LAIK, J. ( 1 ) ON Section 7 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) sub-section (1) of which provides :"where any sum or other consideration has been paid by or on behalf of a tenant to a landlord, in contravention of any of the provisions of this Act, the Controller may, on application made to him within a period of six months from the date of such payment order the landlord to refund such sum of the value of such consideration to the tenant or order the adjustment of such sum of the value of such consideration against the rent payable by the tenant,"the opposite party founded his action, before the Rent Controller, Calcutta for refund of a sum of Rule. 7000/- and odd which was stated to have been received in contravention of the provisions of the Act by the petitioner, who is an M. B. , F. R. C. O. G. and a professor of National Medical College, Calcutta. The defence of the petitioner was principally two-fold. First, he had not received the said sum; and second, he was not the landlord, but his wife Srimati Minati Halder. She was however, no party to the proceedings. ( 2 ) THE Rent Controller found the Doctor, petitioner, to be the landlord of the opposite party, firstly, because he generally talked with the tenants at the time of the inception of the tenancies and looked after the affairs of his wife, who was admittedly the owner of the disputed premises; and secondly because, there was an understanding between the petitioner and his wife that whatever the Doctor did, would be his wife's ratification. This is the summary of the whole evidence in the case. But on the other point viz. as to the receipt of the sum of Rule. 7000/- he, after discussing the Report of the Forensic Science Laboratory, Government of West Bengal, came to the finding, that the stamped document showing the receipt of the said sum by the Doctor, was a fabricated one. The ability of the payment of the sum of Rule. 7000/- by the opposite party for taking settlement of the disputed tenancy, was also not believed. Consequently the Rent Controller dismissed the application. The ability of the payment of the sum of Rule. 7000/- by the opposite party for taking settlement of the disputed tenancy, was also not believed. Consequently the Rent Controller dismissed the application. The appeal taken by the opposite party, under Section 29 of the Act, however, was successful before the learned Judge, Third Bench, Court of Small Causes, Calcutta. He held on the said evidence that there was payment of Rule. 7000/- by the tenant to the Doctor as a deposit against rent. But on the other point viz. as to whether or not the Doctor petitioner was a landlord, the learned Judge disposed of the same clumsily : "the question of ownership of the suit premises was a technical defence in this case and the learned Rent Controller has rightly disallowed it," after observing briefly that the Doctor "wasted much of his energy, in shifting his liabilities on the shoulder of his wife". Accordingly the petitioner was directed to refund to the opposite party the sum of Rule. 7000/ -. The instant application by the Doctor is against the said order, moved under the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution. ( 3 ) HAVING given the best consideration to the arguments put forward by the learned Advocates of both sides I find it not possible to justify the finding that the Doctor petitioner is the landlord of the opposite party, which finding is arrived at not only on misreading the definition clause in Section 2 (d) of the Act, namely, -"the landlord includes any person who, for the time being, is entitled to receive or but for a special contract, would be entitled to receive the rent of any premises whether or not on his own account,"but also on misreading the aforesaid Section 7 and other provisions of the Act. ( 4 ) THE expression 'landlord' is often used in ignorance of the very limited meaning it attaches to that word in the law of landlord and tenant. The whole evidence in this case appears from the above summary of the order of the Rent Controller. The appellate Tribunal overlooked that there were applications made by the tenant before the Electric Supply Corporation admitting the wife as the landlord (Ext. L/1 ). On the said basis, the agreement (Ext. L) was executed, which was also not noticed. The whole evidence in this case appears from the above summary of the order of the Rent Controller. The appellate Tribunal overlooked that there were applications made by the tenant before the Electric Supply Corporation admitting the wife as the landlord (Ext. L/1 ). On the said basis, the agreement (Ext. L) was executed, which was also not noticed. There was no other evidence, in this case to substantiate that the wife authorised her Doctor husband to accept the said sum of Rule. 7000/- or that she consented to the receipt of the said sum from the tenant opposite party. ( 5 ) TO attract the provisions of Section 7 of the Act, the payment, in my judgment, must be made to the landlord or to some one on his or her behalf or with his or her consent or authority, in order to constitute a breach of the statute. Otherwise no safe inference could or should, in my opinion, be drawn. If in the instant case, the wife, had required the said premium or advance to be paid, as a condition of her granting the tenancy, to whomsoever it is to be paid, either to the husband or to the Darwan, she would be herself liable but there was no logical reason why a payment made merely to the husband, though a medical man, should be recoverable as being unlawful when the said payment was not made to the husband by the order of the admitted owner and the landlady or with her consent and authority. ( 6 ) ILLEGALLY apart, the landlord should be the master of the situation in such cases. He or she could demand any payment he or she pleased to be made to himself or herself or to any third person. The landlord may accordingly please to designate. He can decide to receive the payment himself and pay over to any third party he chooses immediately after receipt. But the fact that he or she does not require payment to be made directly to the third party, of his or her choice, cannot, so far as I can see, make the third party liable in the absence of such designation or authority to receive such payment. The consent or authority of the landlord is necessary, to make the landlord liable under the provisions of Section 7 of the Act. The consent or authority of the landlord is necessary, to make the landlord liable under the provisions of Section 7 of the Act. ( 7 ) THE definition Section [section 2 (d) of the Act] which is an inclusive definition, does not help the opposite party. It speaks of the right of the landlord to receive the rent. Emphasis should be there on the word 'entitled'. The said expression presupposes some legal right. The wife who is not a party to this proceeding, is still entitled to receive the rent. There is no evidence that she has divested herself of the right in favour of her husband to realise or collect the same. If the contention of Mr. Ghosh is accepted, then the durwan who admittedly collects the rents, would become the landlord. It would then by analogy, be open to the agent of the landlord, in cases of reasonable requirements, to set out his (agent's) own needs to occupy the premises and the tenant would thereby be evicted, which is absurd. In my judgment, any person for the time being entitled to receive the rent refers only to the person or persons entitled as between the landlord and the tenant. It is obvious that, as dealings and transactions in the premises take place from time to time, the same person might not be necessarily and at all times the landlord. One person may be a landlord at one moment, and after transactions have taken place with reference to the premises, another person may become landlord at some subsequent moment but the question under the statute is always the same, viz. , whether the person claiming to be landlord is the person entitled, as against the tenant, to receive the rents. Of course, it is true that the expression 'landlord' is not always used in the looser meaning of the owner or in the still looser meaning of a person who at later stage is going to appear as a landlord contesting with a tenant the terms of his tenancy. But the landlord generally implied the relationship to a tenant, and the power of the landlord would extend to any person claiming title, consistent with the tenant's possession whether he had received rent or not. But the landlord generally implied the relationship to a tenant, and the power of the landlord would extend to any person claiming title, consistent with the tenant's possession whether he had received rent or not. It might be stated that the provisions of the Act, are not similar to those of the Agricultural Holdings (Scotland Act, 1883), in which the husband falls within the definition of landlord. And it cannot be said in the instant case that the husband is an insufficient description of the wife. ( 8 ) MR. Ghosh submits that it is difficult to draw a line in any case to fix a person as to whether he is a landlord. But I do not think that the learned Advocate has been able to suggest any principle, which would show that the line in the instant case would be a twilight line. In my view it is broad noon-day because the evidence is sufficient to hold that the petitioner is not an agent, having authority to receive the said payment or to receive the rent on behalf of the landlord. The authority for the receipt of the sum from giver to taker is always significant and important in such cases. ( 9 ) THE evidence and the arguments in the present case have satisfied me and I hold after following the above tests and deciding the question being one of substance rather than of words and giving effect to the provisions of the Act that the petitioner is not the landlord within the meaning of the said Section 2 (d) and Section 7 of the Act. It is no good saying that the Founding Fathers of the statute used the term 'landlord' in calculated vagueness to accommodate an unknowable future. Consequently the application of the tenant opposite party for refund under Section 7 of the Act must be dismissed. ( 10 ) MR. Ghosh as a last resort submits, with citations of certain decisions, that the petitioner cannot invoke the jurisdiction of Article 227 of the Constitution in such cases. ( 11 ) THE answer to the said argument is the extract of a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court dated August 23, 1963 in the groups of cases of Ambujakhya Banerjee and others v. State of West Bengal, (Civil Revision Cases Nos. 189 and 190 etc. ( 11 ) THE answer to the said argument is the extract of a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court dated August 23, 1963 in the groups of cases of Ambujakhya Banerjee and others v. State of West Bengal, (Civil Revision Cases Nos. 189 and 190 etc. of 1962) in which I was also a party :"on the extent of jurisdiction and power of superintendence of the High Court under the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution which have been seriously pressed into service on the Government side, for dismissing all these cases straightway, I do not think any one will dispute that such jurisdiction is important and its exercise is wholesome. That the jurisdiction should be no less vigilantly exercised in the case of Tribunals and Authorities than in the case of a Court of Law is also clear. "it is true that the power under Article 227 is to be exercised sparingly. It is also true that the jurisdiction is not appellate so that every mistake of law may be corrected; but in my view the power cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively, there being an element of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature and it must be left to be determined judicially in the facts of each case. To attempt in any one case to lay down a set of iron rails in which the power of superintendence is always to run would in my opinion be perilous. The tests which in my view should guide the High Court for the exercise of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution are as follows : (a) when the Court or Tribunal below outstrips the limits of its jurisdiction; or (b) acts in excess of its authority vested by law; or (c) within the limits of its authority, functions, which is not within the letter and spirit of the law; or (d) contravenes the Act or the Rules; or (e) where there are flagrant violations of law; or (f) where the findings are not supported by any evidence or based on no evidence; or (g) where there is miscarriage of justice. On the other hand, if a properly constituted tribunal has exercised the jurisdiction, entrusted to it in good faith, not influenced by extraneous or irrelevant considerations, and not arbitrarily or illegally, the High Court should not interfere. On the other hand, if a properly constituted tribunal has exercised the jurisdiction, entrusted to it in good faith, not influenced by extraneous or irrelevant considerations, and not arbitrarily or illegally, the High Court should not interfere. " ( 12 ) ON the basis of the said principles particularly on (a) to (d) above, we hold that the instant application under Article 227 is maintainable and we do not think Mr. Ghosh could query the right of the petitioner to be heard under Article 227. ( 13 ) THERE is one other matter which cannot be passed over without notice. That is to say, the real nature of the transaction of Rule. 7000/ -. In the view we take on the meaning of the expression 'landlord' and in the view that the transaction could not be born of the determination of the wife landlady in her absence it has become unnecessary to go into the said question and we need not express our opinion as to the truth of the payment of the said sum and the receipt thereof by the husband petitioner and as to whether the opposite party suffered a pecuniary detriment of the said amount. Accordingly we should not look to see whether the decision on this point was on the balance of evidence, right or not. Otherwise we might have occasion to say very strongly on the ugly facts that have emerged from the cases and the cross-cases, between the parties, both civil and criminal. ( 14 ) BEFORE parting this case I should like to observe that this decision does not suggest; and the facts so far as they have emerged and the reasonings so far given, should not give the petitioner, the slightest encouragement. I should rather say that the provision of Section is susceptible of the meaning which has provided a way of escape for the husband petitioner in this proceeding. For these reasons appearing above, this Rule is made absolute. In view of the particular circumstances of this case there would however be no order for costs. Rule made absolute.