JUDGMENT Hidayatullah, J.- l. These are four appeals, all by Kanhaiyalal Khadiwala, against a judgment, July 29, 1964 and an order, September 29, 1964, passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh Indore Bench) in the following circumstances. The appellant was elected to Parliament from Indore Constituency in 1957. The respondent Vishwanath was the editor and publisher in 1960 of a monthly journal called "Sarita" printed and published at New Delhi. In the January issue of "Sarita" in that year there appeared an article under the heading "Sansada Sadasya Shri Chadarwala" and the writer's name was given as Chaturbhuj Mourya. The journal also carried a caricature of Khadiwala. The article described a person elected to parliament from a city having a name 'N' who was president of an All India Conference of his party, of a Women's Conference and of a Mahila Vidya Ashram. The article described his appearance, his clothes, his manner of speech and went on to charge him with trying to make free with girls, with having used his official position to his own advantage in a variety of ways, and to make money by diverse acts which it is not necessary to specify. The article was per se defamatory and it has rightly been so found. 2. Khadiwala was of opinion that the article referred to him and defamed him. He served a notice on Vishwanath to disclose the real name of the writer of the article but as Vishwanath declined to do so, or to apologise and make amends, Khadiwala filed a complaint under section 500 of the Indian Penal Code against him as the editor, printer and publisher of the journal containing the defamatory article. The case was strenuously defended and Khadiwala was subjected to a long and searching cross-examination in respect of the statements in the article. The attempt was to establish that the allegations were true. However, in his statement under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Vishwanath only pleaded that the article referred to no person in particular and was intended to hold up to public ridicule politicians who make the best of political opportunities to feather their nests and that any resemblance to Khadiwalal was purely coincidental. 3. The defence was not accepted. There were numerous points of resemblance and the identity of the person aimed at was not in any doubt. 3. The defence was not accepted. There were numerous points of resemblance and the identity of the person aimed at was not in any doubt. It was not a general description of politicians but lampooned Khadiwala under the name of Chadarwala. The Magistrate had no difficulty in holding the article to be per se defamatory and in convicting Vishwanath under section 500 Indian Penal Code. He sentenced him to a fine of Rs. 2000 or to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of one year. 4. Vishwanath appealed from the conviction and sentence and the Additional Sessions Judge who heard the appeal set aside the conviction and sentence and ordered a retrial. He reached this conclusion because the Magistrate had spoken of the character and integrity of Khadiwala in fulsome terms and the Sessions Judge was of opinion that the Magistrate was influenced by personal interest. Khadiwala had also applied to the Sessions Judge seeking enhancement of the sentence but his application necessarily failed when the conviction was set aside. Both sides went up in revision to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh and the order of the Additional Sessions Judge was reversed and he was directed to hear and dispose of the appeal of Vishwanath and the application of Khadiwalal on merits. The appeal was then heard and dismissed. The sentence of imprisonment was reduced to simple imprisonment for six months. The sentence of one year was illegal. The application of Khadiwala for enhancement of sentence failed automatically. 5. Both sides filed revisions in the High Court against the order of the Additional Sessions Judge. The High Court by the judgment dated July 29, 1964 maintained the conviction but, holding that some of the allegations in the article were true and public good required that they be made and published, reduced the sentence of fine to Rs. 200 and the simple imprisonment in default of payment of fine, to one month. The High Court expressed the conclusions that Khadiwala had obtained plots in Bhopal and loan on the pretence that his income was below Rs. 200 and the simple imprisonment in default of payment of fine, to one month. The High Court expressed the conclusions that Khadiwala had obtained plots in Bhopal and loan on the pretence that his income was below Rs. 500 and having undertaken to build a residential house constructed shops to get rent, that he failed to disclose the source of the additional money required for the purpose, that he secured through his influence a licence for a petrol pump for his son and gave a remunerative job to his wife for which she was not qualified. In the course of his judgment, the learned Judge commented severely upon the conduct and character of Khadiwala. 6. After the judgment was given Khadiwala applied for expunction of nine passages from the judgment of the High Court, specified in his petition filed for the purpose on August 27, 1964. The learned Judge dismissed this petition summarily, reiterating his remarks in language which, if anything, was severer than before. The reason given by the learned Judge for declining to expunge the remarks was that Khadiwala was aggrieved not so much by the language of the remarks as by the conclusion that some of the allegations were true, and that if the passages were expunged, those conclusions would disappear on which the ,reduction of the sentence was based. Khadiwala then filed four applications to obtain certificates to file appeals to this Court against the main decision and the order declining to expunge the passages to which he had taken exception. The High Court declined to grant the necessary certificates but Khadiwala applied for and obtained special leave from this Court and the four appeals have been filed. 7. In so far as the appeals for the enhancement of the sentence are concerned we may say, what has been said on many occasions, that this Court does not ordinarily enter upon a consideration of sentence. We see no justification to depart from that practice. We shall take up for consideration only the submission about the order declining to expunge the nine passages in the judgment, which bear upon the character and conduct of Khadiwala. 8. We see no justification to depart from that practice. We shall take up for consideration only the submission about the order declining to expunge the nine passages in the judgment, which bear upon the character and conduct of Khadiwala. 8. It was submitted that Vishwanath's plea in defence was that the article was general and referred to no person in particular and as he had not raised a plea of Imputation of truth which public good required to be made or published the truth or falsity of the allegations was not relevant matter. It was also pointed out that the Magistrate and Sessions Judge had viewed Vishwanath's defence from the angle of the defence actually set up and rightly had not considered a defence under the first exception to section 499 of the Indian Penal Code. 9. It is true that Vishwanath did not set up a defence under the first exception but the trend of cross examination of Khadiwala suggested that the truth of the allegations was being sought to be established. The High Court allowed this defence to be set up and while considering it made the observations against Khadiwala. It was submitted that these observations in the judgment bearing upon the truth of the aspersions were extraneous to the controversy and, therefore, quite unnecessary and in appropriate. It was submitted that the observations, for that reason, deserved to be expunged and for the added 'reason, that the remarks themselves exceeded the bounds within which comments, in judgments, on parties should be contained. Lastly it was contended that the defence in the High Court was at variance with the case that the article did not refer to Khadiwala and was general and could not be allowed to be raised. None of these arguments is acceptable. 10. An accused on a criminal chaque of defamation must ordinarily disclose what his defence is but it is wrong to think that the accused must state his pleas like a defendant in a civil case and stand or fall by those pleas. An accused can take alternative pleas and even where he suggests in the first instance that the defamatory matter does not refer to the complainant he can take the plea that the material fact or facts on which his statement is based are truly stated & are a matter of public interest. An accused can take alternative pleas and even where he suggests in the first instance that the defamatory matter does not refer to the complainant he can take the plea that the material fact or facts on which his statement is based are truly stated & are a matter of public interest. The latter plea is known as a rolled-up plea consisting of two stands, namely, that the allegations of fact are true in substance and in fact and the comments are fair, in good faith and for public good. It is not a plea of justification but of fair comment. The burden is no doubt upon the accused to establish such a plea. 11. The High Court was right in saying that although the emphasis was laid upon an accidental resemblance between Khadiwala and the person described in the article, there was in fact ample suggestion in the cross-examination of Khadiwala that the article, if applicable to him, was true in its allegation of facts and the comments were fair and in good faith. Having read the evidence of Khadiwala, we are satisfied that the plea of truth and fair comment was therefore, well-taken and properly considered in the High Court. 12. This brings us to the question whether, in spite of this, there is anything in the judgment which needs to be expunged. In considering such a plea, the evidence of the complainant given on his own behalf, must necessarily be scanned in the context of proved facts and remarks in the discussion may some times appear to be severe. This is bound to be so when conduct and character is judged of in relation to public good. That however does not require interference at our hands. In our opinion the High Court was right in thinking that it had to consider the truth of the statements without reservations. All the same we regret to find that the High Court went beyond the case and made remarks against political aspirants in general. The generality of such remarks is unfortunate and it would have been better if the learned Judge had confined his attention to the requirements of the case and not attempted a homily to political parties and the leaders of such parties. Such remarks are well left out from judgments of Courts. 13. On the whole, we think that there is nothing we need expunge. Such remarks are well left out from judgments of Courts. 13. On the whole, we think that there is nothing we need expunge. The conduct was properly brought under scrutiny on the suggested plea of truth and fair comment and although the remarks are severe in language, they were necessary in the proper appraisal of the special plea The only objectionable part is where the Judge traverses the boundaries of the case and enters areas beyond which he need not have. But as that does not concern Khadiwala we need not specify or expunge it. 14. We see no reason to interfere with the judgment and the order of the High Court and the appeals will accordingly be dismissed.