JUDGMENT.- Defendants, are appellants in the Second Appeal. The plaintiff is Sri Arunjadeswaraswami Temple at Tirupanandal. The temple filed the suit to recover possession of the land of an extent of 120 kulis belonging to it. The facts which are not in controversy are that on 24th January, 1893 the temple granted a lease of the property to one Doraisami Kothan, the father of the first defendant, subject to the condition that this Doraisami Kothan shall take possession of the property, construct a brick building for Drowpadiamman Temple, start and develop a nandavanam all round the temple and plant and rear coconut trees in the nandavanam, and pay a rent of 12 annas per fasli to the devasthanam on or before 31st January of each fasli. He should also maintain worship in the Amman temple. In default of compliance with the conditions, if the temple wants he should surrender possession of the property with the trees, temple building, nandavanam, etc. It is the plaintiff’s case that Doraisami Kothan got into possession of the property and complied with the conditions as per the lease deed Exhibit A-4. Doraisami Kothan died on 6th December, 1940. Thereafter the first defendant got into possession of the property. He has created certain leases in favour of defendants except defendant 8. The temple through its Advocate issued notice Exhibit A-6 dated 17th June, 1959 calling Upon the aforesaid defendants to hand over possession of the property along with the temple building, nandavanam, standing trees, etc., alleging that there has been default on the part of the first defendant to perform the conditions under Exhibit A-4. The complaint of the temple was that the first defendant was guilty of gross negligence and dereliction of duties, and that he did not attend to the temple, etc. The first defendant’s Advocate sent a reply, Exhibit A-7, dated 14th July, 1959 in which the first defendant set up title to the property and did not recognise or accept the title of the temple. This repudiation and attitude of the defendant led to the present suit, O.S. No. 14 of 1960 on the file of the District Munsif’s Court, Kumbakonam. The trial Court found that the property belonged to the temple and there is no substance in the defendants’ contention that the property was the private property of Doraisami Kothan or, the first defendant. This repudiation and attitude of the defendant led to the present suit, O.S. No. 14 of 1960 on the file of the District Munsif’s Court, Kumbakonam. The trial Court found that the property belonged to the temple and there is no substance in the defendants’ contention that the property was the private property of Doraisami Kothan or, the first defendant. It also held that as the lease deed in question was not registered as required by section 107 of the Transferor Property Act, it was terminable on the part of either lessor or lessee by 15 days’ notice, and would be deemed to be a lease from month to month as specified in section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. In this view the contentions of the defendant were negatived and a decree for possession was passed in favour of the plaintiff. On ‘appeal, the appellate Court while confirming the judgment of the trial Court on the merits with regard to the plaintiff’s claim for possession held that the first defendant would be entitled to compensation with regard to the coconut trees which he claimed to have planted on the land in question. It had directed the question of compensation to be determined by a commissioner. The first defendant had preferred the Second Appeal. The plaintiff has filed a memorandum of cross-objections with regard to the claim of compensation which was upheld in favour of the first defendant. Mr. Venkataraman, learned Counsel for the appellants, contended that the lease in question terminated with the death of Dorasami Kothan in 1940, that thereafter it would not enure in favour of the first defendant with the result that his possession thereafter should be presumed to be adverse as that of a trespasser, and that as the first defendant had been in such possession without title as trespasser for over 12 years from 1940 he has perfected his title by adverse possession and the plaintiff’s suit is liable to be dismissed on that ground. In support of his contention, learned Counsel relied on the decisions in Saldana v. R. C. Church, Mermajal1, and Jumma v. Madhusoodan Dayal1. In support of his contention, learned Counsel relied on the decisions in Saldana v. R. C. Church, Mermajal1, and Jumma v. Madhusoodan Dayal1. Learned Counsel also relied upon the decisions in Muralidhar v. Smt. Tara Dye2, and Ramachandra Agarwala v. Syameswari Dasya3, in support of his further contention that as the lease deed was unregistered, the possession of Doraisami Kothan was only that of a tenant-at-will and therefore on his death there was nothing which the first defendant would inherit, and that after 1940 the possession of the first defendant would be without any right and only that of a trespasser. In this view too he contended that the plaintiff’s suit would be barred by limitation as the 1st defendant should be held to have acquired title to the property by adverse possession. I see no substance in these contentions. Mr. M. S. Venkatarama Iyer, learned Counsel for the respondent urged that Exhibit A-4 was undoubtedly a lease which required registration under section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, as it is a lease for more than one year. From this he contended that if for want of registration Exhibit A-4 becomes inadmissible and useless, section 106 of the Transfer of Property would be attracted and the position would be that there is no contract with regard to the terms of the lease, and that as the lease was not for agricultural purpose, statutorily, the lease would be deemed to be a lease from month to month terminable on the part of either the lessor or lessee by issue of 15 days notice. According to learned Counsel the fact that Exhibit A-4 provides that rent is payable at indefinite intervals extending over years or that the terms of the lease are such that it is impossible to regard it as monthly lease, is wholly irrelevant. According to learned Counsel section 106 would apply only to such cases and the section statutorily regards the lease from month to month. In support of his contention learned Counsel referred me to the statement of law in Mulla’s Transfer of Property Act, 6th Edition, at page 106, and also drew my attention to the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Sheik Akloo v. Sheikh Manan4, in which the facts were similar to these in the present case. In support of his contention learned Counsel referred me to the statement of law in Mulla’s Transfer of Property Act, 6th Edition, at page 106, and also drew my attention to the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Sheik Akloo v. Sheikh Manan4, in which the facts were similar to these in the present case. In that case also the terms of the lease which was unregistered showed that it was annual tenancy and the rent was payable every year and the identical point was dealt with by the learned Chief Justice in these terms: “ Then arises the next question whether from that fact, it can be presumed that the tenancy was an annual tenancy. I should be prepared to follow what was said by my learned brother Mr. Justice Mookerjee in the case Durgi Nikarini v. Goberdhan Bose5namely, ‘it may possibly be accepted as a proposition generally true, that, as indicated in Wilkinson v. Holl6 the mode in which rent is expressed to be reserved affords a presumption that the tenancy is of a character corresponding thereto. The rule, however, is not of universal application, and it was pointed out by Mr. Justice Maule in Atherstone v. Bostock7 that the presumption of yearly taking from the rent being paid yearly does not apply to the case of lodgings and the same view is supported by the case of Wilson v. Abbott8. Now in this case there is nothing to rebut the presumption which I think ought to be drawn from the fact that the rent was to be an annual rent. Therefore, the presumption ought to be drawn that the tenancy was to be annual tenancy ; and so far that conclusion at which I have arrived is in favour of the appellant. Therefore, within the words of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, there would be a contract, namely, such as I have described a contract of tenancy between the plaintiff on the one hand and the defendant on the other, and an annual tenancy for which an annual rent of Rs. 15 was to be paid, and, therefore, section 106, if it stood by itself, would not apply because there would be a contract to the contrary. 15 was to be paid, and, therefore, section 106, if it stood by itself, would not apply because there would be a contract to the contrary. But unfortunately for the appellant there is section 107 which says that such a contract as that, a contract such as I have described, which reserves a yearly rent, can be made only by a registered instrument, and, inasmuch as there is no registered instrument in this case, that contract must be treated as invalid contract and as not existing. Therefore, I am forced to the conclusion that this case does come within section 106, because there is an absence of a contract to the contrary inasmuch as the contract which was in fact made and was in fact held to exist by the Court of first instance was not put into writing and was not registered.” Reference has also been made to an earlier decision of the Calcutta High Court in Debendra Nath Bhowmik v. Syama Brosanna Bhowmik9, in which the same aspect is stressed having regard to the express language in section 106. There also the document of lease was unregistered and it was an yearly tenancy, the rent stipulated being annual rent. It was held that as the lease deed was inadmissible under section 107, it was regarded as one terminable either by lessor or lessee by 15 days notice under section 106. It is unnecessary to multiply authorities in view of the clear language of section 106. Therefore the lease in the instant case was terminable by 15 days notice and was current when Doraisami Kothan died. During the currency of the lease the first defendant undoubtedly became entitled to and obtained possession of the property as the lessee, because it is a lease from month to month. It is not in controversy that such a lease has been validly determined as a result of the notice Exhibit A-6. The result therefore is that the first defendant is bound to surrender possession to the plaintiff. The Second Appeal is dismissed with costs. No leave. With regard to the memorandum of cross-objections it is clear that the lower appellate Court has committed a mistake in relying upon the decision in Alagiriswami Kone v. Andhoni1. Having regard to the terms of the lease deed in that case, that decision has no application to the instant case. The Second Appeal is dismissed with costs. No leave. With regard to the memorandum of cross-objections it is clear that the lower appellate Court has committed a mistake in relying upon the decision in Alagiriswami Kone v. Andhoni1. Having regard to the terms of the lease deed in that case, that decision has no application to the instant case. In that case the lease deed contained a provision that on the termination of the lease when the lessor terminated his possession, the lessee would be entitled to the cost of the construction of improvement which was effected on the property with the result it could be said that when the lessee effected improvements, he did them in good faith and on the presumption that he would be entitled to the value thereof. That principle will have no application to a case in which the lease deed contains a contrary provision. Exhibit A-4 contains a clear covenant that on the termination of the lease the lessee should hand over possession of the property along with the building, trees, etc. without any claim for compensation. The first defendant cannot blow hot and cold. If he relies upon the lease deed, Exhibit A-4 he is not entitled to get compensation. If the lease deed becomes inadmissible for went of registration, under section 51 it is clear that a lessee would not be entitled to compensation in respect of any improvements effected on the property demised. Mr. Venkatarama Iyer drew my attention to the decision of the Privy Council in Ariff v. Ra Judunath Majumdar Bahadur2, and the observations therein at page 546 to the effect that if a lessee erects any building not in a mistaken belief of his rights in regard to the land but in assertion of rights which he correctly believes to be his but which ultimately turn to be unfounded in law, he cannot claim compensation. From this it will be clear that the 1st defendant is not entitled to any claim for compensation. The result is the Memorandum of Cross Objections is allowed. No Costs in Memorandum of Cross Objections. No leave. V.K. -------------Appeal dismissed; Memorandum of cross-objections allowed.