S. B. Capoor and H. R. Khanna JJ. ( 1 ) THIS case has been referred to the Division Bench in pursuance of the order of Grover, J. It arises out of a suit for ejectment from the shop in dispute situated in Najafgarh and for recovery of Rs. 456. 00 brought by Joti Pershad plaintiff. respondent against Sahib Dayal defendant. The trial Court dismissed the suit but on appeal the learned Additional District Judge, Delhi, passed a decree for ejectment from the shop in dispute and /or recovery of Rs. 245. 00 in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant In second appeal when the matter came up before Grover, J, he found that the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act did not apply to the area wherein the shop in dispute is situate. Question then arose for determination as to whether it was necessary for the plaintiff to have served a notice for terminating the tenancy in accordance with the rule embodied in Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The plaintiff was found to have issued notice Exhibit P-4 to the defendant on 18th November, 1957 requiring the latter to vacate the premises by 5th January 1958 treating the tenancy month to be from 6th to 5th of the succeeding month. The position taken on behalf of the defendant was that the tenancy month was from the 8th to 7th day of the succeeding month. The lower Appellate Court found that the tenancy month commenced from 8th and ended on the 7th of the next month. This finding was assailed by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-landlord before the learned Single Judge and has also been assailed before us. The learned Single Judge on the assumption that that finding is not open to challenge dealt with the matter as to whether a notice for ejectment in order to be valid should expire on the last day of the period of tenancy. The learned Single Judge on the assumption that that finding is not open to challenge dealt with the matter as to whether a notice for ejectment in order to be valid should expire on the last day of the period of tenancy. He found that there was a conflict on the point and consequently referred the matter to Division Bench, ( 2 ) RELEVANT part of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act reads as under :- "in the absence of a contract on local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immoveable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by six months notice expiring with the end of a year of the tenancy; and a lease of immoveable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy. "the question as to whether the provision of the above Section requiring the notice for termination of the lease to expire with the end of the month of the tenancy, applies to areas not governed by the Transfer of Property Act, has been the subject matter of a number of cases. In Chuni Lal v. Chuni Lal, the tenancy commenced on 1st November 1920 and according to its terms if the landlord wanted to have the premises vacated he was to give one month s previous notice. The landlord gave a notice on 14th November, 1921 to the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises within one month. Upholding the finding of the Court below that the notice was not valid, Moti Sagar, J. observed that in the absence of a contract to the contray Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act applies to the Punjab. According to the learned Judge, Section 106 merely laid down in a codified form what in fact had always been understood to be the general law on the subject. reference in this connection was made by the learned judge to observations in Foe s Law of landlord and Tenant at page 582, and Dr. Gour s law of Transfer at page 1902. ( 3 ). reference in this connection was made by the learned judge to observations in Foe s Law of landlord and Tenant at page 582, and Dr. Gour s law of Transfer at page 1902. ( 3 ). In Rure Khan v. Ghulam Muhammad, the defendant, according to the terms of the lease, was to be a tenant of the plaintiff for eleven months. The plaintiff was empowered at any time to give the tenant a week s notice to vacate the house. The tenancy commenced on the 8th August 1920 and on the 3rd June 1921 the plaintiff sent a notice to the defendant telling him to leave the house within a week or to pay double rent. Contention was advanced that the plaintiff could only give such notice of ejectment as would terminate on the last day of the month. This contention was repelled by Campbell, J. in Ram Nath v. Baari Nath. the defendant took on lease a house with effect from 8th October, 1923. According to the lease deed the rent was to be paid monthly and if the landlord wished to have the house vacated, he should give two months previous notice. On 21st July 1924 the landlord served a notice on the tenant asking the latter to vacate the house within two months from the date of the receipt of the notice at the risk of being charged double rent. It was held by Coldstream, J. That the notice given by the landlord was not invalid though it did not expire with the end of a month of the tenancy. Letters patent Appeal against the decision in this case was dismissed in limine. In Rattan Sen Sachar v. Shrimati Krishan Kaur the landlord served two notices upon the tenant. The first notice was given on 18th June 1931 and required the tenant to vacate the house by the end of the month. The notice was received by the tenant on 23rd June, 1931. The second notice was issued on 20th July 1931 and required the tenant to vacate the premises within 15 days. The tenancy was a monthly one. Bhide. J. held the notices to be not legal because those notices did not give fifteen days to the tenant terminating with the date of the tenancy. The second notice was issued on 20th July 1931 and required the tenant to vacate the premises within 15 days. The tenancy was a monthly one. Bhide. J. held the notices to be not legal because those notices did not give fifteen days to the tenant terminating with the date of the tenancy. In Mst Sunder Bai v. Chaudhrani Muntaz Jan, one of the arguments advanced in revision was that the tenancy terminated on 7th August and the notice to quit on 8th August was bad. This contention was repelled by Wetton C. J. and it was further observed that the Transfer of Property Act did not apply to the locality and the technical defects in the notice to quit did not have the force they might have under that Act. ( 4 ) APART from the Punjab cases, the learned counsel for plaintiff respondent has relied upon the case of Nanakram Das and others v. Nagarmal. In that case Narasimhad, J. observed that though the Transfer of Property Act was not in force prior to the merger, the equitable principles of the Act could be applied in respect of leases which took place prior to the commencement of that Act. It does not mean that every provision of that Act should be applied to the very letter. The provisions in section 116 requiting that the notice should expire with the end of the month of the tenancy, according to the learned Judge, need not be literally applied. It was further observed that a reasonable notice would suffice. In Namdeo Lokman Lodhi v. Narmadabu", their Lordship dealt with the case under Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act relating to a notice of intention to determine lease on forfeiture. It was observed, while dealing with the observations in an earlier Full Bench case of Madras High Court in Brahmayya v. b. Sundaramma, that the observations in that Full Bench case that Sections 105 to 116 of the Transfer of Property Act were founded on principles of reason and equity could not be accepted either as correct or precise. According to their Lordships, to the extent that those Sections of the Act gave statutory recognition to principles of justice, equity and good conscience, they were applicable also to cases not governed by the Act. According to their Lordships, to the extent that those Sections of the Act gave statutory recognition to principles of justice, equity and good conscience, they were applicable also to cases not governed by the Act. No specific observation was, however, made on the point as to whether Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act embodied a principle of justice, equity and good conscience. ( 5 ) THERE can be no manner of doubt that the principles of the Transfer of Property Act, which are based upon Justice, equity and good conscience, would apply to disputes relating to even those properties which are situated in areas to which the Transfer of Property Act has not been made applicable. Equally there can be no doubt on the point that the technical provisions of the Transfer of Property Act cannot be invoked in cases relating to property situated in areas not governed by the Transfer of Property Act. This position is not disputed by the learned counsel for the parties. The question, in the circumstances, arises as to whether the Rule embodied in Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act that the notice of the termination of the tenancy should expire with the end of the month of the tenancy is one based upon justice, equity and good conscience or whether it is a technical rule. After giving the matter our consideration we are of the view that the above rule is of a technical nature. This can best be illustrated with referenence to the facts of the present case. In this case the tenant was admittedly given 48 days notice to quit the premises. According to the learned counsel for the tenant the notice was not valid because it was not a fifteen days notice expiring with the end of the month of the tenancy. The invalidity of the notice, it is stated, is due to the fact that the tenant was given more days to vacate than prescribed by the rule embodied in the statute. It is, however, not disputed that there was nothing to prevent the tenant from vacating the premises at any time within forty eight days of the notice. In our opinion, it would be hardly equitable to invalidate the notice of ejectment because the tenant was given more time than was strictly due to vacate the premises in dispute. It is, however, not disputed that there was nothing to prevent the tenant from vacating the premises at any time within forty eight days of the notice. In our opinion, it would be hardly equitable to invalidate the notice of ejectment because the tenant was given more time than was strictly due to vacate the premises in dispute. This would be taking a highly technical view of the matter and we are not prepared to enforce the vigours of that rule in territories to which the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act have not been made applicable. The correct approach, in our of inion is that embodied in the observations of Narasimham J. In Nanakram Das s case (Supra) according to which the provisions of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act requiring that the notice should expire with the end of the month of the tenancy need not be literally applied and that a reasonable notice would suffice. The notice, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, should in no case be less than that the notice given by the plaintiff to the defendant in the present case was not invalid. No finding, in view of the above, is necessary on the point as to whether the tenancy month was from 8th to 7th of the succeeding month or whether it was from 6th to 5th of the succeeding month. ( 6 ) THE appeal shall now go back to the learned Single Judge for disposal. The costs shall abide the event