JUDGMENT : Das, J. - The Petitioners have been convicted u/s 7(1)(b) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932 and sentenced to undergo S.I. for one month. They have also been convicted u/s 32 of the Police Act, but no separate sentence has been passed. 2. Originally, there were 21 accused persons, but 4 of them being below 21 years of age were released u/s 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, though they were found guilty under both the sections. The remaining 17 accused persons filed separate appeals before the Sessions Judge of Mayurbhanj, who by one common judgment disposed of an the appeals and maintained the convictions and sentence passed by the trial Court. The 17 accused persons have now filed the aforesaid 17 criminal revisions which also shall be disposed of by one common judgment as they involve common question of law and fact. 3. The Petitioners are said to be the members of the Communist Party at Baripada in the district of Mayurbhanj. A notification u/s 30(2) of the Police Act was promulgated and was in force in the Town of Baripada for a period of three months from 15th August to 15th November, 1964. As required under the said notification, a person desiring to take out a procession shall have to obtain a licence from the appropriate authorities. It is the case of the prosecution that Ram Chandra Das, a member of the Communist Party at Baripada, made an application and obtained a licence (ext.1) for taking out a procession. Certain conditions were imposed in the licence. The conditions were that the use of mike and shouting of slogans were prohibited from the gate of the State Transport Office till the procession passes the Collectorate premises; the Court premises shall not be encroached upon nor should the procession create any disturbance which would cause any annoyance in the Court area and it will not stop anywhere on the road. 4. It is the case of the prosecution that on 27 -8-1964 the Petitioners who were members of the Communist Party of the District unit of Mayurbhanj violated the conditions by shouting slogans, encroaching upon the Court premises and creating disturbances in the Court premises. They did not obey the directions issued by the police officer prohibiting them not to do so, broke the police cordon and entered into the Collectorate compound. They did not obey the directions issued by the police officer prohibiting them not to do so, broke the police cordon and entered into the Collectorate compound. The Petitioners were arrested by the Circle Inspector of Police (p.w.1) and were prosecuted u/s 7(1)(b) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932 and u/s 32 of the Police Act. 5. The plea of the Petitioners were that they wanted to put forth their grievance before the Collector against the soaring rise of prices. They admitted to have gone in a procession and given slogans. They denied to have been stopped by the police officer. They did not, however, examine any defence witness nor even cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. 6. In support of the prosecution story, a number of witnesses were examined including the police officer (p.w.1). who asked the processionists to disperse and not to enter into the Court premises or to create disturbance therein. Some evidence has also been led that some of the officials who were working inside the Court premisses were disturbed in carrying out their usual business, as a result of such disturbances and loud slogans given by the Petitioners. The Courts below, after discussion of the evidence, came to hold that the Petitioners were members of an unlawful assembly, committed trespass into the premises of the Collectorate, loitered before the offices of Collectorate premises and also violated the conditions of the licence. The trial Court, accordingly, convicted and sentenced the Petitioners as stated above. The conviction and sentence were confirmed in appeal. 7. Mr. Palit, learned Counsel for the Petitioners raised the following contentions: 1. That for violation of the conditions of the licence, it is only the licensee Ram Chandra Das, who can be made liable, and no other person, unless the other persons, who were in the procession, are aware of the conditions of the licence; and That the requisites to constitute an offence u/s 7(1)(b) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932 being absent, none of the Petitioners can be convicted under that section. 8. That there was a violation of the conditions of the licence cannot be disputed. It is clear from the licence that the processionists were not permitted to encroach upon the Court premises or to use mike, give slogans within that area, to cause any disturbances which would cause annoyance in the Court premises. 8. That there was a violation of the conditions of the licence cannot be disputed. It is clear from the licence that the processionists were not permitted to encroach upon the Court premises or to use mike, give slogans within that area, to cause any disturbances which would cause annoyance in the Court premises. As is clear from the evidence and the findings of the Courts below, the processionists clearly violated the conditions of the licence by entering into the Court premises, shouting slogans, etc.. The only question would be whether the licensee alone would be liable or every other person who took part in the procession would be made liable u/s 32 of the Police Act. Section 32 of the Police Act provides that 'every person posing or not obeying the orders issued under the last three preceding sections (i.e. Sections 30, 30-A and 31), or violating the conditions of the licence grate for the use of mike or for the conduct of assemblies and processions shall be made liable under that section'. It is, however, well settled by authorities that Section 32 is not confined only to the licensee but applies to any member of the procession who has knowledge of the terms of the licence and violates the terms of the licence in spite of such kowledge (see a Full Bench decision of the Lahore High Court in AIR 1941 Lahore 372 . There is, however, no evidence in this case that each of the Petitioners was aware of the conditions of the licence. They cannot, therefore, be convicted u/s 32 of the Police Act. Their conviction under that section must be set aside. 9. Coming to the charge u/s 7(1)(b) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, it was urged by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners that there is nothing in evidence to suggest the commission of the offence u/s 7(1)(b). Section 7(1)(b) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act runs as follows: 7(1)(b) whoever (a) ... (b) loiters or does any similar act at or near the place where a person carries on business, in such a way and with intent that any person may thereby be deterred from entering or approaching or dealing at such place, shall be punished. Section 7(1)(b) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act runs as follows: 7(1)(b) whoever (a) ... (b) loiters or does any similar act at or near the place where a person carries on business, in such a way and with intent that any person may thereby be deterred from entering or approaching or dealing at such place, shall be punished. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners that before a case u/s 7(1)(b) is made out, there must be some evidence to suggest that the Petitioners were loitering at the Court premises and their intention was to deter the officials from carrying on their work in those premises or that they had the necessary intention of deterring any person from entering or approaching the Collectorate premises. A number of officers working at or near the Collectorate premises have been examined in this case to prove that it was not possible for them to carry on their usual business ?T account of the disturbances created by the processionists. P.w.11 is the steno to the A.D.M. (E). His evidence is that due to heavy noise caused by the Petitioners, he could not transact any business. That also is the evidence of p.w.5 Debottar Manager and p.w.6 Sub Postmaster whose office is situate just near the Collectorate. The evidence of p.ws.7 and 8 also is to the same effect. These witness were not subject to any cross-examination and their evidence stands unassailed. On account of the disturbance caused, the officers working at or near the Collectorate were deterred from doing their normal business. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners that in the absence of any evidence of loitering with the intention to commit any specific overt act, conviction u/s 7(1)(b) is not justified. In Damodar Ganesh and Others Vs. State the law has been correctly stated. It was held that u/s 7(1)(a) and (b) the offence consists of loitering at specified places with a particular instant. Under Clause (a), the intention is to cause a person to abstain from doing a thing which such person is entitled to do,' and under Clause (b) he intention is to deter a person from entering;, approaching and dealing at such places. In both the cases, no overt act other than that of loitering is necessary to constitute an offence. Under Clause (a), the intention is to cause a person to abstain from doing a thing which such person is entitled to do,' and under Clause (b) he intention is to deter a person from entering;, approaching and dealing at such places. In both the cases, no overt act other than that of loitering is necessary to constitute an offence. It should be a matter of evidence whether the loitering is with specified intention or not. Such intention may have to be proved either by words uttered, leaflets distributed or gestures adopted. It may also be proved not by anything done or said at the time of loitering, but by speeches made or exhortations given long before such loitering. But the section, as it stands, requires apart from mental- state signified by the word "intention", nothing more than loitering so far as Clause (a) is concerned and loitering in a particular way so far as Clause (b) goes. The word "loitering" has not been defined anywhere, but according to the dictionary meaning, it means "moving about in frequent pauses hanging about and doing nothing". The evidence discloses that the Petitioners persisted in hanging about at the office of the Collector in spite of the request made by the A.D.M. and other office's: stayed there for an hour, raised slogans and did not disperse in spite of the orders given by the Magistrate and the police. There is evidence to show that these activities of the Petitioners interfered with the business of the officials working in the said premises. There cannot be any doubt that those officials were dealing at such places within the meaning of Section 7(1)(b) and the activities of the Petitioners had deterred them from their dealings at their offices and the office work was paralysed for some time. The next question would be whether they were loitering with the intention to deter the officials from carrying on their business. No doubt, the intention of the Petitioners was to bring to the notice of the Collector their grievance regarding the rise of prices, but they had no justification to hang on, loiter and give slogans after they were asked not to do so. Intention cannot be proved by any direct evidence and has to be gathered from the conduct of the parties and the circumstances of the case. Intention cannot be proved by any direct evidence and has to be gathered from the conduct of the parties and the circumstances of the case. That being the option, there cannot be any doubt that the Petitioners also intended to deter the persons in the said offices from dealing at such places. Their conviction u/s 7(1)(b) mush therefore, be held to be justified. 10. In the result, therefore, the conviction and sentence of all the Petitioners u/s 32 of the Police Act are set aside, but their conviction u/s 7(1)(b) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932 is maintained, but in view m the circumstances of the case, their sentence is reduced to the period already undergone. The revision is allowed in part. Final Result : Allowed