J. B. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) THESE two cross revision applications are filed respectively by the original plaintiff and by the original defendants 1 and 3 against the decree passed by the City Civil Court giving partial possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff and to that extent modifying toe trial Courts decree which was for possession of the entire suit premises. The short facts which have given rise to these revision applications are as under:-THE plaintiff is a partnership firm registered under the Indian Partnership Act. The plaintiff is the manufacturer and dealer in steel furniture and steel goods. The plaintiff has a factory in the interior of Ghanchis Wadi near Pankor Naka where the steel goods and furniture are manufactured. As the plaintiff was in need of premises on the main road of Pankor Naka to open a show room and a sales office for its steel goods and furniture the plaintiff firm purchased the suit house in an auction sale held on 26th October 1966. The final sale certificate was issued on 25th April 1957 and thus the plaintiff purchased the suit premises from the Custodian of Evacuee Properties for a consideration of Rs. 35 250 The plaintiffs partner Chimanlal is now residing on the first floor and the second floor of the suit premises. On the ground floor of the suit house the present suit premises namely the shop is situated of which the defendant No. 1 firm of Mohanlal Nathubhai and the two defendants Nos. 2 and 3 who form the said coparcenary are the tenants. The defendants are doing the business of Kharadi preparing wooden articles like cradles wooden boxes bed-stands etc. As the plaintiff needed the suit shop for the show room and the sales office the tenancy of the defendants was terminated by a notice at Exhibit 81 dated 1st July 1957 and the defendants were asked to hand over vacant possession of the suit shop. As the defendants did not comply with the said request toe plaintiff filed the present suit to recover possession of the entire suit shop on the ground of bona fide and reasonable personal requirement for the aforesaid purpose. The defendants contended that the plaintiff did not require the suit premises bona fide and reasonably for their own occupation and that greater hardship would be caused to them if a decree for possession was passed. The defendants contended that the plaintiff did not require the suit premises bona fide and reasonably for their own occupation and that greater hardship would be caused to them if a decree for possession was passed. The trial Court namely the Small Causes Court at Ahmedabad held that the plaintiff required the suit premises reasonably and bona fide for its personal use and occupation and that greater hardship would be caused to the plaintiff if no decree for possession of the entire premises was passed. The trial Court accordingly decreed the plaintiffs suit on 5th May 1961 Defendants 1 and 3 namely the joint family firm of Mohanlal Nathubhai and Ranchhodlal Mohanlal filed an appeal in the Court of the District Judge at Ahmedabad. The appeal stood transferred to the City Civil Court at Ahmedabad. When it came up for hearing the learned Judge passed the order Exhibit 17 permitting additional evidence as the same was required on the question as to whether no hardship would be caused to either party if a decree in respect of only a part of the suit premises was passed. Both the parties led additional evidence and after considering the entire evidence the learned City Civil Court Judge held that the plaintiff required the suit premises reasonably and bona fide for personal occupation. On the question of hardship the learned Judge held that no hardship would be caused to either party if possession of only a part of the suit premises admeasuring 9 x 20 was given to plaintiff and the staircase in the corridor 6 x 20 was removed and placed in the three feet additional space allotted to the plaintiff on the west of the portion decreed to the plaintiff. In view of the said finding the appellate Court modified the trial Courts decree. It is this decree which is challenged in both these cross revision applications. ( 2 ) MR. Vakil for the tenants defendants 1 and 3 raised the following points at the hearing:- (1) that the finding of the lower Court as to the personal requirement of the landlord is contrary to law as it is based on a plain misconstruction of sec. ( 2 ) MR. Vakil for the tenants defendants 1 and 3 raised the following points at the hearing:- (1) that the finding of the lower Court as to the personal requirement of the landlord is contrary to law as it is based on a plain misconstruction of sec. 13 (1) (g) of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rate Control Act 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act); (2) that the finding as to no hardship is based on additional evidence which ought not to have been admitted and the said finding is contrary to law and is without jurisdiction; (3) that the decision on the basis of these findings being contrary to law this Court has no other power except to quash that decision and remand the matter to the lower appellate Court; and (4) that in any event no decree for possession of the suit shop ought to be passed in favour of the landlordmr. Shah on the other hand in his revision application urged that the additional evidence ought not to have been allowed and that the finding as to no hardship being perverse was contrary to law and therefore this Court must pass a decree for possession of the entire suit shop. ( 3 ) IN order to appreciate the first contention of Mr. Vakil we must consider the provision contained in sec. 13 (1) (g) of the Act which runs as under:-13 (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act but subject to the provisions of sec. 15 a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied (g) that the premises are reasonably and bona find required by the landlord for occupation by himself or by any person for whose benefit the premises are held or where the landlord is a trustee of a public charitable trust that the premises are required for occupation for the purposes of the trust. This ground contained in sec. 13 (1) (g) therefore enables the landlord to recover possession if the premises in question are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself. Mr. Vakil urged that the lower appellate Court has in terms interpreted the expression require in sec. 13 (1) (g) as demanded or claimed. The learned Judge in terms states as under:-IN view of these special safeguards provided in sec. Mr. Vakil urged that the lower appellate Court has in terms interpreted the expression require in sec. 13 (1) (g) as demanded or claimed. The learned Judge in terms states as under:-IN view of these special safeguards provided in sec. 13 of the Bombay Act the word require must be equated with demanded or claimed and as an antithesis of pressingly needed. The element of must have to which a reference has been made in the matter of Naresh v. Kanai Lal (A. I. R. 1952 Cal. 852) cannot be introduced in the interpretation of word require in the Bombay Act. I am therefore of the opinion that the expression require as used in the Bombay Act must be equated with the expression claimed or demanded. . . . . . . Mr. Vakil is right in his contention that the expression require could not be equated with a mere demand or claim. The expression require has in the context the element of a genuine present need. For the application of sec. 13 (1) (g) the present need which the landlord must now must both be genuine or honest and reasonable in the circumstances. The whole emphasis of the requirement is on the element of the need which has to be established which is always something more than a mere desire or a claim or a demand but which is surely less than a compelling or absolute necessity. In Naresh v. Kanai Lal in A. I. R. 1952 Cal. 852 the expression require in a similar context under the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act 1948 had been interpreted by Chunder J. in the following words:-THE word require is something more than the word desire. Although the element of need is present in both the cases the real distinction between desire and require lies in the insistence of that need. There is an element of must haves in the case of require which is not present in the case of mere desire. what has got to be seen is that there must be a sort of must have element in the need of the landlord and also that his want or need of the house must be he honestly felt by him. Where both the elements are satisfied the Court would be justified in granting a decree for ejectment. what has got to be seen is that there must be a sort of must have element in the need of the landlord and also that his want or need of the house must be he honestly felt by him. Where both the elements are satisfied the Court would be justified in granting a decree for ejectment. The distinction which has been brought out in the Calcutta case between desire and require is quite correct. Even though the learned Judge has used the expression must have it is only in the context of the element of need as distinguished from a mere desire. Even though the learned appellate Judge was therefore wrong in stating the law on the Point by saying that the word require could be equated with a mere desire or claim the learned Judge was completely right in as far as he negatived the argument of the tenants that there must be a compelling necessity shown. That is why the learned Judge has stated that he would equate the term require with demand or claim as an antithesis of pressingly needed. The whole contention before the learned Judge was based on the ground that unless a pressing need is shown the test of requirement would not be satisfied. As I have already held there is no question of any absolute or compelling necessity. Question is only of a requirement and some element of need must be shown which must both be honest and reasonable in the circumstances of the case. The learned Judge has therefore on the whole applied the correct test in so far as he has held that no absolute necessity ought to be shown. The facts of the case as found by both the Courts show that the plaintiff has a factory for the manufacture of steel goods and furniture inside the premises known as Ghanchis Wadi and just at a short distance on the main road leading from Pankor Naka the suit shop is situated. The honesty of the plaintiffs purpose could never be doubted because the goods manufactured in the factory have to be sold. The honesty of the plaintiffs purpose could never be doubted because the goods manufactured in the factory have to be sold. In fact in the years 1951 to 1955 the plaintiff had a shop in the premises known as Lalbhais Wanda and that shop had been vacated The plaintiffs case in the evidence of partner Chimanlal is that that shop had to be vacated as it was a small shop where no show room could be made and so the shop was not suitable for the requirement. Even the defendants have to admit in their evidence that the plaintiffs old shop was not in the area which was suitable for their market and that is why the same had to be vacated. Immediately after the said shop is vacated the plaintiff firm has invested an amount of Rs. 35 0 to get this much needed alternative accommodation by purchasing the suit premises where the partner can stay on the first and the second floor and the firm can have a show room and a shop in the ground floor shop. Thus the plaintiffs requirement of the suit premises was an honest requirement and at the same time it was a reasonable requirement. The finding therefore of both the lower Courts of this question of fact must be upheld. Mr. Vakil had no doubt argued in this connection that when the requirement is of a part there could be no reasonable requirement of the whole. Mr. Vakil in this connection relied upon the decision of Pratt J. in Vithaldas Bhagwandas v. Nagubai M. Joshi in 23 B. L. R. 856 where the learned Judge had decided the question of bona fide and reasonable requirement in the context of sec. 9 of the Bombay Rent (War Restrictions) Act 1918 In that case it was held that a bona fide requirement of a small fraction of premises leased did not amount to a reasonable requirement of the whole of the premises within the meaning of sec. 9 of the said Act. 9 of the Bombay Rent (War Restrictions) Act 1918 In that case it was held that a bona fide requirement of a small fraction of premises leased did not amount to a reasonable requirement of the whole of the premises within the meaning of sec. 9 of the said Act. The said decision is a decision on its special facts The tenant sought to be evicted in that case was a lady doctor who was in occupation of the ground floor as residence and the first floor as a hospital and she had also one motor garage in an outhouse appertaining to the said building The landlord who lived on the New Churney Road and had two motor cars and two carriages without horses in terms stated that he did not require any part of the premises in the possession of the tenant except the motor garage for the accommodation of one of his cats. At the relevant time the landlords cars were accommodated one in a hired garage close to his residence and the other in a vacant shop in his sisters house. On these facts the learned Judge held that to evict the lady doctor from the suit premises merely for giving a garage to the landlord could not be considered as a reasonable requirement of the landlord of the suit premises. That decision could have no application to the facts of the present case. Mr. Vakil next relied upon the decision of a Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Damodar Sharma v. Nandram Deviram in A. I. R. 1960 M. P. 645 where the Full Bench held that a tenant was liable to be ejected from the shop in his occupation on the ground that his landlord required it for continuing or starting his own business unless it could be shown that any other nonresidential accommodation in occupation of the landlord was suitable for the purpose of continuing or starting the landlords own business. Their Lordships no doubt added that ejectment of a tenant could not be had for future expansion of the business of the landlord. But on the other hand if the landlords business had in fact grown and there was a felt need to be determined objectively. for additional accommodation for the purpose of continuing the expanded business the tenant was liable to be ejected. But on the other hand if the landlords business had in fact grown and there was a felt need to be determined objectively. for additional accommodation for the purpose of continuing the expanded business the tenant was liable to be ejected. I could not appreciate how this decision could help Mr. Vakil. In the present case admittedly the plaintiff is not in possession of any other shop of its own or in any rented premises. The plaintiff needs the suit shop for the purpose of continuing the present business. At present the plaintiff sells the goods by canvassing orders or on the factory premises themselves. The shop which he had has been vacated and now the plaintiffs need for the suit shop is both reasonable and genuine and is a present need and so the finding of both the Courts on this question that the plaintiff requires the suit premises bona fide and reasonably for personal occupation cannot be questioned. In Kolley v. Goodwin in (1947) 1 All England Law Reports at page 810 the Court of Appeal consisting of Cohen and Evershed L J. and Lynskey J. also held that although the landlord required a part of the premises for accommodation the lower Court was justified in finding on the evidence that the suit premises were reasonably required by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself. In fact the tenancy is indivisible and unless it is terminated as a whole it would not be open to the landlord to get a part of the premises. Even though therefore it may be open to the Court to decree the suit partially in so far as the question of requirement of the landlord is considered even when a part of the premises is required honestly and reasonably the test of the section can be said to have been satisfied. The factors which the Court considers in judging the bona fides or reasonableness of the requirement may have also to be considered again in the context of greater hardship. The same factors may be asked to perform their services twice over in two different contexts. If the requirement of the landlord is not reasonable for the whole of the premises and a partial decree could be passed without causing any hardship to either side the question would be resolved on the second ground contemplated in sec. 13 (2 ). Mr. If the requirement of the landlord is not reasonable for the whole of the premises and a partial decree could be passed without causing any hardship to either side the question would be resolved on the second ground contemplated in sec. 13 (2 ). Mr. Vakil in this connection relied upon the decision of my learned brother Bhagwati J. in Civil Revision Application No. 797 of 1963 decided on 11th March 1967. At page 7 of his judgment my learned brother also holds that the word require imports a certain element of necessity and a mere desire on the part of the landlord is not enough. The landlord must require the premises that is the need of the premises must be bona fide and reasonable. My learned brother thereafter considered the question in the context of rented premises where the tenure of the landlord of the rented premises was insecure. In such a case my learned brother held that his claim for possession of his own premises could in a proper case be regarded as amounting to bona fide and reasonable requirement; but in the case where his possession of rented premises was protected under the Rent Act a mere desire on his part to occupy his own premises in preference to the rented premises could not amount to bona fide and reasonable requirement so as to entitle him to evict his tenant. This decision is therefore in the context of what was considered as unreasonable in the context. It does not help Mr. Vakil in his contention that where the landlord requires a substantial part and proves his genuine present need the test required in sec. 13 (1) (g) is not satisfied. In fact as I will presently show the landlords present need is genuine and reasonable for the entire suit premises. In these circumstances the finding on the first question as to bona fide and reasonable requirement of the suit premises in favour of the landlord must be accepted. ( 4 ) TURNING now to the next important question about greater hardship or no hardship the contention of Mr. Vakil is based on sec. 13 (2) of the Act which reads as under:-NO decree for eviction shall be passed on the ground specified in clause (g) of sub-sec. ( 4 ) TURNING now to the next important question about greater hardship or no hardship the contention of Mr. Vakil is based on sec. 13 (2) of the Act which reads as under:-NO decree for eviction shall be passed on the ground specified in clause (g) of sub-sec. (1) if the Court is satisfied that having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available for the landlord or the tenant greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it. The second part is as follows:-WHEREAS the Court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in respect of a part of the premises the Court shall pass the decree in respect of such part only. It should be noted that this sec. 13 (2) relates to the ground of eviction specified in sec. 13 (1) (g ). Once the landlord satisfies the requirement of sec. 13 (1) (g) by proving his genuine present need of the suit premises reasonably and bona fide it is obvious that there would always be some hardship to him if the premises needed by him are not given to him. That is why it is now well-settled that once the landlord satisfies the requirements of sec. 13 (1) (g) the burden as to greater hardships is on the tenant. My learned brother Divan J. in his decision in Civil Revision Application No. 237 of 1962 decided on 7th December 1962 has elaborately considered this question. He also considered the position in the light of the corresponding provisions of the English Act namely Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions (Amendment) Act 1933 Schedule I clause (h) which is identical with the first part of our sec. 13 (2) and he held that so far as the issue of greater hardship is concerned it is obvious looking to the language of sec. 13 (2) of the Act that the onus of proving that issue of greater hardship always lies on the tenant. 13 (2) and he held that so far as the issue of greater hardship is concerned it is obvious looking to the language of sec. 13 (2) of the Act that the onus of proving that issue of greater hardship always lies on the tenant. So far as the question of establishing the availability of the alternative accommodation is concerned he held that it must be borne in mind that the question of alternative accommodation is but one of the circumstances the totality of which has to be considered while deciding the issue of greater hardship. If the burden under sec. 10 (2) lies on the tenant it necessarily follows that the burden of establishing different circumstances on the strength of which the Court is to be satisfied or can be said to be satisfied about the issue of greater hardship must also lie on the tenant and therefore it is not correct to say that under sec. 13 (2) part of the burden namely that of establishing alternative accommodation lies on the landlord and that the other burden of proof regarding the issue of greater hardship lies on the tenant. My learned brother summarised the entire position as regards proof of greater hardship by holding that the entire burden of proving greater hardship lies on the tenant and it is for the tenant to establish various circumstances including the circumstance of availability of alternative accommodation In order to succeed on the issue of greater hardship. If no evidence is led by either side then the tenant would fail and the decree for possession would be passed in favour of the landlord. The Legislature has contemplated in sec. 13 (2) a delicate process of weighing the relative hardships and it in terms directs the Court to consider the most important question as to whether other reasonable accommodation is available for the landlord or the tenant amongst other factors. As Scott L. J. figuratively put it is Chandler v. Strevett in (1947) 1 All England Law Reports 164 in a decision of the Court of Appeal under the corresponding English section each case must always depend on its own facts but there are two aspects which call for consideration. As Scott L. J. figuratively put it is Chandler v. Strevett in (1947) 1 All England Law Reports 164 in a decision of the Court of Appeal under the corresponding English section each case must always depend on its own facts but there are two aspects which call for consideration. The first is that it is to the balance of hardship that the Judge is directed to turn his mind and that means that he has to add up the items of hardship proved in evidence on each side of the statutory profit and loss account or balance sheet (for either metaphor will serve) and then see on which party the greater hardship falls. The second is that the Judge is called on to operate the process by putting a hardship value on the various Items on each side. In the case before the Court of Appeal the landlord had a flat in which they could live whereas the tenant with his large family of children had no where to go and so the Court of Appeal held that the only one possible answer on the issue of greater hardship could be given and that was one in favour of the tenant and on that finding even the Court of Appeal reversed the finding of the country court Judge. Bucknill L. J. at page 166 also observed that one would have to consider the nature and place of business the size of the family the actual residence or lack of one at the time of a king for the order. Questions of health and cost of living and innumerable other possible factors might have to be taken into account. The Judge has to consider the problem of other accommodation but he has to consider all the circumstances of the case and then if he is satisfied that the order for possession would cause greater hardship to the tenant than the landlord be must not make it. The burden of proving greater hardship would be on the tenant. Somervell L. J. also observed at page 168 that in having regard to all the circumstances of the case the Court was expressly enjoined in deciding on the issue of greater hardship to have regard to the question whether other accommodation was available for the tenant or the landlord. The burden of proving greater hardship would be on the tenant. Somervell L. J. also observed at page 168 that in having regard to all the circumstances of the case the Court was expressly enjoined in deciding on the issue of greater hardship to have regard to the question whether other accommodation was available for the tenant or the landlord. These words and the general principles of the Act make it clear that alternative accommodation though not a condition was the most important of the circumstances to which regard must be had. In the same Volume in the aforesaid decision in Kelley v. Goodwin in (1947) 1 All England Law Reports 810 the Court of Appeal held that on the question of hardship the county court Judge was entitled to have regard to the financial means of the tenant by reason of which he was in a position to obtain accommodation not merely by renting a house but by buying one and also the fact that the tenant had taken no real steps to provide himself with alternative accommodation. These decisions show that one of the most important factors is what other reasonable accommodation as available for the landlord or the tenant. The Court would have to put In the scale other circumstances which would tilt the balance of hardship on either side including the financial position both of the landlord and the tenant the financial means available to them for securing alternative accommodation either by purchase or by hiring one the nature and the extent of the business or their requirement of residential accommodation as the case may be and the hardship that would be caused not only to the landlord and the tenant personally but even to their family members dependents or persons residing with them as one unit so that the hardship of those persons would really amount to the hardship of the landlord or the tenant. The whole process of weighing the hardship is a delicate process where various factors have to be thrown into the scales and the Court has to examine how each factor tilts the balance on either side and thereafter it has to find out the final balance of hardship. Once this question is determined. The whole process of weighing the hardship is a delicate process where various factors have to be thrown into the scales and the Court has to examine how each factor tilts the balance on either side and thereafter it has to find out the final balance of hardship. Once this question is determined. keeping in mind that the burden of proving greater hardship is on the tenant the Court would have to find out the resultant hardship on this statutory balance-sheet. Thereafter the second part of sec. 13 (2) comes into play which is enacted in our Act. Even though the words no hardship are used in the context of a partial decree they must mean no resultant hardship because the partial decree would deprive the tenant of some part of his premises and would require the landlord also to be satisfied with only a part. What the Legislature intends is a just balance being struck between the landlord and the tenant so that when this factor is put in the scale the Court would be satisfied that the scale will not be tilted on either side. It is only when such a just solution could be found which causes no resultant hardship either to the tenant or to the landlord that the Court could pass a partial decree. But if even this partial decree still tilts the balance and swings it on the side of the landlord then the Court would have no jurisdiction to refuse to pass the decree for the entire suit premises. Thus three contingencies might arise. If the balance swings on the side of the landlord so that there is greater hardship left to the landlord as a result of this statutory balance sheet of hardship the landlord must get the entire decree. If however resultant balance of hardship in this balance-sheet is nil in the sense that there is a just balance and the scale swings on neither side then the case is one of a partial decree. It is only when the greater hardship is on the side of the tenant and the balance or the scale tilts in his favour that the decree would be refused. It is only when the greater hardship is on the side of the tenant and the balance or the scale tilts in his favour that the decree would be refused. My learned brother Divan J. had considered this question in Shankerlal v. Ranchhodlal in VII G. L. R. 1039 and he held that the decree for partial eviction could be passed under the second paragraph of sec. 10 of the Act. Since this paragraph engrafts an exception to the general rule of law it must be strictly construed and before a Court can pass a decree for partial eviction the conditions laid down in that paragraph must be satisfied. Before any decree for partial eviction can be passed the Court must satisfy itself that by passing such a decree no hardship is going to be caused either to the landlord or to the tenant. Unless that satisfaction is reached by the Court the decree for partial possession cannot be passed. At page 1042 correcting the approach of the learned trial Judge who bad held that there would not be any question of hardship as he was not ordering the defendant to vacate the entire suit premises but only a portion of the shop admeasuring 10-8 x 9-5 in breadth my learned brother held that this was entirely an erroneous approach as it was obligatory upon the learned Judge to consider in view of the issue that he bad framed whether greater hardship was going to be caused by passing the decree for eviction than by refusing to pass it and unless he came to a specific conclusion on that issue he could not have passed any decree for eviction. My learned brother therefore observed on the same page that it was obligatory on the Court before confirming the decree for partial eviction to satisfy itself that no hardship was going to be caused either to the landlord or to the tenant by confirming the decree for partial eviction. My learned brother also observed that the tenant at the stage of giving evidence could not have anticipated that the learned trial Judge was going to pass a decree for partial eviction and therefore it was impossible for him to prove that he could not carry on his business in the portion which the learned Judge had allowed to remain with him. In these circumstances my learned brother had remanded the matter as there was no material in the case before him which would go to show that the tenant had led evidence on the issue of hardship when a partial decree was being contemplated This decision clearly applies to the facts of the present case. The learned Judge of the City Civil Court in the present case in terms held that in para 6 of the judgment that in view of his finding on the issue regarding feasibility of a partial decree the question of greater hardship became insignificant and so in his vies it was not necessary to express any final opinion on that aspect of the matter. This is the erroneous approach which was sought to be corrected by learned brother Divan J. In such cases the lower Court must first arrive at the finding on the issue as to whom the landlord or the tenant greater hardship would be caused. It is only when the Court arrives at a finding on that specific issue against the tenant or against the landlord that there would be some resultant hardship on either side which would require the Court either to pass the decree or to refuse it. It is only thereafter that the Court must consider the further question whether the partial decree would strike a just balance without causing any resultant hardship to either side. The second question can be taken up by the Court only after reaching a conclusion on the first question. In the present case the appellate Court has ignored the first question and attempted to answer the second question and so it has resulted in dissatisfaction both to the landlord and the tenant and both of them are arguing before me that the additional evidence ought to have been discarded completely. The additional evidence was allowed by the learned appellate Judge to give an opportunity to both the sides as their attention was not focused on this relevant aspect which every Court must bear in mind if a partial decree could afford a just solution which would strike a just balance leaving no resultant hardship on the statutory balance-sheet. As the Court attempted to answer this second question first it has left entirely out of consideration the most important question of availability of alternative accommodation to the tenants and has passed this decree. As the Court attempted to answer this second question first it has left entirely out of consideration the most important question of availability of alternative accommodation to the tenants and has passed this decree. In fact Mr. Shah the learned advocate for the landlord is tight in his contention that the evidence of the plaintiff which was led before the appellate Court has been misread by the learned appellate Judge. The partner of the plaintiff in his deposition before the trial Court had in terms stated that they were not able to carry on their business properly because of want of a shop and a show room. If they did not get possession of the suit shop their business could not prosper. Ho further stated that he wanted the suit shop for showing and selling steel furniture. He had also added that they wanted to keep their sample furniture therein. In the additional evidence at Exhibit 20 he has stated that for display of articles he would require a show room and his minimum requirement would be of premises at least about 25 feet in depth and 15 feet in width from the front side and if he was allowed that much space his requirement would be satisfied for the present though with some difficulty. The learned appellate Judge in paragraph 5 has observed that the plaintiff has categorically stated that so far as he is concerned his requirement would be satisfied if a part of the premises of the dimensions mentioned by him was made Available to him. Therefore there was no doubt that no difficulty would be caused to the plaintiff. This is clearly a misreading of the plaintiffs evidence. The plaintiffs requirement for a show room might be met if the space of the entire frontage twenty-five feet in depth was given to him for the display of his articles. The plaintiff however had the present need even of the rear portion for keeping his sample furniture as the entire suit shop was required not only for the show room purpose but also for being used as a shop where furniture could be kept for sale after it was prepared in the factory. The plaintiff however had the present need even of the rear portion for keeping his sample furniture as the entire suit shop was required not only for the show room purpose but also for being used as a shop where furniture could be kept for sale after it was prepared in the factory. The learned appellate Judge had also fallen into another important error in that he completely neglected the consideration of the hardship that would be caused to the plaintiff by the corridor carved out by the learned appellate Judge for use by the defendants both for a passage and for displaying their articles as the plaintiffs partner was residing upstairs. The plan Exhibit 23 produced by the defendants shows that the suit shop has a frontage of fifteen feet abutting on the main Pankor Naka road and it has a depth from east to west of about 43 feet. Now in the said frontage of fifteen feet there is a collapsible gate to close the stair-case and the W. C. portion for the use of the plaintiffs partner who resides upstairs on the first and the second floors. This portion has never been let to the defendants. The partial decree which the learned Judge has ordered is by asking the plaintiff to change the position of this stair-case by taking it in the rear portion in the three feet space given to the plaintiff beyond the twenty feet depth. The plaintiff is given the portion 9 x 20 the frontage being 9 fees and the depth being 20 feet and the stair-case has to be removed and placed in the three feet additional space allotted to the plaintiff so as to leave to the defendants a clear space in the rear portion of about 20 x 15. The learned Judge has passed this partial decree with a view that the defendants get the front corridor so carved out of 6 x 20 where at present the plaintiff has the stair-case and the W. C. The learned appellate Judge has stated in the final part of his order that the tenants shall be able to enjoy full use of the corridor 6 x 20 for their access to the rear portion. However in para 5 of his judgment the learned Judge has in terms observed that in view of the corridor of 6 x 20 the tenant will be able to exhibit wooden articles in the front portion of the corridor and utilise the rest of it for his manufacturing activities and carrying on his selling operations. This would be creating a fresh lease of this corridor 6 x 20 which was never let to the defendants. Besides if the defendants were to display their articles in this corridor where both the plaintiff and the defendants have a right of passage it would result in great hardship to the family members of the plaintiff who have to use that corridor for going upstairs through the stair-case which is ordered to be removed at the back. Even Mr. Vakil argued that this type of partial decree would cause great hardship to the tenant as he would have every now and then to remove his articles in this corridor and when at the time the shop would have to be closed. In fact the lower appellate Judge has not considered all these relevant aspects while coming to the conclusion that no hardship would be caused and he has attempted to answer the second question without going into the first question itself The whole approach of the learned appellate Judge is therefore completely erroneous and the decision on this question being perverse must be interfered with on the second finding as it is contrary to law. ( 5 ) MR. Vakil therefore argued that once this Court holds that a finding of fact is contrary to law and that it has vitiated the decision this Court must only quash the impugned decision and must remand the matter to the lower appellate Court which is the Court of facts. Mr. Vakil urged that this is a question of jurisdiction itself and the High Court would have no jurisdiction to pass any other order except the one of remanding the matter to the lower appellate Court by arriving at a fresh finding on the questions of greater hardship and no hardship as required under sec. 13 (2) of the Act. I cannot accept this argument of Mr. Vakil. Mr. 13 (2) of the Act. I cannot accept this argument of Mr. Vakil. Mr. Vakil in this connection relied upon a decision of the Bombay High Court in Negayya Garupadayya v. Chayappa Santamappa in 53 B. L. R. 144 by the Division Bench consisting of Dixit and Vyas JJ. In that case the question had arisen in the context of sec. 76 of the Tenancy Act which conferred powers on the Revenue Tribunal to entertain a revision application on the following grounds only (a) that the order of the Collector was contrary to law (b) that the Collector failed to determine some material issue or law or (c) that there was a substantial defect in following the procedure provided by that Act which has resulted in miscarriage of justice At page 147 the Division Bench only observed that as there was an error apparent on the face of the Tribunals order and as the said error had resulted in the denial of an opportunity to the tenant to show that the landlord did not want the possession of those lands for bona fide personal cultivation it was clear that their Lordships must interfere but the question was whether they should remand the matter to the Tribunal or to the Assistant Collector. In that context the Division Bench held at page 143 that in the light of the various decisions the direction must be that the matter must be sent back to the Tribunal with a direction that if there was any point of law left in deciding the matter the Revenue Tribunal should decide that point of law and so far as the question of fact namely whether the landlord wanted to recover possession for his bond fide personal cultivation was concerned the Tribunal would send back the case to the Assistant Collector for recording a finding on that issue and for disposal according to law. That decision could not help Mr. Vakil for the simple reason that in that case the tenant was not given any opportunity tow lead evidence by showing that the landlord did not want the possession of the fields for bona fide personal cultivation and so the Court had to consider the narrow question as to which authority they should make the remand whether to the fact finding body or to the body dealing with the questions of law alone. The decision would not help Mr. Vakil in his contention that this Court would have no jurisdiction to pass a just order even when all the evidence has been led and there would be no purpose remanding the matter except in prolonging the hardship which is being felt by the landlord. Sec. 29 (2) of the Act which gives revisional jurisdiction to this Court provides as under:-NO further appeal shall lie against any decision in appeal under sub-sec. (1) but the High Court may for the purpose of satisfying itself that any such decision; in appeal was according to law Cull for the case in which such decision was taken and pass such order with respect thereto as it thinks fit. The revisional jurisdiction with which this Court is invested under this sec. 29 (2) is not therefore merely in the nature of jurisdiction control. It extends to corrections of all errors ors in the overall decision which would make the decision contrary to law. The Legislature further empowers this Court in its revisional jurisdiction to pass such order with respect thereto as it thinks fit. The Legislature having invested this Court with powers of the widest amplitude to pass such orders as the Court thinks fit in order to do complete justice it is obvious that this wide power should not be narrowly construed. In so far as sec. 13 (2) is concerned it deals with the human problem of considering the relative hardships of the landlord and the tenant and to arrive at a just solution. In such cases the highest Court of the State is given revisional powers which are wider in scope than sec. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code so that it could do substantial justice by correcting even the errors where the decision as a whole is contrary to law. In such cases if a limitation is sought to be implied that the power of this Court would only extend to the quashing of the impugned order and no further it would clearly defeat the purpose of this wide revisional jurisdiction. In fact the Legislature directs this Court to pass a just order considering all the circumstances of the case. In such cases if a limitation is sought to be implied that the power of this Court would only extend to the quashing of the impugned order and no further it would clearly defeat the purpose of this wide revisional jurisdiction. In fact the Legislature directs this Court to pass a just order considering all the circumstances of the case. When all evidence is on the record it would be denying justice to the part who is feeling a genuine need of the suit premises to remand the matter to the lower appellate Court only to invite its decision on this issue of hardship. Mr. Vakil sought to argue this point on the analogy of the jurisdiction of this Court in writ petitions under Article 226 where it is well-settled that the Court issuing a writ of certiorari only quashes the impugned order and does not pass any further order. Mr. Vakil also tried to argue that sec. 103 of the Civil Procedure Code in terms provides that in second appeal the High Court may if evidence on the record is sufficient determine any issue of fact necessary for the disposal of the appeal which has not been determined by the lower appellate Court or which has been wrongly determined by such Court by reason of any illegality omission error or defect as is referred to in sub-sec. (1) of sec. 100. Even in the absence of a similar provision like sec. 103 of the Civil Procedure Code a similar power is conferred on this Court when the Legislature invests it with the power to pass such order as it deems fit as would be just in the circumstances of the case. The jurisdiction of this Court is to correct all errors of law going to the root of the decision which would in such cases include even perverse findings of facts perverse in the sense that no reasonable person acting judicially and properly instructed in the relevant law arrive at such a finding on the evidence on the record of the case. It would therefore be necessarily implied that a Court correcting such a perverse finding of fact must in the proper cases itself go into the question and arrive at such a finding itself if all the evidence is on the record in order that no further hardship would cause to the party in whose favour the scale of hardship has already tilted. To refuse to exercise such a power would really result in failure of justice itself by prolonging the hardship of the party concerned. Mr. Vakil had also in this context argued that the additional evidence ought not to have been admitted. No such objection had been raised before the lower appellate Court and in fact after taking a chance of getting a decision in their favour it would not be open to the defendants to raise any such point in this revision. In fact the lower appellate Court had itself required this additional evidence on the ground that the parties attention had not been focused on this relevant issue which had not been framed by the trial Court so the lower appellate Court thought of passing a partial decree it gave an opportunity to both the sides to lead additional evidence on this question. That was exactly the approach which my learned brother approved in the aforesaid decision in VII G. L. R. 1039 I cannot therefore agree with Mr. Vakil that the matter ought to be remanded to the lower appellate Court to give the defendants an opportunity to fill up the lacuna in their evidence. ( 6 ) NOW considering the relevant question of greater hardship Mr. Vails first argument is that In view of the partition between the two brothers the hardship to the brother who remained in the suit shop alone should be examined in the light of the alternative accommodation available to him alone ignoring the consideration of what was available to the other brother by reason of what they had divided amongst themselves. On this question the trial Court has not relied upon the evidence of the defendants that they had partitioned the suit tenancy and that the suit shop had gone exclusively to the share of defendant No 3. Two documents Exhibit 171 dated 23rd April 1955 and Exhibit 172 dated 1st June 1957 were strongly relied upon by Mr. On this question the trial Court has not relied upon the evidence of the defendants that they had partitioned the suit tenancy and that the suit shop had gone exclusively to the share of defendant No 3. Two documents Exhibit 171 dated 23rd April 1955 and Exhibit 172 dated 1st June 1957 were strongly relied upon by Mr. Vakil to show such a partition between the brothers under which the tenancy of the suit shop went to defendant No. 3 Ranchhodlal while the tenancy of the shop in Ghanchis Wadi went to the share of defendant No. 2 Narottamdas. Both these agreements are on a stamp paper for a mere agreement and they are unregistered. The trial Court had admitted these two documents in evidence only for a limited purpose for showing collateral facts. Both these documents are clearly documents partitioning immovable properties which are admittedly worth more than Rs. 100. 00. Mr. Vakil however argues that they are admissible in evidence for a collateral purpose to show the nature of the possession of the two defendants in respect of the two shops. I cannot agree with this contention of Mr. Vakil for the simple reason that what he contends for is that the suit shop had gone exclusively to defendant No. 3 Ranchhodlal while the other shop at Ghanchis Wadi had gone to defendant No. 2 Narottamdas. Thus he relies upon these two documents to show that they had created an exclusive title in one brother in respect of one shop and had extinguished the corresponding exclusive title of the other brother in the other shop. This is clearly trying to rely on the two documents as evidence of partition itself and for this purpose these two documents which were unregistered could never be admitted. Both these documents must therefore be completely excluded from consideration. The third document of partition which was sought to be relied upon was Exhibit 101 dated 31st July 1958. This document has been executed between the two brothers partitioning their immovable properties during the pendency of the present suit which was filed by the plaintiff on 6th September 1957. This document is no doubt a registered document and could be admitted in evidence. This document has been executed between the two brothers partitioning their immovable properties during the pendency of the present suit which was filed by the plaintiff on 6th September 1957. This document is no doubt a registered document and could be admitted in evidence. In connection with this document defendant No. 3 Ranchhodlal has deposed that defendant No. 2 Narottamdas had not executed any registered document releasing his right in the tenancy in the suit shop nor had he executed any registered deed except Exhibit 101. He further admitted that in the said document it was not mentioned that he had released his right in Ghanchis Wadi shop nor there was any mention in Exhibit 101 about defendant No. 2 releasing his tenancy rights in the suit shop. Mr. Vakil also agrees that so far as tenancy rights in these two shops are concerned there is no mention in the document Exhibit 101. Mr. Vakil however argued that in the last paragraph of exhibit 101 it is mentioned that the joint immovable property was partitioned as mentioned in the document while the movable and the business had been partitioned previously. Mr. Vakil pointed out that the previous two documents are incorporated by reference in this deed Exhibit 101 which mentioned them specifically. When the document itself does not partition this specific immovable property consisting of the tenancy rights in the suit shop and in the shop in Ghanchis Wadi it would not be open to Mr. Vakil to contend that the document Exhibit 101 could be read on any such doctrine of incorporation for evidencing partition of which the best evidence itself is found to be inadmissible. Therefore none of these three documents could help Mr. Vakil. When the plaintiff gave the notice Exhibit 81 to the defendants on 1st July 1957 mentioning all the three defendants as the tenants of the Custodian from whom the plaintiff had purchased the suit property by the sale certificate dated 25th April 1957 the defendants in their reply. Exhibit 86 dated 23rd July 1957 did not come out with any such version that they had already partitioned the suit shop. Exhibit 86 dated 23rd July 1957 did not come out with any such version that they had already partitioned the suit shop. Not only this but even thereafter both these defendants in their suit against the electricity company as well as the plaintiffs partner Chimanlal at Exhibit 107 dated 22nd August 1957 in terms admit that both of them are the tenants of the suit property. Even in the requisition for electric service at Exhibit 71 given to the electricity company and in the indemnity bond Exhibit 72 dated 27th August 1957 defendant No. 2 alone applies and gives the bond for getting electric service for the suit shop which according to them had gone exclusively to the share of defendant No. 3. Even the electric service of the suit shop as per Exhibit 106 and the consequential bills are in the name of defendant No. 2. The boards on both the shops namely the suit shop as well as the one at Ghanchis Wadi were of the firm of defendant No. 1 Mohanlal Nathubhai and the said signboards continued in the suit property right upto the date of the evidence and in the other property till 1960 October. Even the rent to the Custodian was paid from the account of the firm maintained in the name of defendant No. 2 till the date of the purchase by the plaintiff. The sales-tax number has continued in the name of defendant No. 1. The trial Court had considered the oral evidence as well and found that even the purchases and payments were made in the firm name by both of them. In the document at Exhibit 164 was the statement before the sales-tax authorities where no such theory of partition in 1955 was put up before the sales-tax authorities or the income tax authorities and before no Court any such document of partition was ever produced. As I have already shown the whole theory of partition has been subsequently developed during the pendency of the suit which was not taken up at the earlier stage in the reply Exhibit 86 and which is wholly inconsistent with the averment in the plaint at Exhibit 107. As I have already shown the whole theory of partition has been subsequently developed during the pendency of the suit which was not taken up at the earlier stage in the reply Exhibit 86 and which is wholly inconsistent with the averment in the plaint at Exhibit 107. In the light of all the relevant evidence the trial Court was right in holding that there was nothing on the record to show any such partition of the two shops in question which would show that one of the brothers had become the exclusive owner. In fact after the landlord had filed the suit against the firm which was the tenant along with the two coparceners who constituted the joint family firm no such theory of partition could be pleaded so as to prejudice the plaintiffs rights on the ground of greater hardship because whatever hardship would be caused would be the result of their own creation. In fact the tenancy is of the firm as a whole as one unit and therefore the question of greater hardship will have to be examined by considering the needs of the entire unit as a whole along with the alternative accommodation available also to the unit as a whole of both the brothers. ( 7 ) MR. Vakil next argued that in considering the alternative accommodation the trial Court had wrongly considered that a shop in the Pandani Khancha was available to the defendants. The plaintiff in terms deposed about such a shop in the Pandani Khancha. In fact a photo graph Exhibit 155 of the shop in Ghanchis Wadi had been produced which was relied upon by the trial Court which shows that there is a show room belonging to the defendants on the opposite side in the Pandani Khancha. In fact when the learned trial Judge visited all these relevant properties he found that there was a shop in this Pandani Khancha. Even though both the brothers have denied the existence of any such shop their word is thoroughly worthless in view of this evidence which was relied upon by the trial Court. Even defendant No. 3 Ranchhodlal Mohanlal in terms admitted that their car was kept in the passage in the Pandani Khancha and that he had taken one room used as a godown in the Pandani Khancha. Even defendant No. 3 Ranchhodlal Mohanlal in terms admitted that their car was kept in the passage in the Pandani Khancha and that he had taken one room used as a godown in the Pandani Khancha. Both the brothers have admitted that in their residential houses one of the ownership and the other a rented one they have godowns where their timber is kept and the workers sit for manufacturing wooden articles. In addition to these two godowns the aforesaid room in the Pandani Khancha exists. The trial Court which had visited these premises in question had actually seen this shop and therefore there could be no doubt that the alternative accommodation which is available to these defendants consists of the following items:- (1) Ghanchis Wadi shop where there is a three phase electric service (2) the shop at the Pandani Khancha and (3) at least two godowns. It is also undisputed that the defendants have a number of properties in the Pandani Khancha and only one house thereof had been sold in 1960 for a price of about Rs. 45 0 It is in the light of these available premises that we have to consider the question of hardship as required under sec 13 (2) of the Act. ( 8 ) IF we have now to prepare the statutory balance sheet we would have to consider the following items and weigh their effect as to how they tilt the scare in favour of the landlord or the tenants. The first circumstance is that the landlord has proved the genuine present need of the entire suit premises for his show room and shop purposes. The landlords factory is situated in close vicinity and one of the partners actually stays on the first and the second floors of the suit shop itself. The ether merchants trading in steel furniture have their shops in the locality and five or six of them have been mentioned by the plaintiff in his evidence. It may be that they may not have a show room because a show room requires a fairly large frontage. Thus the plaintiff has on the one band established a genuine present need and a reasonable and bona fide requirement of the entire suit premises and he would suffer hardship without these premises as he has no other premises where he could have his own shop. Thus the plaintiff has on the one band established a genuine present need and a reasonable and bona fide requirement of the entire suit premises and he would suffer hardship without these premises as he has no other premises where he could have his own shop. On the other hand the defendants have a shop at Ghanchis Wadi another shop at Pandani Khancha and two godowns and other house properties. Thus the landlord has no other alternative accommodation while the tenants have an alternative accommodation for their shop purposes as well as accommodation for their manufacturing purposes where their workers can sit and where even the timber can be stored in the shape of godowns. In fact each brother has on their own showing one shop and a godown. Thus this circumstance would definitely tilt the balance of hardship in favour of the landlord as against the tenants. The next circumstance which Mr. Vakil wants me to throw into the scale was that the landlord had a shop in Lalbhais Wanda which he had vacated in 1955. This circumstance would really show the landlords genuine need for a shop. The landlord had vacated the same as the shop was found to be too small for his requirements and he could not have adequate frontage for opening a show room and in fact the defendants themselves admit that it was not in a locality suitable for the landlords business. In fact the landlords efforts to secure alternative accommodation are proved by the fact that as soon as a shop was available they purchased this suit property where they could both stay and carry on their business of a shop by investing such a large sum as Rs. 35 0 Thus on the one hand we have a landlord who has done all within his power to get his much needed accommodation for his business; on the other hand we have tenants who led no evidence whatsoever as to their efforts to secure any alternative accommodation whether of their own or in rented premises even when they had such large funds available to them by sale of only one property for the large sum of Rs. 45 0 in the year 1960. In fact if the defendants need any alternative accommodation they would have made genuine efforts for which they have led no evidence. 45 0 in the year 1960. In fact if the defendants need any alternative accommodation they would have made genuine efforts for which they have led no evidence. The learned appellate Judge was right in observing that even when he gave specific opportunity to the defendants to lead additional evidence they did not avail of this opportunity by showing what is the extent of their business what is the extent of their requirement and as to what they had done to secure other additional accommodation if they really needed any. No evidence whatever has been led by the defendants to show what stocks they had and what area they needed for their various purposes. Therefore this circumstance could not in any manner tilt the balance in favour of the tenants but really would tilt the balance on the other side as the defendants have made no efforts whatever to secure any alternative accommodation whatsoever even when they had sufficient means to do so. The last circumstance which Mr. Vakil relied upon was that the defendants had alleged that the plaintiff had taken one shop of Harjivandas in the name of one of the partners of the firm and that the said shop in Ghanchis Wadi where the factory is situated could be used by the plaintiff for his business. The learned trial Judge had visited this shop which was inside the Wadi. The plaintiffs partner Chimanlal has deposed that one of their partners who was the brother of the plaintiff had his son carrying on business of a book stall in that shop in the Dela. This shop could therefore not be available to the plaintiff-firm which is a partnership firm. The learned trial Judge was therefore right in excluding this shop as being available to the plaintiff-firms Thus all the three circumstances which have been urged by Mr. Vakil if considered would show that the most important consideration namely the availability of accommodation to the landlord and the tenants which in this case is conclusive on the question of the relative hardship would lead to only one conclusion that the landlord has no shop whatsoever while the tenants have sufficient accommodation of two shops and two godowns which would satisfy all their needs and it is therefore that they have not made any efforts whatsoever to seek any alternative accommodation. Therefore the finding as regards greater hardship-issue must be in favour of the plaintiff. The next question which therefore arises is as to the second part of sec. 13 (2) whether this is a case of partial decree. That issue can be answered only if I come to the conclusion that the resultant hardship which I have already found would be equalised by taking into consideration this additional factor so as to result in no hardship to either side. As I have already stated earlier the lower Courts finding is based on a complete misreading of the plaintiffs evidence. The lower Court has also disregarded the question of hardship which would be caused to the plaintiffs family members and their visitors if they have to go through the corridor where the defendants have been permitted by the learned appellate Judge to display their articles. It would amount to creating a new lease of the space in the corridor which the learned appellate Judge carved out. All this has been done by the learned appellate Judge without considering the fact that the defendants led no evidence whatever to prove the extent of their business requirement by producing any books of account or their stock register or any other documentary evidence to show why they needed any more accommodation than what is actually available to them in the shape of two shops and two godowns at least. Mr. Vakil suggested that if a passage was given of about three feet the defendants could have access to the rear portion and such a partial decree would not cause any hardship to either side. If from the much needed frontage for the show room purposes of the plaintiff this portion was carved out for a passage of the defendants what would remain would be the rear portion for the use of the defendants which they could use for storage or for their manufacturing activities. On the one hand we have a landlord who himself needs this back portion for his own show room and shop to store his articles which are big articles consisting of all steel furniture while on the other hand we have tenants who have sufficient space so far as the storage of timber and manufactured articles is concerned in the shape of the various godowns and the two shops. Thus even on this ground it would b. all hardship on the one side namely the plaintiffs side and this would not be a just solution which would strike an even balance so as to leave no resultant hardship to either side. Therefore this is not a case where the second part of sec. 13 (2) would be attracted because partial decree would even result in greater hardship to the plaintiff as against the defendants who have already sufficient available space and who do not care to find out any more space even though they have sufficient means for that purpose. Therefore the finding of the trial Court that this is a case where greater hardship would be caused to the plaintiff must be confirmed as the defendants have failed to prove that greater hardship would be caused to them if they are evicted from the suit shop. The finding of the lower appellate Court must be set aside that this is a case where no hardship would be caused if a partial decree was passed. ( 9 ) IN the result Civil Revision Application No. 710 of 1962 filed by the plaintiff must be allowed while Civil Revision Application No. 602 of 1963 filed by defendants 1 and 3 must be rejected. I therefore set aside the partial decree passed by the lower appellate Court and I restore the trial Courts decree with the only modification that the possession of the entire suit shop shall be delivered by the defendants to the plaintiff on or before 31st December 1967 which shall give them sufficient time to adjust their affairs. The rule is affairs accordingly made absolute in Civil Revision Application No. 710 of 1963 with costs while the rule in Civil Revision Application No. 602 of 1963 is discharged with costs. Orders accordingly. .