Judgment Choudhary, J. 1. This is an appeal by the plaintiff, the Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd., having its Works at Jamshedpur in the district of Singbhum. It appears that a settlement of about 57 bighas of land, including an area of 7.24 acres, having a house over the same in an area of .06 acre, which is the subject-matter of the suit, was made by the plaintiff with the defendant and his father, who is since dead According to the plaintiff, the defendant was a monthly tenant, and it instituted the suit giving rise to this appeal for eviction of the defendant, after service of notice to quit under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act. According to the case of the plaintiff, the rent payable for the settlement was Rs. 5-5-8 per month, and that the house that was on the suit land had been constructed subsequent to the settlement. The suit was contested by the defendant on the ground that the police to quit was invalid and that the purpose of the tenancy was agricultural. It was pleaded that the defendant had acquired the right of occupancy in the land and he is not liable to be ejected. Both the Courts below held that the notice to quit under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act was valid: but they held that the purpose of the tenancy was agricultural and the defendant was a raiyat having acquired the right of occupancy in the suit land and as such, he could not be evicted. The suit of the plaintiff was therefore, dismissed by the trial Court, and the judgment and decree of the trial Court were affirmed in appeal by the lower appellate Court. Being thus aggrieved, the plaintiff has filed this second appeal. It was placed for hearing before a learned Single Judge of this Court, who referred it to be heard by a Division Bench, and it has now, therefore, been listed lief ore us for hearing. 2. Mr. Lalnarayan Sinha, appearing for the appellant, has mainly contended that the suit was filed in the Court of the Munsif on an erroneous value fixed according to the provisions of Section 7 (xi) (cc) of the Court Fees Act and section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, although, according to the defendant himself, the market value of the suit land is more than rupees ten lacs. He has submitted that this erroneous valuation of the suit based on Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act is illegal, inasmuch as Section 8 of that Act is ultra vires. His argument is that the discrimination made with respect to the valuation of a suit like the present one contravenes the provision of Article 14 of the Constitution, and therefore, it is ultra vires. He has, however, conceded that this point could not be decided in this second appeal because no notice of this ground had been given to the Attorney-General, as required under Order 27-A of the Code of Civil Procedure. He has, therefore, on the 17th of August 1966, during the course of the hearing of the appeal, filed an application for permission to withdraw the suit with liberty to bring a fresh suit. Mr. Sarkar, appearing for the defendant-respondent, has objected to the prayer of Mr. Sinha in regard to the permission to be given for withdrawing the suit with liberty to bring a fresh suit. Various authorities have been cited on behalf of both the parties with respect to the desirability and legality of the permission to be given in a second appeal for withdrawing the suit with liberty to bring a fresh suit It has. therefore, to be decided first whether the permission to withdraw the suit with liberty to bring a fresh suit should be given or not. 3. Sub-rule (1) of Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure states that at am time after the institution of a suit the plain tiff may, as against all or any of the defendants, withdraw his suit or abandon part of his claim. Sub-rule (2) lays down that where the Court is satisfied (a) that suit must fail by reason of some formal defect, or (b) that there are other sufficient grounds for al lowing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit for the subject-matter of a suit or part of a claim, it may, on such terms as it thinks fit grant the plaintiff permission to withdraw from such suil or abandon such part of a claim with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the subject-matter of such suit or such part of a claim. Mr. Sinha has drawn our attention to the Privy Council decision in Robert Watson and Co. V/s. Collector of Zillah Rajshahye. Mr. Sinha has drawn our attention to the Privy Council decision in Robert Watson and Co. V/s. Collector of Zillah Rajshahye. (1869-70) 13 Moo Ind App 160 (PC) which lays down that there is no power in the Courts in India, similar to that exercised by Courts of Equity or Common Law in Eng land, to dismiss a suit with liberty for the plaintiff to bring a fresh suit for the same matter, or to enter a new suit; and that such power of the Indian Courts is limited to question of form, as in the case (1) of misjoinder, or parties, or of the matters in suit. (2) where a material document has been rejected for not having a proper stamp, and (3) if there has been an improper valuation of the subject-mat ter of the suit. On the authority of this deci sion. Mr. Sinha has advanced an argument that, if section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act is held to be ultra vires, the proper value of the suit would be, according to the defendant him self, about rupees ten lacs and the incorrect valuation will result in failure of the suit. A Bench of this Court in Mahendra Ram V/s. Singi Lal, 3 Pat LJ 651: (AIR 1918 Pat 261) has laid down that the "sufficient grounds" contemplated in the second clause of Order XXIII. Rule 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. should be grounds analogous to the grounds given in the first clause, and that it is not sufficient for the Court merely to record a vague opinion that there is a defect which may materially affect the decision. The Court is required to make a serious inquiry as to whether the suit must fail or not. Mr Sinha has contended that, on the authorities referred to above, it should be held that the inaccurate valuation in the present case will be fatal to the suit. He has submitted that, if it is found that the valuation of the suit property for the purposes of jurisdiction is more than the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Munsif, the plaint will have to be returned to be presented to the appropriate Court, and, after the fresh presentation of the plaint in the appropriate Court, it starts as a fresh suit and the original suit stands having failed. He has, therefore, argued that, under either of the two Clauses of Order XXIII. Rule 1, he has made out a prima facie case to withdraw the suit with liberty to bring a fresh suit The above provision requires the derision of the Court about the failure of the suit. and. unless it is held that section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act is ultra vires, it is not possible for us to form a satisfactory opinion about the fatality of the suit. Again as held by the Bench of this Court in the case reported in 3 Pal LJ 651: (AIR 1918 Pat 261) the grounds for the permission to withdraw the suit under Clause (b) must be analogous to that under Clause (a) It is not possible to hold that an inaccurate valuation could result in the failure of the suit. All that could, under, the law be done in case of inaccurate valuation is that, if it is found that the suit is undervalued and on a proper valuation is beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court, the plaint will be returned under the provisions of Order VII Rule 10, of the Code of Civil Procedure, for being presented to the proper Court. That in my opinion, does not amount to failure of the suit, though that suit comes to an end in that Court and it begins afresh in the other Court. 4. Even assuming that, on account of the inaccurate valuation due to section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act being declared as ultra vires, as contended by Mr. Sinha. It is not a fit case in which we should exercise our discretion to grant permission to withdraw the suit with liberty to bring a fresh suit The suit was filed in March, 1957, and the second appeal in the High Court was filed in March, 1960. The case went before the learned Single Judge of this Court for hearing on the 2nd September, 1963, and it was referred to a Division Bench on that date. About three years have passed after the reference of the case to a Division Bench; but until the 17th August, 1966 the appellant never thought of raising the point with regard to the vires of Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act; nor did he ever think of filing any application for withdrawing the suit. About three years have passed after the reference of the case to a Division Bench; but until the 17th August, 1966 the appellant never thought of raising the point with regard to the vires of Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act; nor did he ever think of filing any application for withdrawing the suit. The case has, by now gone to four Courts, and it is not expedient in the ends of justice that at this late stage the permission should be granted to the appellant to withdraw the suit with liberty to bring a fresh, suit. If any authority is needed, reference may be made to the case of Rajrikh Pandey V/s. Sham Shanker Dubey. 12 Pat LT 280: (AIR 1930 Pat 410), where their Lordships have pointed out that, where a suit has reached the stage of a Letters Patent appeal, it would not be right to allow the plaintiff to withdraw the suit in order to bring a fresh one, especially when the defendants do not consent to that course. Following this decision, the same view has been taken by another Bench of this Court in Domi Ram Chaudhuri V/s. Nawadah Bazar Cooperative Society, AIR 1942 Pat. 148. There also, in a Letters Patent appeal, permission was sought to withdraw the suit with liberty to bring a fresh suit, but their Lordships rejected the prayer for withdrawal of the suit at such a late stage. 5. There is yet another ground for not permitting the appellant to withdraw the suit in the present case. The ground of inaccuracy of the value of the suit is based on the proposed argument that section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act is ultra vires, and, therefore, the valuation of the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction in accordance with the valuation for the payment of court-fee under Section 7 (xi) (cc) of the Court Fees Act was wrongly given and the jurisdictional value should have been the market value of the suit properly. It is not possible at present to express any opinion as to legality of this argument; but supposing that, if the suit is re-filed in the Court of a Subordinate Judge on the market valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction on the ground of Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act being ultra vires and the Subordinate Judge holds that the above section intra vires, the appellant will again file the suit in the Court of the Munsif and will have fresh opportunity to have fresh decision, although it has lost in the two courts below. It is also not desirable to give the permission to the appellant to withdraw the suit with permission to bring a fresh suit after having deliberately filed the suit in the Court of the Munsif. giving the jurisdictional valuation according to Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act and having taken a chance of succeeding in the case, both in the original court as well as in the lower appellate court. The law of estoppel applies in such a case and the plaintiff should not be permitted to say and raise a point, after if has lost the suit, that the Court in which it filed the suit had no jurisdiction to try the same. I am not, therefore, prepared to give any permission to the appellant to withdraw the suit with liberty to bring a fresh suit. The appellants petition for permission to withdraw the suit with liberty to bring a fresh suit is, therefore, liable to he dismissed. 6. Mr. Sinha has then submitted an argument that the appeal, in any case, will have to he remanded at least to the Court of appeal below, because of non-consideration of certain points that had to be considered by it. In that view of the matter, he has urged that, if we feel inclined to remand the case, the permission to withdraw the suit may be given, as the case will have to start afresh even if the appeal is remanded to the Court below. He has submitted that no prejudice will be caused to the defendant-respondent if the suit is permitted to be withdrawn in case the appeal is going to be remanded. Unfortunately for the plaintiff. I do not see any merit in the contention that the appeal has to be remanded. 7. Mr. He has submitted that no prejudice will be caused to the defendant-respondent if the suit is permitted to be withdrawn in case the appeal is going to be remanded. Unfortunately for the plaintiff. I do not see any merit in the contention that the appeal has to be remanded. 7. Mr. Sinha has urged that the learned Subordinate Judge, who decided the appeal in the Court of appeal below, did not appreciate the point that it had to be decided by him as to what were the terms of the settlement, in order to find out whether it was a settlement for agricultural purposes or for housing purposes. His argument is that the lower appellate court has relied on certain documentary evidence which came into existence subsequent to the date of the settlement and such evidence could not be a piece of evidence as to the terms of the settlement on the date on which it was made. He has also submitted that the revisional survey khatain recorded the suit land to be "Dihbari" of the defendant, showing thereby that it could not be an agricultural land, and the learned Subordinate Judge did not apply his mind to the presumption of correctness attaching to such entry. Lastly, he has submitted that, in a proceeding between the plaintiff and the defendant under Sec. 50 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, when the plaintiff wanted to acquire the land in suit, it was pleaded by the defendant that the land was "Dihbari" and the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act had no application to it. The defendant succeeded in that case on that point before the Deputy Commissioner. But later on he filed an appeal before the Commissioner against the decision which was made in his favour according to his contention, and raised a point that the order of the Deputy Commissioner was wrong, inasmuch ;is his land was agricultural. The Commissioner, however, did not accept it. In the present case, the defendant has again raised a point that the land is not "Dihbari", but agricultural. Thus, the defendant had taken two different stands with respect to the nature of the Hind in suit in order to defeat the plaintiff in the present suit as well as in the proceeding under Sec. 50 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act. Thus, the defendant had taken two different stands with respect to the nature of the Hind in suit in order to defeat the plaintiff in the present suit as well as in the proceeding under Sec. 50 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act. nne on the ground that the land is not agricultural and the other on the ground that it is agricultural Such a plea cannot be allowed to be raised. In support of this contention. Mr. Sinha has relied on a Bench decision of this Court in Hakim Syed Shah Khurshed Ali V/s. Commissioner of Tirhut Division. 1955 BLJR 47 : ( AIR 1955 Pat 198 ) . In that case, it was held that, after having succeeded In the civil suit on the plea that Sec.11 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 was a bar to the suit and the House Controller had jurisdiction to decide the matter of eviction, it was not open to the tenant to raise a different and quite an inconsistent plea before the House Controller. As a matter of principle a party denying the jurisdiction of a particular tribunal and succeeding in that plea cannot deny the truth of that plea in subsequent proceedings before another tribunal. 8. So far as the first point is concerned, it appears that the final Court of fact considered the oral testimony of the defendant as well as certain documentary evidence, such as, rent receipts and certain letters written by in officer of the plaintiff permitting the defendant to plough and cultivate the land. On a consideration of those documents, the lower appellate court has come to the conclusion that the settlement was for agricultural purposes. The learned Subordinate Judge has definitely held that, from the very inception of the settlement, the purpose of settlement was agricultural. The trial court relied on Ext. D, but the appellate court affirmed its decision without referring to that document. On a reading of that document, there appears to be no doubt that the settlement was for agricultural purposes. The settlement in question is said to have been made some time in April, 1931. On the 7th April, 1931, the Farm Superintendent of the plaintiff wrote to Mr. S.C. Bose, father of the defendant A. C. Bose (Ext. On a reading of that document, there appears to be no doubt that the settlement was for agricultural purposes. The settlement in question is said to have been made some time in April, 1931. On the 7th April, 1931, the Farm Superintendent of the plaintiff wrote to Mr. S.C. Bose, father of the defendant A. C. Bose (Ext. D) to the following effect: "with reference to your application for land made to our Land Officer, and in continuation of our personal talk. I am herewith confirming our allotting you about 58 bighas of land and a pond at Gumriagora. The proper lease is under drawing. Meanwhile, you can go ahead with ploughing on the lands shown to you". This letter, read along with another letter (Ext. D/1), dated the 6th January, 1933, which the lower appellate court has considered, gives full support to its finding that the settlement was for agricultural purposes. The construction of these documents, which are documents of evidence, and not of title, is not a question of law and cannot be challenged in a second appeal. 9 Even with respect to the entry in the revisional record-of-rights, the trial court, after discussing the evidence on the record, clearly held that the presumption of correctness had been fully rebutted. The lower appellate court affirmed that finding, without discussing in detail the evidence on the point. Its judgment, however, being a judgment of affirmance cannot be said to be not in accordance with law, on the ground that there is no full discussion of the evidence. The learned Subordinate Judge has, however, noticed all the evidence that has been given by the parties, and has ultimately come to the conclusion, that, in spite of the entry in the survey record-of-rights, the defendant has proved that the land was settled for agricultural purposes. 10. With respect to the last point. I find that the necessary documents which could have lent support to the contention raised by Mr. Sinha have not been filed. The judgment (Ext. 9) shows that the defendant and several other persons were parties in several separate cases and all those cases were disposed of by one judgment by the Deputy Commissioner; and in giving the summary statement of the cases of the parties, he had noticed that an objection was raised that the land was "Dihbari" land. Mr. The judgment (Ext. 9) shows that the defendant and several other persons were parties in several separate cases and all those cases were disposed of by one judgment by the Deputy Commissioner; and in giving the summary statement of the cases of the parties, he had noticed that an objection was raised that the land was "Dihbari" land. Mr. Sarkar has urged that the defence taken by all the tenants in those proceedings was not similar, and, in the absence of the pleadings of the parties on the record, it cannot definitely be said as in what stand the defendant had taken in that proceeding. I agree with the contention of Mr. Sarkar; and, without there being on the record the pleadings, it cannot be ascertained as to what actual stand the defendant had taken in that proceeding. Therefore, the principle laid down in the case of Hakim Syed Shah Khurshed Ali, 1955 BLJR 47 : ( AIR 1955 Pat 198 ) cannol be applied to the present case. 11. There is thus no merit in this appeal, which is, accordingly, dismissed with costs. The petition for permission to withdraw the suit with liberty to bring a fresh suit is also dismissed. Tarkeshwar Nath, J. 12 I agree.