ORDER Shivdayal, J. - 1. This revision arises from a proceeding under section 14 of the Arbitration Act. The trial Court refused to make the award a rule of the Court. The appellate Court affirmed that order. 2. Gangadhar petitioner 2 as President and Jaisingh petitioner 3 as Secretary of the Arya Samaj Gorakhpur, Jabalpur, on the one hand, and Gopaldas respondent 1, R. N. Chopra respondent 2 and Stayapal Handa respondent 3, representing the Arya Vidya Sabha, Jabalpur, on the other hand, referred their dispute to Divyanand Saraswati petitioner, 1 authorising him to end the deadlock in respect of the Samaj, Arya Sabha and Arya Kanya Vidyalaya. The parties agreed to abide by the decision of the arbitrator. This reference was made on 21 August 1960. The arbitrator gave an award on 30 August 1960. Notices of the award were given by the arbitrator to the parties concerned, which notices were served between 31 August and 2 September 1960. 3. On 29 November 1960 the arbitrator filed a copy of the award with an application under section 14 of the Arbitration Act before the Second Civil Judge Class II, Jabalpur. Notices of filing the award were served on the parties between the 21st and 23rd December 1960. 4. The Arya Vidya Sabha filed its objections on 1 February 1961 which were supplemented by further objections on 5 May 1961. 5. Following the decision in Mauj Biharl Vs. Umarao Bihari 1960 JLJ 668 =ILR 1961 MP 832= 1961 MPLJ 717 , the trial Court held that the objections were barred by time under Article 158 of the Limitation Act and dismissed them as such. 6. However, in its judgment the trial Court suo motu considered the question whether the jurisdiction of the Court was barred and answered it in the affirmative on the basis of section 92(2), Code of Civil Procedure, and section 27 of the M. P. Public Trusts Act 1951 (hereinafter called the Act). Consequently it refused to make the award a rule of the Court. The First appellate Court, while agreeing with the trial Court, further observed that the reference was too vague to be the foundation for an award, which therefore, could not be enforced. Consequently it refused to make the award a rule of the Court. The First appellate Court, while agreeing with the trial Court, further observed that the reference was too vague to be the foundation for an award, which therefore, could not be enforced. Both the Courts below have held that section 92 (2) Civil Procedure Code and section 27 of the Act create a bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to pass a decree enforcing an award which provides a scheme for the management of a public trust. 7. It is first contended by Shri G. P. Singh, learned counsel for the revision-petitioners, that what is barred under section 92 (2) C. P. C. or section 27 of the Act is a 'suit' but a proceeding under section 14 read with section 17 of the Arbitration Act is not a 'suit'. It is also contended by the learned counsel that before the bar under either of those provisions can be invoked, it has to be shown that it is a 'public trust', but, although in the trial Court the parties joined issue on that question of fact, the trial Court, without recording evidence and giving a finding thereon, just assumed it to be a public trust. 8. It is quite plain from the language of section 92 (2) C. P. C. that what is barred is a suit. Now, there is a clear contrast between the provisions contained in the Second Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and those in the Arbitration Act, 1940, which repealed that Schedule. Para 20 of the Schedule conferred a right on any person interested in the award to apply to the Court that the award be filed in Court. Clause (2) of that paragraph was as follows:- "That application shall be in writing and shall be numbered and registered as a suit between the applicant as a plaintiff and the other parties as defendent" There is no provision in the Arbitration Act, 1940, corresponding to the above clause (2) of Para 20 of the Second Schedule. The provisions of a statute must be construed according to the natural meaning of the language used and not on the assumption that it was intended to leave the previous state of the law unaltered. (See observations of Lord Herschell in The Governor and Company of the Bank of England Vs. The provisions of a statute must be construed according to the natural meaning of the language used and not on the assumption that it was intended to leave the previous state of the law unaltered. (See observations of Lord Herschell in The Governor and Company of the Bank of England Vs. Vagliano Brothers 1991 AC 107, and Norendra Nath Sircar Vs. Kamlabasini Dasi 23 IA 18. On this principle, the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940, being a consolidating and amending Act and in the form of a Code, must be construed according to natural meaning of the language used and not on an assumption that it was not intended to alter the law which was laid down in the Second Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (See Union of India Vs. Mohindra Supply Co., AIR 1962 SC 256 . Thus, in the absence of any provision in the Arbitration Act, 1940, for institution of a 'suit' for enforcement of the award and in the absence of a deeming provision that an application under section 14 read with section 17 of the Arbitration Act would be treated or registered as a suit, it cannot be said that such an application is 'suit'. It is no doubt a judicial proceeding but every judicial proceeding is not a suit within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure. This position is now undoubted as has been authoritatively laid down in Usmanali Khan Vs. Sagarmal, 1965 JLJ 1028= AIR 1965 SC 1798 . Their Lordships say: "A proceeding under section 14 read with section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, for the passing of a judgment and decree on an award does not commence with a plaint or a petition in the nature of a plaint and cannot be regarded as a suit......" In Nandkishore Vs. Beharilal Civil Revision No. 507 of 1963, decided on the 9th March 1964, it was said by this Court that the only mode of enforcement of an award is to have it filed in the Court under section 14 of the Arbitration Act and obtain a decree on its basis under section 17 of the Act. Beharilal Civil Revision No. 507 of 1963, decided on the 9th March 1964, it was said by this Court that the only mode of enforcement of an award is to have it filed in the Court under section 14 of the Arbitration Act and obtain a decree on its basis under section 17 of the Act. Just as a claim to set aside an award can be made only by an application under the provisions of the Act and not by means of a suit, so a suit for enforcement of an award is not maintainable. An application, and not a suit, is the vehicle to approach the Court in Nandkishore Vs. Beharilal, 1964 MPLJ Short Note 133. The decision in Nalam Lakashmikantham Vs. Nalam Ramalingayya, AIR 1939 Mad. 170 , has no application now. On this analysis, it must be held that the Courts below were in error when they held that there was no jurisdiction to make the award a rule of the Court. 9. What is barred under section 27 (4) of the M. P. Public Trusts Act, 1951, is a suit relating to a public trust under section 92, Civil Procedure Code. For reasons already stated, this was not a 'suit' much less a "suit under section 92, C.P.C." The bar under the M. P. Public Trusts Act is therefore, out of the way. 10. Now as regards the question whether the institutions above-named or any of them are or is a public trust within the meaning of section 92 C.P.C. or section 27 of the M. P. Public Trusts Act 1951, it must be mentioned that the petitioners while contesting the objection filed by the respondents specifically pleaded that the institutions were not public trusts. An educational institution is not always or necessarily a public trust. This was the view taken in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. An educational institution is not always or necessarily a public trust. This was the view taken in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Mother Superior Convent School, Sagar 1958 JLJ 713 =ILR 1957 MP 599=AIR 1968 MP 362= 1958 MPLJ 611 , Hidayatullah, C. J., as his Lordship then was observed: "In such a state of affairs where the dedication is not to the public but to God and money is handed out, not as a trust, but as something to be used at the sweet will of the officers of the church concerned, there cannot be any public trust." (at pages 6 and 8) And Bhutt, J., said: "It therefore, appears that unless a religious and charitable institution has vested in it or administers, property to the ownership of which an obligation is annexed, it would not be amenable to the provisions of sections 4 and 5." In this case, the trial Court could not just assume that the Arya Vidya Sabha or the Arya Kanya Pathashala are public trusts. It unwarrantedly assumed a jurisdictional fact and then denied to itself the jurisdiction which it had. It wrongly refused to exercise jurisdiction under sections 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act. Moreover, this question becomes inconsequential in view of the conclusions I have reached on the first question relating to the ambit of section 92 C.P.C. and also of section 27 of the Act. 11. I desire to add that although the expression "or is otherwise invalid" in clause (c) of section 30 of the Arbitration Act is not to be read ejusdem generis and it extends the jurisdiction of the Court to set aside an award on grounds other than those mentioned in the different clauses of the section, yet, such jurisdiction of the Court to act suo motu is not to be exercised beyond taking notice of obvious facts and cases of inherent want of jurisdiction. Barring such cases, the Court would clearly be committing an error of jurisdiction if, while rejecting the objections filed by the parties as time barred, the Court were to enter into questions of fact, which were endeavoured to be raised in the time barred objections. The jurisdiction of the Court in raising an objection suo motu for refusing to enter judgment on an award, is a limited one. In Hastimal Vs. Hiralal, AIR 1954 SC 243, Mr. The jurisdiction of the Court in raising an objection suo motu for refusing to enter judgment on an award, is a limited one. In Hastimal Vs. Hiralal, AIR 1954 SC 243, Mr. Justice Gajendragadkar (as he then was) speaking for the Division Bench, laid down thus: "We are disposed to think that the Jurisdiction which is conferred on the Court under section 30 to act 'suo motu' is similar to that conferred on the Court under Section 17. It is obvious that Courts would exercise this jurisdiction rarely and only where the award may be patently illegal and void. If the award directs a party to do what is prohibited by law or, as the illustration taken by Mr. Justice Blagden suggests, if the award proceeds to divide the booty obtained by the commission of an offence, the Court can exercise its jurisdiction though no application may have been made by either party to set aside the offending award. In the very nature of things, such awards are not likely to be made and so occasions to use this jurisdiction may arise rarely if at all. But that is not to say that the Court is powerless to set aside awards even though they are illegal and void in the sense that they direct the commission of an act which is prohibited by law." 12. Shri Dabir then contends that the award is illegal and beyond the jurisdiction of the arbitrator inasmuch as it has settled a scheme as is contemplated in clause (g) of section 92 (1). Civil Procedure Code for the institutions concerned. The argument is twofold: (1), A scheme for a public trust can be settled only under section 92(1), C.P.C., or section 27 of the Public Trusts Act by the District Judge; and (2) no Court subordinate to a District Judge has jurisdiction to pass a decree for settling such a scheme. In my opinion, this contention is untenable. The Code of Civil Procedure nowhere lays down any impediment to a private arrangement being arrived at by those who are incharge of a public trust nor is there any bar to a proceeding under section 14, read with section 17, of the Arbitration Act for making an award a rule of the Court, which award settles a scheme. Such proceedings are not covered by section 92. Such proceedings are not covered by section 92. The aim and object of section 92, Civil Procedure Cede, is to protect the rights of the public in a public trust of a charitable or religious nature and to enable the public, Advocate-General and the Court to stop any misuse of the income of the charitable institution. The section further intends to provide for proceedings of a special nature so as to prevent multifarious and vexatious suits being filed by irresponsible persons against the trustees whose duty it is to administer such trusts. Institution of a proceeding or taking recourse to arbitration and enforcing objects. Finally, it is always open to the public and the Advocate-General to take recourse to a suit under section 92(1), Civil Procedure Code. A decree passed under section 17 of the Arbitration Act on the basis of the award given on an arbitration agreement without the intervention of the Court, will be out of the way and the decree passed under section 92 (1), Civil Procedure Code, will supersede the decree under section 17 of the Arbitration Act. This position is incontestab1e. As to the other aspect, suffice to say that a Court, which has jurisdiction to make an award a rule of the Court under sections 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act, does not cease to have such jurisdiction because the award settles a scheme. 13. Shri Dabir then urges that a decree cannot be passed on the basis of the award today because under the scheme of management contained in the award a committee was constituted for one year which term of office has already expired. Moreover, the award does not state that consent was taken of the persons who have been appointed to constitute the committee. In the first place, on such objections the Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction suo motu and refuse to pass a decree on the basis of the award. Besides, it is not for the Court to see whether consent of the persons was obtained or not. Nor can the Court start with the assumption that such consent had not been obtained. If really such consent was not obtained, consequences which should follow, will follow. Above all the period of one year has to be computed from the day that the award becomes operative. Nor can the Court start with the assumption that such consent had not been obtained. If really such consent was not obtained, consequences which should follow, will follow. Above all the period of one year has to be computed from the day that the award becomes operative. Since an award does not by itself come into operation unless it is made a rule of the Court (See Sheonarainlal Vs. Prabhuchand AIR 1958 Pat. 252 , the tenure of office will commence on the day on which a decree under section 17 of the Arbitration Act is passed. 14. Shri G. P. Singh attacked the decision of the appellate Court where it has said that the arbitration agreement was so vague that it could not be called a reference to arbitration so that the award made on it was ipso facto unenforceable. In my opinion the learned counsel is right. The appellate Court had erroneously taken that exception suo motu. The scope of the Court's jurisdiction after dismissal of the objections as time barred, was a limited one. In the name of that power, the Court will not take the place of any party and substitute as its own objections which were time barred. Although it is usual that in an agreement to refer a dispute to arbitration the dispute is specified, but where parties appoint an arbitrator to settle their "dispute" in regard to a certain transaction or a certain matter, without formulating the dispute, the arbitration agreement cannot be said to be inoperative or ineffective for vagueness or uncertainty. In Radha Kishna Vs. Sapattar Singh AIR 1957 All. 406 , what the parties to the reference said was that there was some dispute with regard to a brick kiln and the arbitrators were to decide the dispute in any, manner they thought proper. It was observed: "Generally, references are made to arbitration where disputes arise and the parties thereafter formulate, when necessary, their disputes before the arbitrators and seek their decision on those points of difference. The arbitration agreement in this case cannot be said to be so vague or uncertain as to be unenforceable and section 29 of the Contract Act was referred to which will not be attracted if an agreement is capable of being made certain. (See also Donald Graham Vs. Asumal Khushalaas 12 IC 187. 15. The arbitration agreement in this case cannot be said to be so vague or uncertain as to be unenforceable and section 29 of the Contract Act was referred to which will not be attracted if an agreement is capable of being made certain. (See also Donald Graham Vs. Asumal Khushalaas 12 IC 187. 15. It cannot just be assumed that in the present case the parties did not know what dispute they were referring to arbitration The parties appointed Divyanand Saraswati, petitioner 1, as arbitrator for ending the deadlock which existed in the institutions "GATYAWARODH DOOR KAREN" and further agreed that his decision would be binding on the parties "NIRNAY HAMEN MANYA HOGA". Thus, there can be no doubt that the parties were fully conscious of their dispute and the resultant deadlock. They appointed a private Court for the settlement of their dispute and agreed to abide by its award. 16. No other contention is raised before me by either side. As all other points have been decided by the Courts below in favour of the petitioners, it is not necessary to send back the case to the trial Court or the appellate Court. The award must forthwith be made a rule of the Court. 17. This revision is allowed. The judgments and orders passed by the Courts below are set aside. A decree shall, under section 17 of the Arbitration Act, be passed in terms of the award. The applicants shall get their costs throughout. Counsels fee of Rs. 50/- in this Court.