Judgment S. C. Misra, J. 1. This is an application by the decree holder, at whose instance Execution Case No.17 of 1963 was started in the Court of the Special Execution Mun-aif, Muzaffarpur. Opposite party No.1, Bindeshwari Thakur, was one of the judgment debtors and he filed an application in the executing court on the 4th (c)f February, 1964 stating that he paid a sum of Rs.375 to the decree holder on the 17th of December, 1963 and that an adjustment to the extent of that amount should be made. It may be stated that no notiee of this application, was served on the decree holder. What happened was that a copy of the application by the judgment debtor was served on the lawyer for the decree holder. The court thereafter started a miscellaneous case, being Miscellaneous Case No.27 of 1964, and it was adjourned from the 4th of February, 1964 to the 8th of February, 1964, when certain defects were ordered to be removed and also for statement of address. On the 21st of February, 1964 statement of address was filed and other defects were also removed. Then, it was ordered that the case should be put up on the 6th of March, 1964 for disposal. On the 6th of March the judgment debtor filed hazri, but the decree holder did not appear, and the court ordered that the miscellaneous case should be put up for final hearing on the 11th of March, 1964. On the 11th of March also the case was not taken up, and it was ordered to be put up on the 23rd of March, 1964. On that date Bindeshwari Thakur, Judgment debtor was examined as A. W.1 and Gouri Shanker Sahi as A. W.2, and order was passed on the 24th March, 1964 allowing the miscellaneous case, holding that the amount of Rs.375 was in fact paid by the judgment debtor to the decree holder. The court proceeded ex parte on the ground that although copy of the application was served on the lawyer for the decree holder no step was taken on his behalf. 2. " Mr. Baidyanath Jha appearing in support of the petition challenging the correctness of the order passed by the learned Special Execution Munsif has raised a number of questions. The main point, however, on which reliance has been placed by Mr. 2. " Mr. Baidyanath Jha appearing in support of the petition challenging the correctness of the order passed by the learned Special Execution Munsif has raised a number of questions. The main point, however, on which reliance has been placed by Mr. Jha is that in terms of Order 21, Rule 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure it was the mandatory duty of the court to issue a notice to the decree holder fixing the date of hearing of the miscellaneous case, calling upon him to show cause why the payment alleged to have been made by the judgment debtor would not be certified under Order 21, Rule 2 of the Code. Only when such a date would be fixed and notice of it would be served on the decree holder would it be within the jurisdiction of the court to proceed to hear it in presence of the parties. Mr. Jha has urged that once Order 21, Rule 2, in terms, refers to notice being issued to the decree holder, mere service of notice on the lawyer, even assuming that notice wag served on the lawyer for the petitioner could not be held to be sufficient compliance with the requirement of Rule 2, Order 21. He has drawn my attention to certain observation in the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Ligraj V/s. Mahadeb Ram, AIR 1918 Cal 62. In that case, no doubt, the facts were different, out it has been observed that there may be an application by the judgment debtor. Where he makes such an application for entering up satisfaction in whole or in part, it should contain a prayer for issue of notice to the decree-holder to show cause why the adjustment should not be recorded as certified. In fact, Order 21, Rule 2 itself, in terms, provides that, and, therefore, no authority is necessary for supporting the contention of Mr. Jha that the judgment-debtor should "apply to the Court to issue a notice to the decree-holder to show cause, on a day to be fixed by the Court, why such payment or adjustment should not be recorded as certified; and if, after service of such notice, the decree-holder fails to show cause why the payment or adjustment should not be recorded as certified, the Court shall record the same accordingly. " It is correct, no doubt, to say, as Mr. " It is correct, no doubt, to say, as Mr. A. C. Ray for the opposite party has urged, that there may be cases in which a formal application by the decree holder to that effect cannot be insisted upon and the judgment debtors objection to the execution of the decree in part or in whole, on the ground that he has paid a part of the decretal amount or whole of it to the decree-holder out of court may be held to be an application by the judgment-debtor under Order 21, Rule 2 (2 ). This no doubt, has been held in Chengayya V/s. Chenga, AIR 1959 Andh Pra 632, a Full Bench decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court, following several decisions of other High Courts including a decision of this Court in Chandi Charan V/s. Panchanan Pandit, AIR 1930 Pat 526. But none of those cases, in fact, lays down that without fixing a date of hearing and without giving notice of such date of hearing to the decree-holder, the court can proceed to take up the hearing of the matter, as the learned Execution Munsif in the present case has done. That, in my opinion, is the most essential part of Order 21, Rule 2 (2), because if such a date is not fixed, the decree-holder cannot be blamed for not appearing on the date so fixed for hearing the objection to the execution proceedings urged on behalf of the judgment-debtor under that rule. In this case, as I have shown already with reference to the various dates to which the case was adjourned, the learned Execution Munsif did not think it necessary to fix any date of hearing and give notice thereof to the decree holder. It seems, he felt that it was sufficient for the judgment debtor to serve a copy of the application for adjustment on the lawyer for the decree-holder, and for the rest, it was the duty of the decree-holder to appear and take steps. I am unable to understand what step could be taken prior to the date of hearing being notified to the decree-holder by the court below. I am unable to understand what step could be taken prior to the date of hearing being notified to the decree-holder by the court below. The order passed by the learned Execution Munsif, therefore, appears to be wholly misconceived and, as has been laid down by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Ramchandra V/s. Narayan Das, AIR 1944 Pat 251, the court will have no jurisdiction at all to proceed in a matter unless notice is issued in Form I, Appendix E to the Code of Civil Procedure. The court having failed to issue such notice, any order passed by the court would be illegal. 3 Mr. Ray has, however, urged that whatever view may be taken by this Court in regard to the merits of the matter and, even assuming that the Court was not right in proceeding with the miscellaneous case without notifying to the decree holder the date of hearing, the remedy, however of the decree-holder would be by way of an appeal against the order passed by the learned Execution Munsif and not to make an application under Sec.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Learned Counsel for the parties have been at pains to support their respective contentions as to whether such an order would be covered by Sec.47 and as such appealable, as was held by a Division Bench of this Court in Jadunandan Singh V/s. Sheonandan Prasad Singh, ILR 1 Pat 644 = (AIR 1922 Pat 276), or it would be an order under Order 21, Rule 2 of the Code, plain and simple, and no provision being made for an appeal from that order under Order 43, Rule 1, such an order with regard to adjustment will not be appealable. The point is of some nicety as to whether where the judgment-debtor pleads complete adjustment of the decree and as such disposal of the execution case, it would be one covered by Sec.47, but other payments of partial nature would be covered only by Order 21, Rule 2, and as such not appealable. Since, in the circumstances of the present case, the application may be disposed of on other considerations, it seems not necessary for me to pursue that point. 4. Mr. Since, in the circumstances of the present case, the application may be disposed of on other considerations, it seems not necessary for me to pursue that point. 4. Mr. Jha, however, has urged that even assuming that such an order under Sec.47 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be appealable, that would not preclude the Court from taking recourse to its inherent jurisdiction under Sec.151 of the Code, because the two remedies may be supplemental to each other and not exclusive of each other. As a matter of fact, it is well settled in similar circumstances in regard to a suit which is decreed ex parte that the remedy of the defendant in such circumstances would be three-fold (1) an appeal from the ex parte decree, (2) an application for review, and (3) an application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, since an execution proceeding is-- not covered under the term the suit, and as such not amenable to Order 9, Rule 13, inherent jurisdiction provided under Sec.151 would take the place of the remedy open to the defendant under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code. The contention at Mr. Ray, therefore, that if the present order is appealable, the Court could not take recourse to its inherent jurisdiction has no substance. In my opinion, the contention of Mr. Jha is correct There is no contradiction between an appeal being preferred by an aggrieved party and to apply to the court for review in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction as the facts and circumstances of the case may justify. In fact, even the decision of this Court in Ram Ghulam V/s. Sham Sahai, AIR 1920 Pat 750, which is a Division Bench decision cited by Mr. Ray himself, lays down that the Court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction to rectify its mistake, if the order is passed behind the back of the party and justice of the case suffers. This also goes against the contention of Mr. Ray and is consistent with the argument put forward on behalf of the petitioner. Moreover, Mr. Ray himself, lays down that the Court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction to rectify its mistake, if the order is passed behind the back of the party and justice of the case suffers. This also goes against the contention of Mr. Ray and is consistent with the argument put forward on behalf of the petitioner. Moreover, Mr. Jha has relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Manohar Lal V/s. Hiralal, AIR 1962 SC 527 , where it has been clearly laid down that unless there is a provision in the Code of Civil Procedure, its inherent jurisdiction may be resorted to by the Court to do justice between the parties, and merely because some provision has been made in the Code which, in terms, would not cover the facts of the case, it would not preclude the court from proceeding under Sec.151 of the Code. Specific provision of one kind in the Code would not necessarily rule out the exercise of inherent jurisdiction, unless that specific provision amounts to a provision against going beyond the terms of that provision. In the above case, the question for consideration was whether the court would be justified in issuing injunction in terms beyond what is provided in Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and it was held that the Court would still proceed under Sec.151, if the case was not covered completely by Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, if, of course, the facts of a particular case would justify recourse to Sec.151 for the ends of justice. 5. In my opinion, therefore, Mr. Jhas contention must be accepted as correct. The learned Execution Munsif committed a clear error in proceeding to take up the disposal of Misc. Case No.27 of 1964 without notifying to the decree-holder that a particular date was fixed for hearing, which is required to be done under Order 21, Rule 2 (2 ). Mr. Jha, as I have already stated, has also urged that a copy of the application by the judgment-debtor was served on Bimalendu Narain Sinha and not on Anand Kumar Thakur who held power on behalf of the decree holder. Mr. Jha, as I have already stated, has also urged that a copy of the application by the judgment-debtor was served on Bimalendu Narain Sinha and not on Anand Kumar Thakur who held power on behalf of the decree holder. Service of notice on Bimalendu Narain Sinha who held no power on behalf of the decree holder, therefore, would not be taken to be service of notice of any kind whatsoever on the decree-holder a fact to which the attention of the court below was not drawn. The learned Execution Munsif satisfied himself that it was valid service, merely because there was some kind of signature of some lawyer purporting to have been the lawyer on behalf of the decree-holder. The plaintiffs contention also appears to be correct, but it is not necessary for me to go into the details of this matter, because the application can be disposed of on the ground that Miscellaneous Case No.27 of 1964 giving rise to this application was decided by the learned Execution Munsif without fixing a date of hearing and without giving notice of that to the decree-holder and without calling upon him to show cause on that particular date as to why the payment alleged to have been made by the judgment-debtor would not be certified. 6. The application, therefore, is al lowed, the order passed by the learned Execution Munsif is set aside and the case is remanded to him for disposal on merits, after hearing the parties. The applicant is entitled to his costs. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs.32/-.