Judgment :- 1. The second defendant is the appellant. The plaint property belonged to Chirutha who died on 24-12-1954. Chirutha executed Ext. A-2 will on 13-7-1943 in favour of her three brothers, plaintiff, Bappu and Kannan and her sister the second defendant in respect of all her properties. The plaint property was given to Kannam under Ext. A-2. Kannan predeceased the testator. The first defendant is the son of Kannan. The plaintiff claimed exclusive right to the plaint property on the ground that under Clause.6 of Ext. A-2 he was constituted as the residuary legatee and since the bequest in respect of the plaint property in favour of Kannan lapsed, he is entitled to claim the same. The contention of the second defendant was that the plaintiff was not constituted as residuary legatee but only a specific legatee and the plaint item should devolve on the heirs of Chirutha as on intestacy in which case the plaintiff and the second defendant should share the plaint property in equal halves. The plaintiff was granted a decree by the two courts below over-ruling the contentions of the second defendant. 2. It was under Clause.2 of Ext. A-2 that the plaint property was bequeathed to Kannan to be enjoyed by him absolutely after the death of Chirutha. Clause.3 and 4 provided for bequests in favour of the second defendant and Bappu. Under Clause.5 of the will some properties were jointly devised to Kannan, Bappu, plaintiff and the second defendant. Clause.6 3. Now the legacy under Clause.2 of Ext. A-2 lapsed by reason of the fact that Kannan predeceased the testator. The point that is raised in the appeal is whether this legacy that has lapsed goes to the plaintiff in view of Clause.6 of Ext. A-2. 4. S.105, sub-section (1) of the Succession Act is to the following effect: "If the legatee does not survive the testator, the legacy cannot take effect, but shall lapse and form part of the residue of the testator's property, unless it appears by the will that the testator intended that it should go to some other person." And the learned advocate for the appellant did not demur to the general proposition that where a legacy lapses, it forms part of the residue of the testator's property but it was contended by him that the intention of the testator to be gathered from Clause.6 of Ext. A-2 is that the plaintiff was not constituted a general residuary legatee and that the lapsed legacy did not fall into the residue allotted to the plaintiff under Clause.6 of Ext. A-2. It is not possible to accept this contention of the appellant's advocate. S.102 of the Succession Act which provides for constituting a residuary legatee says that "a residuary legatee may be constituted by any words that show an intention on the part of the testator that the person designated shall take the surplus or residue of his property". S.103 provides that "under a residuary bequest, the legatee is entitled to all property belonging to the testator at the time of his death, of which he has not made any other testamentary disposition which is capable of taking effect." In Chhabi Bai v. Chunia Bai AIR. 1935 Nagpur 239 it was observed thus. "The Indian Succession Act does not contain any formal definition of the expression residuary legatee", but its meaning is evident from S.102 and 103 of that Act. A residuary legatee is the person designated by the testator as one who will take the surplus or residue of his property; the residuary bequest implies that the legatee is entitled to all property belonging to the testator at the time of his death of which he has not made any other testamentary disposition which is capable of taking effect. So it means that whatever is not effectually disposed of goes to the residue. The rule is thus stated in Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume 39, page 949, para 1436: "Where a will contains a residuary devise, then, unless a contrary intention appears, real estate, or an interest in real estate, comprised or intended to be comprised in any specific devise which fails or becomes void by reason of the death of the devise in the lifetime of the testator, or by reason of the devise being contrary to law, or which is otherwise incapable of taking effect, is included in the residuary devise. If the will contains no residuary devise, and a specific devise fails, the devised property passes as on an intestacy. Property included in a residuary devise which lapses also passes as on an intestacy." The reason of the rule is stated by the Lord Chancellor in Easum v. Appleford 10 LJR. Ch. If the will contains no residuary devise, and a specific devise fails, the devised property passes as on an intestacy. Property included in a residuary devise which lapses also passes as on an intestacy." The reason of the rule is stated by the Lord Chancellor in Easum v. Appleford 10 LJR. Ch. 81 thus: "The general rule, that a residuary clause passes a lapsed legacy, arises from the circumstance, that the residuary clause is deemed and understood to comprise every thing not before given and bequeathed by the will. The Court gives effect to the general intention of the testator; but where the general presumption in favour of a residuary legatee is negatived, the rule does not apply. In the case of a gift to tenants in common, if one dies, the survivor does not take the whole --Cambridge v. Rons, (8 Ves. 25) and The Attorney General v. Johnstone (Ambl. 580). The residuary legatee, in order to take the whole, must be a general legatee for if the testator confines the residue to what may remain after certain deductions, the residuary legatee becomes a specific legatee." In Williams Law on Executors, Vol. 2,12th edition, page 994, it was stated: "No particular mode of expression is necessary to constitute a residuary legatee. It is sufficient, if the intention of the testator is plainly expressed in the Will, that the surplus of his estate, after payment of debts and legacies, should be taken by a person there designated." The principle of English law regarding the construction of residuary gift in a will is stated thus by Jessel, M. R. in Blight v. Hartnoll (1883) 23 Ch. D. 218 at 222: "You may have a residuary bequest in various forms; the same thing may be meant though not expressed in the same words. But however it is expressed, the effect must be that it is intended to comprise all which is not disposed of by the will. It is not a true residue if there is some part not disposed of by the will to anybody at all. There is difference between a part of the estate being undisposed of and a part being unduly disposed of. When I say a residue I mean the residue of the estate not professed to be otherwise disposed of by the will. There is difference between a part of the estate being undisposed of and a part being unduly disposed of. When I say a residue I mean the residue of the estate not professed to be otherwise disposed of by the will. If any part is not professed to be disposed of at all by the will there is no true residuary gift. The wording is not material." In In re Bagot, Paton v. Ormerod (1893) 3 Ch. D. 348 Lindley, L. J. observed thus: "Now, the residuary bequest is expressed in terms wide enough to include whatever personal estate not otherwise disposed of by her will the testatrix might have at her death, whether she knew that she had it or not. She intended whatever was hers, and was not otherwise disposed of, to go to her residuary legatee. It is true that she did not intend this particular fund to go at once to him, because she thought she had settled it already, and that, therefore, it it was not hers. She made a mistake; it was hers, and the residuary bequest in terms carried it. The effect of a residuary bequest is so fully explained in Easum v. Appleford and Blight v. Hartnoll (23 Ch. D. 218) as to render it quite unnecessary to examine the authorities on the point. The short effect of them is what I have stated. To exclude a particular portion of the personal estate of a testator, not otherwise disposed of by his will, from a bequest of his residuary personal estate, it is necessary to find an intention not to Include that portion even if it is his. If such an intention can be found effect must of course be given to it, and an intestacy will then necessarily be the consequence. If such an intention can be found effect must of course be given to it, and an intestacy will then necessarily be the consequence. In this case there is absolutely no indication of any intention to exclude this fund from the operation of the residuary bequest if the fund was the testatrix's property, which in fact it was." The law is summed up in Theobald on Wills (12th Edition), para 713, pages 221 and 222, in these terms: "If there is a residuary gift, and certain property is excepted from it which is disposed of by a later or earlier part of the will, or by a later will, the presumption is that the exception was made for the purposes of the particular disposition, and if that disposition fails the excepted property passes by the residuary gift. If, however, no disposition of the excepted property is attempted by the testator, or a codicil recognises that an attempted disposition has failed and confirms the will, the same reasoning does not apply, and the excepted property is undisposed of. Nor does it apply, if the true conclusion upon the construction of the will is, that the excepted property was excepted for all purposes. In some cases an exception has been held to except the property in question only from certain administrative powers, such as a trust for sale, and not to prevent the property from passing under the residuary gift. In order that the principle of the above cases may apply there must be on the one hand a clear residuary gift, and on the other hand an exception from it. If the testator declares his intention of disposing of certain property by codicil and then gives his residue not 'reserved to be disposed of by codicil', the only gift is a gift of limited residue, and if the excepted property is not disposed of by codicil there is no residua into which it can fall. In the same way, if the gift is of residue beyond £10,000 which sum is directed to be set apart, the residence by the force of the description used cannot include any part of the £10,000, which lapses." 5. In view of the statement of law mentioned above, the contention raised by the learned advocate for the appellant has to be answered in the light of the intention expressed by the testator in Ext. A-2. In view of the statement of law mentioned above, the contention raised by the learned advocate for the appellant has to be answered in the light of the intention expressed by the testator in Ext. A-2. The intention of the testator gatherable from Ext. A-2 is that she wanted to make a disposition of all her properties and Clause.6 makes it clear that after the disposition in favour of the second defendant, Bappu and Kannan, the remainder of her estate should be taken by the plaintiff. The learned advocate for the appellant contended that on account of the expression in Clause.6 of Ext. A-2 the legacies contained in Clause.2 to 5 are excluded from the operation of Clause.6 and on account of this expression the plaintiff is not constituted a general residuary legatee. First of all the expression hnhcri' XpIIAiv ]pdsa does not at all refer to the bequests mentioned in Clause.2 to 5 but only to the enumeration of the several assets mentioned in the earlier portion of Clause.6. even assuming that the expression taA hnhcri' XpIIAiv ]pdsa refers to the bequests in Clause.2 to 5 it cannot be said that the intention of the testator was to exclude those bequests which became incapable of taking effect from falling into the residue in Clause.6 of Ext. A-2. The language of the residuary gift in Clause.6 is wide enough to comprehend the entire residue including those assets comprised in any specific devise which failed on account of the death of the devisee in the lifetime of the testator. On a reading of the entire will I can find nothing in Ext. A-2 to come to the conclusion that the residuary gift contained in Clause.6 has been reduced to the level of a specific gift by excluding any portion of the assets of the testator from the operation of Clause.6 in Ext. A-2. Clause.6 contains a residuary bequest and the intention evidenced by the said clause is that the testator intended to make a devise of her residuary estate in favour of the plaintiff. Then the only question is whether anything is excluded from this residue. In the absence of words sufficiently definite and distinct excluding any portion of the estate of the testator from the operation of Clause.6, it is not possible to construe the gift as a specific one. Then the only question is whether anything is excluded from this residue. In the absence of words sufficiently definite and distinct excluding any portion of the estate of the testator from the operation of Clause.6, it is not possible to construe the gift as a specific one. The decisions of the courts below do not therefore call for any interference. 6. In the result, in confirmation of the decrees and judgments of the courts below, I. dismiss the second appeal but without costs. Dismissed.