JUDGMENT B.D. Gupta, J. - This is a defendants' second appeal arising out of a suit for partition of a one-sixteenth share in a dwelling-house and a similar share in two enclosures. In order to appreciate the questions that have arisen for consideration the facts, about which there is no controversy, may be briefly summarised. 2. One Roop Singh was the owner of the dwelling-house and the Ghers. He had three wives, one of whom had died in his lifetime leaving two sons Harpal and Katara,- who were arrayed as defendants, Nos. f and 2 respectively in the suit and are the appellants before me. Thereafter Roop Singh died in 1957 leaving the remaining two wives, viz. Hoshiari (issueless) who is the sole plaintiff-respondent, and Chhoti with four issues viz. a son and four daughters. This Chhoti and her son and daughters were the remaining defendants in the suit which was instituted about five months after the death of Roop Singh. Plaintiff's case was that the first three defendants, viz., the three sons of Roop Singh. in collusion with the remaining defendants, desired to partition the property and enter separate possession over their shares and deprive the plaintiff of her share in the property, that even though the plaintiff had repeatedly asked the defendants to give her share, the defendants declined with the result that she had to institute the suit. In papa. 11 of the plaint the cause of action given was the death of Roop Singh followed by an alleged talk about partition between the defendants which was stated as having taken place in July, 1957, and the last refusal b: the defendants to give plaintiff her share which was stated to have taken place in Ai.gust, 1957. It is on these allegations that the plaintiff claimed a one-sixteenth share in the dwelling-house, and a similar share in the two enclosures. 3. Five of the defendants, including defendants Nos. 1 and 2, filed written statements but the defendants who really contested the claim of the plaintiff were the first two defendants, viz., Harpal and Katara, who are the appellants before me. 3. Five of the defendants, including defendants Nos. 1 and 2, filed written statements but the defendants who really contested the claim of the plaintiff were the first two defendants, viz., Harpal and Katara, who are the appellants before me. As regards plaintiff's claim for a share in the enclosures their case was that the enclosures constituted part of agricultural holding with the result that, in view of the provisions contained in clause (2) of Section 4 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, hereinafter referred to as the Act, the plaintiff was not entitled to claim any share therein. As regards plaintiff's claim regarding a share in the dwelling-house, the defence set forward was that though the contesting defendants had instituted a suit against the third defendant for recovery of their two-third share in certain crops, none of the defendants had filed any suit for a partition of that house, nor intended to do so and, further, that none of them had any desire to deprive the plaintiff of her right to reside therein and that, the plaintiff had no right to claim partition of any share in the dwelling-house. 4. The trial court awarded the plaintiff a decree for partition of 1196th share in the dwelling-house, as also in the enclosures. Both parties appealed. The appeal filed by the defendants, who are the appellants before me, was dismissed, but the appeal filed by the plaintiff was allowed and she was granted a decree for a one-sixteenth share, instead of 1196th share, in the dwelling-house and the enclosures. The first two defendants then filed this second appeal. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at some length I am of the view that, whilst the decree under appeal must be maintained as regards the enclosures, it must be set aside as regards the dwelling-house and the suit of the plaintiff for a share in the dwelling-house must be dismissed. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants did not controvert the proposition that the share to which the plaintiff would be entitled would be a one-sixteenth share and, so far as the decree in respect of the above share, in the enclosures is concerned, learned counsel conceded that, in view of the finding recorded by the learned Judge, he could not challenge that court of the decree. As regards the decree for a share in the dwelling-house, learned counsel for the appellants urged that the plaintiff had failed to establish any right to claim a partition of any share in the dwelling-house. Reference was made by learned counsel to the provisions contained in Section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which runs as follows: "Where a Hindu intestate has left surviving him or her both male and female heirs specified in Glass I of the Schedule and his or her property includes a dwelling. house wholly occupied by members of his 7 or her family, then, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the right of any such female heir to claim partition of the dwelling-house shall not arise until the male heirs choose to divide their respective shares therein; but the female heir shall be entitled to right of residence therein: Provided that where such female heir is a daughter, she shall be entitled to a right of residence in the dwelling-house only if she is unmarried or has been deserted by or has separated from her husband or is a widow." 6. Learned counsel urged that, on the finding recorded by the learned Judge himself, the plaintiff had failed to establish any right to claim partition of any share in the dwelling-house. The contention raised before the court below, which has been repeated before me, was that the plaintiff was not entitled to get the dwelling-house partitioned unless partition actually took place between the male heirs of Roop Singh. The learned Judge took the view that, since the appellants had admitted having instituted a suit for recovery of a two third share in certain crops, as against their step-brother the third defendant, it reflected badly upon the relations between the sons of Roop Singh and there was possibility that these sons "may have chosen to divide the house also". Thereafter the learned Judge Observed that the defendants had not appeared in the witness-box "to state their intention to have the house as joint". The learned Judge also referred to the fact that these sons resided separately in distinct portions of the house and that all this indicated that "the defendants Nos. 1 to 3 have chosen to divide the house". The learned Judge also referred to the fact that these sons resided separately in distinct portions of the house and that all this indicated that "the defendants Nos. 1 to 3 have chosen to divide the house". The learned Judge took the view that, that being so, the plaintiff's suit for partition of the dwelling-house was not barred by Section 23 of the Act. 7. Though it might be accepted that the sons of Roop Singh were living separately in distinct portions of the house, there was no evidence before the court that they had partitioned the house between themselves or that any one of them had instituted any suit for getting the dwelling-house partitioned. Plaintiff's own case in para. 9 of her plaint was that the defendants had the desire of effecting a separation of the dwelling-house and taking separate possession-over their shares, and all that appears to have been found to the learned Judge was that the sons of Roop Singh intended to bring about a division, between themselves, of the dwelling-house in question. The contention of learned counsel for the appellants is that such a desire or intention does not, by itself, authorise a female heir to claim partition of the dwelling-house. The answer to this contention obviously depends on the interpretation of the expression "until the male heirs choose to divide their respective shares therein" in Section 23 of the Act. I have no hesitation in taking the view that the expression "choose to divide" must be interpreted to mean actually exercising their choice of getting the dwelling-house divided. 8. The fact that the appellants instituted a suit against the third son of Roop Singh for a division of their shares in certain crops would undoubtedly bring about a disruption of the joint family status, but it would not follow that a partition of the dwelling-house took place. The disruption of the joint family status would only mean that the members of the co-parcenary, instead of being joint tenants, became tenants in common, and there can be no controversy that, even after disruption of the joint Hindu family status has taken place members of the family may, nevertheless, continue without bringing about a partition of the family properties. The disruption of the joint family status would only mean that the members of the co-parcenary, instead of being joint tenants, became tenants in common, and there can be no controversy that, even after disruption of the joint Hindu family status has taken place members of the family may, nevertheless, continue without bringing about a partition of the family properties. To my mind, the Act attaches sanctity to the dwelling-house and protects the same from being fragmented at the instance of a female heir, and the only right given to the female heir is that if and when the female heirs bring about an actual division of their shares in the dwelling-house, the female heirs will also be entitled to have their-shares carved out for themselves. The male heirs always have the choice to get the dwelling-house divided but, until they exercise that choice, by taking steps to bring about such a division, the female heirs would have no right to claim a share therein. Mere intention to divide is far behind taking steps for actual division, and the mere entertaining of such an intention by the male member would not authorise the female heirs to claim a partition of the dwelling-house. It may very well be that though the male heirs, or one of them, may, at some stage, entertain such an intention, the same may not be translated into practice for years and may even be dropped, later on. In my opinion; therefore, no cause of action for claiming a partition of the dwelling-house arose in favour of the plaintiff-respondent by reason merely of the fact that the male heirs of Roop Singh had evinced or formed a desire to have the same partitioned between themselves, and this part of the plaintiff's claim must, therefore, fail. 9. I, therefore, allow this appeal and modify the decree of the court below to this extent that plaintiff's claim for partition of the dwelling-house is dismissed, whereas the decree in her favour for partition of the enclosures is affirmed. As regards costs also, the decree under appeal is modified and it is directed that the parties to the suit shall themselves bear their costs of the litigation throughout. Appeal allowed.