This is a second appeal filed against the concurrent judgment of the Revenue Appellate Authority, Kota dated the 29th of March, 1963 and the Sub-Divisional Officer, Jhalawar dated the 26th of November, 1962. The facts of the case, in brief, are that Munirshah and Mahmoodshah sons of Rahmanshah plaintiffs-respondents brought a suit under sec. 183, 186 & 188 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Jhalawar alleging that fields No. 8 measuring 1 bigha and 10 biswas, No. 9 measuring 5 bighas 14 biswas, No. 31 measuring 2 bighas 4 biswas, No. 85 measuring 2 bighas 15 biswas, No. 411 measuring 18 biswas, located in village Pedawa were in the khata of Yasin-shah,appellant. The father of these plaintiff-respondents and the other respondents had been cultivating this land for a long period, but the appellant on 21st of May, 1960 took forcible possession over half of this land. It was prayed that the plaintiff-respondent should be put in possession and permanent injunction be issued against the appellant preventing him from interfering in the cultivation of the land. The suit was resisted by the appellant-defendant on the plea that the respondents and their father Rehmanshah never lived together and that Yasinshah had given this land on batoi to the father of the respondents who had surrendered the same on 11th of January, 1960 before he died. The respondents, it was alleged, had never been in possession of the land. On the basis of these pleadings, the trial Court framed eight issues excluding that of relief and ultimately came to the finding that the land in dispute was in the khata of Yasinshah, that it had been in the possession of the father of the defendants-respondents and that the surrender was not proved and was not valid. He decreed the suit in favour of the respondents. On an appeal filed before the Revenue Appellate Authority, the order of the trial Court was confirmed and the Revenue Appellate Authority also held that the so called surrender has not been taken up. We have heard counsel for the parties. So far as the facts in this case are concerned they need not detain us as both the courts have concurrently come to a finding that the appellant was a khatedar and the land had been in cultivatory possession of the respondents since long. We have heard counsel for the parties. So far as the facts in this case are concerned they need not detain us as both the courts have concurrently come to a finding that the appellant was a khatedar and the land had been in cultivatory possession of the respondents since long. They have also held that the surrender deed has not been proved. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, argued on the authority of 1930 AIR Privy Council 91 (Wali Mohammed and others versus Mohammed Baksh and others) and 1940 Lahore 486 (Omprakash versus Mukhtar Ahmad) that where a deed is the document of the title in the case and is the foundation of the suit, the construction of such a document is a question of law, which can be raised in second appeal. He thus, attacked the finding of the courts below in respect of construction of Ex D-l(A) which is said to be the surrender deed by the appellant on three grounds. In the first place, he urged that this surrender deed should be construed as a deed of abandonment. Secondly he contended that the Courts below had committed an error in holding this surrender deed as invalid, as it did not conform to the provisions of sec. 55 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. Thirdly, he argued that the mode of execution of a surrender deed as provided in sec. 55 was only directory in nature and not mandatory. Therefore even if there was no attestation, the surender deed would not be deemed to be invalid. The learned counsel for the respondents argued that the surrender deed is not held to be proved, that the abandonment plea was not taken in the memo of the appeal and even in their written statements and the appellant has taken it as a surrender. The provisions of sec. 55 are mandatory and if the so called surrender deed has not been executed in the manner prescribed in the Section, it can never be held to be valid. At best, the Ex. D-l can be treated as a notice under sec. 56 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. We have carefully considered these arguments. It may be noted that the dispute between the parties is of long standing. The respondents were dispossessed on the 6th of February. At best, the Ex. D-l can be treated as a notice under sec. 56 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. We have carefully considered these arguments. It may be noted that the dispute between the parties is of long standing. The respondents were dispossessed on the 6th of February. 1955 and got possession in 1957 through litigation which went up to the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan but according to them, they were again dispossed in 1960. The only question, however, for determination in this case, is whether Ex. D-1 (A) has been proved, and if so, how it can be construed, and whether non-conformity of the provisions of sec. 55 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act would not render it invalid. So far as the nature of this Ex. D-l (A) is concerned, both the trial Court and the Revenue Appellate Court have based their decisions on its execution. Coming to the construction of this document, we do not think ourselves in agreement with the plea advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant that it should be treated a deed of abandonment. Abandonment, as defined in sec. 60(4) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 envisages, a tenant who ceases to cultivate and leaves the neighbourhood provided he leaves in charge thereof no person responsible for payment of rent when it becomes due. In this case, though the learned counsel lor the appellant wanted us to lead into the evidence that as two sons of Rehmanshah were not taking interest in cultivation as admitted by Rehmanshah in Ex. D-l (a), he should be deemed to have abandoned this land. Such an interpretation, in our opinion, is too far fetched. This so-called surrender does not fall within the purview of sec. 60(4) as there is no evidence on record to the fact that Rehmanshah or his two sons ever left the village and unless someone leaves the village, leaving no arrangement for the payment of rent, the land can never be abandoned. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the provisions of sec. 55 prescribe only the mode of attestation, and that they are not mandatory also does not stand much scrutiny. The learned counsel relied on Har Narain versus Board of Revenue for Rajasthan (RRD 1966 page 31) in which their Lordships of the Rajasthan High Court have examined the scope of sec. 55 before amendment. 55 prescribe only the mode of attestation, and that they are not mandatory also does not stand much scrutiny. The learned counsel relied on Har Narain versus Board of Revenue for Rajasthan (RRD 1966 page 31) in which their Lordships of the Rajasthan High Court have examined the scope of sec. 55 before amendment. They have held that two modes of surrender of holdings have been provided (1) by giving up possession of holding (2) by execution of surrender deed in writing and attested by Sarpanch or village Headman or Chairman of Municipal Board. Even though, it was held that, the surrender may not be in writing, evidence with regard to the possession having been passed could be relevant as surrender could be effected by either of the two means as stated in sec. 55 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act before it was amended. Their Lordships specifically did not examine the scope of the Section as it existed after the amendment. It may be stated that this alleged surrender deed was said to have been executed by deceased Rehmanshah on the 11th of January, 1960. The amendment to sec. 55 came into force on the 24th of December, 1958. The present case will, therefore, be covered by the amended sec 55. Provisions of sec. 55 as it existed before the amendment read as under : "Surrender—A tenant, other than a tenant bound by a lease or other agreement to continue to occupy his holding in the following year may on or before the 1st May surrender his holding by giving up possession thereof in writing attested by the Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat of the circle or by the headman of the village, where there is no Gram Panchayat or by the Chairman of a Municipal Board whether such holding is or is not sub let or mortgaged." A bare perusal of the provisions of Sec. 55 as it exists after the amendment will indicate that before the amendment, the surrender can be by either of the two means i. e. by giving up possession or by executing a surrender deed in writing duly attested. Sec. 55 after the amendment prescribes only one mode i. e. the possession must be given up and the giving up of the possession must be accompanied with a writing attested by the Tehsildar having jurisdiction or by the Chairman of the Municipal Board. Sec. 55 after the amendment prescribes only one mode i. e. the possession must be given up and the giving up of the possession must be accompanied with a writing attested by the Tehsildar having jurisdiction or by the Chairman of the Municipal Board. There is no question of two alternative ways of effecting the surrender in accordance with the provisions of sec. 55 after the amendment. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the provisions of sec. 55 even after amendment should be considered as merely prescribing a mode of attestation is devoid of any force. On the other hand, as remarked by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh versus Singhara Singh & Others (AIR 1964 Supreme Court 358) "if a statute has conferred a power to do an act and has laid down the method in which, the power has to be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any other manner than that which has been prescribed. The principle behind the rule is that if this were not so, the statutory provisions might have not been as well enacted". Since this surrender deed does not conform with the requirements of sec. 55 we have no hesitation in agreeing with the Courts below that it cannot create a valid surrender. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that provisions of sec. 55 are not mandatory, but only directory as they did not contain a penal clause, does not also lay down a correct proposition of law. As was observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Banwarilal Agarwalla versus the State of Bihar & others, ( AIR 1961 SC 849 ) "no general rule can be laid down for deciding whether any particular provision in a statute is mandatory, meaning thereby that non-observance thereof involves the consequence of invalidity, or only directory i. e. a direction the non-observance of which does not entail the consequence of invalidity, whatever other consequences may occur. But in each case the Court has to decide the legislative intent. But in each case the Court has to decide the legislative intent. To decide this the Court has to consider not only the actual words used but the scheme of the statute, the intended benefit to public of what is enjoined by the provisions and the material danger to the public by the contravention of the same." Even the authorities relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, AIR 1955 SC 196 (H. N. Rishbud & another versus the State of Delhi) AIR 1955 SC 233 Hari Vishnu Kamath versus Ahmad Ishaque and others) do not support the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. On the other hand they reiterate the principles laid down in 1961 Supreme Court 849. Thus, their Lordships observe in 1955 SC 196 at page 200 quoting Lord Campbell in Liverpool Burough Bank versus Turner" there is no universal rule to aid in determining whether the mandatory enactments should be considered directory only or obligatory with an implied nullification for dis-obedience. It is the duty of the Court to try to get at the real intention of the Legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be construed." The legislative intent in the present case is clear from the history of the amendment of this Section. As we have seen above, at first, either of the two modes were provided for surrender, but after the amendment, the legislature has insisted that there should be not only a delivery of possession in a surrender, but it must also be accompanied by a document in writing duly attested by the Tehsildar etc. It was, therefore, clear that for a valid surrender made after the amendment of sec. 55 of the Tenancy Act, compliance of the provisions of this Section was imperative. It did not merely prescribe a mode of attestation, but its non-compliance would render any surrender deed invalid. For the reasons given above, we see no reason to interfere in the findings of the Courts below and reject this appeal.