and alternative aceornmodation would also be provided to them. Until such accommodation Was provided they would not be disturbed in their trade at the respective sites. In terms of the above, the appellant paid a sum of Rs. 300. 00 as licence fee upto 30th Jane 1965. It is aileged that although alternative sites to a large number of squatters had been allotted in Ramakrishan Puram, yet he was not allotted any site and his licence was also not renewed beyond 30th June, 1965. The appellant maintained that the above act of the respondent-committee amounted to infringement of his fundamental right of carring on trade. All that the respondent-committee could do was to regulate his trade under section 173 of the Punjab Municipal Act (as extended to. Delhi ). It was further alleged that no resolution was passed by the respondent- committee annulling the licence nor any notice was given to the appellant. The action of the committee was said to bs without jurisdiction, illegal and arbitrary. ( 3 ) THE respondent-committee resisted the petition and filed an affidavit of Shri B. S. Sexana, its secretary, in which some preliminary objections were taken. The action of the committee was said to bs without jurisdiction, illegal and arbitrary. ( 3 ) THE respondent-committee resisted the petition and filed an affidavit of Shri B. S. Sexana, its secretary, in which some preliminary objections were taken. It was said that the petition was misconceived and was made on grave misconception of the statute of the Punjab Municipal Act and further that equally efficacious remedy was available to the petitioner-appellant in a civil Court, The question whether he was entitled to any relief could not be decided without recording evidence of the parties which could not be done in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. Besides, the said question was disputed question of fact. It was denied that any fundamental right of the appellant had been violated. The restriction which the committee imposed was reasonable and within the four corners of the powers conferred on it by the Punjab Municipal Act. It was also averred that the petitioner was only granted a temporary fehbazari permit under the Tehbazari permit Scheme evolved vide resolution of the Committee dated 20th December, 1963 and according to condition No. 2 of the said scheme, the respondent-committee reserved the right to cancel the permit without assinging any reason whatsoever as the said permit did not confer any right in the property. In any case the appellant had no permission to carry on his business which had since been banned vide resolution of the Committee dated 30th April, 1965, and that the petitioner was carrying on business in violaton of sepcific resolution passed by the Committee under section 173 of the Punjab Municipal Act. Further, the appellant had not come with clean hands in Court and had intentionally suppressed material facts, and was guilty of the abuse of process of Court which fact alone was sufficient to disentitle the petitioner from the relief claimed by him. ( 4 ) THE petition was challenged on merits alao. It was stated in the affidavit that it was made clear that the holder was not to entitle himself to any alternate accommodation and that the sites were to be marked by the respondent-committee. The. conditions under. which the permit was granted were also embodied in the permit These permits were to enure for day time only (as per resolution of the committee dated 13th March, 1964 ). The. conditions under. which the permit was granted were also embodied in the permit These permits were to enure for day time only (as per resolution of the committee dated 13th March, 1964 ). It was, hower, noticed by the respondent-committee that the permit-holders did not. comply with the condition under which they were issued. In order, therefore, to enforce these conditions, specially against the tirpaulin sheds and night-stays, raids v/ere conducted and trpaulin sheas of various squatters were removed. The goods of those who stayed on sight at night were also removed. It was then stated that under the existingby laws of the Committee, framed under the Punjab Muncipal Act and prevention of Food Adulteration Act sale of cooked food-stuff on road-berms cold not be licenced because of practical difficulties. Sale of cooked food e. g. alu-ki-tikia, kulche chhole, tea, biscuites, allowed under the tehbazari scheme was trial measure which did not prove satisfactory. After considering the whole matter "the committee in its resolution dated 30th April, 1965, decided to ban sale of such food. Therefore, no permit could be issued to any person thereafter and any person carrying on the said business was a trespasser. ( 5 ) MR. Saxena ;in his affidavit also stated that the appellant had submitted a declaration that he had ceased to squat in the area of the respondent-committe and that he would not-restall in the. said area. The appellant did not apply for allottment of alternate accommodation in Rama Krishna puram but asked for change of trade within the committee s limits. The place where ha squated, being a public place, the appellant could not be permitted to squat there. ( 6 ) AT the very outsetit was conceded that the facts of this case were similer to the one disposed of by the Division Bench of this Court in Sardar Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committed. The case was argued at considerable length by the parties but the points raised were almost the same which had been brought before the Divison Bench in the above-mentioned case. The case was argued at considerable length by the parties but the points raised were almost the same which had been brought before the Divison Bench in the above-mentioned case. Before dealing with this cae, it has to be kept in mind that the tehbazari permits were allowed to the appellant and others on the following terms and conditions :- " (1) That the permit shall be considered as a temporary one and the same shall not entitle the hawkers/squatters to any alternate accomodation and he shall be bouhd to abide by other by laws framed by the Committee under the Punjab Municipal Act or any other corresponding Act. (2) The committee reserves the right to cancel the permit without assigning any reason whatsoever. (3) That the hawker/squatter shall pay every month permit fee to be fixed by the Committee and the same shall be payable in advance. (4) In case, the hawker/squatter makes any of monthly fees or commits any breach default in the payment/with respect to any municipal by laws, the permit shall be deemed to be cancelled automatically. (5) That the hawker/squatter shall be entitled to vend goods at the specified site only and during such hours as may be prescribed. (6) The hawker/ squatter shall also put on the uniform and badges and use Rehri/box as may be prescribed by the Committee from time to time. (7) The hawker/squatter shall not set up any permanent or semipermanent structure on the site so allotted to him. (8 ). The hawker/squatter shall keep the site clean to the satisfaction of the authorities concerned. (9) This permit is non-transferable. (10) The permission for the use of road-berm shall under no circumstances be deemed to be a licence either under the prevention of Food Adulteration Act or any other by laws framed under the Punjab Municipal Act. (11) This temporary permit will be for day time only from sunrise to sunset, and the site must be left clear during night. " ( 7 ) AS would be evident from. above, the respondent committee has wide powers to issue or not to issue such permits and the committee has the right to cancel it without assigning any reasons whatsoever It is also clear from the terms [and conditions mentioned above that the person who possesses such a licence cannot as a matter of right claim any alternative accommodation. above, the respondent committee has wide powers to issue or not to issue such permits and the committee has the right to cancel it without assigning any reasons whatsoever It is also clear from the terms [and conditions mentioned above that the person who possesses such a licence cannot as a matter of right claim any alternative accommodation. The main argument of the appellant s counsel was that the resolution, dated 30th April, 1965, was ultra vires and that the licence was renewable. The respondent-committee therefore, could not cancel the permit under the provisions of section 173 of the Punjab Municipal Act. Operative part of this section runs as under:- "73 (1) The commitee may grant permission in writing on such conditions as it may deem fit for the safety or convenience of persons passing by,or dwelling or working in the neighbourhood, and - may charge fees for such permission, and may at its discretion with draw the permission, to any person to (a) place in front of one building any movable encroachment upon the ground level of any public street or over on any sewer, drains or water course or any movable overhanging structure projecting into suco public street at a point above the said ground level. "from a perusal the above it is clear that the above argument of the argument of the appellant s counsel has no force whatsoever. ( 8 ) THE counsel for the appellant drew our attention to sections 23 and 24 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and to the Rules framed by the Chief Commissioner of Delhi under the said Act,and submitted that under section 23 (1) (b) and (e) of the Act it was only the Central Government which was competent to make rules definding the standards of quality for, and fixing the limits of variability permissible in respect of, any article of food; and for laying down special provisions for imposing rigorous control over the production, distribution and sale of any article or class of articles of food. But we agree with the observations of the learned single Judge, while discussing this point, that section 173 of the Punjab Municipal Act is entirely independent and does not restrict the powers of the Committee to exercise the same subject to any other Act. The counsel than drew our attention to section 19. But we agree with the observations of the learned single Judge, while discussing this point, that section 173 of the Punjab Municipal Act is entirely independent and does not restrict the powers of the Committee to exercise the same subject to any other Act. The counsel than drew our attention to section 19. 7 of the Punjab Municipal Act and submitt ed that this section protanto repealed section173 of the said Act and, therefore, the respondent- committee could not take any action against the appellant as it did. But these two sections are altogether for different purposes. By virtue of section 197, the committee has power to regulate the manufacture, preparation and sale of food and drink, and section 173 empowers the committee to permit occupation of public street and to remove obstruction therefrom. These two sections are entirely independent and in no way over-ride each other. ( 9 ) THE main objection of the appellant s counsel was that although some persons were allowed alternative sites, but the appellant was not given any which showed discrimination against him and thisact of the committee violated the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution. This Article states that the state shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India". This point was also raised before the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sardar Singh. It was agitated by the appellant s counsel that out of the pre-1957 squatters 99 persons were recommended for allotment for platforms in Ramakrishna purem while 6 were recommended for allotment in Nauroji Nagar. As regards the remaining 51 persons, including the appellents, they were forced to make declarations that they were willing to change their trade and that they should be allotted such sites as would be approved by the respondent committee. The grievance of the appellant was that he was never asked whether he was willing to shift to Ramakrishana purem and if he had been so asked he would have given his option for the allotment of a site there. This contention was rejected by the Division Bench after relying upon various authorities. The respondent s counsel submitted the above contention of the appellant s counsel was incorrect and that the appellant was all the time insisting on retaining the present site. This contention was rejected by the Division Bench after relying upon various authorities. The respondent s counsel submitted the above contention of the appellant s counsel was incorrect and that the appellant was all the time insisting on retaining the present site. Annexure h to the written statement, however, entirely falsifies the contention of the appllant s counsel and clinches the issue. This was a letter written by Bhagwan Das appellant to shri Mohan Singh, senior Vice, President of the respondent committee and was dated 17th June 1965. In the first paragraph of this letter the appellant had clearly mentioned that he had been allotted a shop-space in Ramakrishna puram by the authorities and that he had been asked to shift his business there, after this, no argument of discrimination can be advanced with any justification. Moreover, it was not the respondent committee which was responsible for allotting alternative sites. It had only to make recommendations to som3 other authority. In any case, the terms of the tehbazari permits were so clear that the committee could even ask the permit-holders to vacate the premises without any alternative accommodation. ( 10 ) THE appellant s counsel was not able to show to us that the appellant had any legal right to stick on to the premises which had been infringed by the respondent-committee by ousting him under provsions of section 173 of Punjab Municipal Act. As already remarked, it is needless for us to go into lengthy discussion as most of the points taken up by the parties have been met by the Division Bench judgment in Sardar Singh s case with which we respectfully agree. Although it was alleged that that judgment was faulty, nothing of any consequence was pointed out to us in that connection. We, therefore, see no force in this appeal and dismiss the same, but we make no order as to costs. ( 11 ) THE Delhi Administration, Delhi, was at the instance of the appellant impleaded as a party to this appeal by order dated 21st June, 1966, of the learned Vacation Judge. The Delhi Administration contested this petition on the grounds, inter alia that the Administration was not made a party at any earlier stage of these proceedings, and that a large number of writ petitions made on similar grounds against the Administration had already been dismissed by this Court. The Delhi Administration contested this petition on the grounds, inter alia that the Administration was not made a party at any earlier stage of these proceedings, and that a large number of writ petitions made on similar grounds against the Administration had already been dismissed by this Court. It is,however, unnecessary to go into that point as the main appeal is being dismissed. ( 12 ) IT appears to us that the appellants in these appeals are displaced persons from Pakistan and they are likely to be thrown out from the sites under their occupation. This Court, however, expects that the authorities concerned will try to accommodate them on some alternative accommodation on humanitarian grounds. ( 13 ) I agree.