Judgment :- 1. The second appeal arises out of a suit for redemption of a mortgage; and two questions are raised by the appellant, the fourth defendant, who lost in both the lower courts. The first is that the suit property belonged exclusively to her tawazhi. 2. The main tarwad of the appellant was known as the Edamuttathu tarwad. It was partitioned into two branches; and one of the branches had three sub-branches or tavazhies, Kulavarathala, Pulimoodu and Kottarakonathu. The plaintiff-respondents belonged to the first tavazhi; and the appellant and the other defendants belonged to the second tavazhi. The respondents claimed that they purchased the right of the third tavazhi; and they therefore claimed redemption of two shares out of three of the mortgage and the purakatom. One of the pleas raised by the appellant was that the mortgage and the purakatom were executed by her tawazhi. a partition having taken place in the branch earlier to the mortgage and the purakatom. It is the same contention that is reiterated before me. 3. Reliance is placed by the appellant on Ex. N for this contention. Ex. N is a mortgage document, under which several individuals are given separate shares in the mortgage money. From this it is contended that the branch was already partitioned. The mere division of the mortgage money under Ex. N is not sufficient to presume that there was a partition. On the other hand, the respondents rely on Ex. G, the decree in O. S. No. 1214 of 1108. That was a suit for partition of the properties belonging to the appellant's tavazhi. The appellant and the other defendants were parties to that suit; and the present suit property was also included therein. But it is recited that the tavazhi had only a third right in the suit property. That shows that in 1108 the branch was not partitioned. Therefore, at the time of the suit mortgage and purakatom the branch could not have been partitioned; and the decision of the lower courts on this question is correct. 4. The next question urged is that the lower courts are wrong in thinking that there was an acknowledgment of the mortgage sought to be redeemed. The date of the mortgage is not known; and the respondents relied on Ex. A, a surrender of the mortgage. Ex. 4. The next question urged is that the lower courts are wrong in thinking that there was an acknowledgment of the mortgage sought to be redeemed. The date of the mortgage is not known; and the respondents relied on Ex. A, a surrender of the mortgage. Ex. A is of 1073: and the respondents claimed that that was an assignment and that it acknowledged the earlier mortgage. They also claimed that Ex. J, a written statement filed in a suit to set aside Ex. A, was itself a further acknowledgment. It may also be pointed out that there was a purakatom of 1078 evidenced by Ex. B, which can again be claimed to be an acknowledgment. The question for consideration is whether these constitute acknowledgments as decided by the lower courts. 5. Two decisions are relied on by the lower appellate court: (1) the decision of the Supreme Court in Shapoor Freedom Mazda v. Durga Prosad Chamaria (AIR. 1961 SC. 1236); and (2) the Division Bench ruling of this Court in Sankara Pillai Kunjukrishna Pillai v. Ananda Pitta Bharathi Amma (1957 KLT. 732). The counsel of the appellant draws my attention to the recent Full Bench decision of the Madras High; Court in Valliamma Champaka v. Sivathanu Pillai (AIR. 1964 Mad. 269). The argument of the counsel of the appellant is that Ex. A is not an assignment but only a release, and if so, the acknowledgment therein will not be an acknowledgment of a subsisting liability so as to give a fresh starting point for limitation. If is for this purpose that he relies on the Madras Full Bench ruling. 6. Even if the contention of the appellant's counsel is accepted that Ex. A is not an assignment but only a surrender, still the appellant cannot succeed, since the Division Bench ruling of this Court is against her. At any rate, since the question has been argued at some length, I propose to consider the question. 7. 6. Even if the contention of the appellant's counsel is accepted that Ex. A is not an assignment but only a surrender, still the appellant cannot succeed, since the Division Bench ruling of this Court is against her. At any rate, since the question has been argued at some length, I propose to consider the question. 7. The Supreme Court says that acknowledgment must relate to "a present subsisting liability", though the exact nature or the specific character of the said liability may not be indicated in words; and that the words used in the acknowledgment must indicate the existence of jural relationship between the parties such as that of debtor and creditor and it must appear that the statement is made with the intention to admit such jural relationship. The Supreme Court says further that stated generally, courts lean in favour of a liberal construction of such statements, though it does not mean that where no admission is made one should be inferred, or where a statement is made clearly without intending to admit the existence of jural relationship, such intention could be fastened on the maker of the statement by an involved or far-fetched process of reasoning. The Madras Full Bench was dealing with a case of a co-mortgagor redeeming the mortgage and the other co-mortgagor subsequently trying to get his share of the mortgaged property. The Full Bench said that in such a case the reference to the mortgage in the surrender taken by the co-mortgagor would not constitute an acknowledgment, because it was not the acknowledgment of an existing relationship. In other words, the reference was made not to continue the relationship but to terminate it. 8. The reference must be to an existing jural relationship or, in other words, a relationship which is continuing at that moment. In an assignment the relationship is continuing; and it is such continuing relationship that is transferred, so that even after the transfer the relationship continues to exist. On the other hand, in a surrender the reference to the mortgage is only a reference to a jural relationship which existed up to the surrender and which does not continue after the surrender, so that it cannot be said that the reference is to an existing jural relationship. On the other hand, in a surrender the reference to the mortgage is only a reference to a jural relationship which existed up to the surrender and which does not continue after the surrender, so that it cannot be said that the reference is to an existing jural relationship. In other words, the reference to the mortgage in a surrender is only for the purpose of extinguishing it or putting an end to it and not for the purpose of continuing it. Therefore, if the transaction is a surrender, it will not be an acknowledgment of the mortgage surrendered; whereas, if it is an assignment, it will be an acknowledgment of the mortgage assigned. 9. To this extent the position taken by the counsel of the appellant is correct; and it is accepted. Still, the decision of this Court in Sankara Pillai Kunjikrishna Pillai's case is against the contention of the appellant's counsel. A surrender or release of a mortgage can be taken only by a mortgagor or his representative and not by a stranger; and the transfer of a mortgage taken by a stranger can only be an assignment of it. The nature of a transfer taken by a person having a dual capacity, I mean a person who can be said to be a representative of the mortgagor and can also be said to be a stranger, will depend upon his intention in taking the transfer; and in such a case, the normal rule that what the court does in interpreting a document is only to gather the intention of the parties to it must apply. The surrounding circumstances always throw light on such intention; and the intention will often be reflected by the subsequent conduct of the parties. Instances are many where karnavans of tarwads have taken amounts from tavazhies or individual junior members and created mortgages in their favour. In such cases, if no special reason appears, the tavazhies or the junior members would be mortgagees simpliciter; and limitation would apply to them. Again, if a junior member or a tavazhi purchases a mortgage (takes an assignment of a mortgage) executed by the tarwad to a stranger, the assignee will also be a mortgagee. But, if the transfer taken by the tavazhi or junior member is a release or surrender of the mortgage (not an assignment), then the position is different. Again, if a junior member or a tavazhi purchases a mortgage (takes an assignment of a mortgage) executed by the tarwad to a stranger, the assignee will also be a mortgagee. But, if the transfer taken by the tavazhi or junior member is a release or surrender of the mortgage (not an assignment), then the position is different. In such a case, what the transferee gets is a special right; and the transferee is entitled to be in possession of the property until the amounts paid by it or him are repaid. No question of limitation can arise. I may also reiterate that the question whether a particular transfer is an assignment or as a surrender will depend on the intention rather than the mere nomenclature or wording of the document. 10. I shall now turn to the Division Bench ruling of this Court. There was a mortgage by a tarwad, and a surrender was taken by some of the junior members. After the surrender there was an additional charge or purakatom; and it was claimed that the surrender was really an assignment and it constituted an acknowledgment. This contention was accepted by the Division Bench. As I have already pointed out, the question whether a particular document is an assignment or a surrender will depend upon its real nature or the intention of the parties. In the Division Bench case the surrender was Ex. D; and thereafter, a subsequent purakatom evidenced by Ex. CD was taken. Construing these two documents the Division Bench held that Ex. D was an assignment, because the necessary intention was clearly reflected by Ex. CD. The same is the position in the case before me. After taking Ex. A in 1073 there was a purakatom under Ex. B in 1078. The taking of a purakatom indicates that the intention with which Ex. A was taken was only to take an assignment and not a surrender; because a purkatom or additional charge admits the existence of an earlier mortgage, while a surrender extinguishes the earlier mortgage. Therefore, construing Ex. A in the light of the subsequent conduct evidenced by Ex. B, it is clear that Ex. A was only an assignment and not a surrender. It follows that Ex. A itself was an acknowledgment and that Ex. B was a further acknowledgment, with the result that the suit was within time. Therefore, construing Ex. A in the light of the subsequent conduct evidenced by Ex. B, it is clear that Ex. A was only an assignment and not a surrender. It follows that Ex. A itself was an acknowledgment and that Ex. B was a further acknowledgment, with the result that the suit was within time. I may add that since Ex. A was itself an acknowledgment, Ex. J would also be an acknowledgment. 11. Even if the contention of the appellant is accepted that Ex. A was only a surrender, even then the persons who took the surrender being junior members of the tarwad, what they obtained was only a special right; and no question of limitation or adverse possession can arise against the tarwad. That was also decided, though not directly, by the Division Bench; and I am of the same opinion too. Thus, looking at the question in either way, there is no force in the second appeal. The second appeal is dismissed with costs. Dismissed.