JUDGMENT : Sarkar, J. 1. This appeal arises out of an order under Section 476 of Cr.P.C. passed by the High Court at Allahabad directing the Registrar of that Court to lodge a complaint in a proper court against the appellant under Section 193 ox I.P.C. for having sworn a false affidavit. 2. The facts are somewhat out of the ordinary and lengthy but a statement of them cannot be avoided. The appellant was a tenant of premises in Dehradun, where he carried on a business in jewellery. The respondent Mo-hinder is the son of the appellant by his first wife who is dead. The appellant, we were told, has been living with his second wife and children separately from Mohinder. He had to come to Delhi for a few days early in 1955, having left the premises at Dehradun in charge of Mohinder. Taking advantage of his absence, Mohinder made an application to the appropriate authorities at Dehradun for allotment of the premises to him as a tenant on the basis that the premises were vacant, and an order of allotment of the premises to him was made. This was sometime in April 1955. The appellants efforts to have the order of allotment to Mohinder cancelled, failed. He, thereupon, filed a petition in the High Court at Allahabad for a writ quashing the order of allotment. This petition was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of that Court on October 18, 1957. The appellant filed an appeal to a Division Bench under the Letters Patent of that Court. The Division Bench set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge on May 12, 1961. On the date when the Division Bench heard the matter neither Mohinder nor his lawyer had appeared in the Court. Mohinder then applied for a review of the order of the Division Bench of May 12, 1961 on the ground that his advocate had been misled by the list issued in respect of the days business of that court and that is why he could not appear. This review petition, as it was called, was allowed and the case was restored and heard in the presence of both the parties. In the result, however, the Division Bench maintained its earlier order of May 12, 1961 setting aside the decision of the learned Single Judge. This was on November 4, 1961. 3. This review petition, as it was called, was allowed and the case was restored and heard in the presence of both the parties. In the result, however, the Division Bench maintained its earlier order of May 12, 1961 setting aside the decision of the learned Single Judge. This was on November 4, 1961. 3. The original dispute concerning the premises appears to have come to an end by the order of November 4, 1961 but the dispute between the father and the son did not also then stop. On December 12, 1961, Mohinder moved the High Court under Section 476 of Cr.P.C. for action being taken against the appellant for having made a false allegation in para 14 of the affidavit sworn by him in the proceedings for review. That statement in substance was that on May 12, 1961, when the Division Bench first decided the matter in the absence of Mohinder, Mohinder was in fact present in the Court and was running about to get hold of his advocate to appear in the case as it was called out. This statement had been made presumably to establish that there was no reason to set aside the order of May 12, 1961. Mohinder filed an affidavit in reply to that of the appellant stating that on May 12, 1961, he was in fact at Dehradun and, therefore, the statement of the appellant that he was then in Allahabad was deliberately false. In support of his case that he was in Dehradun, he annexed to his affidavit a letter from the Manager of the Oriental Bank of Commerce, Dehradun, which purported to set out, with a certificate by the Manager, a true copy of entries contained in the register maintained by the Bank in respect of its Safe Deposit Vault Register in its Dehradun Branch. The entries showed that the locker stood in the name of Mrs. Rani Verma and that on May 12, 1961 at 1.15 p.m. it had been opened by her nominee, Mohinder, and that the register bore the signature of Mohinder and the initials of the custodian of the vault. We have earlier said that the High Court set aside the ex parte order and heard the matter freshly in the presence of Mohinder. We have earlier said that the High Court set aside the ex parte order and heard the matter freshly in the presence of Mohinder. It was in respect of the aforesaid alleged false statement by the appellant regarding the presence of Mohinder at Allahabad on May 12, 1961 that the High Court directed the complaint to be lodged against him. This order of the High Court was made on August 27, 1963. This appeal by special leave challenges the correctness of that order. 4. A few more facts however have to be stated because some point was sought to be made out of them as to the maintainability of the present appeal. It appears that on October 22, 1963, the appellant moved this Court under Art 135 for special leave to appeal against the order of the High Court directing the complaint to be lodged against him. On October 30, 1963, the appellant also applied to the High Court under Article 133 of the Constitution for a certificate of fitness for appeal to this Court in respect of the order of August 27, 1963. The application for special leave was returned by the office for non-compliance with certain rules of this Court. After the rectification of the defects, the application was finally re-filed on March 26, 1964 with an application for condonation of the delay that had occurred in filing it. The time between October 22, 1963 and March 26, 1964 was occupied in taking various other steps to which it is unnecessary to refer. We have not been satisfied, however, that they were idle. On March 30, 1964, this Court granted the appellant special leave to appeal and condoned the delay in filing it "subject to objections". By that order it directed the office of this Court to have the records printed under its supervision after having intimated the High Court of the order granting leave and requiring it to send the original records. Para 6 of this Order stated, "That the petitioner herein Do take expeditious steps to have the application for leave to appeal to this Court filed in the High Court disposed of". This Court also stayed further proceedings for the lodging of the complaint against the appellant. Para 6 of this Order stated, "That the petitioner herein Do take expeditious steps to have the application for leave to appeal to this Court filed in the High Court disposed of". This Court also stayed further proceedings for the lodging of the complaint against the appellant. After this order had been made, the appellant deposited in this Court the necessary charges of the printing of the records of appeal arising out of the leave granted. On May 15, 1964, the High Court granted the certificate for which the appellant had applied on October 30, 1963, but revoked this certificate on July 31, 1964, as the appellant did not deposit the printing charge or the security for costs as required by the order granting it. After the certificate had been revoked, the appellant had been advised that there might be some technical difficulties in his way in the hearing of this appeal and so he made an application to this Court (CMP No. 742 of 1964) for certain orders removing those difficulties. 5. Mohinder has taken no steps to show that the order of this Court condoning the delay in the filing of the special leave application by the appellant should be set aside. He has filed no objection to the condonation of the delay. We have however heard counsel in this matter on such materials as are on the record, and we are not satisfied that the delay should not have been condoned. We have set out the facts as far as relevant and it seems to us that the delay was caused by various proceedings which arose because the appellant had been asked to pursue his application in the High Court for a certificate under Article 133 and because he had been erroneously required by this Court in the beginning to furnish court fee in respect of his application for special leave. The appellant was anxious to move this Court for a stay of the proceedings in the High Court under the order challenged in this appeal and in fact obtained the necessary order. He had come to this court for an expeditious order of stay for he had been advised that in the High Court he could not obtain the stay as expeditiously. He had come to this court for an expeditious order of stay for he had been advised that in the High Court he could not obtain the stay as expeditiously. That his apprehension was justified, would appear from the fact that the application, for the certificate under Article 133 which had been filed on October 30, 1963, was heard and disposed of by the High Court on May 15, 1964. We, therefore, think that no sufficient objections have been established to justify the recall of the order condoning delay in filing the petition for special leave. 6. It was said that the certificate having been revoked by the High Court, this Court should not hear this appeal. We fail to appreciate this point altogether. This Court had granted the special leave intending that the appeal would be heard. This Court, while granting special leave, further directed the office of this Court to have the record of the appeal printed and pursuant to that order the appellant, as was his duly, deposited the printing charges in the Court and the printing duly commenced. This Court, no doubt, while granting the special leave also stated that the appellant should proceed with his application to the High Court for a certificate under Article 133. We are, however, unable to hold that thereby this Court held that the result of that application would decide the question whether the appeal arising out of the special leave granted by it should be heard or not. It may be that this Court wanted to get the High Courts view on the question that would arise in this appeal and that is why it directed the appellant to proceed with the application for the certificate. However that may be, we do not think that this Court intended that the appellant on obtaining the certificate, the application for which he was directed to pursue in the High Court, would incur costs getting the records prepared in both the Courts for the hearing of the appeal. We, therefore, do not think that he committed any default in not depositing the printing charges in the High Court for the preparation of the records there. In the circumstances that have happened, we think that the appeal should be heard by this Court. The revocation of the certificates by the High Court in no way affects the competence or maintainability of the appeal. In the circumstances that have happened, we think that the appeal should be heard by this Court. The revocation of the certificates by the High Court in no way affects the competence or maintainability of the appeal. It is unnecessary, therefore, to make any order in CMP No. 742 of 1964. 7. We now come to the merits of the appeal. Mr. Misra appearing for the appellant contended that Section 479-A of Cr.P.C. applied to this case and not Section 476, and, therefore, as the High Court had not made the order for lodging the complaint at the time of the delivery of the judgment in the case at the hearing of which the offence was said to have been committed, the High Courts order was incompetent and illegal. It is not disputed that if Section 479-A applied, that would be the result. But what is said by the opposite side is that that section does not apply. We think it unnecessary to go into this question in the present case for, in our view, the order is not justified even by the terms of S. 476, under which it was purported to have been made. That section requires that when a Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an enquiry should be made into an offence referred to in Section 195, sub-section (1) clause (b) or clause (c), which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court, such Court may record a finding to that effect and make a complaint thereof and shall forward the same to a magistrate. An offence under Section 193 of I.P.C. is one of the offences mentioned in the provisions of Section 195 of Cr.P.C. specified in Section 476. It would have been noticed that one of the essential conditions for an order under Section 476 is that it should appear to the Court that an offence referred to in Section 195 had been committed. If it does not so appear, of course, the Court cannot form an opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice to take steps against any person in respect of that offence. 8. If it does not so appear, of course, the Court cannot form an opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice to take steps against any person in respect of that offence. 8. Now what happened in this case was that the learned Judges having referred to the two affidavits of the appellant and Mohinder, which we have earlier summarised, concerning the presence of Mohinder in Allahabad on May 12, 1961, observed, "There is an apparent inconsistency between the averment of Swami Dass and the contents of annexure 1. Both cannot therefore be true. We, therefore, think that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an enquiry should be made whether Swami Das has committed perjury. ..." Annexure 1 referred to in the above quotation is the letter from the Manager of the Oriental Bank of Commerce earlier mentioned. We are entirely unable to hold that by such observation the learned Judges indicated that it had appeared to them that an offence of perjury had been committed. That being so, it must be held that the basic element on which an order under Section 476 could have been made, did not exist. Not only does the section clearly require the Court acting under it to record a finding that it appeared to it that an offence had been committed, but the reported cases, to which our attention had been drawn all take the same view : Muniswami Naiau v. Emperor, AIR 1928 Mad. 783 Faujdar Rai v. Emperor, AIR 1926 Pat. 25 Pitamber v. King Emperor, AIR 1927 All. 567 and Mannalal Sardarmal Jain v. Ramkishan Jodhraj Maharaj, AIR 1959 M.P. 264 . We, therefore, think that the order of the High Court is unsustainable. 9. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court is set aside. Appeal allowed.