J. S. Bedi, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision petition has cropped up from the following facts : Seth Mathra Pershad, who was defendent in this case, died during the pendency of the suit instituted by Radhey Lal petitioner. The plaintiff Radhey Lal, it may be mentioned, is the son of Mathra Pershad defendant. On the death of Mathra Pershad; Radhey Lal plaintiff applied for bringing his legal representatives on the record. Mohini Devi, widow of the deceased, in reply to the application stated that she was the only heir of Mathra Pershad as the latter had executed a will on 3rd September, 1959, in her favour by virtue of which she was the only heir of the deceased. Radhey Lal resisted that application and also the allegations made therein averring that Mathra Parshad never made any will on 3rd September, 1959. The alleged will was a forgery as Mathra Parshad, long before the execution of the will, was not of a sound and disposing mind and had a serious attack of paralysis. He was, therefore, physically incapable of signing any document. It was also stated that Ladli Parshad defendant No. 2, who was the son of Mathra Parshad, was the mukhtar-i-am of his father and was controlling the property. The will in question, according to the plaintiff, was not a free will and was the result of undue influence. It was also alleged that Mathra Parshad had signed many blank papers and Ladli Parshad forged the alleged will on one of those papers and Smt. Mohini Devi, therefore, was not the only legal representative of the deceased. The trial Judge framed the following issues :- I Whether Mohini Devi, widow of the deceased, is the only heir of the deceased ? 0. P. Resp. 2. Relief. The learned Subordinate Judge, Shri R. K. Synghal, decided issue No. I in favour of the respondent and ordered that her name be substituted in place of Mathra Parshad defendant as his legal repres tative, vide his order dated 5th February, 1965. Radhey Lal felt aggrieved and filed the present revision petition against that order in this Court. ( 2 ) I have heard arguments of the parties at considerable length. The onus of issue No. 1 was on Mohini Devi. Radhey Lal felt aggrieved and filed the present revision petition against that order in this Court. ( 2 ) I have heard arguments of the parties at considerable length. The onus of issue No. 1 was on Mohini Devi. In order to discharge the same, she examined Faquir Chand R. W. I, Ram Gopal R. W. 2 and Laxmi Narain R. W. 3, the attesting witnesses of the will. They, in unequivocal terms, stated that Mathra Parshad had executed the will in their presence and they all attested the same in the presence of Mathra Parshad. They also stated that Mathra Parshad, at that time, was of sound and disposing mind. The same is borne out from the statement of K. L. Sehgal R. W. 4. The plaintiff examined H. N. Tandon A. W. I to rebut the evidence led by the respondent who stated that he could not say definitely if the signatures on R. I, the will, of Mathra Pershad. He also stated that Mathra Parshad was not in the habit of signing blank papers. The evidence of this witness is not helpful to the plaintiff, but, in my opinion, goes against his pleas. The evidence of Goverdhan Lal A. W. 2 was also discussed by the Court below, and rightly rejected. According to this witness, Mathra Parshad was not physically fit, in the year 1959, to have executed this will. He, however, could not say whether Mathra Parshad could write or speak then. The plaintiff also produced T. R. Nanda, handwriting expert, who stated that the signatures on the will were not of Mathra Parshad. But the evidence of hand-writing expert as has been consistently held, is not helpful, firstly, for the reason that this science is not exact and, secondly, invariably a hand-writing expert supports the party who produces him in Court. Besides the witnesses mentioned above, the plaintiff also appeared in the witness-box as his own witness. I agree with the finding of the Court below that execution of the will was proved by the three attesing witnesses of the will mentioned above, against whom. nothing has been, or could be said, more so when the evidence produced by the plaintiff was also extremely weak. I agree with the finding of the Court below that execution of the will was proved by the three attesing witnesses of the will mentioned above, against whom. nothing has been, or could be said, more so when the evidence produced by the plaintiff was also extremely weak. It may also be mentioned that in the pleading the plaintiff did not categorically deny the signatures of Mathra Parshad on the will but stated that Ladli Parshad had obtained the signatures of Mathra Parshad on blank papers and on one of those parpers the will had been typed out. ( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner then submitted that the signatures of the attesting witnesses on the will were in different inks which showed that they did not attest the will at one and the same time but at different ^occasions. This is only a conjecture and no question was put to the witnesses as to how the difference in the inks, in their signatures, came to be. May be, they were having their own fountain pens and attested the will using the same. ( 4 ) ANOTHER circumstance which was pointed out to me by the petitioner s counsel was that in the original suit the execution of a registered will in 1951 was admitted and, therefore, there was no occasion for Mathra Parshad to execute another will, but when examined in Court the plaintiff-petitioner admitted that he came to know from his sister that another will had been executed in 1956. In any case, it is clear. from the statement of Radhe Lal that some will was executed after 1951 by Mathra Parshad. ( 5 ) THE counsel for the plaintiff-petitioner then submitted that according to the attesting witnesses the will was not read out to them before they signed nor was it dictated to any one. by Mathra. Parshad in their presence. But this is not required for proving the execution. of a will. It is enough if the attesting witnesses are in a position to say that the deceased put his signature on the will in their presence or they had received from the testator a personal acfaiowledgment of his signature or mark. It is not necessary that the will should, :be read to the testator in the-presence of the attesting witnesses, ln. the. It is not necessary that the will should, :be read to the testator in the-presence of the attesting witnesses, ln. the. will R. I it is mentioned that Mathra Parshad executed the will freely and after understanding the full effect of the same. ( 6 ) THE counsel for the petitioner next submitted that Mohini. Devi had died before the judgment by the Subordinate Judge was - pronounced. Therefore, the impugned judgment was anullity. . :the" respondent s counsel, on the other hand, refuted the above argument: adding that the will R. I was executed on 3rd September, 1959, by. Mathra Parshad, who died on 26th September, 1963. Arguments on the application were heard by the learned Sub-Judge on 7th January 1965 and the case was adjourned for pronouncement of the judgment. In the meantime, Mohini Devi died on 26th Jaunary, 1965. . The counsel then drew my attention to rule 6 of Order 22, Civil Procedure" Code, which lays down that notwithstanding anything. . contained: in the foregoing rules, whether the cause of action survivor or. not, there shall be no abatement by reason of the death of eitherparty between. the conclusion of the hearing and the pronouncing of the judgment,? but judgment may in such case be pronounced not with standing the death and shall have the same force arid effect as-if if had been pronounced before the death took place. The wordings of the rule are quite clear. The arguments as stated above were concluded before the. death of Mohini Devi although the orders Were pronounced after her? death. The counsel for petitioner, faced with the above, could not say anything. ( 7 ) THE petitioner s counsel lastly drew my attention to. section 2-13 of the Indian Succession Act, the. judgment of Shamsher. Bahadur J. in Kesar Singh v. Tej Kaur and of the Supreme Court in Mrs Hem Nolini v. Mrs. Isolvne Sarojbashini Bose submitted that unless a Court of competent jurisdiction in India had granted. probate of the will under which the right was claimed, or had granted letters of administration with the will or with a copy of an authenticated copy of the will annexed, Mohini Devi could not be permitted to act as: legal representative of the deceased. It would, perhaps, be better- to notice here the provisions of section 213 and 57 of the Indian Succession Act. It would, perhaps, be better- to notice here the provisions of section 213 and 57 of the Indian Succession Act. Section 213 runs as under:- "213. (1) No right as executor or legatee can be established in any court of justice unless a Court of competent jurisdiction in India has granted probate of the will under- which the right is claimed, or has granted letters of administration with the will or with a copy of an authenticated copy of the will annexed. (2) This section shall not apply in the case of wills made by Muhammadans, and shall only apply in the case of wills made by any Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina where such wills are of the classes specified in clauses (a) and (b) of section 57. " ( 8 ) SECTION 57 of the Act is in these terms :- 57. The provisions of this Part (Part VI) which are set out in Schedule III shall, subject to the restrictions and modification specified therein, apply- (a) to all wills and codicils made by any Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina, on or after the first dav of September, 18/0, within the territories which at the said date were subject to the Lt. Governor of Bengal or within the local limits of the ordinary original civil Jurisdiction of the High Courts of Judicature at Madras and Bombay, and (b) to all such wills and codicils made outside those territories and limits so far as relates to immovable property situate within those territories or limits ; and (e) to all wills and codicils made by any Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina on or after the first day of January, 1927, to which those. provisions are not applied by clauses (a) and (b) : Provided that marriage shall not revoke any such will or codicil. As would appear, clause (a) of section 57 appiles to those cases where the property and parties are situate in the territories of Bengal, Madras and Bombay, while clause (b) of this section applies to those cases where the parties are not residing in those territories but the property involved is situate within those territorries. Clause (e) of this section, however, is not relevant for the present purposes. So far as the decision of the Supreme Court in Mrs. Hom. Clause (e) of this section, however, is not relevant for the present purposes. So far as the decision of the Supreme Court in Mrs. Hom. Nalini s case mentioned above, is concerned, the parties in that case were Christians and their Lordships only considered the implications of sub-section (1) of section 213 of the Act and not of sub-section (2) of that section read with section 57, clauses (a) and (b ). The decision of Shamsher Bahadur J. in Kesar Singh s case was considered by Falshaw J.- (as he then was in Ram Chand v. Sardara Singh who differred with the view taken by Shamsher Bahadur J. in the above-mentioned case. Falshaw J. held that no probate was necessary in order to set up a claim regarding property either movable or immovable on the basis of a will excuted in the Punjab and a succession certificate could be granted on the ground of a will without obtaining probate. While referring to the decision of Shamsher Bahadur J. , in Kesar Singh s case, Falshaw J. observed that the view taken by Shamsher Bahadur J. was apparently based on the decision of a Full Bench in Gansham Dass v. Gulab Bi Rai where it was held that a defendant resisting a claim made by the plaintiff as heir-at-law could not rely in defence on a will executed in his favour at Madras in respect of property situate in Madras when the will was not probated and no letters of administration with the will annexed had been granted. The Madras case was clearly in accor dance with section 213 read with section 57 of the Act. I respectfully agree with the decision of Falshaw J. in Ram Chand s case mentiond above. To similar effect is the decision of Jai Lal J. in Sohan Singh v. Bhag Siugh To my mind, therefore, the point raised by the petitioner s counsel has no force at all. ( 9 ) NO other point was raised. This petition has no force. The same is dismissed with costs.