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1967 DIGILAW 106 (KER)

RAMAN v. AMMEDUTTY

1967-05-24

M.MADHAVAN NAIR

body1967
Judgment :- 1. This petition has arisen in a proceeding for restitution under S.144 CPC. The decree in O. S. No. 207 of 1954 on the file of the Munsiff, Kozhikode-I, allowed eviction of the defendants, and in execution thereof the plaintiffs took possession of the property; but on appeal by the defendants that decree has been reversed and that reversal has become final. Consequent on such reversal, the defendants moved E. A. No. 33 of 1955 for restitution of the property under S.144 CPC., which, it is regrettable to note, has not so far been disposed of. After the enactment of the Kerala Prevention of Eviction Act, XII of 1966, the present petitioner moved for his impleadment in the proceedings on the ground that he had been given an oral lease of part of the property by the 1st plaintiff in 1954 after she got possession in execution of the Munsiff's decree and a registered lease in renewal thereof in 1962 and been in possession and cultivation of the same since 1954 and as such he is entitled under the aforesaid Act of 1966, to immunity from ouster in these proceedings. The Munsiff dismissed that motion. Hence this Civil Revision Petition. 2. Counsel for petitioner contends that the petitioner is a Harijan tenant of part of the property concerned and as such entitled to the protection of S.3 of the Act XII of 1966. 3. S.3 prohibits eviction of tenants belonging to any Scheduled Caste. But, to attract that immunity the petitioner must be a tenant and the proceedings must be for eviction. I am afraid neither of those conditions is satisfied in the present case. 4. A proceeding under S.144 CPC. is not one in eviction; it is one in annulment of a prior unwarranted or incorrect eviction. Eviction is defined in the Act XII of 1966 (by reference to the Kerala Land Reforms Act) as "the recovery of possession of land from a tenant " The proceeding here is not for ouster of a tenant but of one who got into unlawful possession by a wrong turn of the litigation. That a person who got benefit of a wrong turn of litigation should surrender that unmerited benefit to the person who would have had it but for that wrong turn of litigation is a fundamental principle in the administration of justice by Courts. That a person who got benefit of a wrong turn of litigation should surrender that unmerited benefit to the person who would have had it but for that wrong turn of litigation is a fundamental principle in the administration of justice by Courts. There is nothing in the Act XII of 1966 to affect that principle. By virtue of the wrong decree of the Munsiff, the 1st plaintiff was able to get possession of the property and then to grant a lease of part of the property to the petitioner. When that wrong decree was reversed, the 1st plaintiff and the petitioner, who took benefit of the wrong decree, became obliged to surrender the property back to the defendants who had been wrongly evicted under the wrong decree. The petitioner cannot claim the status of a tenant as against the defendants in this case. When the appellate Court reversed the Munsiff's decree, it is as if, in the eye of law, there was no decree by the Munsiff and the only decree in the case was that passed ultimately by the appellate Court, which disentitled the plaintiffs to possession of the property. The 1st plaintiff, when she obtained possession of the property in execution of the Munsiff's decree which was subsequently found incorrect and reversed in appeal, cannot be held to have been in lawful possession of the property as concerns the defendants; and the lease she gave to the petitioner also shares the same defect. The apparent physical possession they had in the interval was little better than that of a trespasser as regards the defendants. The petitioner cannot therefore claim the protection or immunity under S.3 of the Act XII of 1966. 5. The contention that the non-obstante clause in S.3 of the Act "notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law" would exclude considerations of legality of present physical possession is not convincing. As has been observed by me in S. A. No. 803 of 1966, the word "contrary" has no intelligible meaning except in juxtaposition with something and that something in the context of S.3 can only be what is provided in the Section itself. What are therefore excluded by the non-obstante clause are the laws providing for eviction and not the laws relating to legality of disputed tenancies. 6. What are therefore excluded by the non-obstante clause are the laws providing for eviction and not the laws relating to legality of disputed tenancies. 6. Thus the conditions necessary to attract S.3 of the Act XII of 1966 are not present in this case. The petitioner cannot therefore claim any relief under the Act XII of 1966, against the proceedings in restitution moved by the defendants in the suit. The rejection of his prayer for impleadment by the Munsiff is therefore right. The Civil Revision Petition has no merit. It is hereby dismissed; but, I take this opportunity to direct the Munsiff, Kozhikode-1, to dispose of the restitution petition expeditiously and in any case within two months of the receipt of this order in his office. I make no order as to costs here. Dismissed.