Srinivasan, J.*- Against the appellant in this appeal, the respondent had obtained a decree in C.S. No. 53 of 1946 of the Penang High Court. After obtaining a certificate of non-satisfaction from that Court, the decree-holder-respondent sought to execute the decree by attaching certain properties within the jurisdiction of the District Court, Nagapattinam. The judgment-debtor contended that the decree of the High Court of Penang cannot be executed by the District Court and that the execution petition is barred by limitation. The learned District Judge held that since the High Court of Penang and the Supreme Court of the Federated Malay States have been notified by the notification of the Government of India as Courts in a reciprocating territory, the District Court could proceed with the execution by reason of section 44-A of the Civil Procedure Code. Another contention was that since the decree sought to be executed was passed on 4th January, 1954, that date would be the starting point of the period of limitation. The learned District Judge accepted the plea that as, it was not shown that the High Court of Penang had been established by Royal Charter, Article 183 of the Limitation Act would not apply. He next proceeded to hold that though the decree was passed by the High Court of Penang on 4th January, 1954, an appeal had been taken to the Supreme Court which received final disposal only on 23rd February, 1960. Limitation had to be computed only from that date and applying Article 182 (2), he concluded that the execution petition which had been presented before the District Court even on 3rd December, 1959, was not barred by limitation. The learned District Judge accordingly directed attachment proceedings to be taken. It is against this judgment of the District Court of Nagapattinam that the present appeal has been filed. After the filing of this appeal, Mr. K. Rajah Iyer, learned Counsel for the appellant-judgment-debtor, obtained an adjournment in order to enable him to apply to the Supreme Court of Malaya to set aside the decree of 1960, that is, the decree dismissing the appeal against the decree passed by the High Court of Penang. After the filing of this appeal, Mr. K. Rajah Iyer, learned Counsel for the appellant-judgment-debtor, obtained an adjournment in order to enable him to apply to the Supreme Court of Malaya to set aside the decree of 1960, that is, the decree dismissing the appeal against the decree passed by the High Court of Penang. The Supreme Court of Malaya pronounced judgment on the 21st of October, 1963, as a result of which the order made by it on the 23rd of February, 1960, purporting to dismiss the appeal against the judgment and decree of the Penang High Court now under execution, was set aside. In order to appreciate the effect of this judgment, certain further facts have to be stated. The judgment and decree obtained by the respondent was on the 4th of January, 1954. The judgment-debtor filed an appeal in the Supreme Court and sought for stay. By an order of the Supreme Court dated 31st of May, 1954, stay was granted on condition that the judgment-debtor gave security for the taxed costs;of 5453 and odd dollars and further security for the costs of the appeal in a sum of 1,000 dollars, such security to be furnished on or before the 30th day of June, 1954. Apparently, a sum of 500 dollars was paid by the judgment-debtor, which was directed to be received by the Court as security for the costs of the appeal. The terms of the conditional order were not complied with. By a further application, the judgment-debtor sought for extension of time, and time was so granted lor compliance with the conditions till the 31st day of July, 1954, and it was further ordered by the Supreme Court that " if the appellant made default in giving such security by the date aforesaid, the appeal would be dismissed with costs. Thc appellant-judgment-debtor did not avail himself of the extension of time and did not comply with the condition, but apparently no formal order of dismissal of the appeal was made at that time. On the 27th of November, 1954, the decree-holder moved the Supreme Court. In his affidafit, he stated that since the appellant had failed to comply with the conditions, the appeal stood dismissed and he sought in that application for the issue of a certificate of non-satisfaction in order to enable him to forward the judgment for execution in India. On the 27th of November, 1954, the decree-holder moved the Supreme Court. In his affidafit, he stated that since the appellant had failed to comply with the conditions, the appeal stood dismissed and he sought in that application for the issue of a certificate of non-satisfaction in order to enable him to forward the judgment for execution in India. He appears to have been granted such a certificate. As stated, he filed the execution petition in the District Court of Nagapattinam on the 3rd of December, 1959. The District Court took the petition on file but directed that the decree of the dismissal of the appeal should be furnished. It was thereafter that the decreeholder moved the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court made an order on 23rd February, 1960, to the effect "Appeal struck out." The judgment-debtor had not opposed those proceedings, though he appeared by Counsel. It would accordingly appear that the date of dismissal of the appeal by an order of the Court was 23rd February, 1960. The contention raised by the judgment-debtor was however that the dismissal was for non-prosecution and that in terms of the order that was passed by the Supreme Court granting stay, the appeal stood dismissed at least on the 30th of July, 1964, when the conditions were not complied with. It was on that footing that it was alleged that the decree was barred by limitation and could not be executed here. The learned District Judge however was not inclined to accept that plea. After the filing of the appeal in this Court, the judgment-debtor moved the Supreme Court and obtained an order setting aside the formal order dismissing the appeal dated 23rd February, 1960. The position accordingly is that the appeal was in fact dismissed by the Supreme Court of Malaya some time in 1954. Mr. Rajah Iyer, appearing for the appellant, contended that the date of dismissal of the appeal by the Supreme Court was on the 31st of July, 1954. Since the execution petition was filed in the District Court of Nagapattinam on 3rd December, 1959, it was out of time. It is claimed that it is Article 182 of the Limitation Act that applies. Since this Article provides for three years, Mr. Since the execution petition was filed in the District Court of Nagapattinam on 3rd December, 1959, it was out of time. It is claimed that it is Article 182 of the Limitation Act that applies. Since this Article provides for three years, Mr. Rajah Iyer contends, that treating the decree under execution as one passed by the District Court, Nagapattinam, the execution petition should have been filed within three years from the 31st of July, 1954. Support for this proposition is sought from a judgment of a Bench of this Court in A.A.O. No. 86 of 1961, which has since been reported in Uthamarama v. Abdul Kassim and Co.1. At this stage, we may broadly state that this decision does indeed support the proposition advanced by Mr. Rajah Iyer. That case referred to a decree of the High Court of the Colony of Singapore, dated the 2nd October, 1953. There was a supplemental judgment dated 25th May, 1954. The decree-holder filed an application in the District Court of Thanjavur on the 16th of August, 1958, obviously beyond a period of three years, computed from the date of the later of the two judgments of the foreign Court. The decision in that case was that for purposes of section 44-A of the Civil Procedure Code, which is the law in regard to the enforcement of judgments of superior Courts of foreign countries situate in reciprocal territories, the decree sought to be put into execution should be deemed to be a decree of the District Court: assuming so much, the learned Judges held that Article 182 of the Limitation Act would automatically apply. It accordingly followed that since three years had elapsed since the date of the decree, the execution petition was barred by limitation. On the other hand, the learned Advocate-General, appearing for the decree-holder, contends that where under a reciprocal arrangement the Government of this country undertook to execute decrees of foreign Courts, it would be illogical to apply rules of limitation of this country to the decree before it was brought here for execution. To do so would result in the position that even on the date on which it was filed for execution in a Court of this country, the decree had become barred. To do so would result in the position that even on the date on which it was filed for execution in a Court of this country, the decree had become barred. The learned Advocate-General refers to section 44-A(2) of the Civil Procedure Code, which states that when once a certificate from the superior Court of the reciprocal territory is produced, stating the extent to which the decree has been satisfied or adjusted, such a certificate shall be conclusive proof of the extent of such satisfaction or adjustment. The words ‘conclusive proof are emphasised by the learned Advocate-General, and he urges that the Court would not have granted a certificate unless on the date of the grant of the certificate, the decree was alive and was capable of being put into execution. The question to ask, so argues the learned Advocate-General, would be: Was the decree barred in the country of its origin on the date it was brought here for purposes of execution ? If it was so barred, then no question arises but that the Courts of this country could not also execute it. But, if it was not barred in that country, would it be logical to apply the rules of limitation of this country and deny execution? Would it not conflict with the principle of reciprocity which forms the basis of section 44-A? He has referred to certain decisions and urges that in the light of those decisions (to which we shall presently refer), the view taken by the Bench in Uthamarama v. Abdul Kassim and Company1requires reconsideration. We have carefully considered the arguments of the learned Advocate-General and we are of the view that the matter does deserve a further examination. We shall briefly record the reasons for our reaching that conclusion. Part III of the Civil Procedure Code deals with several modes in which a decree can be executed. A decree may be executed by the Court which passed it or by the Court to which it is sent for execution. The Court which passed the decree may send it for execution to another Court in certain circumstances covered by section 39 of the Code. A decree can also be sent for execution in another State. A decree may be executed by the Court which passed it or by the Court to which it is sent for execution. The Court which passed the decree may send it for execution to another Court in certain circumstances covered by section 39 of the Code. A decree can also be sent for execution in another State. The transferee Court, that is, the Court to which that decree has been sent for execution, shall have the same powers in executing the decree as if it had been passed by itself. There are other provisions which provide for execution of a decree in places to which the Code does not extend. Section 44-A deals with the execution of decrees passed by Courts in a reciprocating territory. Reciprocating territory means, “any country or territory outside India which the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette declares to be reciprocating territory for the purpose of this section.” Section 44-A provides for the execution in India of the decree of any superior Court of any reciprocating territory. Superior Courts are also defined in the notification referred to. It is only decrees of such superior Courts as have been specified in the notification that are executable in the territory of India by reason of this reciprocal arrangement. By a notification dated 3rd January, 1956, the Federation of Malaya was declared to be a reciprocating territory under section 44-A of the Code. The High Court and the Courts of Appeal of the said Federation were also declared to be superior Courts of that territory for the purpose of this section. This notification also published a notification issued by the Government of the Federation of Malaya which provided for the execution of decrees of superior Courts in India in the Courts in the territory of the Federation of Malaya. There seems to be very little doubt that by reason of this notification, the High Court of Penang and the Supreme Court of Malaya are superior Courts within the meaning of section 44-A. It is a well understood principle of law that judgment of a foreign Court cannot operate outside the country in which that Court is situate. Such a judgment can however be enforced by action in another territory, the judgment itself operating as the cause of action for the suit. Such a judgment can however be enforced by action in another territory, the judgment itself operating as the cause of action for the suit. Sections 13 and 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure deal with a suit laid on a foreign judgment. Section 13 declares a foreign judgment to be conclusive as to any matter adjudicated upon between the parties thereto, including representatives of those parties. Section 14 provides that it shall be presumed on the production of a certified copy of a foreign judgment that such a judgment was pronounced by a Court of competent jurisdiction, but such a presumption is liable to be rebutted. The conclusiveness of a foreign judgment adumbrated by section 13 is however subject to certain exceptions set down in that section. While the filing of a suit upon a foreign judgment can be regarded as more or less the normal procedure, it is open to the statute to provide otherwise, and the Code of Civil Procedure has in fact so provided for the direct execution of decrees passed by foreign Courts. By virtue of such provision, a decree passed by any of the superior Courts of a reciprocting territory can be put into execution in this country by filing a certified copy of the decree of the foreign Court, together with a certificate from such superior foreign Court stating the extent to which the decree has been satisfied. When an application is made under section 44-A of the Code in the District Court, which is the only Court armed with the powers of the execution of foreign decrees of that nature, the section provides that the decree may be executed in the State as if it had been passed by the District Court. The District Court is competent under section 44-A (3) to refuse execution of any such decree if it is shown to the satisfaction of the Court that the decree falls within any of the exceptions specified in section 13. In Uthamrama v. Abdul Kassim and Company1, a Bench of this Court had to decide two questions in relation to the execution of a foreign judgment in a District Court of this State. In Uthamrama v. Abdul Kassim and Company1, a Bench of this Court had to decide two questions in relation to the execution of a foreign judgment in a District Court of this State. These questions were (1) whether the non-submission of a certificate from the superior Court at Singapore showing the extent to which the decree is still outstanding will be a bar to the maintainability of the execution petition; and (2) whether the execution petition is barred by limitation. Some facts require to be stated in order to understand the scope of that decision. The appellant had obtained a decree in the High Court of the colony of Singapore. It was dated the 2nd of October, 1953. By a supplemental judgment dated 25th May, 1954, a partner of the respondent firm was also held liable for the entire amount. Various payments had been in partial discharge of the decree and they were all duly acknowledged by the appellant. In October, 1958, one of the partners of the respondent firm was adjudicated insolvent by the High Court of Singapore. That insolvent possessed considerable properties in this country. Some time prior to the adjudication referred to, the appellant filed an application in the District Court of West Thanjavur for executing the decree of the foreign Court. The petition was not accompanied by any certificate from the High Court of Singapore stating the extent to which the judgment remained unsatisfied. The District Judge held that by reason of the bankruptcy of the judgment-debtor, the decree could not be executed in Singapore, the country of its origin, and consequently, it could not be executed here. He further held that the application was barred by Article 182 of the Limitation Act. The appellant-decree-holder brought the matter up in appeal to this Court and on the two questions referred to, this Court held that in the absence of a certificate as required by section 44-A, the application for execution could not lie. The view taken was that whatever may be the practice obtaining in the High Court of Singapore with regard to certifying part satisfaction of money decrees and the lack of a practice to issue non-satisfaction certificates, an executing Court of this country is bound by the mandatory provisions of section 44-A (2), which requires that such a certificate shall be filed along with the certified copy of the decree. The learned Judges observed thus (at page 415): “The petition under section 44-A of the Civil Procedure Code is an original petition in an Indian Court and unless the terms of the section are satisfied, the petition cannot obviously lie. The circumstance that the High Court of Singapore has no practice of recording part satisfaction cannot justify a non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of the section. We may, however, observe that even if in that country there is no practice of recording part satisfaction, there could be no prohibition to the decree-holder applying to the Court which passed the decree for a certificate or order that the judgment remains unsatisfied either wholly or with respect to any specified amount. We are, therefore, of opinion that the application for execution cannot lie in the absence of the certificate.” So far as this part of the judgment is concerned, the present case does not involve any such defect, for, a certificate of non-satisfaction has been produced by the respondent herein. Dealing next with the question of limitation, the learned Judges pointed out that Article 117 of the Indian Limitation Act provides for a period of six years from the date of the foreign judgment for a suit to be laid thereon. They observe that the general principle is that limitation in regard to suits will be governed by lex fori and hold that the rule of limitation applicable for execution of a decree of a foreign Court will have to be found in the Limitation Act. They repelled the contention that Article 183 would govern the case. According to them, though the foreign Court might have been established by Royal Charter, in so far as the Indian Limitation Act is concerned, in interpreting Article 183, reference to a Court established by Royal Charter can only be to Courts so established in India. Dealing with this aspect of the matter, they state at page 417: “It will be noticed that the provisions of the Limitation Act is to govern suits and applications filed in this country. Prior to 1937, there was no provision by which decrees passed outside India could be executed by the Indian Courts. Dealing with this aspect of the matter, they state at page 417: “It will be noticed that the provisions of the Limitation Act is to govern suits and applications filed in this country. Prior to 1937, there was no provision by which decrees passed outside India could be executed by the Indian Courts. Therefore, Articles 182 and 183 can only apply to execution of decrees passed by the Courts of this country and the words” established by Royal Charter “ occuring in Article 183 can refer, therefore, only to such Courts established in India and not to any Court albeit established by Royal Charter outside its territory. As we have pointed out earlier, the prescribing of different periods of limitation for execution of decrees has no relation to the status or character of the Courts. If the Court is one which is specified in Article 183, the period prescribed by that provision will apply for execution of the decrees passed on its Original Side. For the reasons stared above, we are of opinion that Article 183 will not apply to execution of a foreign judgment albeit the Court in the reciprocating territory, whose judgment is sought to be executed, might have been established by Royal Charter.” Though the learned Advocate-General, appearing for the respondent decree-holder attempted to argue that the expression “ Courts established by Royal Charter” might in the context of the political conditions of India and the colony of Singapore reasonably be interpreted to include the Courts of Singapore as well, we are unable to agree. Our view upon this question also accords with the view expressed by the learned Judges in the passage extracted above. The learned Advocate-General contended that the conclusion reached by the learned Judges in the judgment referred to in holding that the period of limitation as prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act for the execution of a decree by the District Court would equally apply to foreign decrees of the kind covered by the reciprocal arrangement requires reconsideration. In order to deal effectively -with this contention, it is necessary to set out the reasoning adopted by the learned Judges in this regard. In order to deal effectively -with this contention, it is necessary to set out the reasoning adopted by the learned Judges in this regard. They observe (at page 418): “Learned Counsel for the appellant contends that Article 182 will not apply to the present case as the judgment which is now sought to be executed could not be regarded as a decree or order of a civil Court in this country. We have earlier referred to section 44-A(1), Civil Procedure Code, which states that where a certified copy of a decree of any of the superior Courts of any reciprocating territory has been filed in a District Court, the decree may be executed in the State as if it had been passed by the District Court. It would prima facie follow, particularly having regard to the fact that the Limitation Act does not provide any special period of limitation for execution of decrees of foreign Courts, that the period of limitation applicable to such cases would be the same as that which would apply for the execution of a decree of the District Court, viz., Article 182. But learned Counsel contends that it is only by a fiction that the judgment of the foreign Court is treated as a decree of the District Court for purposes of execution and that fiction cannot be extended so as to attract the provisions of the Limitation Act as well.” After dealing with certain cases which, in the opinion of the learned Judges, did not apply to the case of a foreign judgment, they proceed (at page 419); "There is no provision in the Civil Procedure Code or Limitation Act specifically providing for a limitation for execution of the decree of a foreign Court. On the other hand, section 44-A itself says that such a decree shall be executed in the State as if it had been passed by the Courts in the State. The words of the section are comprehensive enough to treat the decree itself as a decree of a Court in the State and they need not be confined so as merely to confer on the Court the powers which it would exercise in executing its own decree. The words of the section are comprehensive enough to treat the decree itself as a decree of a Court in the State and they need not be confined so as merely to confer on the Court the powers which it would exercise in executing its own decree. Section 44-A, Civil Procedure Code, creates a fiction that the decree of a superior Court of a reciprocating territory, if filed for the purpose of execution, can be executed as if it had been passed by the Courts in this country. The corollary to that fiction is that execution would not lie if in respect of a decree passed by the executing Court the period of limitation as prescribed in this country had expired. In giving effect to the legal fiction, a Court is entitled to ascertain the purpose for which the fiction has been created. The purpose being one for execution and not merely for the manner of execution, it must follow that all the incidents, including the rule of procedure that applies to execution proceedings, will attach to the decree of the foreign Court. They then refer to the effect of a legal fiction as indicated in East End Dwellings Co., Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council1, and Income-tax Commissioner v. Teja Singh2, which lay down that in construing the scope of a legal fiction, it would be proper, and even necessary, to assume all those facts on which alone the fiction could operate. They accordingly took the view that it should be assumed for the purposes of section 44-A that the District Court had actually passed the decree, and if so much was assumed, then Article 182 would apply. In that view, the decree was held to be barred by time. The learned Advocate-General argues that the interpretation placed upon the expression "as if it had been passed by the District Court" is not in consonance with the law as laid down in certain decisions. His contention is that section 44-A does not say that the foreign decree has to be deemed to be a decree passed by the District Court, but only "as if it had been passed" by the District Court. Even assuming either construction, there is still an area of doubt, for there is nothing in the section to indicate the date on which the decree could be regarded to have been passed by the District Court. Even assuming either construction, there is still an area of doubt, for there is nothing in the section to indicate the date on which the decree could be regarded to have been passed by the District Court. Whether it is the date on which the foreign Court itself passed the decree or whether the date on which the petition was filed in the District Court under section 44-A that should be regarded as the date cannot possibly be elucidated from the section as it is worded. But the broader question argued by the learned Advocate-General was, even assuming that the law of limitation is part of the law of procedure, is it proper to interpret the expression "as if it had been passed by the District Court " to lead to this result ? Before referring to the decisions cited by the learned Advocate-General, we may remark that a somewhat curious state of things would result if the view is taken that the date on which the foreign Court passed the decree is taken to be the date on which,for purposes of section 44-A, it is treated as having been passed by the District Court. The period of limitations within which proceedings in execution have to be undertaken in respect of a decree, passed by the District Court is three years. Suppose the foreign Court which passed the decree is governed by a law of limitation which provides for a much longer period of limitation for the execution of a decree say twelve years, in such an event, the foreign decree-holder would seek to execute the decree in the foreign territory, and failing realisation of the full extent of the decree may obtain a certificate of non-satisfaction in whole or in part, and seek to take advantage of the reciprocal arrangement and try to execute the decree in the Courts in India. But, if he comes to India after three years from the date of that decree, according to the decision in Uthamrama v. Abdul Kassim & Co.3, that decree would be a dead decree in so far as its executability in the reciprocating territory is concerned. It would mean, therefore, a person armed with a foreign judgment and decree cannot execute the decree in any Court in this country on a date more than three years from the date of the decree itself. It would mean, therefore, a person armed with a foreign judgment and decree cannot execute the decree in any Court in this country on a date more than three years from the date of the decree itself. Examining the question on principle, it seems difficult to conceive that when the two Governments entered into reciprocal arrangements, this result would at all have been anticipated. The requirement found in section 44-A(2) appears to us to suggest that before a Court in India proceeds to put a decree into execution, it takes care to see that the decree is executable in the country of its origin. If the decree were no longer capable of execution in the foreign territory itself, the Court which passed that decree would not issue a certificate of non-satisfaction. Such a certificate is mandatorily required by section 44-A(2) only to satisfy the executing Court of this country that the decree is still alive and is capable of being executed in the country of its origin. If any clue can reasonably be drawn from section 44-A(2), it seems to us that it was only intended to secure that decrees which were no longer alive in the country of their origin were not put into execution in the reciprocating territory. The expression ‘as if it had been passed’ occurs in more than one section of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 42 enables a Court executing a decree sent to it to have the same powers in executing such decree as if it had been passed by itself. This expression again occurs more than once in that very section, the further parts of which state: “All persons disobeying or obstructing the execution of the decree shall be punishable by such Court in the same manner as if it had passed the decree. And its order in executing such decree shall be subject to the same rules in respect of appeals as if the decree had been passed by itself.” This expression ‘as if it had been passed by itself occuring in section 44-A cannot have a meaning different from that which it has in section 42. And its order in executing such decree shall be subject to the same rules in respect of appeals as if the decree had been passed by itself.” This expression ‘as if it had been passed by itself occuring in section 44-A cannot have a meaning different from that which it has in section 42. If we examine section 42 then, in the light of the decision in Uthamrama v. Abdul Kassim and Co.1, would it mean that if the decree of a High Court were sent to a District Court for execution, it should be deemed that that decree is one which had been passed by the District Court attracting the lesser period of limitation which the law provides for the execution of a decree of a District Court? Such a construction is hardly possible. The answer may no doubt be that the Limitation Act provides for a specific period for execution of decrees passed by a High Court; but that apart, in interpretating the expression ‘as if it had been passed by itself, if the principle laid down in Uthamrama v. Abdul Kasim and Co.1, were to apply, it would lead to an inconsistent position. With respect, we are unable to agree that the expression ‘as if it had been passed’ in the context in which it appears in these sections, can be equated to ‘deemed to have been passed’. In Ramachandra v. Pichaikanni2, the question arose whether when land is sold under the provisions of the Madras Abkari Act, 1864, for arrears due by a Abkari renter, the purchaser takes the land free of all encumbrances as in the case of a sale for arrears of land revenue under the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act. Section 10 of the Abkari Act enabled the Collector to proceed against Abakari renters licensed under the Act for recovery of arrears due by them in like manner as for the recovery for arrears of land revenue. This expression “in like manner as for recovery for arrears of land revenue”, in the opinion of the learned Judges, intended only that the same procedure is to be followed, and that section 42 of the Revenue Recovery Act II of 1864, which declared that all land brought to sale on account of arrears of revenue shall be sold free of all encumbrances, could not apply in the case of sales for Abkari arrears. In Chinnaswami Mudali v. Thirumalai Pillai and the Secretary of State3, a similar expression in the Land Improvement Loans Act XIX of 1883, came to be construed. These observations are pertinent (at page 575): “In the present case, it is clear that the Collector when he attached the land and brought it to sale was attempting to recover the loan granted under section 7, clause 1(a) of the Land Improvement Loans Act. Clause 1(a) provides that the amount of loan, interest, costs, etc. shall be recovered from the borrower as if they were arrears of land revenue due by him. The question to be decided is therefore whether when the borrower’s patta land was sold under the provisions of that clause, the purchaser took it free of all encumbrances as he would do under the provisions of section 42 of Act II of 1864 in case of a sale for arrears of land revenue, or, in other words, has section 42 been extended by section 52 of the same Act to sales for recovery of loans under Act XIX of 1883? The decision in Ramachandra v. Pichaikanni 2is a clear authority for the negative of the above proposition, unless it can be shown that there is such difference between the wording of section 10 of Act II of 1864 (Madras) and of section 7, clause 1(a) of Act XIX of 1883, as to render this decision inapplicable to the present case.......... We cannot see any real difference in recovering arrears as if they were arrears of land revenue and proceeding for the recovery of them in like manner as for the recovery of arrears of land revenue.” Both of these decisions accordingly lay down that the expression meant that only the procedure was attracted and not any other incident for which a separate provision existed. A similar view was taken in the case of a sale of certain property under the Revenue Recovery Act for income-tax arrears in Kadir Mohideen Marakkayar v. Muthukrishna Ayyar1. The question was whether on a sale for arrears of income-tax, the purchaser took the property free of a pre-existing mortgage thereon. Under section 30 of the Income-tax Act II of 1886 the Collector was empowered to recover the amount as if it were arrears of land revenue or by any process applicable to recovery of a municipal or local tax. Under section 30 of the Income-tax Act II of 1886 the Collector was empowered to recover the amount as if it were arrears of land revenue or by any process applicable to recovery of a municipal or local tax. The learned Judges observe that section 30 of the Income-tax Act has not the effect of converting income-tax into an arrear of land revenue due in respect of the land, but that its effect simply is to extend the procedure prescribed by Act II of 1864 to the recovery of arrears of income-tax. They approved of the decision in Ramachandra v. Pichaikanni2. On a consideration of the entire question we are of the view that where a deeming provision might attract larger incidents, the particular expression in section 44-A(2) is not capable of being given that enlarged construction. Our consideration of the question on broad principles also leads us to the view that if such an extended meaning is given to that expression and the decree is deemed to have been passed by the District Court as on the date on which it was passed by the foreign Court, it would render the very reciprocal order wholly infructuous. This expression cannot bear a meaning different from that it can bear in other sections of the Code itself, principally section 42. For the foregoing reasons, we are of opinion that the view expressed in Uthamrama v. Abdul Kassim and Company3, requires reconsideration by a larger bench. The matter will accordingly be placed before the Honourable Chief Justice for suitable orders. In pursuance of the abovesaid Order of Reference, the appeal was heard by a Full Bench (Veeraswami, Kunhamed Kutti and Natesan, JJ.). K. Rajah Ayyar, K. Hariharan and Habib Mohammed, for Appellant. V.K. Thiruvenkatachari, D. Ramamurthi, for Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Veeraswami, J.†:- This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is directed against an order of the learned District Judge of East Thanjavur at Nagapattinam and turns on whether there is any limitation and, if so, what is it for execution by that Court of a foreign judgment of a superior Court in a reciprocating territory. The District Judge held that Article 183 of the Limitation Act, 1908, was inapplicable but Article 182 was. The District Judge held that Article 183 of the Limitation Act, 1908, was inapplicable but Article 182 was. On the view that the starting point of limitation would be the date of the order of the appellate Court in such territory, he directed execution to proceed. He also repelled a contention that execution was barred under section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure but this question is no longer reiterated. For the appellantjudgment-debtor reliance was placed on Uthamarama v. Abdul Kassim and Company3, and it was urged that on the principle of this authority, the execution petition should be held to be barred as the judgment of the foreign Court had been obtained on 4th January, 1954. Srinivasan and Ramakrishnan, JJ., who heard the appeal were of the opinion that Uthamarama v. Abdul Kassim and Company3, required reconsideration by a larger Bench. On 4th January, 1954, the respondent obtained a judgment against the appellant in the Consolidated Civil Suits Nos. 53 of 1945 and 51 of 1950 on the file of the High Court at Penang for $ 24,682-72 and costs which were taxed at $ 5,453-80. Tending an appeal of the appellant from that judgment to the Supreme Court of Federation of Malaya, the respondent made an application for a direction to the appellant to furnish on or before 30th June, 1954, security for the payment of taxed costs and a further security in a sum of $1,000 towards costs of the appeal within the same period which was ordered on 31st May, 1954. This order provided that unless the security was furnished within time, the appeal should be stayed. On the respondent’s application, again the Supreme Court by an order dated 23rd July, 1954, extended the time upto 31st July, 1954, for compliance. But this time the order stated that if the appellant should make default in giving such security by the date fixed, the appeal be dismissed with costs. The appellant defaulted with the consequence that the appeal stood dismissed on 31st July, 1954. The respondent then applied for and obtained from the Supreme Court on 7th December, 1954, a certificate of non-satisfaction of the judgment. The appellant defaulted with the consequence that the appeal stood dismissed on 31st July, 1954. The respondent then applied for and obtained from the Supreme Court on 7th December, 1954, a certificate of non-satisfaction of the judgment. No execution was levied against the appellant until 3rd December, 1959, when the respondent filed a certified copy of the foreign judgment together with the non-satisfaction certificate and an execution petition in the Court of the District Judge of East Thanjavur for attachment and sale of the appellant’s properties. On 13th July, 1960, the District Judge ordered attachment from which this appeal has arisen. In the meantime, on 19th February, 1960, the respondent applied to the Supreme Court for a formal order striking out the appeal which was given on 23rd February, 1960. When this appeal in the first instance was before Ramachandra Ayyar, C.J., and Venkataraman, J., the learned Judges adjourned it on 10th January, 1963, to enable the appellant to have the order of 23rd February, 1960, set aside. The appellant’s application was disposed of by the Supreme Court on 21st October, 1963, allowing it. While doing so, the Supreme Court set aside the earlier order dated 23rd February, 1960, and made it explicitly clear that the order of that Court dated 23rd July, 1954, was the final order and by its operation the appeal stood automatically dismissed on 31st July, 1954. The District Judge was not prepared to apply Article 183 of the Limitation Act as he was not satisfied that the High Court of Penang had been established by Royal Charter. But he took the order of the Supreme Court of Penang dated 23rd February, 1960, as the final order for the purpose of limitation and, applying Article 182(2) held that the execution petition was not barred by limitation. In the appeal, it seems to have been argued before Srinivasan and Ramakrishnan, JJ., as we see from their referring judgment that the conclusion of Ramachandra Ayyar, C.J. and Anantanarayanan, J., in Uthamarama v. Abdul Kassim and Company 1to the effect that the period of limitation as prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act for execution of a decree by the District Court would equally apply to a foreign decree of the kind covered by the reciprocal arrangement required reconsideration. The learned referring Judges indicated their view that the expression "as if it had been passed" in section 44-A of the Code of Civil Procedure could not in the context, be equated to ‘deemed to have been passed’ which, as they thought, might attract larger incidence and that, if such enlarged construction were given and the decree were deemed to have been passed by the District Court as on the date on which it was passed by the foreign Court, it would render the very reciprocal order wholly infructuous. The learned Judges, however, concurred with the view in Uthamarama v. Abdul Kassim and Company1, in so far as it held that Article 183 was not applicable if the judgment sought to be executed in India was not one rendered by a Court established by Royal Charater in the foreign reciprocating territory. "Before us the arguments for the respondent did not proceed precisely on the lines which would appear to have been addressed to the referring Bench. K. Rajah Ayyar who appears for the appellant supports the view taken in Uthamarama v. Abdul Kassim and Company1, that Article 182 applies. He contends that the words ‘as if it had been passed by the District Court’ in section 44-A of the Code of Civil Procedure mean that a foreign decree, for the purpose of execution on filing a certified copy thereof in that Court, shall be deemed to have been passed by it on the date the decree originally bears and if it be the case, limitation should be computed from that date or in any case from 3rd January, 1956, when the Government of India notified declaring the Federation of Malaya to be a reciprocating territory. Learned Counsel argues that though section 44-A does not by itself provide for limiation for execution, it is settled that by operation of International Law, the Indian Limitation Act, as part of procedure, will govern and apply to execution locally of foreign judgment. He submits that Article 182 is the proper Article and that if that is not so, Article 181 applied, the starting point for limitation being the date on which the non-satisfaction certificate was obtained by the respondent from the foreign Court whence according to Mr. Rajah Ayyar the right to apply for execution accrued. On the other hand, Mr. He submits that Article 182 is the proper Article and that if that is not so, Article 181 applied, the starting point for limitation being the date on which the non-satisfaction certificate was obtained by the respondent from the foreign Court whence according to Mr. Rajah Ayyar the right to apply for execution accrued. On the other hand, Mr. V.K. Thiruvenkatachari for the respondent urges that whatever be the effect of the words ‘as if it had been passed’ in section 44-A and assuming that the law of limitation, as part of procedure, applies to execution proceedings in the executing Courts in India, there is nothing in section 44-A or its legislative history or any other provision of India law to warrant the view that the Indian Limitation Act will apply to execution of a foreign judgment even before it had been filed in a District Court in India. He also contends that, in any case the proper Article which is applicable is Article 183 and that if that be not so, on the same logic neither Article 182 will be applicable so that one is left with. Article 181. He would however recognise that to be consistent with the principle of reciprocity, it would be open to a judgment-debtor to show under section 47, Civil Procedure Code, to the executing Court in India that between the date of the non-satisfaction certificate in relation to the foreign judgment and the date of its filing in and execution by that Court the foreign judgment or decree became barred by limitation in the country of its origin or otherwise stood partly or wholly satisfied or discharged. We take it as incontrovertible under the common law that a foreign judgment or decree does not operate proprior vigore in this country and is not capable of automatic execution by the Indian Courts. Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure defines a foreign judgment as one of a foreign Court which obviously is a Court situate outside the limits of India and has neither been established or continued by the President of the Indian Union nor has authority in India. Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure defines a foreign judgment as one of a foreign Court which obviously is a Court situate outside the limits of India and has neither been established or continued by the President of the Indian Union nor has authority in India. While a decree of an Indian Court is enforced by proceedings in execution, a foreign judgment, until the enactment of sections 44 and 44-A of the Code, could only be enforced by a suit upon that judgment, subject, however, to the provisions of section 13 of the Code. But the Indian Courts are not bound in every case to take notice of a foreign judgment in a suit to enforce it and it is always open to them to decline to recognise it on grounds of policy. Article 117 of the Indian Limitation Act prescribed a. period of limitation for institution of a suit to enforce a foreign judgment, namely, six years from the date of such judgment. Before we refer to certain exceptions to the common law rule of inexecutability of foreign judgments by the Indian Court except by an action, introduced in the Code of Civil Procedure in stages, it will be useful to notice the position in the United Kingdom of foreign judgments or decrees. The Judgments Extension Act, 1868 was the first in point of time to be enacted by the British Parliament which made certain judgments of the Supreior Courts of Scotland and Ireland effective in the United Kingdom. Before that Act, the only way to enforce such judgments in the United Kingdom was by institution of suits on them. After the Act, the executability of such judgments in the United Kingdom was permitted on a system of registration with the British Courts by means of a certificate that the particular judgment had been obtained in a Superior Court in Scotland or Ireland. The foreign judgment, when so registered, was regarded as extended judgment for purposes of execution but was made subject to certain restrictions. Next came the Administration of Justice Act, 1920 which extended the facility of execution in the United Kingdom of foreign judgments to such judgments obtained in a Superior Court in any of the British dominions. The foreign judgment, when so registered, was regarded as extended judgment for purposes of execution but was made subject to certain restrictions. Next came the Administration of Justice Act, 1920 which extended the facility of execution in the United Kingdom of foreign judgments to such judgments obtained in a Superior Court in any of the British dominions. The judgment-creditor within twelve years: of the judgment could apply to the High Court in England or Ireland for registration and the High Court in its discretion could allow or refuse the application. The registration was, therefore, not as of right unlike under the earlier Act of 1868. Further the 1920 Act provided for certain conditions or restrictions for registration. some of which were analogous to those mentioned in section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure in this country. Once a foreign judgment of a Dominion was registered at the British High Court, it was regarded to have the same force as if it had been initially obtained in the registering Court. The Act of 1920 allowed registration only if its provisions had been extended by an Order-in-Council to the Dominion in which a Superior Court passed the judgment. Registration was thus based on reciprocity. In 1933 the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal and Enforcement) Act came into force, the effect of which was to extend the provision for registration to foreign judgments of Superior Courts in foreign countries even outside the Dominions But the extension was to be by Orders-in-Council and on a reciprocal basis’ Provisions are found in the Act which enable a person, who holds a final and conclusive foreign judgment in his favour of a Superior Court in a reciprocating territory to apply to the High Court in England for registration within six years of such judgment. The High Court was no longer left with the discretion to decline the registration. The provision for registration was confined to foreign judgments for recovery of money. The High Court was no longer left with the discretion to decline the registration. The provision for registration was confined to foreign judgments for recovery of money. On certain grounds specified in the Act, liberty was given to the person, against whom the judgment was given, to have the registration set aside The effect of registration under the Act would appear to be that the foreign judgment registered would, for the purpose of execution, be of the same force and be subject to the same control, as if it had been originally given in the registering Court and that further no action in England would lie on a foreign judgment which was entitled to registration. In British India there was originally no statutory or other provision conferring jurisdiction on Indian Courts to enforce foreign judgments in execution. On 27th February, 1924, a Bill was introduced in the Central Legislature to provide for enforcement in British India of judgments obtained in the United Kingdom or other notified parts of His Majesty’s Dominions, as part of a reciprocal arrangement by which the provisions of Part II of the Administration of Justice Act, 1920 were to be extended to the British India. But the Bill was dropped in 1925 on the ground that full reciprocity could not be ensured as most of the British Indian Courts of unlimited civil jurisdiction would not possibly be viewed as Superior Courts as contemplated by the Administration of Justice Act, 1920. But the position became different by the passing of the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, 1933 which provided for the extension of Part I of the Act to His Majesty’s Dominions outside the United Kingdom by the Order-in-Council and also left it to the Orderin-Council to specify the Courts which should be deemed as ‘superior’ within the meaning of the Act. The Lord Chancellor having expressed his no objection to the British Act being applied to all Indian Courts possessing unlimited original civil jurisdiction, section 44-A was inserted in the Code of Civil Procedure by section 2 of the Code of the Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1937. The Lord Chancellor having expressed his no objection to the British Act being applied to all Indian Courts possessing unlimited original civil jurisdiction, section 44-A was inserted in the Code of Civil Procedure by section 2 of the Code of the Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1937. The section as then read: "44-A- Where a certified copy of a decree of any of the superior Courts of the United Kingdom or any reciprocating territory has been filed in a District Court, the decree may be executed in British India as if it had been passed by the District Court. Explanation 1.-‘Superior Courts’, with reference to the United Kingdom, means the High Court in England, the Court of Sessions in Scotland, the High Court in Northern Ireland, the Court of Chancery of the County Palatine of Durham. Explanation 2.-‘Reciprocating territory’ means any country or territory, situated in any part of His Majesty’s Dominions or in India which the Governor-General-in-Council may, from time to time, by notification in the Gazette of India, declare to be reciprocating territory for the purposes of this section; and 'superior Courts', with reference to any such territory, means such Courts as may be specified in the said notification. " To the section was added a further ‘Explanation ‘setting out the meaning and scope of a decree with reference to a superior Court. In view of the constitutional changes in 1937, certain consequential amendments were made to the section by the Government of India (Adaptation of Indian Laws) Order, 1937. Later in 1952 by an amending Act of that year, the section was recast and in its present form it is as follows: "44-A. (1) Where a certified copy of a decree of any of the superior Courts of any reciprocating territory has been filed in a District Court, the decree may be executed in India as if it had been passed by the District Court. (2) Together with the certified copy of the decree shall be filed a certificate from such superior Court stating the extent, if any, to which the decree has been satisfied or adjusted and such certificate shall, for the purposes of proceedings under this section, be conclusive proof of the extent of such satisfaction or adjustment. (2) Together with the certified copy of the decree shall be filed a certificate from such superior Court stating the extent, if any, to which the decree has been satisfied or adjusted and such certificate shall, for the purposes of proceedings under this section, be conclusive proof of the extent of such satisfaction or adjustment. (3) The provisions of section 47 shall as from the filing of the certified copy of the decree apply to the proceedings of a District Court executing a decree under this section, and the District Court shall refuse execution of any such decree, if it is shown to the satisfaction of the Court that the decree falls within any of the exceptions specified in clauses (a) to (f) of section 13. Explanation 1.-‘Reciprocating territory’ means any country or territory outside India which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazettee, declare to be a reciprocating territory for the purposes of this section; and ‘superior Courts’ with reference to any such territory, means: such Courts as may be specified in the said notification. Explanation 2.-‘Decree ‘with reference to a superior Court means any decree or judgment of such Court under which a sum of money is payable, not being a sum payable in respect of taxes or other charges of a like nature or in respect of a fine or other penalty, but shall in no case include an arbitration: award, even if such an award is enforceable as a decree or judgment." Reciprocity within India under that section was, however, not established until 3rd January, 1956, when the Central Government, by a Notification of that date, declared the Federation of Malaya to be a reciprocating territory and the High Court and the Courts of Appeal of that Federation to be the Superior Courts of that territory for the purpose of section 44-A of the Code of Civil Procedure. It appears there was in force in the Federation of Malaya what was called the Reciprocal. Enforcement of Judgments Ordinance, 1949 enabling the Government of Malaya to extend its provisions to particular foreign territories. On 13th September, 1955, in exercise of his powers under section 5 of the Ordinance the High Commissioner for Malaya extended its provisions to judgments obtained in a superior Court in India as it extended to judgments obtained in a Superior Court in the United Kingdom. On 13th September, 1955, in exercise of his powers under section 5 of the Ordinance the High Commissioner for Malaya extended its provisions to judgments obtained in a superior Court in India as it extended to judgments obtained in a Superior Court in the United Kingdom. The effect of the enabling provisions and the orders of the relative Governments referred to is that the judgments obtained in the Superior Courts of each of the reciprocating territories became enforceable in the other subject of course to the. restrictions conditions and limitations in the les fori in the executing territory. Section 44-A of the Code of Civil Procedure read with the Notification made thereunder compendiously but exhaustively provides not only for the executability in India of a foreign judgment in a reciprocating territory but also the procedure to be followed in execution. The jurisdiction to execute a foreign judgment is entrusted to a District Court and arises with the filing in such Court of a certified copy of a decree of any of the Superior Courts of the reciprocating territories. On such filing the decree of the foreign Court becomes executable in India as if it had been passed by the District Court. The term ‘district’ in defined in the Code to mean the local limits of the jurisdiction of a principal civil Court of original jurisdiction which is called a ‘District Court’ and includes the local limits of the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of a High Court. The expression ‘foreign Court’ and ‘foreign judgment’ are also defined by the Code. The former means a Court situate outside India and not established or continued by the authority of the Central Government and ‘foreign judgment’ is a judgment of a foreign Court. Though section 44-A (1) of the Code speaks of a decree of a foreign Court it may be taken that as it means but the formal expression of an adjudication it includes a judgment of a superior Court of a reciprocating territory in accordance with which no formal decree is drawn up under the procedure applicable to it. In fact this is made clear by the second Explanation to the section. But the judgment should be one so far as the Court entering it which conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy. In fact this is made clear by the second Explanation to the section. But the judgment should be one so far as the Court entering it which conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy. Further for the purpose of section 44-A a decree or judgment as is seen from the second Explanation is not any decree or judgment of a superior Court in the reciprocating territory but is confined to a decree or judgment for money. Even then the money payable under the foreign decree or judgment should not be one in respect of taxes or other charges of a like nature or of a fine or other penalty. There is also a further restriction namely an arbitration award even though it may be enforceable as a decree or judgment is not enforceable within the purview of section 44-A. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 44-A contain the procedure to be adopted in execution of decree or judgments passed by Courts in a reciprocating territory. Sub-section (2) further contains a rule of evidence. Together with the certified copy of a decree should be filed a certificate from the relative superior Court in the reciprocating territory showing the extent to which it has been satisfied or adjusted and such certificate is conclusive proof of the extent of satisfaction or adjustment. This only means the executing Court cannot go behind the certificate and embark on an enquiry on the extent of satisfaction or adjustment of the decree as on the date of the certificate It would impliedly follow that it is open to a party in an executing Court in India to show that the foreign decree or judgment has since been satisfied or adjusted. That is a matter relating to execution discharge or satisfaction of the decree or judgment and in fact section 44-A(3) which applies section 47 to execution as from the filing of the certified copy of the decree in a District Court enables that Court to decide such question. As we said a foreign judgment has no force except in the country of its origin. As under the Anglo-Saxon Jurisprudence so in this country certain restrictions operate on the recognition and effect to be given to a foreign judgment either in an action based on it or in its execution under the enabling statutory provisions. As we said a foreign judgment has no force except in the country of its origin. As under the Anglo-Saxon Jurisprudence so in this country certain restrictions operate on the recognition and effect to be given to a foreign judgment either in an action based on it or in its execution under the enabling statutory provisions. These restrictions are matters of public policy legislative and judicial. Such restrictions are to be found listed by section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. These restrictions are extended by section 44-A(3) to the execution of a foreign judgment. Where such restrictions apply the District Court is perforce to refuse execution of the foreign decree. The rival arguments before us raise the following question: (1) Does section 44-A provide not merely for the manner of execution of a foreign judgment but also the period of limitation for it? (2) Is there any period of limitation for filing a certified copy of a foreign judgment and (3) what is the Article of the Limitation Act, 1908 that is applicable to execution of such a judgment? On the first question a two-fold argument in the alternative is addressed to us for the appellant One is based on the effect to be given to the words ‘as if it had been passed by the District Court’ in section 44-A (1). The contention is that by those words the foreign judgment shall be deemed for the purpose of section 44-A to be a judgment of the District Court and that as a necessary corollary the period of limitation applicable to execution of its decrees is automatically attracted. This view has the support of Uthamrama v. Abdul Kasim & Co.1. The other part of the argument is that limitation is a part of procedural laws and that since under the International Law lex fori governs execution of a foreign decree or judgment the Limitation Act 1908 applies to execution. This argument again was accepted in Uthamrama v. Abdul Kassim & Co.1as an additional reason for the view that execution in that case was. barred by time. This argument again was accepted in Uthamrama v. Abdul Kassim & Co.1as an additional reason for the view that execution in that case was. barred by time. The words ‘as if it had been passed by the District Court’ undoubtedly create a fiction whether they are construed in the deeming sense treating the foreign decree for purposes of section 44-A as a decree passed by the District Court or in a sense not having that effect but only indicating a fiction of a lesser scope just enabling the District Court to apply to execution the manner of procedure indicated by section 44-A. As to the effect of the words, Uthamrama v. Abdul Kassim & Co.1 expressed the view: “It would prima facie follow particularly having regard to the fact that the Limitation Act does not provide any special period of limitation for execution of decrees of foreign Courts, that the period of limitation applicable to such cases would be the same as that which would apply for execution of a decree of the District Court, namely, Article 182. There is no provision in the Civil Procedure Code or Limitation Act specifically providing for a period of limitation for execution of the decree of a foreien Court. On the other hand, section 44-A itself says that such a decree shall be executed in the State as if it had been passed by the Courts in the State. The words of the section are comprehensive enough to treat the decree itself as a decree of a Court in the State, and they need not be confined so as merely to confer on the Court the powers which it would exercise in executing its own decree.” The concluding sentence in the above extract shows that the learned Judges in that case considered that in their opinion those words in section 44-A(1) treated as the foreign decree itself as a decree of a Court in India and that means the words automatically, by their own force, attract and apply the Indian Limitation Act,1908 to execution of a foreign decree just in the same way as in the case of a decree passed by the District Court. The Court referred to East End Dwellings Co., Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council1and Income-tax Commissioner v. S. Teja Singh2, which held that if a statute directs an imaginary state of affairs to be taken as real, one should imagine also as real the consequences and incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it and not boggle with one’s imagination when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of the state of affairs imagined as real. Applying this principle, the Court opined that it followed that the Court must assume, for purposes of section 44-A ‘that the District Court had actually passed the decree'. Having said that, the learned Judges proceeded at page 419: “If so much is assumed, the question then is only one of interpretation of the provisions of the Limitation Act and Article 182 which refers to execution of decrees by the civil Courts will in our opinion automatically apply. That provision will apply to all cases of execution petitions filed under section 44-A, Civil Procedure Code, whether the foreign Court which gave the judgment was a Chartered High Court or any other superior Court. In this view it is unnecessary to consider the applicability of Article 181 of the Limitation Act. The execution petition in the instant case must therefore be held to be barred by limitation.” Let us examine the facts in that case. That was a case of an application under section 44-A to the Court of the District Judge of West Thanjavur for execution of a judgment of the High Court of the Colony of Singapore. The judgment was entered on 2nd October, 1953, and there was a supplemental judgment delivered on 25th May, 1954. The judgments were for payment of money and they were partly satisfied. One of the judgment-debtors owned considerable properties in this country. On 16th August, 1958, sometime prior to his adjudication as an insolvent by the High Court of Singapore, the judgment-creditor filed an application in the District Court, West Thanjavur, for execution by attachment and sale of the debtor’s properties in this country. The petition was not accompanied by a certificate from the High Court of Singapore showing the extent of non-satisfaction. The petition was not accompanied by a certificate from the High Court of Singapore showing the extent of non-satisfaction. The District Judge dismissed the application on the ground that the judgment-creditor on account of the adjudication of the debtor in Singapore was not entitled to execute the decree there and so too in this country on that account and that further the application was barred under Article 182 of the Limitation Act. On appeal by the creditor, the learned Judges constituting the Division Bench posed two questions for their decision: (1) whether the non-submission of a certificate from the Supreior Court at Singapore showing the extent to which the decree was still outstanding would be a bar to the maintainability of the execution petition and’ (2) whether the execution petition was barred by limitation. They answered both the questions against the appellant-creditor. In doing so, they repelled a contention that Article 183 was the Article to apply. It is on the view that the words established by Royal Charter ‘in that section can refer only to such Courts established in India and not to any Court albeit established by Royal Charter outside it territory. We shall advert to this aspect of the matter when we consider the third question we have formulated for our decision. It is obvious from the facts in that case and the view of the learned Judges that the application there was barred by limitation. In their judgment, the effect of section 44-A(1) was that the judgment of the High Court, which was entered on 2nd October, 1953 and 25th May, 1954, should be treated as one passed by the District Court of West Thanjavur on those dates and that, therefore, the application for execution filed on 16th August, 1958, more than three years from the date of the judgment was barred under Article 182. With due respect to the learned Judges, we are unable to accept their view as to the scope and effect of section 44-A and the applicability of the period of limitation to execution in India of foreign judgments in exactly the same manner as to execution of a decree passed by the executing Court itself. With due respect to the learned Judges, we are unable to accept their view as to the scope and effect of section 44-A and the applicability of the period of limitation to execution in India of foreign judgments in exactly the same manner as to execution of a decree passed by the executing Court itself. In our view, section 44-A has nothing to do with limitation and is merely confined to an extended application of the procedure provided for the manner of execution of a decree passed by any civil Court in this country to execution by an Indian District Court of a foreign judgment of a superior Court in a reciprocating territory. When a statutory provision creates a fiction, it is first necessary to find out the purpose for which it was created, in order to understand the scope and implication of the fiction: State of Travancore-Cochin and others v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashewnut Factory and others1. In that case the Supreme Court quoted with approval the following principles from In re Coal Economising Gas Company2. “Where the Legislature provides that something is to be deemed other than it is, we must be careful to see within what bounds and for what purpose it is to be so deemed.” The purpose of the fiction in section 44-A(1) will be clear from an examination of the general sections relating to execution in Part II of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 37 defines a Court which passed a decree. The expression, ‘in relation to execution of decree ‘means the Court of first instance which, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, passed the decree and the expression is understood in the same sense even if the decree to be executed has been passed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. The next section says that a decree may be executed either by the Court which passed it or by the Court to which it is sent for execution. The Court which passed a decree may under section 39 on application send it for execution to another Court if certain conditions specified therein are satisfied. The Court which passed the decree may also of its own motion send it for execution to any subordinate Court of competent jurisdiction. Section 40 provides for transfer of decrees made by Courts in one State to Courts in another State for execution. The Court which passed the decree may also of its own motion send it for execution to any subordinate Court of competent jurisdiction. Section 40 provides for transfer of decrees made by Courts in one State to Courts in another State for execution. Under section 42, the Court executing a decree sent to it shall have the same powers in executing such decree as if it had been passed by itself. Clearly, as it appears to us, the words “as if it had been passed by itself” in section 42 have no more effect than indicating that the executing Court, in executing a decree transferred to it, shall have the same powers of execution as the Court which passed the decree. The words are confined to the manner of execution and do not suggest that they have any implication relating to limitation for execution. Similar words occur in section 44 which relates to execution of decrees of Revenue Courts in places to which the Code does not extend. The scheme of the sections relating to execution is that a decree is executed either by the Court which passed it or the Court to which it is transferred for execution and in the latter case, the transferee Court will have the same powers of execution as the Court which passed the decree possesses. That is all the meaning of the words “ as if it had been passed” in the sections we have referred to. But these provisions have no application to execution of foreign judgments. They are not and cannot be transferred to an Indian Court for execution. Nor do the Courts in India exercise the same powers of execution as a foreign Court in the reciprocating territory possesses. The whole purpose of the words “as if it had been passed by the District Court” in section 44-A(1) clearly, in the context of the preceding sections, appears to be to determine or fix the particular District Court in India to execute the foreign decree or judgment and attract to its execution by such Court the manner of procedure that governs execution of its own decree. The purpose and ambit of the fiction go no further. In fact, it is impossible to equate the District Court to an original Court in relation to the foreign decree or judgment. The purpose and ambit of the fiction go no further. In fact, it is impossible to equate the District Court to an original Court in relation to the foreign decree or judgment. The District Court in which a certified copy of the foreign decree has been filed, has no control over that decree itself and all that it can do is to execute it in accordance with its procedural laws and regulations. For instance a District Court cannot amend the foreign decree or even hear any argument impugning it. Nor, as we already mentioned, can it transfer the certified copy of the foreign decree filed with it to another Court for execution. The District Court will have no power to review the foreign judgment on any ground. It may be also visualised that simultaneous execution of the foreign decree in different Courts in different countries constituting reciprocating territories cannot be ruled out. Further, we can find no justification in the language of section 44-A(1) for the assumption that the decree should be taken to have been passed by the District Court even on the date it was originally passed by the foreign Court. Such an assumption will lead to surprising results and anomalies. This very case under consideration will demonstrate it. In the light of the facts, it will mean that even before reciprocity was established between the two Governments in January, 1956 and the certified copy of the foreign decree was filed in the District Court in 1959, the District Court had passed the decree. The fiction under section 44-A(1) does not, in our opinion, extend to that effect for, unless the laws of this country explicitly so direct, a foreign decree can have no force in this country and that too from a date prior to a date when such laws were made or reciprocity was established thereunder. In England, as we saw, registration of a foreign judgment should be made within a specified period from the original date. But there is no such provision to be found in the Code of Civil Procedure. In England, as we saw, registration of a foreign judgment should be made within a specified period from the original date. But there is no such provision to be found in the Code of Civil Procedure. In the absence of such a provision or any indication by any other law in this country, it seems to us not possible to hold that section 44-A(1) has addressed itself to any limitation and provided that the foreign decree, when filed in the District Court, should be taken to have been passed by it on the date it was passed by the original Court. As a matter of fact, the Code of Civil Procedure itself, generally speaking, does not include the law of limitation. Referring to the Code of Procedure (Act VIII of 1859) the Right Hon. Sir James Colvile, speaking for the Judicial Committee in Krishto Kinkur Roy v. Rajah Burrodacaunt Roy1, expressed the view: “But that Code did not touch the subject of limitation, which continued to be regulated by Act XIV of 1859.” That is still the position under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the subject of limitation is dealt with separately by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. In a sense, procedure need not also necessarily include limitation. See for instance Messrs. Solar Works v. Employees’ State Insurance Corporation, Madras2. In Morlays (B’ham) Ltd. v. Roshanlal3, a learned Judge of the Bombay High Court held that the words “as if” were used in section 44-A(1) to make the whole scheme of Order 21 applicable in respect of execution of decrees of foreign Courts and that the words had no wider meaning. This precisely accords with our view. For the appellant, however, reliance has been placed on certain decisions in support of the contention that the words “as if” also take in limitation In re Relveders Jute Mills4, Rankin, C.J., with whom Mitter, J., agreed, held that as section 15 of the Arbitration Act, 1899, directed that an award on being filed in a Court in accordance with the earlier provisions should be enforceable as if it was a decree of that Court, it was not only enforceable as if it were a decree in general but the award having been filed in a particular Court should be enforceable as if it were a decree of that Court. That meant that the words employed by section 15 (1) were intended to go to the question of limitation as well as the question of procedure. The learned Judges had in mind that contrast between the words employed by section 15 (1) and the words in section 12 of the English Arbitration Act, 1889, namely, an award may by leave of the Court be enforced in the same manner as a judgment or order to the same effect and felt that section 15 (1) of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1899, expressed itself much more widely. But the learned Judges themselves referred to section 42 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the language in which was that the Court executing a decree sent to it should have the same powers in executing that decree, as if it had been passed by it and expressed the view that the section merely dealt with the powers of the Court executing it and only with those powers, so that there could not be very much doubt that the question of limitation was excluded from the purview of that section. They considered that the question of limitation was not merely a question of power. We respectfully agree with this reasoning which, in our opinion, applies to the construction of section 44-A (1) too. Nadirshaw v. Gajraj5, was again a case under section 15 of the Arbitration Act, 1899. Beaumont, G.J., and Kania, J., were of the view that as the section spoke of an award to be enforceable as if it were a decree of the Court, the expression should be read as including both the manner of execution and the time within which execution should take place. This decision like the Calcutta one does not assist the appellant. Apart from what the Calcutta High Court said in regard to section 42 of the Code, neither of these decisions related to a foreign decree or judgment. The Code of Civil Procedure is confined to the procedure to be followed by civil Courts in this country in proceedings before them and the Indian Limitation Act applied only to proceedings by suits, appeals or applications in Indian Courts. The Code of Civil Procedure is confined to the procedure to be followed by civil Courts in this country in proceedings before them and the Indian Limitation Act applied only to proceedings by suits, appeals or applications in Indian Courts. It has been argued for the appellant that by the rules of the International Law, when a foreign judgment is executed in a local Court by virtue of enabling provisions, the procedure applicable to the proceedings is the lex fori and that procedure includes limitation. The argument to that extent is undoubtedly correct. Dicey’s Conflict of Laws (Sixth Edition) at page 859 sets out the rule: “All matters of procedure are governed wholly by the local or domestic law of the country to which a Court wherein an action is brought or other legal proceeding is taken belongs. The term ‘procedure ‘is to be taken in its widest sense and includes, inter alia, remedies and process, evidence, limitation of an action or other proceeding and set-off or counter-claim.” The author points out where limitation involves substantive rights of the parties, it is excepted from the rule. It seems the English lawyers give the widest possible extension to the meaning of the term ‘procedure’ as including all legal remedies and everything connected with the enforcement of a right, not involving the determination of the nature of the rights. We think that the position is the same in this country as well. In Pierce Leslie v. Perumal1, three learned Judges of this Court including the then Chief Justice held that an application to a British Court in India to send a decree of such Court for execution to a Court of Travancore was neither an execution application nor a step-in-aid of execution within Article 182 (5) of the Limitation Act, 1908. This is on the view that the execution contemplated by the Civil Procedure Code under Article 182 was execution by British Courts in India on application made to such Courts. Oldfield, J., said that the application could not be said to be a step-in-aid, because although it was made to the proper Court, it was not in accordance with the law and that it was not sufficient that it was in accordance with the foreign law administered by the Court where execution proceedings were to be taken. Oldfield, J., said that the application could not be said to be a step-in-aid, because although it was made to the proper Court, it was not in accordance with the law and that it was not sufficient that it was in accordance with the foreign law administered by the Court where execution proceedings were to be taken. The learned Judge stated the principle to be: “the law of limitation is a law relating to procedure having reference only to the lex fori” and that “ no Court is obliged to depart from its own notions of judicial order from mere comity to any foreign nation.” Cheshire in his Private International Law (Sixth Edition) also says that execution of a foreign judgment in a local Court will be governed by the procedure that obtains in the lex fori and, therefore, any relevant statute of limitation may be pleaded in defence while a statute of some foreign law, even though it belonged to the proper law of the transaction must be disregarded. The same author further points out at page 686: “An English statute of limitation is a good plea to an action brought in England, notwithstanding that the action is still maintainable according to the proper law of the transaction. Thus in British Linen Company v. Drummond2, the English period of six years was applied to an action on a Scottish contract, although the time within which the action might have been brought in Scotland was forty years..........the extinction of the right of action by the proper law of the transaction is not a bar to an action in England. In other words, if the permissible period is longer in England than in the foreign country the plaintiff is at liberty to sustain his action here. Moreover, this is so, even though the foreign Court has already adjudged the action to be barred in its own country.” We, therefore, accept the proposition that by International Law, execution of a foreign judgment is governed by procedure in the lex fori and that the law of limitation, where it does not concern the nature of the right, is procedural. But we are unable to accept the further proposition that, though a foreign decree may be barred or unenforceable in the country of its origin, it can nevertheless be enforced in the Indian Court where a larger period of limitation obtains in relation to a similar judgment passed by it. To do so will be contrary to the basic requirements of reciprocity. Reciprocity in the context means that Indian Courts will execute foreign judgments of Superior Courts in the reciprocating territories in the same manner as if they were their own decree and vice versa. It follows from the principle of reciprocity that if a foreign judgment is barred by limitation in the country of its origin and is, therefore, unenforceable, it cannot possibly be enforced in the Indian executing Courts on the ground that a larger period of limitation is available there. Reciprocity applies to enforceable decrees in the country of their origin. Subject to this, since lex fori governs execution, if under the Indian law, the decree is barred, the judgment-debtor can successfully plead it in defence. To sum up our conclusions, we are of the view that section 44-A(1) is confined to the powers and manner of execution and has nothing to do with the law of limitation. The fiction created by the sub-section goes no further and is not for all purposes, but is designed to attract and apply to execution of foreign judgments by the District Court its own powers of execution and the manner of it in relation to its decrees, without reference to limitation. It follows that the contrary view expressed in Uthamrama v. Abdul Kassim & Co.1, is, in our opinion, not correct. The law of limitation as contained in the Limitation Act, as a procedural law and as lexi fori, will, however, apply, independently of section 44-A, to execution in India of a foreign judgment of a superior Court in a reciprocating territory. But the effect of its application is a different thing which is a matter of construction and which will be considered elsewhere in this judgment. We now pass on to a consideration of the second question. From our earlier observations it should be clear that the fiction in section 44-A(1) does not, in any way, affect the original date of the foreign judgment when filed in a District Court in India. We now pass on to a consideration of the second question. From our earlier observations it should be clear that the fiction in section 44-A(1) does not, in any way, affect the original date of the foreign judgment when filed in a District Court in India. There is no indication in the section that the date of the foreign judgment should be taken to be anything but the original date. But can it be said that the Indian Limitation Act applies to it even from that date ? Neither section 44-A nor the International law relating to foreign judgments and their execution in the local Courts provides an answer. But there can be only one answer, as we think, namely, that it does not. The jurisdiction of a District Court in this country to execute a foreign judgment arises from and is exercisable by the filing of a certified copy of the foreign decree or judgment. It is only thereafter, and never until then, the procedural laws as lex fori will be attracted to execution. The Indian Limitation Act can possibly apply to such execution only after filing a certified copy of the foreign decree or judgment as required by section 44-A(1). It is argued for the appellant that since sub-section (2) of section 44-A requires a non-satisfaction certificate from the foreign superior Court to be filed together with a certified copy of the decree of such Court, compliance with that requisite is a condition precedent to invoking the jurisdiction of the District Court for execution of the foreign decree or judgment and that, therefore, the right to apply for execution arises the moment the foreign Court issues a non-satisfaction certificate. We are unable to accept this contention on two grounds. The first is what we just now referred to, that before the filing under section 44-A(1), the Indian Courts will have no jurisdiction to execute the foreign judgments and before that event, therefore, there is no possibility of the application of the Limitation Act to foreign judgments. The second is that sub-section (1) of section 44-A does not require the filing of a non-satisfaction certificate as a condition for the District Court to assume jurisdiction. Subsection (2) of the section does not pertain to jurisdiction but is in our view procedural; it contains besides a rule of evidence as to the conclusiveness of the certificate in the specified respect. Subsection (2) of the section does not pertain to jurisdiction but is in our view procedural; it contains besides a rule of evidence as to the conclusiveness of the certificate in the specified respect. We are, with respect, unable to agree with Uthamrama v. Abdul Kassim & Co.1, which held that unless a non-satisfaction certificate’ is filed together with a certified copy of the foreign decree, the mere filing of a certified copy of the foreign judgment or decree alone will not vest the District Court with jurisdiction to execute. It is next to be considered whether there is any limitation for filing a certified copy of a foreign decree or judgment under section 44-A(1). Though such filing is like registration under the English procedure, there is no provision in India unlike in the United Kingdom, which specifies any period of time within which the filing should be done. Further, filing is not an application and is not even a stepin-aid of execution. It is but a ministerial act which in terms of the statutory provision gives rise to the jurisdiction of the District Court concerned and makes it competent to apply its powers of execution according to the law applicable to such Court to the execution of a foreign decree or judgment. The Limitation Act applies only to suits, appeals and applications. In Hansraj Gupta v. Official Liquidators of Dehra Dun etc. Company1, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held: “Unless the application which the Liquidators made on the 26th March, 1928, was a ‘suit instituted’ or ‘an application made’, for which a period of limitation is prescribed by the First Schedule no question of limitation in regard thereto can arise.” There is no such provision in the First Schedule to the Limitation Act treating the filing under section 44-A(1) as an application and providing limitation therefor. An application normally contains a prayer for some kind of an order or relief of interlocutory character or sometimes even a final order. Filing under section 44-A(1) by itself will not enable the Court to execute, for it contains no prayer in that regard. The party, who seeks execution of a foreign judgment, has after filing a certified copy thereof to apply under Order 21, rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure for execution and it is only then the executing Court can proceed. The party, who seeks execution of a foreign judgment, has after filing a certified copy thereof to apply under Order 21, rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure for execution and it is only then the executing Court can proceed. Ebrahim Kassam v. Northern Indian Oil Industries Ltd.2, held that filing of an award by an arbitrator was a ministerial act and not a judicial or quasi-judicial act of the arbitrator. Mukherji, J., in that case followed an earlier judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Anandi Lal v. Keshavdeo3. On that view Article 178 of the Limitation Act will have no application for filing of an award by an arbitrator under section 14(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1940. That was the decision by a Divisional Bench of this Court in Dasaratha Rao v. Ramaswamy Iyengar4, where Govinda Menon and Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, JJ., observed: “All provisions of limitation are intended to prescribe a period for taking steps by a party who has perforce to have recourse to a Court of law for getting relief. The arbitrator is not in that position. His situation is analogous to that of an adjudicator resembling a Court and unless the provisions of the Limitation Act expressly provide a period of limitation for any act to be performed by him, it is unreasonable to impute any intention to the Legislature, that an article of the Limitation Act should control his actions. That Article 178 is applicable only to parties and not to arbitrators has been decided already by other High Courts.” Though this reasoning may not precisely apply to the filing under section 44-A(1) and the analogy between section 14(1) of the Arbitration Act and section 44-A(1) of the Code is not close, broadly speaking, the filing for the purpose of section 44-A(1) is not a judicial act as an application for which a period of limitation is provided but is a ministerial act which the statute requires to be done so that the District Court may be seized of jurisdiction to execute a foreign judgment. There is also another reason why we must hold that there is no period of limitation for filing a certified copy of a foreign judgment. There is also another reason why we must hold that there is no period of limitation for filing a certified copy of a foreign judgment. The procedural laws in respect of the executing Court are applicable to execution of foreign judgments only on and from the date of the filing under section 44-A(1) and it follows that in the absence of a specific provision in the Limitation Act, no question of limitation will arise for filing. Further, as we already mentioned, filing will not, by itself, give the right of execution for it will be open to the judgment-debtor under section 44-A(3) to prove that the foreign decree is inexecutable in the country of its origin. This liberty is also inherent, as we are inclined to think, in the very concept of reciprocity for purposes of execution. We are of the view, therefore, that no question of limitation arises before or for filing under section 44-A(1) of the Code. That takes us to the last question as to what the proper Article applicable to execution in India of foreign judgments is. On this matter, we are in complete agreement with the reasoning and conclusion in Uthamrama v. Abdul Kassim & Co.1, that Article 183 will be inapplicable. We do not, therefore, propose to reiterate the reasoning and cover the same ground. We may, however, briefly state that the difference in the period of limitation applicable for execution of a decree on the Original Side of Courts established by Royal Charter and decrees of other Courts in this country, which were eventually merged in the High Court under the High Courts Act, 1861 sprang out of historical reasons and had nothing to do with the status of the Courts as those established by Royal Charter or not. This was pointed out by the Judicial Committee in Kristo Kinkur Roy v. Rajah Burrodacaunt Roy2. After quoting two extracts therefrom, the learned Judges in Uthamrama v. Abdul Kassim & Co.1went on to say at page 417: “From the observations extracted above it follows that the mere fact that a Court has been established by a Royal Charter does not ipso facto attract the operation of section 19 of the 1859 Act which corresponds to the present Article 183. On the other hand, that Article would apply to decrees obtained on the Original Side alone of the High Courts of the three Presidency Towns. On the other hand, that Article would apply to decrees obtained on the Original Side alone of the High Courts of the three Presidency Towns. Act IV of 1859 was superseded by Act IX of 1871. Article 169 of the latter enactment which corresponded to section 19 of the old Act accepted the view of the Privy Council and expressly referred to decrees as ‘those in the exercise of their Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction’. This Article 169 was renumbered as Article 180 in the Limitation Act of 1877 and the same has been reproduced in the present Limitation Act of 1908 as Article 183. It will be noticed that the provisions of the Limitation Act is to govern only suits and applications filed in this country. Prior to 1937 there was no provision by which decrees passed outside India could be executed by the Indian Courts. Therefore Articles 182 and 183 can only apply to execution of decrees passed by the Courts of this country, and the words ‘established by Royal Charter’ occurring in Article 183 can refer, therefore, only to such Courts established in India and not to any Court albeit established by Royal Charter outside its territory.” We are in entire agreement with these observations which represent, in our opinion, a correct statement of the law. We are, however, not able to agree that Article 182 is applicable. If Article 183 is applicable only to execution of decrees of a Court established by Royal Charter in this country, which, as we think, is correct, on the same logic and reasoning it should, in our view, be held that Article 182 is not applicable either to execution of foreign judgments because that article also is confined to execution of a decree or order of any civil Court in this country. Mr. V.K. Tiruvenkatachari pressed before us that the language in Article 183 should be liberally and widely read so that it comprehends decrees of superior Courts in the reciprocating territory. But the reasoning on this aspect in Uthamrama v. Abdul Kassim & Co.1, which commends itself to us, provides an effective answer against the contention. We are thus left with Article 181 which is a residuary article. We are of opinion that this article is the only one that applies to execution of a foreign judgment under section 44-A of the Code. We are thus left with Article 181 which is a residuary article. We are of opinion that this article is the only one that applies to execution of a foreign judgment under section 44-A of the Code. The language in column 1 for this article is not related to any particular Court. The article prescribes a period of three years and the limitation commences when the right to apply accrues. The right to apply under Order 21, rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure for execution of a foreign judgment accrues on and from the date of filing under section 44-A(1) and for this purpose non-filing of a non-satisfaction certificate is not relevant. The appeal is dismissed with costs. V.S. ----- Appeal dismissed.