Research › Browse › Judgment

Kerala High Court · body

1966 DIGILAW 89 (KER)

KARUNAKARAN Nair v. RAMAKRISHNAN NAIR

1966-03-23

M.MADHAVAN NAIR

body1966
Judgment :- 1. The decree in this case is for eviction of the appellant from a leasehold granted for a commercial purpose to the 1st defendant, the assignor of the appellant. Admittedly the lessee had put up a building before December 18,1957, and was trading there. An injunction was, on the application of the plaintiff, served on the appellant in August 1959 restraining renewal, reconstruction or remodelling of the building. It is stated that at the time of the injunction the superstructure of the building had fallen down and as reconstruction was prevented by the injunction there was no building as such on the property Since 1959. The decree in the suit passed on February 8, 1961, allowed resumption of the property by the plaintiff. In execution the appellant claimed benefit of S.78 of the Kerala Act IV of 1961 which is now re-enacted as S.106 of the Act I of 1964. The Munsiff accepted that claim and disallowed recovery of property in execution; but, on appeal, the District Judge has reversed him. Hence this second appeal by the 2nd defendant. 2. Sub-section (1) of S.106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, I of 1964, which sub-section alone is relevant here, reads thus : " Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, or in any other law, or in any contract, or order or decree of court, where, on any land leased for commercial or industrial purpose the lessee has constructed buildings for such commercial or industrial purpose before the 18th December 1957, he shall not be liable to be evicted from such land, but shall be liable to pay rent under the contract of tenancy. Such rent shall be liable to be varied every twelve years on the motion of the lessor or the lessee, in such manner as may be prescribed." The District Judge has construed this to confer a benefit only on lessees whose buildings are in existence when the provision came into force. Counsel for the appellant challenges the correctness of that construction and urges that on the admission that the lessee had put up a building on the leasehold before December 18, 1957, even though that had fallen down in 1959, he is entitled to the benefit of the Section. Para.342 of the English Grammar, Composition and Usage, by J. C. Nesfield, deals with the present perfect tense of a verb thus : "The Present Perfect. Para.342 of the English Grammar, Composition and Usage, by J. C. Nesfield, deals with the present perfect tense of a verb thus : "The Present Perfect. The peculiar purport of this tense is that it invariably connects a completed event in some sense or other with the present time. I have lived twenty years in Lucknow. (That is, I am living there still, and I began to live there twenty years ago). (a) Such a sentence as the following is wrong: Babar has founded the Mogul Empire. This is wrong, because the state of things arising out of the foundation of the empire by Babar has entirely passed away. (6) The Present Perfect, since it denotes present time, cannot be qualified by any Adverb or phrase denoting past time. This would be a contradiction in terms: Incorrect Correct The rain has ceased yesterday. The rain ceased yesterday. I have finished my letter last evening. I finished my letter last evening. It follows that the expression "has constructed buildings" in S.106 connotes buildings that have been completed in construction and are continuing in existence at the relevant time. Admittedly, even on the day the Act IV of 1961, which for the first time enacted the provision, came into force, the building constructed by the lessee was not in existence. The finding of the District Judge that the 2nd defendant is not entitled to the benefit of S.78 of the Act IV of 1961 (now S.106 of the Act I of 1964) is therefore right. The second appeal fails and is dismissed, with costs. Dismissed.