Sri Nivas v. State of Rajasthan — 1966 DIGILAW 86 (RAJ)

JAGAT NARAYAN, J.—This is a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution by nine members of Deedwana Municipal Board challenging the validity of an order of the State Government superseding the Board under sec. 295(l)(b) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act 1959. 2. The last general election to the Board was held on 30.12.63. Nine out of the 14 members who were elected or co-opted belong to the Jan Sangh Party. They are the petitioners. Out of them Shri Sri Nivas Moth petitioner No. 1 was elected as chairman and Shri Hari Shankar petitioner No. 2 was elected as Vice-Chairman and the Board started functioning from 31.1.64. 3. The case of (he petitioners is that members of the Congress party who were defeated in the elections succeeded in persuading the ruling Congress party in the State to oust the Deedwana Municipal Board because it had a majority of Jan Sangh members and the Minister for Local-self Government Department tried to create ground for getting rid of the Board. First a charge sheet was served on the Chairman on 4.3.65 under sec. 63(1)(d) read with sec. 65(10) to which he submitted a reply on 20.3.65. Then a charge sheet dated 30.6.65 (annexure 4) was served on the Board asking it to show cause by 15.7.65 why it should not be superseded. It runs as follows:— "Whereas on an enquiry made by the Assistant Director of Local Bodies, Rajasthan, Jaipur it has come to the notice of the Government that the Municipal Board, Deedwana is not competent to perform the duties imposed on it under the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959. and has exceeded and abused its powers relating to the following matters, namely:— (1) Abolition of cycle tax without prior approval of the government and thereby causing a financial loss to the Board. (2) Sale of land recorded as Gair Mumkin, Cabristan which does not at all come within the definition of Nazul land and the Municipal Board was not competent to dispose of any plots. (3) Sale of land to Shri Mohan Lal Darji in contravention of Government orders dated 8.3.61 and the execution of the two sale deeds which are not according to the terms and conditions of the Government on which the Municipal Board is authorised to alienate such Nazul lands. (3) Sale of land to Shri Mohan Lal Darji in contravention of Government orders dated 8.3.61 and the execution of the two sale deeds which are not according to the terms and conditions of the Government on which the Municipal Board is authorised to alienate such Nazul lands. (4) Compounding of unauthorised constructions in contravention of the Rajasthan Municipalities (Compounding of Offiences) Rules under Boards resolution dated 19 4-64. (5) Misuse of Municipal funds by appointing counsels at Nagaur, Merta and Jodhpur without any sufficient, litigation work load relating to the Municipal Board. (6) Delegation of power to committees constituted by the Board retrospectively in contravention of the provisions of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959. I am therefore directed to serve this notice upon the Chairman and all other members of the Municipal Board Deedwana under sec. 295 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act 1959 to show cause as to why the Board should not be superseded. A written reply in this respect should be submitted to the Government on or before 15th July, 1965 explaining all that the Board has to say regarding the allegations mentioned above. It may also kindly be indicated whether the Board desires to be heard." The Board requested the Government to supply it with a copy of the report of the Assistant Director of Local Bodies referred to in the charge sheet but it was not supplied. The Assistant Director had taken away with him the records relating to matters which were the subject of the charges. These records were neither made available to the Board before it was called upon to reply to the charges, nor was the Chairman allowed to inspect them even at the hearing which the Deputy Minister gave him at Jaipur. The Chairman protested against the withholding of the record by filing an application before the Deputy Minister at the hearing on 9.9.65 (annexure 6). 4. The Chairman and members of the Board had complained to the Minister on 16.1.65 (annexure 7) that because the Board had a majority of Jan Sangh Members the Government and its officers were putting various obstacles in its way instead of being helpful, but no action was taken on this complaint. On the contrary under a notification published in the Rajasthan Gazette Extraordinary dated 19.10.65 the Board was superseded. This notification runs as follows (annexure 8)— "Local Self-Government Department ORDER Jaipur October 19, 1965. On the contrary under a notification published in the Rajasthan Gazette Extraordinary dated 19.10.65 the Board was superseded. This notification runs as follows (annexure 8)— "Local Self-Government Department ORDER Jaipur October 19, 1965. No. F.l(33) LSG/B/65.—Whereas the State Government after affording a reasonable opportunity of submitting an explanation and of being heard, as required by the proviso to clause (b) of sub-sec. (() of sec. 295 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 (Rajasthan Act 38 of 1959) and after considering the explanation and hearing the Municipal Board, Deedwana, is satisfied for the reasons specified below that the said Municipal Board, Deedwana has exceeded and abused its powers and has persistently made defaults in the performance of the duties imposed on it, by or under the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 (Rajasthan Act No. 38 of 1959):— REASONS 1. That the Municipal Board Deedwana (hereinafter called the Board) abolished the cycle tax without Government sanction and after the proposal being rejected by the Government disobeyed the Government Orders and also caused loss to the Municipal Fund. 2. That the Board sold the land recorded as Gair Mumkin Cabristan which was not a Nazool land in excess of its powers. 3. That the Board sold land to one Shri Mohanlal Darjee in contravention of Government orders and thereby abused and exceeded its powers and caused financial loss to the Board. 4. That the Board compounded the cases under sec. 170 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act 1959 in contravention of the Rajasthan Municipalities (Compounding of Offences) Rules, 1960 and thus violated the provisions of said rules. 5. That the Board appointed Vakils out of the Municipal Fund for contesting election peti- tion of the members, which was in their individual capacity and thus misused the Municipal fund. 6. That the Board delegated its powers to committees retrospectively in contravention of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959. Now therefore in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-sec. (1) of section 295 read with sub-sec. (5) of the said section, the State Government hereby :— (1) declares the Municipal Board Deedwana to be incompetent and in default and to have exceeded and abused its power ? Now therefore in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-sec. (1) of section 295 read with sub-sec. (5) of the said section, the State Government hereby :— (1) declares the Municipal Board Deedwana to be incompetent and in default and to have exceeded and abused its power ? (2) Supersedes the said Municipal Board Deedwana with immediate effect, for a period of six months or until a newly constituted Board takes over which ever is earlier, and (iii) appoints the Tehsildar Deedwana as administrator to exercise and perform the powers and duties of the said Board under the said Act in addition to his own duties till further orders. By order of the Governor B.L. Mehta Deputy Secretary to the Government." 5. The case of the petitioners is that the charges brought against the Board are without substance and the action taken by the Government in superseding the Board is unjustified, illegal and mala fide. 6. The petition was contested by the State. It was denied that the Government was actuated by ulterior motive in superseding the Board. It was also denied that reasonable opportunity to furnish an explanation was not given. It was asserted that the charges brought against the Board were proved. Some fresh allegations not incorporated in the charges served on the Board were also made. The Minister for Local Self-Government also filed an affidavit denying the mala fides. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and have perused the material on record. I may say at once that the only allegations which are relevant for the purposes of the present writ petition are those contained in the charge sheet dated 30-6 65 (annexure 4) which was served on the Board under sec. 295 and it is not open to the State Government to justify the supersession of the Board on the basis of any new allegation. It was not disputed before me that a copy of the report of the Assistant Director Local Bodies was not supplied to the Board. All that the Board was called upon to answer were the allegations contained in the charge sheet dated 30.6.65. It is well settled that if a charge is incapable of being met on account of being vague, it has to be ignored. Further a finding which is not covered by any charge is also of no effect. 8. All that the Board was called upon to answer were the allegations contained in the charge sheet dated 30.6.65. It is well settled that if a charge is incapable of being met on account of being vague, it has to be ignored. Further a finding which is not covered by any charge is also of no effect. 8. In Rama Nand vs. Divisional Mechanical Engineer, N. Rly. Bikaner (1) it was held— "Where the charges are not specific but general and vague, they throw the person completely and, if not completely, very largely, at the mercy of his accusers, and afford an almost limitless opportunity for those minded to run down a Government servant and to say what they like against him without any check whatsoever. A charge in order to be proper and in order that it may give a reasonable opportunity for defence must not be vague or general but must be clear cut and specific. The failure to observe this fundamental requirement is bound to make the inquiry a snare and a weapon of oppression instead of a safeguard for justice and fair play. In Kundal Lal vs. State of Pepsu (2) it was held— "The contents of the notice intimating the reasons of the proposed action against the president under secs. 16 and 22 should be such as to enable him effectively to meet the charges levelled against him. This can be possible only if the notice gives every possible detail of all material facts on which the charges are based and makes him understand what he is to reply and explain. He should be told in the clearest terms and with full particulars as to what his faults are." 9. The next question which arises for determination is whether the Board can be superseded on the subjective satisfaction of the State Government that the reasons mentioned in sec. 295 exist or whether in exercising its power under the section the State Government is required to act judicially and to record objective findings Sec. 295(i) runs as follows— "Sec. 295. The next question which arises for determination is whether the Board can be superseded on the subjective satisfaction of the State Government that the reasons mentioned in sec. 295 exist or whether in exercising its power under the section the State Government is required to act judicially and to record objective findings Sec. 295(i) runs as follows— "Sec. 295. Power of Government to dissolve or supersede board in case of incompetency—(1) If at any time the State Government is satisfied that the board is not competent to perform, or persistently makes default in the performance of, the duties imposed on it by or under this act or otherwise by law or has exceeded or abused its powers the State Government may by an order published along with the reasons thereof in the official Gazette, declare, the board to be incompetent or in default or to have exceeded or abused its powers as the case may be and may— (a) dissolve such board as from a date to be specified in the order of dissolution, or (b) supersede it for a period, not exceeding six months, to be specified in the order of supersession. Provided that no action shall be taken under this sub-section unless the board has been afforded a reasonable opportunity of submitting an explanation and of being heard if the board so desires: (a) Provided further that an order under cl. (a) shall not be passed— (i) unless the State Government has drawn up a statement setting out distinctly the charges against the board and sent the same for inquiry in the prescribed manner and findings to a tribunal consisting of a chairman and not less than two members constituted in the prescribed manner, or (ii) otherwise than in conformity with such findings." 10. The effect of an order of supersession is extremely drastic and puts an end to the very existence of the Municipal Board. It casts a slur on the members of the Board and is a penal action against them. In view of the grave consequences that ensue supersession the legislature made provision for issuing of a notice to the Board, affording it a reasonable opportunity of submitting an explanation and of being heard. The nature of the action under sec. It casts a slur on the members of the Board and is a penal action against them. In view of the grave consequences that ensue supersession the legislature made provision for issuing of a notice to the Board, affording it a reasonable opportunity of submitting an explanation and of being heard. The nature of the action under sec. 295 and the procedure provided for taking it leave no doubt in my mind that the State Government is required to act quasi-judicially superseding a board. Its findings must be objective and not merely subjective and are open to judicial review. 11. The provisions of sec.57 of C.P. and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922 came up for consideration before a Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Kareli Municipality vs. State(3). The provisions of that section are similar to the provisions of sec. 295 of the Rajasthan Act. The corresponding provisions of sec. 57 are reproduced below— "Sec. 57(1)—If a committee is not competent to perform or persistently makes default in the performance of the duties imposed on it or undertaken by it under this Act or any other enactment for the time being in force, or exceeds or abuses its powers to a grave extent the State Government may, by an order stating the reasons therefor published in the Official Gazette, dissolve such Committee and may order a fresh election to take place." "Sec. 57(5)—No order under sub-sec. (1) or sub-sec. (2) shall be passed until reasonable opportunity has been given to the committee to furnish an explanation." The full Bench held as follows— "The short question is that where charges have been framed and the explanation of the municipal committee is in whether the reasons given for superseding the committee can be examined by the Court. We agree with the learned Judges of the earlier D vision Bench that the Court may in its writ jurisdiction interfere if the order is mala fide, arbitrary, without jurisdiction or in utter violation of the principles of law or natural justice. We are however, not satisfied that the Court is incompetent to consider the sufficiency or adequacy of the material upon which the charges were regarded as proved. We would like to restate this part of the law again. We are however, not satisfied that the Court is incompetent to consider the sufficiency or adequacy of the material upon which the charges were regarded as proved. We would like to restate this part of the law again. The learned Judges of the earlier Division Bench quite correctly gave the four reasons on which the Court may interfere but they however, took away the effect of much that they had said before by observing as follows — "We therefore, decline to consider the sufficiency or adequacy of the material upon which the charges were regarded as proved." In our opinion, this dictum takes away the power of examining the reasons which may be entirely unrelated to the facts proved, and it is too wide and needs to be re-stated. The Central Provinces & Berar Municipalities Act, 1922 requires that supersession of a Municipal Committee maybe done when one or more of the conditions laid down in sub-sec. (2) of sec. 57 of the Act are found to exist. The reasons must have relation to those conditions and must be sufficient for the exercise of the power conferred on the Government. The Court will not examine the reasons as in an appeal, but will certainly examine them with advertence to their reasonableness and sufficiency for the legitimate exercise of the power granted to the Government. At the same time, the action of the Government has to be reasonable and the reasons for the action have to be stated, and the exercise of power can be examined to see whether in the circumstances under which it has been exercised the necessary power under the Act flows to the Government. In a democratic society it is of the essence that democratic institutions are allowed to function and not superseded on trumpery charges inadequately brought home or unreasonably accepted. The Courts will be vigilant to see that such over reaching powers are kept within the four corners of the statute granting them. We think that the fact that a reasonable opportunity to show cause has been made a condition precedent to the exercise of the power and that reasons for the supersession have to be notified to the electorate shows that there is not to be a subjective appraisal but that the reason must be sufficient under the Act and an objective test is indicated. The requirements of the law are not satisfied by accepting insufficient or inadequate reasons for supersession. We think that the Courts are at liberty to examine the reasons for this limited purpose in addition to the purposes which the learned Judges of the Division Bench (Mangal Murti & Madholkar JJ.) have already indicated in their order." I am in respectful agreement with the above observations. 12. The provisions of sec. 57 of the C.P. and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922 were also considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Radeshyam vs. State of Madhya Pradesh(4). It was held that the procedure prescribed for taking action under sec. 57 was a quasi-Judicial one. 13. Sec. 295 speaks of— (a) incompetence to perform its duties, (b) persistent default in performing its duties, (c) exceeding its powers, (d) abusing its powers. The same act may fall under more than one of the above heads. But in order that the Board may have reasonable opportunity to explain, the State Government should normally indicate about each act separately whether it proves incompetence or whether it shows persistent default or whether it amounts to exceeding its powers or to abusing its powers. There is a clear distinction between exceeding its powers by the Board and abusing them. The Board exceeds its powers where it does something which it is not authorised to do. But it can be said to abuse its powers only when it is shown that the power was used for an ulterior purpose. The Board may abuse its powers without exceeding them. 14. In the show cause notice it was stated that (1) the Board was incompetent to perform its duties, and (2) it had exceeded and abused its powers. 15. But in the statement of allegations accompanying the notice it was no where alleged that any power was abused, that is used for an ulterior motive. It is thus clear that all that was really alleged was that the Board was incompetent to perform its duties and had exceeded its powers. 16. The finding of the State Government on the other hand was that : (1) the Board has exceeded and abused its powers, and (2) it had persistently made defaults in the performance of its duties. In the show cause notice it was not alleged that the Board had persistently made defaults in the performance of its duties. 17. 16. The finding of the State Government on the other hand was that : (1) the Board has exceeded and abused its powers, and (2) it had persistently made defaults in the performance of its duties. In the show cause notice it was not alleged that the Board had persistently made defaults in the performance of its duties. 17. Now I proceed to deal with the charges one by one in the light of the observations made above. Charge No.1. Abolition of cycle tax without prior approval of the Government and thereby causing a financial loss to the Board. 18. The facts relevant to the charge are that on 7.3.64 the Board passed a resolution abolishing cycle tax. The Board did not think that it was necessary to obtain the sanction of the State Government before it could abolish the cycle tax. But in the audit report dated 14.8.64 it was stated that the Board could not abolish cycle tax without the sanction of the State Government. When this report was received the Board moved the Government for sanction. Sanction was refused by the Government vide its letter dated 16.2.65. The Board again passed a resolution on 23.2.65 requesting the Government to reconsider its decision. It was pointed out that Deedwana was a small town having regard to the expenditure incurred in collecting cycle tax it was not worth while levying it. The Government again turned down the request of the Board under its letter dated 15.5.65. The Board then passed a resolution on 23.5.65 deciding to levy cycle tax with effect from 1.4.65. 19. By the time a reply from the State Government was received under letter dated 16.2.65 the financial year 1964-65 had practically run. That is why the Board decided to levy cycle tax from 1.4.65 only. 20. So far as the legal position is concerned it was not necessary for the Board to obtain prior approval of the State Government before abolishing cycle tax. Under the Act taxes are classified into two classes: (1) Obligatory taxes imposed under sec. 104 by the State Government and collected by the Board, and (2) Other taxes that may be imposed under sec. 105. Cycle tax comes under the latter category as it falls under sec. 105(1) (1). Sec. 108 provides that before imposing a tax the proposal to do so should be published and objections invited against it. 104 by the State Government and collected by the Board, and (2) Other taxes that may be imposed under sec. 105. Cycle tax comes under the latter category as it falls under sec. 105(1) (1). Sec. 108 provides that before imposing a tax the proposal to do so should be published and objections invited against it. If any objection is filed the Board is required to consider it. It may either drop the proposal or if it is still of the opinion that the tax should be levied it is required to forward the proposal alongwith the objections to an officer appointed under sec. 108(c). That officer is required to forward the proposal and the objections to the Government under sec. 109. It is open to the Government either to sanction the proposals, to reject them or modify them. It is clear from these provisions that if no objection is filed against the imposition of the tax it can be imposed by the Board without the sanction of the State Government. Sec. 112 lays down the procedure for altering taxes. It runs: "Procedure for altering taxes. The procedure for abolishing or altering a tax imposed under sec.105 shall so far as may be, be the procedure prescribed by sec. 108 to 111 for its imposition. 21. It is clear from the wordings of the above section that it is not necessary to go through the entire procedure prescribed for imposing a tax in every case, where it is sought to alter it. It depends on the nature of the alteration. Imposition of tax is a quasi-judicial matter. If it is proposed to impose a tax or to alter it so as to enhance it the persons affected adversely thereby are to be given an opportunity of objecting. But if it is intended to alter a tax by reducing it or by abolishing it altogether the inhabitants are not affected adversely and it is not necessary to invite objections against a proposal to reduce or abolish a tax. As has been pointed out above it is only necessary to obtain the sanction of the State Govt. under sec. 109 to the imposition of a tax if an objection is filed against. It follows that the sanction of the State Government is not necessary if a tax is reduced or abolished. As has been pointed out above it is only necessary to obtain the sanction of the State Govt. under sec. 109 to the imposition of a tax if an objection is filed against. It follows that the sanction of the State Government is not necessary if a tax is reduced or abolished. There is no provision in the Act for obtaining the sanction of the State Government for reducing a tax, or abolishing a tax. On the contrary express power is conferred under sec. 89 on the Board to suspend, modify, reduce or abolish a tax imposed under sec. 105. 22. It will thus be seen that the Board was competent to abolish the cycle tax without obtaining the sanction of the State Government. This charge is therefore not made-out against the board. Charge No. 6.—Delegation of powers to committees constituted by the Board retrospectively in contravention of the provisions of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959. 23. On 13.2.64 the Board constituted some committees under sec. 73(5), but inadvertantly omitted to pass a resolution under sec. 78 delegating powers, duties and functions to the committees. All these committees however started functioning. A resolution delegating powers to them was passed by the Board on 19.4.64. At the time of passing this resolution the Board ratified all the proceedings of the committees which had taken place till then without express delegation. This validated all the proceedings in view of sec. 196 of the Contract Act which runs as follows: "Where acts are done by one person on behalf of another but without his knowledge or authority he may elect to ratify or to disown such acts. If he ratify them the same effects will follow as if they had been performed by his authority." 24. The act of the Board in so ratifying the proceedings was thus perfectly legal and validated the proceedings of the committees. It is quite wrong to say that any contravention of any provision of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act 1959 was made by the Board in this respect. 25. This charge is also therefore not proved. Charge No.5. Misuse of municipal funds by appointing counsels at Nagaur Merta and Jodhpur without any sufficient litigation work load relating to the Municipal Board. 26. It is quite wrong to say that any contravention of any provision of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act 1959 was made by the Board in this respect. 25. This charge is also therefore not proved. Charge No.5. Misuse of municipal funds by appointing counsels at Nagaur Merta and Jodhpur without any sufficient litigation work load relating to the Municipal Board. 26. The allegation implicit in this charge was that standing counsel were appointed by the Board at Nagaur, Merta and Jodhpur, in spite of the fact that there was not sufficient work for them. The Board explained that standing counsel was appointed only at Nagaur because appeals from the decision of the Board lie to the Collector and there are always a large number of cases pending there so that it is more economical to have a standing counsel. This explanation was accepted by the Government. 27. As for Merta it was explained that a civil suit had been filed against the Board of valuation over Rs. 14,000/- and a lawyer was engaged in that case to defend it as the Board had a good case. This explanation was also accepted by the Government. 28. As for Jodhpur it was explained that a writ petition was filed by one Gulam Rasul challenging the validity of the general election to the Board held on 30.12.63 on the ground that the delimitation of the Municipality was not proper. The Board passed a resolution that it should contest the writ petition by engaging a lawyer as a fresh election would involve a lot of unnecessary expense. An application was accordingly made by the lawyer who was engaged praying that the Municipal Board Deedwana may be impleaded as a party. This application was allowed by the Court. Thereafter the Board prayed that the State of Rajasthan should also be impleaded as a party. The Court thereupon directed the petitioner to implead the State as well. The Government did not accept this explanation and recorded the following finding: That the Board appointed Vakil out of the Municipal fund for contesting election petition of the members which was in their individual capacity and thus misued the municipal fund. 29. In my opinion the Board acted properly in deciding to contest the writ petition in which the delimitation of the Municipality was challenged and in engaging a lawyer for that purpose at its expense. 29. In my opinion the Board acted properly in deciding to contest the writ petition in which the delimitation of the Municipality was challenged and in engaging a lawyer for that purpose at its expense. The money spent for engaging the lawyer was a legitimate expenditure which was incurred and the Board cannot be said to have misused municipal funds. 30. This charge is also not made out. Charge No.2: Sale of land recorded as Ghair Mumkin Qabristan which was not a Nazul land in excess of its powers. 31. The Development, Sale and Lease sub-committee auctioned 5 plots after public notice on 13.4.64 and sent the papers for the approval to the Collector as required under see. 80(2) The Collector did not sanction the sale on the ground that the land was recorded as agricultural land which had not been converted into abadi. The Committee was not aware of this fact. When the matter came to the notice of the Board it applied for the conversion of the land into abadi land under the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act. The Collector made a local inspection and sanctioned the conversion. 32. The above land is part of plot No. 796. The area of this plot is 72-3/4 Bighas. According to revenue records 18| Bighas of it is already recorded as abadi land. The land was in Gadha Dham Panchayat till 5.2.63. Pattas of plots out of this land were issued both by the Panchayat as well as by the Tehsildar in the past. In auctioning the land the committee of the Board committed a very minor irregularity of a technical nature. The Board had earlier written to the revenue authorities to supply a plan showing Nazul lands but no action was taken by them on this matter. 33. As the sale has not been approved by the Collector it has not taken place. It cannot therefore be said that the Municipal Board actually sold any land which was not Nasul land. It certainly attempted to sell it under the circumstances pointed out above. 34. It was contended on behalf of the Board that even the small technical irregularity in auctioning the land in, ignorance of the fact that it had not been converted into abadi was committed by a committee of the Board and not by the Board itself and the latter cannot be held responsible for it. 34. It was contended on behalf of the Board that even the small technical irregularity in auctioning the land in, ignorance of the fact that it had not been converted into abadi was committed by a committee of the Board and not by the Board itself and the latter cannot be held responsible for it. Reliance was placed on the judgment of Nowasker, J. in Maursinha vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (5). The other learned Judge who constituted the Bench did not agree with him on this point. However so far as the Rajasthan Act is concerned I am of the view that the Board must bear the responsibility for the acts of its committee as it exercises supervisory powers over it under sec. 77(1). Charge No. 3—Sale of land to Shri Mohanlal Darji in contravention of Government orders dated 8.3.61 and the execution of the two sale-deeds which are not according to the terms and conditions of the Government on which the Municipal Board is authorised to alienate such Nazul land. 35. The only contravention of the Government order dated 8.3.61 pointed out in the above charge was that the sale-deeds were not according to the terms and conditions laid down in the Government order. 36. A plot of land was allotted to Mohanlal Darji under notification No. F.7 (187) LSG/53, dated March 8, 1961 under clause 2(i) (ii)which runs: "The land at fixed price may be alloted to the following categories of persons: (ii) Those persons who do not pay income tax. Sub-clause (k) of clause 2 lays down that every allotment of land at a fixed price shall be subject to the condition that the purchaser shall have to complete the construction of the house within the period of two years from the date of allotment and the land so allotted shall not be transferables by the allottees till such construction. 37. The Above condition was not incorporated in the two sale-deeds of the plots which were executed by the Chairman. The Chairman certainly contravened the above sub-clause by not incorporating it in the sale-deed. But the Board cannot be held responsible for this act of the Chairman, as it is no part of the duty of the Board to execute a sale-deed. The charge that the Board contravened the Government order dated 8.3.61 is therefore not made out. 38. The Chairman certainly contravened the above sub-clause by not incorporating it in the sale-deed. But the Board cannot be held responsible for this act of the Chairman, as it is no part of the duty of the Board to execute a sale-deed. The charge that the Board contravened the Government order dated 8.3.61 is therefore not made out. 38. The finding recorded by the Government on the above charge runs as follows: "That the Board sold land to one Shri Mohan Lal Darji in contravention of Government orders and thereby abused and exceeded its powers and caused financial loss to the Board." 39. The finding that the Board abused and exceeded its powers and caused financial loss to the Board goes beyond the charge and is of no effect. In the charge no allegation was made that the allotment was made to Mohanlal Darji with an ulterior motive. 40. The allotment of land to Shri Mohanlal Darji was made at the price fixed by the committee appointed under the notification dated March 8, 1961. Charge No. 4—Compounding of unauthorised constructions in contravention of the Rajasthan Municipalities (Compounding of Offences) Rules 1960 under Boards resolution dated 19.4.64. 41. Under resolution No. 11 dated 19.4.64 the Board decided not to prosecute the following persons under sec. 170 on their agreeing to pay a sum of Rs. 25/- each by way of fine: 1. Kishan Mali. 2. Govind Prasad. 3. Poonam Chand. 4. Noor Mohamad. 5. Siraram Sonar. The explanation of the Board is that it entered into compromise with the above persons as contemplated by sec. 266(a) and did not compound the offences within the meaning of sec. 266(c). It stated that the Rajasthan Municipalities (Compounding of Offences) Rules 1960 only prohibit the compounding of an offence under sec. 170 but do not prohibit a compromise. According to the Board the expression "compromise" is applicable to a case before a challan is presented in court. If a case is compromised after the challan is presented then alone it amounts to compounding. 42. 170 but do not prohibit a compromise. According to the Board the expression "compromise" is applicable to a case before a challan is presented in court. If a case is compromised after the challan is presented then alone it amounts to compounding. 42. See, 266 runs as follows: "Power to compound offences.—A board may— (a) compromise with any person who in the opinion of the board has committed an offence punishable under this Act or any bye-law thereunder and on such compromise no proceeding shall be taken against such person in respect of such offence, (b) withdraw from prosecutions instituted under this Act or under any bye-law made thereunder, (c) compound any offence against this Act or against any bye-law made thereunder which may, by rules made by the State Government be declared compoundable: Provided that the State Government may make rules to regulate the proceedings of persons empowered to compromise offences under this section." 43. The Rajasthan Municipalities (Compounding of Offences) Rules 1960 purport to have been framed in exercise of the powers conferred by sec. 297 read with clause (c) of sec. 266 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act 1859. Rule 3 of these Rules lay down that the offences punishable under the provisions of the Act and bye-laws made thereunder, except under sec. 170 and 194 shall be compoundable. 44. Three different expressions have been used by the Legislature in the three clauses of sec. 266. In clause (a) the expression "compromise" is used. In clause (b) the expression "withdraw" is used. In clause (c) the expression "compound" is used. Although the dictionary meaning of the expression "to compound" is to agree for a consideration not to prosecute, this expression is generally used for an agreement not to prosecute arrived at after the case is instituted in court. In view of this connotation the expression "compromise" naturally must mean an agreement not to prosecute which is arrived at before a case is sent to court. The Rajasthan Municipalities (Compounding of Offences) Rules, 1960 only prohibit the compounding of offences under sec. 170. They do not expressly prohibit the compromising of offences under sec. 170. The Government did not issue any circular laying down that the provisions of the Rajasthan Municipalities (Compounding of Offences) Rules 1960 are equally applicable to the compromising of offences. Nor is there any reported judgment of the High Court on this point. 170. They do not expressly prohibit the compromising of offences under sec. 170. The Government did not issue any circular laying down that the provisions of the Rajasthan Municipalities (Compounding of Offences) Rules 1960 are equally applicable to the compromising of offences. Nor is there any reported judgment of the High Court on this point. On the contrary the interpretation put by the Board on the scope of the Rajasthan Municipalities (Compounding of Offences) Rules 1960 has also been put by the author of "A Hand Book of Municipal Laws" by Shri K.C. Luhadia (See Commentary at page 403). 45. It is unnecessary for me to decide in this case as to whether the interpretation put by the Board on the provisions of the Rajasthan Municipalities (Compounding of Offences) Rules 1960 is correct or not. Suffice it to say that if the intention of these Rules was that they should equally apply to compromises or withdrawals then the Rules have not been properly worded. The interpretation put by the Board on them is a possible interpretation. If the Rules were not correctly interpreted it was a bona fide mistake on the part of the Board. 46. The result of the above scrutiny is that charges Nos. 1, 3, 5, and 6 have not been made out at all against the Board. In respect of charge No. 2 all that is proved is that a very minor technical irregularity was committed in auctioning some plots which was rectified as soon as it came to the notice of the Board. In relation to charge No. 4 if the Municipal Board committed any error at all it was a bona fide mistake in interpreting the provisions of the Rajasthan Municipalities (Compounding Offences) Rules, 1960 which are not properly worded. By enacting sec. 295 the Legislature did not intend that a drastic step like supersession of the Municipal Board should be taken for petty irregularities of this nature. 47. By enacting sec. 295 the Legislature did not intend that a drastic step like supersession of the Municipal Board should be taken for petty irregularities of this nature. 47. In Kesarimal vs. The State of Rajasthan (6) while setting aside the removal of the Chairman of a Municipal Board who belonged to the Praja Socialist party a Division Bench of this Court observed: "The constitution of local bodies was primarily intended to bring out the best talent without restriction to caste creed or party, and to educate people in the matter of civic affairs and gradually to make them fit for a co-operative effort in bringing about a welfare State and this is only possible when as was originally intended there is a minimum of interference by outside agencies and the business of the Government is to offer friendly advice and guidance rather than to come upon them for petty irregularities in matters where the bona fides of the persons who enjoy the conn dence of the electorate are not questionable." 48. I accordingly allow the writ petition with costs and quash the order of the Government dated October 19, 1965 superseding the Municipal Board of Deed-wana and appointing Tehsildar Deedwana as Administrator. Further I issue a direction to the State Government and the Tehsildar Deedwana to hand over charge of the Municipality of Deedwana to the Municipal Board Deedwana forthwith. 49. The Deputy Registrar (Judicial) is directed to issue formal orders within a week. 50. The order shall be served on the Chief Secretary to Government, on the Secretary, Local-Self-Government Department, and on the Tehsildar Deedwana.